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Throughout	  history	  the	  study	  of	  chance	  has	  largely	  been	  either	  neglected	  or	  
dismissed	  as	  futile.	  This	  changed	  around	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  and	  since	  then	  
interest	  in	  chance	  phenomena	  has	  exponentially	  grown	  up	  to	  this	  day.	  This	  thesis	  
addresses	  the	  question	  what	  influenced	  this	  increase	  in	  interest	  occurring	  around	  
the	  turn	  of	  the	  last	  century.	  The	  approach	  is	  interdisciplinary	  and	  takes	  three	  main	  
theories	  of	  chance	  from	  the	  subject	  areas	  of	  philosophy,	  analytical	  psychology	  and	  
avant-­‐garde	  art,	  mainly	  literature,	  as	  its	  starting	  point.	  The	  theories	  are	  Charles	  
Sanders	  Peirce's	  tychism,	  Carl	  Gustav	  Jung's	  synchronicity	  and	  André	  Breton's	  
objective	  chance.	  	  
From	  these	  theories	  it	  can	  be	  deduced	  that	  the	  growing	  interest	  in	  chance	  
arose	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  ‘epistemological	  uncertainty’	  marking	  the	  age.	  Besides	  
the	  exploration	  of	  what	  chance	  in	  itself	  could	  be,	  all	  three	  were	  also	  keen	  to	  
investigate	  its	  impact	  on	  man.	  Furthermore,	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  significance	  of	  
the	  irregular	  and	  unpredictable	  they,	  in	  their	  own	  ways,	  employed	  chance	  as	  a	  tool	  
of	  cultural	  subversion,	  namely	  to	  counteract	  the	  dominance	  of	  rationality	  prevailing	  
since	  the	  Enlightenment.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  chance’s	  impact	  on	  man,	  it	  
emerged	  that	  they	  all	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  deal	  with	  the	  relationship	  of	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“Two	  dangers	  threaten	  the	  world:	  order	  and	  
disorder.”	  (Paul	  Valéry)	  
“It	  is	  on	  the	  edge	  between	  order	  and	  chaos	  that	  the	  
subtle	  dance	  of	  life	  takes	  place.”	  (I	  Ching)	  
“Every	  bird,	  every	  humming	  insect,	  every	  sandy	  shore	  
and	  every	  shining	  pine	  needle	  is	  sacred	  and	  holy	  to	  
my	  people.	  All	  things	  are	  connected.	  Man	  did	  not	  
weave	  the	  web	  of	  life,	  he	  is	  merely	  a	  strand	  in	  it.	  
Whatever	  he	  does	  to	  the	  web	  he	  does	  to	  himself.”	  
(Chief	  Seattle	  Suquamish	  Nation)	  
	  
	  
Over	  the	  past	  decades	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  chance	  has	  attracted	  increasingly	  
more	  attention	  in	  popular	  culture	  as	  well	  as	  academia.	  The	  complex	  role	  of	  chance	  is	  
sought	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  diverse	  fields	  such	  as,	  for	  example,	  nature,	  physics,	  
evolution,	  financial	  markets,	  gambling	  and	  personal	  history.	  It	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  
great	  interest	  in	  finding	  out	  more	  about	  the	  unpredictable	  and	  uncontrollable	  that	  
keeps	  interfering	  with	  these	  systems.	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  Part	  I,	  researchers	  from	  
various	  subject	  areas	  such	  as	  philosophy,	  psychology,	  sociology	  and	  the	  arts	  have	  
been	  captivated	  by	  its	  fascinating	  influence	  on	  us.	  Growing	  interest	  within	  the	  
humanities	  and	  social	  sciences	  shows	  that	  an	  expansion	  is	  taking	  place	  from	  the	  
questions	  of	  ‘What	  is	  chance?’	  and	  ‘How	  does	  it	  work?’	  that	  the	  hard	  sciences	  have	  
mainly	  been	  grappling	  with,	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  chance’s	  impact	  on	  man	  and	  our	  
relationship	  with	  it	  and	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  this	  area	  
too.	  Today’s	  popularity	  of	  chance	  is	  a	  fairly	  recent	  development,	  beginning	  from	  the	  
late	  19th	  century,	  while	  during	  the	  rest	  of	  history	  of	  history	  it	  had	  been	  largely	  
marginalised.	  	  
The	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  manifold,	  but	  can	  for	  example	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  
difficulty	  in	  grasping	  its	  nature	  and	  meaning.	  As	  the	  first	  chapter	  will	  show,	  it	  
remains	  an	  elusive	  term	  that	  defies	  clear	  definition	  and	  it	  continues	  to	  be	  described	  
in	  widely	  differing	  and	  even	  contrary	  ways.	  Especially	  since	  the	  Enlightenment	  when	  
mechanical	  determinism	  became	  the	  dominating	  worldview,	  chance	  was	  no	  longer	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considered	  a	  real	  force	  in	  nature	  but	  instead	  became	  equated	  with	  ignorance,	  as	  
merely	  a	  gap	  in	  knowledge	  as	  to	  the	  real	  causes	  of	  events.	  As	  such,	  Enlightenment	  
thinkers	  perceived	  chance	  as	  the	  negative	  opposite	  to	  logic,	  rationality,	  efficiency	  
and	  control	  and	  they	  fostered	  the	  idea	  that	  through	  reason	  all	  processes	  of	  nature	  
could	  be	  discovered	  and	  chance	  would	  thus	  eventually	  be	  eradicated.	  Its	  
unpredictability	  was,	  at	  the	  least,	  considered	  a	  nuisance,	  but	  in	  other	  cases	  it	  
became	  a	  source	  of	  fear.	  This	  of	  course	  only	  portrays	  one	  part	  of	  the	  picture	  and	  
since	  earliest	  times	  chance	  has	  also	  been	  associated	  with	  good	  luck	  and	  fortune.	  Its	  
perception	  therefore	  always	  depends	  on	  one’s	  worldview	  and	  the	  evaluation	  of	  its	  
impact	  on	  each	  individual	  circumstance.	  	  	  
The	  19th	  century	  saw	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  huge	  paradigm	  shift	  regarding	  the	  
perception	  of	  such	  fundamentals	  as	  time,	  space,	  consciousness,	  truth	  and	  reality.	  
The	  doubts	  and	  uncertainties	  that	  came	  with	  the	  reframing	  increased	  in	  intensity,	  
until	  they	  reached	  their	  height	  during	  the	  early	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  The	  
belief	  in	  universality	  began	  to	  crumble	  and	  as	  part	  of	  the	  process	  chance	  received	  
renewed	  interest.	  For	  some,	  like	  the	  thinkers	  discussed	  in	  this	  work,	  chance	  
represented	  a	  phenomenon	  which	  exemplarily	  stood	  for	  the	  change	  in	  worldview	  
that	  they	  embraced:	  it	  radically	  demonstrated	  man’s	  lack	  of	  control	  over	  nature	  and	  
it	  suggested	  that	  real	  novelty,	  spontaneity	  and	  creativity	  are	  possible.	  	  	  
This	  thesis	  looks	  at	  theories	  where	  chance	  begins	  to	  take	  on	  new	  significance	  
and	  meaning.	  It	  focuses	  on	  a	  pivotal	  moment	  in	  time,	  which	  in	  retrospect	  marks	  the	  
beginning	  of	  research	  into	  chance	  today.	  It	  argues	  that	  all	  three	  main	  theories	  
discussed	  here,	  tychism,	  synchronicity	  and	  objective	  chance,	  include	  questions	  of	  
how	  chance	  impacts	  the	  trajectory	  of	  our	  lives.	  During	  the	  research	  process	  it	  
emerged	  that	  all	  three	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  contain	  links	  between	  chance	  
and	  creativity.	  The	  first	  main	  argument	  therefore	  is	  that	  even	  if	  chance	  constitutes	  
only	  a	  small	  interference,	  it	  nevertheless	  forms	  a	  vital	  element	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  
true	  novelty.	  	  
The	  thesis	  is	  divided	  into	  five	  parts.	  Part	  I	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  history	  
of	  chance	  and	  creativity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  etymology	  and	  use	  of	  some	  of	  the	  key	  terms	  
relating	  to	  both	  concepts.	  The	  last	  section	  focuses	  on	  the	  particular	  research	  into	  
the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two,	  introducing	  contemporary	  views	  from	  a	  variety	  of	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humanistic	  fields.	  Yet	  this	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  literature	  review	  
because	  research	  into	  the	  particular	  subject	  area	  of	  links	  between	  chance	  and	  
creativity	  is	  still	  insufficiently	  established.	  Furthermore,	  due	  to	  the	  interdisciplinary	  
nature	  of	  this	  work,	  relevant	  literature	  is	  directly	  included	  in	  the	  three	  main	  parts	  on	  
Peirce,	  Jung	  and	  Surrealism.	  	  Part	  II	  then	  	  concentrates	  on	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Charles	  
Sanders	  Peirce,	  his	  concept	  of	  tychism	  and	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  chance	  forms	  a	  
crucial	  element	  in	  cosmogony	  and	  evolution.	  As	  a	  way	  of	  introduction,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  chance	  and	  natural	  creation	  is	  described	  first	  and	  then	  used	  as	  
an	  analogy	  for	  chance’s	  involvement	  in	  human	  creativity.	  Through	  Carl	  Gustav	  Jung's	  
theory	  of	  synchronicity,	  the	  discussion	  dives	  in	  Part	  III	  into	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  chance	  and	  creativity	  by	  introducing	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  
unconscious.	  For	  Jung	  the	  psyche	  was	  inherently	  creative	  and	  synchronicity,	  chance	  
in	  the	  shape	  of	  ‘meaningful	  coincidence’,	  when	  properly	  understood	  and	  integrated,	  
could	  aid	  psychological	  maturity,	  healing	  and	  individuation.	  Part	  IV	  examines	  the	  
intentional	  utilisation	  of	  chance	  for	  artistic	  purposes	  in	  Dada	  and	  Surrealism	  and	  
reviews	  André	  Breton’s	  concept	  of	  objective	  chance.	  	  
	  	  	   This	  work	  therefore	  focuses	  particularly	  on	  the	  era	  spanning	  Peirce’s	  work	  on	  
tychism	  and	  Jung’s	  writings	  on	  synchronicity,	  thus	  roughly	  between	  1883	  and	  1952.	  
Their	  works	  should	  be	  considered	  landmarks	  in	  the	  history	  of	  chance	  research,	  even	  
though	  they	  received	  little	  attention	  or	  credibility	  in	  their	  own	  times.	  With	  their	  
radical	  views	  they	  remained	  gross	  outsiders	  to	  the	  mainstream	  intellectual	  debates	  
and	  only	  now	  do	  their	  theories	  slowly	  find	  a	  wider	  audience.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  this	  
argument	  still	  appeared	  alien	  to	  most	  people,	  all	  three,	  in	  their	  own	  fields,	  
recognised	  not	  only	  the	  value	  of	  chance	  but	  also	  its	  power	  to	  subvert	  the	  traditional	  
worldview.	  In	  this	  respect	  they	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  pioneers	  of	  the	  modern	  outlook	  
that	  we	  still	  share	  today.	  Hans	  Richter	  once	  wrote:	  	  
	  
Randomness,	  chance,	  of	  course!	  It	  is	  the	  experience	  and	  the	  sensation	  of	  our	  
age,	  but	  it	  occurred	  to	  me	  that,	  because	  of	  this	  fact,	  the	  problem	  and	  
necessity	  arises	  to	  integrate	  it	  into	  our	  everyday	  experience	  …	  to	  interpret	  
the	  possible	  meaning	  of	  this	  disorder,	  randomness,	  chaos,	  cosmos	  or	  




Chance	  is	  not	  a	  thing	  of	  itself.	  As	  Cocteau	  said	  in	  his	  most	  beautiful	  film	  
Orphée,	  ‘Everyone	  has	  his	  own	  death.’	  So	  is	  chance	  a	  personal	  matter.	  An	  
arrangement	  without	  cause	  is,	  as	  Jung	  calls	  it	  –	  Chance	  –	  but	  it	  is	  still	  the	  
individual,	  the	  author,	  who	  accepts	  this	  offering	  at	  the	  moment.	  So	  chance	  
can	  be	  offered	  to	  you	  a	  hundred	  times,	  and	  you	  don’t	  make	  anything	  of	  it.	  
And	  then,	  another	  time,	  it	  clicks	  (Watts,	  1980,	  134).	  
	  
What	  he	  described	  here	  illustrates	  the	  turn	  in	  interest	  towards	  the	  individual	  
experience	  of	  chance	  encounters,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  read	  as	  a	  description	  of	  the	  
discovery	  of	  chance	  itself.	  It	  might	  have	  offered	  itself	  up	  many	  times	  before	  and	  
certainly	  for	  a	  few	  individuals	  it	  has	  revealed	  itself	  much	  earlier,	  but	  at	  the	  beginning	  
of	  the	  20th	  century	  it	  finally	  ‘clicked’	  for	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  people,	  thus	  breaking	  
through	  into	  collective	  consciousness.	  	  	  
The	  other	  central	  argument	  is	  therefore	  that	  all	  thinkers	  discussed	  here	  used	  
chance	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  cultural	  critique.	  In	  all	  of	  them	  one	  finds	  a	  rebellion	  against	  the	  
mainstream’s	  one-­‐sided	  focus	  on	  rationality	  and	  logic.	  Since	  chance	  was	  considered	  
their	  opposite,	  they	  used	  it	  to	  shock	  people	  and	  thus	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  their	  
shortfalls	  in	  perspective.	  In	  their	  radical	  outlooks,	  these	  thinkers	  were	  also	  united	  in	  
arguing	  for	  the	  need	  of	  a	  more	  holistic	  worldview	  that	  includes	  chance	  and	  more	  
generally	  regards	  pairs	  of	  opposites	  as	  ultimately	  two	  sides	  of	  one	  coin.	  The	  focus	  of	  
Part	  V	  therefore	  is	  to	  represent	  this	  criticism	  through	  three	  overarching	  themes	  
which	  have	  been	  distilled	  from	  the	  discussions	  on	  Peirce,	  Jung	  and	  Breton	  taken	  
together,	  which	  is.	  	  
Firstly,	  their	  discussions	  of	  chance	  inherently	  contain	  a	  call	  for	  greater	  
freedom.	  By	  clinging	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  man’s	  superior	  status,	  it	  is	  always	  implied	  
that	  man	  is	  in	  control	  and	  that	  their	  task	  is	  to	  stay	  in	  control.	  Control	  creates	  tension	  
and	  leads	  to	  a	  narrow-­‐minded	  attempt	  at	  staying	  fixed	  and	  determined	  to	  reach	  a	  
pre-­‐conceived	  target.	  However,	  only	  by	  breaking	  habits	  and	  routine	  and	  by	  
accepting	  that	  spontaneous	  interruptions	  will	  continue	  to	  happen	  can	  one	  harness	  
the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  unexpected.	  To	  stay	  receptive	  to	  the	  unforeseen	  that	  may	  
emerge	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  infinite	  possibilities	  meant	  freedom	  for	  them.	  It	  requires	  
one	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  delicate	  balancing	  act	  between	  staying	  focused	  on	  one’s	  purpose	  
and	  being	  able	  to	  let	  go	  of	  it	  in	  decisive	  moments.	  It	  furthermore	  means	  to	  accept	  
the	  unexpected	  as	  one’s	  natural	  and	  constant	  companion	  in	  creative	  processes	  and	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to	  actually	  maintain	  a	  beneficial	  relationship	  with	  its	  presence.	  The	  idea	  behind	  this	  
goes	  back	  to	  Heraclitus’	  philosophy	  of	  the	  universal	  flux.	  Man	  is	  part	  of	  this	  ever-­‐
changing,	  evolving	  flow	  of	  events	  and	  to	  go	  with	  it,	  rather	  than	  against	  it,	  frees	  man	  
from	  the	  tension	  of	  his	  will	  to	  control.	  In	  this	  regard	  all	  three	  pick	  up	  on	  Schiller’s	  
concept	  of	  the	  Spieltrieb	  (play-­‐drive),	  which	  means	  that	  only	  when	  humans	  play	  can	  
they	  be	  truly	  free.	  	  	  
Secondly,	  the	  criticism	  was	  directed	  against	  the	  view	  that	  man	  and	  nature,	  or	  
culture	  and	  nature,	  are	  separate	  from	  each	  other	  and	  that	  man	  and	  his	  cultural	  
achievements	  are	  superior	  to	  nature.	  Instead,	  all	  three	  thinkers	  were	  keen	  to	  point	  
out	  that	  man	  will	  always	  remain	  firmly	  rooted	  within	  their	  environment	  and	  that	  the	  
separation	  is	  only	  an	  unhelpful	  conceptual	  one.	  They	  argued	  that	  chance	  not	  only	  
highlights	  the	  bond	  between	  man	  and	  nature,	  but	  that	  it	  can	  actually	  strengthen	  it.	  
Man	  does	  not	  create	  in	  a	  vacuum	  and	  without	  the	  impressions	  and	  influences	  from	  
outside	  inventions,	  scientific	  and	  artistic	  productions	  would	  not	  exist.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  
stay	  open-­‐minded	  in	  order	  to	  leave	  enough	  room	  so	  that	  something	  from	  both	  
worlds	  can	  unfold.	  The	  sudden	  interruption	  of	  chance	  therefore	  constitutes	  one	  of	  
the	  elements	  that	  can	  aid	  man	  in	  their	  search	  and	  during	  the	  process	  of	  
actualisation.	  	  	  
Thirdly,	  their	  preoccupation	  with	  chance	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  highlights	  the	  
underlying	  archetypal	  struggle	  between	  order	  and	  chaos.	  Every	  creative	  process	  
takes	  place	  within	  the	  field	  of	  tension	  that	  exists	  between	  them.	  Again,	  their	  
criticism	  was	  directed	  against	  the	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  order	  as	  good	  and	  chaos	  as	  
bad.	  All	  three	  stressed	  the	  vitality	  of	  chaos	  and	  considered	  chance	  an	  element	  of	  
chaos	  that	  potentially	  carries	  the	  power	  to	  inspire	  new	  order.	  This	  process	  of	  order	  
emerging	  out	  of	  chaos	  exists	  equally	  in	  nature	  and	  in	  man.	  Creation	  myths	  are	  
already	  telling	  us	  about	  this	  deepest	  and	  central	  interrelationship	  that	  creates	  
movement	  and	  life.	  The	  sphere	  of	  the	  chaotic	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  realm	  of	  
infinite	  possibilities	  and	  all	  three	  thinkers	  in	  their	  own	  ways	  encouraged	  a	  deliberate	  
return	  to	  the	  chaotic	  in	  order	  to	  retrieve	  novelty	  that	  cannot	  be	  conceived	  in	  any	  
other	  way.	  Their	  rebellion	  itself	  was	  meant	  to	  instigate	  a	  state	  of	  chaos	  within	  





Part	  I:	  Introductory	  Exploration	  of	  Creativity	  and	  Chance	  
	  
1.	  Chance	  
1.1.	  Early,	  Characterising	  Theories:	  Chance	  in	  Western	  Philosophy	  	  
	  
It	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  chance	  has	  seen	  
exponential	  growth	  in	  popular	  as	  well	  as	  academic	  interest	  over	  the	  past	  hundred	  
years.	  Before	  that	  time	  chance	  had	  either	  largely	  been	  ignored	  or	  dismissed.	  In	  the	  
margins	  one	  can	  nevertheless	  find	  interesting	  theories	  and	  interpretations	  of	  a	  
concept	  that	  has	  remained	  slippery	  and	  difficult	  to	  define.	  Shew	  for	  example	  writes:	  
‘For	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  týchē	  [chance]	  has	  been	  a	  radically	  impossible	  
consideration	  for	  philosophy,	  and	  has	  shown	  itself	  to	  be	  a	  common	  allergen	  to	  the	  
history	  of	  Western	  philosophy’	  (Shew,	  2008,	  4).	  Yet	  by	  looking	  at	  ancient	  Greek	  
philosophy	  four	  key	  theories	  stand	  out:	  the	  religious	  belief,	  the	  mechanical	  
determinism	  of	  the	  atomists,	  Aristotle’s	  focus	  on	  chance	  as	  coincidence	  and	  
Epicurus’	  atomic	  swerve.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  they	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  different	  
interpretations	  of	  chance	  that	  were	  to	  follow	  and	  that	  are	  accepted	  today.	  	  	  
The	  Greek	  noun	  týchē	  (τύχη)	  means	  ‘fortune’	  or	  ‘luck’,	  but	  it	  also	  relates	  to	  
the	  verb	  tynchano	  which	  means	  ‘to	  happen’	  or	  ‘befall’.	  Betegh	  explains	  that	  ‘týchē	  
was	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  chance	  events	  –	  events	  that	  one	  could	  not	  or	  did	  not	  
calculate	  and	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  a	  regular	  pattern’	  (2006,	  319).	  Popular	  belief	  in	  
Ancient	  Greece	  held	  that	  chance	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  supernatural	  power.	  Tyche,	  
the	  goddess	  of	  fortune1,	  was	  a	  favoured	  patron	  of	  cities	  and	  many	  coins	  featured	  
her	  image	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  attracting	  good	  fortune.	  ‘Citizens	  began	  to	  appeal	  to	  Tyche	  
in	  the	  attempt	  to	  explain	  and	  negotiate	  the	  spontaneous	  events	  that	  seemed	  to	  
emerge	  in	  public	  and	  personal	  histories.	  These	  practices	  also	  reflected	  the	  belief	  
that	  a	  particular	  orientation	  to	  chance	  and	  possibility	  could	  affect	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Predecessor	  to	  the	  Roman	  goddess	  Fortuna.	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people	  grew	  and	  flourished	  in	  their	  everyday	  lives’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  63).	  She	  was	  often	  
depicted	  standing	  on	  or	  juggling	  with	  a	  ball	  to	  illustrate	  her	  erratic	  and	  
unpredictable	  nature.	  She	  had	  the	  power	  to	  bestow	  good	  luck	  or	  cause	  great	  
mishap.	  In	  this	  interpretation	  chance	  appears	  only	  contingent	  to	  man,	  but	  it	  is	  
actually	  part	  of	  a	  godly	  design	  plan.	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  ambitions	  of	  the	  early	  philosophers	  was	  to	  thwart	  such	  
superstitious	  beliefs	  and	  replace	  them	  by	  reason.	  They	  therefore	  rejected	  the	  idea	  
that	  chance	  is	  due	  to	  supernatural	  causes	  and	  replaced	  them	  with	  natural	  ones.	  The	  
atomists,	  for	  example	  Leucippus	  (first	  half	  of	  5th	  century	  BCE)	  and	  Democritus	  (460-­‐
370	  BCE)	  were	  among	  the	  first	  to	  give	  chance	  a	  place	  in	  their	  philosophy.2	  	  
The	  atomists	  were	  strict	  determinists	  and	  for	  them	  every	  movement	  was	  
fixed	  according	  to	  mechanical	  principles.	  Other	  than	  the	  theological	  worldview	  
where	  everything	  happens	  according	  to	  some	  higher	  final	  purpose,	  the	  atomists	  
imagined	  that	  all	  happens	  as	  a	  result	  of	  atomic	  interaction.	  One	  of	  the	  few	  surviving	  
text	  fragments	  by	  Leucippus	  reads:	  'Nothing	  happens	  at	  random,	  but	  everything	  
from	  reason	  and	  by	  necessity'	  (Taylor,	  1999,	  185)	  .	  Reason	  and	  necessity	  are	  the	  
ultimate	  governing	  forces	  and	  chance,	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  necessity,	  can	  therefore	  
not	  exist	  as	  a	  real	  phenomenon.	  However,	  Long	  writes	  that	  'we	  have	  evidence	  that	  
the	  atomists	  assigned	  some	  role	  to	  chance	  in	  the	  causation	  of	  events,	  though	  
precisely	  what	  role	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  determine’	  (ibid.,	  186).	  Comparing	  surviving	  
fragments	  one	  is	  faced	  with	  a	  range	  of	  contradictory	  statements:	  	  	  
	  
	   Democritus	  is	  committed	  to:	  	  
(1) Everything	  happens	  by	  necessity.	  
Eudemus	  and	  Diogenes	  now	  give	  him:	  	  
(2) Nothing	  happens	  by	  chance.	  
But	  the	  doxography	  offers:	  
(3) Everything	  happens	  by	  chance.	  
And	  Simplicius	  produces:	  
(4) Some	  things	  happen	  by	  chance	  and	  others	  are	  caused	  (Barnes,	  1979,	  
122).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Original	  surviving	  fragments	  by	  Leucippus	  and	  Democritus	  are	  sparse	  and	  most	  of	  what	  we	  know	  
comes	  filtered	  through	  texts	  by	  their	  successors,	  such	  as	  Aristotle	  and	  Simplicius.	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While	  the	  atomists	  attributed	  everything	  that	  happens	  within	  the	  cosmos	  to	  
necessity,	  they	  at	  the	  same	  time	  believed	  that	  the	  original	  formation	  of	  the	  cosmic	  
whirl	  came	  about	  by	  chance.	  ‘On	  this	  view	  necessity	  governs,	  but	  is	  local	  to	  a	  world	  
order,	  which	  itself	  arises	  by	  chance	  from	  a	  precosmic	  state	  where	  there	  is	  no	  
necessity'	  (Taylor,	  1999,	  187)	  .	  Hence,	  chance	  did	  exist	  as	  a	  real	  phenomenon	  before	  
and	  during	  the	  time	  the	  universe	  was	  formed,	  but	  since	  then	  everything	  has	  been	  
governed	  by	  chains	  of	  cause	  and	  effect.	  
	   What	  is	  otherwise	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘chance’	  merely	  posits	  a	  gap	  in	  knowledge	  
as	  to	  the	  real	  causes.	  Democritus:	  ‘Men	  fashioned	  the	  image	  of	  chance	  as	  an	  excuse	  
for	  their	  own	  thoughtlessness;	  for	  chance	  rarely	  fights	  with	  wisdom,	  and	  a	  man	  of	  
intelligence	  will,	  by	  foresight,	  set	  straight	  most	  things	  in	  his	  life’	  (Barnes,	  1979,	  266).	  
In	  this	  regard	  the	  term	  is	  void	  of	  substance	  because	  there	  exists	  no	  real	  
phenomenon	  that	  it	  represents.	  It	  only	  points	  towards	  a	  lacuna	  in	  human	  
knowledge,	  which	  the	  philosophers	  seek	  to	  fill	  and	  which	  if	  achieved,	  the	  term	  
‘chance’	  would	  be	  made	  redundant.	  ‘Chance	  as	  a	  subjective	  notion	  can	  take	  its	  place	  
in	  the	  system	  without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  ruling	  idea	  of	  an	  all-­‐pervading	  necessity’	  
(Guthrie,	  1981,	  Vol.	  2,	  419).	  	  
This	  understanding	  of	  chance	  also	  explains	  why	  there	  are	  more	  references	  to	  
chance	  within	  Democritus’	  ethics	  than	  in	  his	  physics.	  Taken	  from	  Democritus’	  
fragments:	  ‘Fools	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  gifts	  of	  fortune	  (τύχη),	  but	  men	  who	  understand	  
such	  things	  by	  those	  of	  wisdom.’	  ‘Those	  who	  take	  pleasure	  in	  the	  misfortunes	  of	  
their	  neighbours	  do	  not	  understand	  that	  what	  fortune	  (τύχη)	  sends	  is	  common	  to	  all’	  
(ibid.,	  415),	  and	  ‘Chance	  (τύχη)	  is	  a	  giver	  of	  great	  gifts,	  but	  uncertain.	  Nature	  is	  self-­‐
sufficient’	  (Vlastos,	  1946,	  59).	  Bailey	  remarks	  on	  the	  predominant	  occupation	  with	  
chance	  in	  ethics:	  ‘there	  is	  here	  a	  striking	  contrast	  to	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  
chance	  in	  the	  physical	  theory	  and	  it	  seems	  to	  show	  that	  Democritus'	  ethics	  are	  
largely	  independent	  of	  his	  physics’	  (in	  ibid.,	  56).	  Yet,	  Vlastos	  clarifies:	  ‘The	  fiction	  of	  
chance	  excuses,	  and	  therefore	  confirms,	  our	  own	  stupidity	  and	  helplessness.	  Thus	  
the	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  relative	  reality	  of	  chance	  means	  an	  absolute	  reduction	  
in	  our	  own	  natural	  power.	  Hence	  Democritus'	  preoccupation	  with	  chance	  in	  the	  
ethics’	  (ibid.).	  Chance	  acts	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  device	  to	  mark	  out	  human	  ignorance	  and	  it	  
is	  through	  teaching	  and	  learning	  that	  the	  true	  causes	  to	  events	  will	  be	  discovered.	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Aristotle’s	  (384-­‐322	  BCE)	  writings	  provide	  the	  first	  surviving	  documents	  from	  
ancient	  Greek	  philosophy	  that	  contain	  detailed	  discussions	  of	  chance.	  He	  rejected	  
the	  theory	  of	  complete	  causal	  determinism	  and	  for	  him	  chance	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
elements	  calling	  this	  very	  idea	  into	  question.	  He	  wrote	  extensively	  on	  týchē,	  its	  place	  
in	  the	  world	  and	  also	  our	  experience	  with	  it.	  Aristotle	  wondered,	  for	  example,	  why	  
many	  wise	  men	  have	  understood	  chance	  in	  a	  strict	  either/or	  fashion,	  attributing	  all	  
or	  nothing	  to	  chance,	  and	  he	  attempts	  to	  grasp	  it	  differently:	  ‘Is,	  or	  can,	  týchē	  be	  
said	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  things	  that	  happen	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  (how)	  can	  it	  
determine	  how	  things	  appear	  to	  us?	  Is	  týchē,	  Aristotle	  wonders,	  among	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  things	  come	  to	  be?’	  (Shew,	  2008,	  67).	  In	  Physics	  Aristotle	  discussed	  týchē	  
after	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  four	  causes	  in	  nature.	  He	  wrote	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  
causes	  one	  might	  find	  another	  reason	  for	  things	  to	  be,	  which	  is	  not	  causal	  in	  the	  
usual	  sense	  and	  this	  reason	  might	  be	  chance.	  However,	  Shew	  points	  out	  that	  chance	  
should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  fifth	  “lost	  cause”	  (ibid.,	  10).	  	  
Aristotle	  actually	  distinguished	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  chance,	  týchē	  and	  
automaton	  (spontaneity).	  He	  applied	  the	  former	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  
latter	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  nature.	  ‘Týchē	  is	  experienced	  by	  agents	  capable	  of	  moral	  
action	  and	  is	  predicated	  on	  deliberate	  intention’	  (Monk,	  1994,	  17).	  Also,	  new	  in	  
Aristotle’s	  theory	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘the	  things	  which	  might	  act	  as	  causes	  of	  chance	  
events	  are	  bound	  to	  be	  indeterminate’	  and	  things	  which	  happen	  by	  chance	  ‘happen	  
coincidentally,	  and	  chance	  is	  a	  coincidental	  cause’	  (Aristotle,	  2008,	  Vol.	  2,	  197a8-­‐15).	  
To	  explain	  what	  he	  means	  Aristotle	  described	  a	  chance	  meeting	  of	  two	  friends	  in	  the	  
market	  place	  (II,	  196a1-­‐5	  and	  196b33-­‐197a7).	  A,	  who	  rarely	  visits	  the	  market	  meets	  
B,	  who	  just	  reclaimed	  a	  loan.	  B	  owes	  money	  to	  A	  and	  them	  meeting	  in	  the	  market	  
allows	  B	  to	  pay	  back	  A.	  If	  A	  had	  known	  that	  he	  could	  find	  B	  in	  the	  square	  with	  
sufficient	  funds	  he	  would	  have	  gone	  there	  for	  this	  reason.	  However,	  since	  he	  did	  not	  
know,	  the	  cause	  for	  A	  going	  there	  was	  a	  different	  one.	  Only	  the	  coincidental	  cause	  
of	  them	  both	  meeting	  in	  the	  square	  by	  chance	  leads	  to	  A	  collecting	  his	  money.	  
Aristotle	  concludes:	  ‘Clearly,	  then,	  chance	  is	  a	  coincidental	  cause	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  
events	  which	  have	  some	  purpose	  and	  are	  subject	  to	  choice’	  (ibid.,	  197a2).	  
For	  Aristotle	  týchē,	  even	  though	  not	  a	  cause	  in	  a	  scientific	  sense,	  constituted	  
one	  way	  in	  which	  things	  unexpectedly	  come	  about.	  Shew	  writes:	  ‘Aristotle	  is	  right:	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Týchē	  points	  to	  that	  which	  is	  peculiar,	  confronting	  what	  we	  expect	  to	  find	  in	  an	  
inquiry	  into	  nature’	  (ibid.,	  90).	  When	  he	  wrote	  about	  chance	  Aristotle’s	  rhetoric	  was	  
marked	  by	  strangeness	  and	  wonder	  through	  which	  he	  wanted	  to	  exemplify	  that	  the	  
boundaries	  between	  nature	  and	  human	  thought	  blur.	  ‘Týchē	  ultimately	  emerges	  in	  
relation	  to	  human	  thinking	  and	  choice	  for	  Aristotle	  while	  it	  is	  not	  simply	  removed	  
from	  nature	  like	  an	  object	  from	  a	  subject’	  (ibid.,	  92).	  He	  therefore	  focused	  on	  
examining	  how	  chance	  influences	  man’s	  life	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  this	  regard	  
Shew	  makes	  two	  important	  remarks:	  ‘For	  Aristotle,	  týchē	  most	  certainly	  sustains	  a	  
fundamental	  relationship	  to	  life’	  (ibid.,	  43)	  and	  ‘we	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  sustained	  
relationship	  that	  Aristotle	  maintains	  to	  tyche	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  give	  a	  logos	  (reason)	  
to	  something	  which	  exceeds	  the	  logos	  in	  some	  ways	  but	  which	  nonetheless	  orients	  
human	  beings	  in	  the	  world	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  best	  logos’	  (ibid.,	  90).	  Thus,	  contrary	  
to	  the	  view	  of	  the	  atomists,	  for	  Aristotle	  chance	  events	  were	  as	  real	  as	  necessary	  
ones	  that	  in	  some	  way	  influence	  and	  guide	  one’s	  life.	  	  
Another	  early	  theory	  of	  chance	  is	  Epicurus’	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘atomic	  swerve’.	  
Epicurus	  (341-­‐270	  BCE)	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  influenced	  by	  Democritus’	  theory	  of	  
atoms.	  He	  agreed	  that	  they	  infinitely	  fall	  downwards	  in	  the	  void	  and	  that	  they	  are	  
controlled	  by	  natural	  laws.	  However,	  he	  diverged	  in	  one	  crucial	  point,	  namely	  that	  
atoms	  not	  only	  fall	  continuously	  straight	  down	  in	  the	  void	  but	  that	  they	  also	  
sometimes	  swerve	  in	  their	  motion,	  colliding	  with	  other	  atoms.	  Epicurus	  
hypothesised	  that	  this	  swerve	  happens	  spontaneously	  and	  utterly	  independent	  of	  
any	  causal	  force.	  Epicurus’	  follower,	  the	  Roman	  poet	  Lucretius	  (99-­‐55	  BCE),	  named	  
this	  swerve	  clinamen,	  arguing	  that	  it	  introduces	  novelty	  motion	  into	  an	  otherwise	  
static	  system:	  ‘...	  this...	  comes...	  From	  that	  slight	  swervement	  of	  the	  elements	  in	  no	  
fixed	  line	  of	  space,	  in	  no	  fixed	  time’	  (Vavilov,	  1948,	  36).	  
This	  hypothesis	  set	  Epicurus	  apart	  from	  Democritus	  and	  while	  he	  continued	  
to	  hold	  a	  materialistic	  worldview,	  he	  rejected	  the	  deterministic	  one.	  Motte	  
comments:	  ‘the	  Epicurean-­‐Lucretian	  strategy	  depends	  precisely	  upon	  the	  injection	  
of	  the	  aleatory	  into	  the	  motivated,	  upon	  the	  insertion	  of	  an	  element	  of	  chaos	  into	  a	  
determinist	  symmetry’(1986,	  264).	  Epicurus'	  dismissal	  of	  determinism	  becomes	  
evident	  in	  his	  Letter	  to	  Menoceus:	  ‘it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  follow	  the	  myths	  about	  the	  
gods	  than	  to	  be	  enslaved	  to	  the	  destiny	  of	  the	  natural	  philosophers;	  for	  the	  former	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suggest	  a	  hope	  of	  placating	  the	  gods	  by	  honouring	  them,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  involves	  
implacable	  necessity’	  (Long,	  1977,	  68).	  
Yet,	  he	  denied	  that	  tyche	  is	  ‘either	  a	  god’	  or	  an	  ‘unstable	  cause,’	  but	  that	  it	  is	  
rather	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  ‘starting-­‐point	  of	  great	  good	  and	  bad	  things’	  (ibid.,	  69).	  
Unfortunately	  the	  passage	  that	  follows	  is	  in	  imperfect	  condition	  and	  its	  further	  
meaning	  remains	  unrecognisable.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  with	  Epicurus	  the	  idea	  
and	  importance	  of	  chance	  moves	  into	  the	  foreground	  and	  turns	  into	  a	  crucial	  
feature	  not	  only	  of	  his	  atomic	  theory	  but	  his	  ethics	  too:	  	  ‘Epicurus	  supposed	  atomic	  
Declination	  to	  have	  a	  two-­‐fold	  action,	  firstly	  as	  causing	  the	  falling	  atoms	  in	  the	  void	  
to	  swerve	  and	  come	  into	  contact	  so	  that	  the	  worlds	  can	  come	  into	  being;	  secondly,	  
the	  same	  latent	  force	  coming	  into	  action	  in	  the	  soulatoms,	  makes	  free-­‐will	  possible	  
for	  human	  beings’	  (Masson,	  1902,	  458).	  	  
In	  his	  attempt	  to	  dispel	  deist	  and	  teleological	  worldviews,	  Epicurus	  found	  a	  
good	  starting	  point	  in	  atomist	  theory	  but	  diverged	  on	  the	  question	  of	  causality.	  The	  
concept	  of	  the	  clinamen	  frees	  the	  world	  from	  absolute	  determinism	  and	  allows	  for	  
novelty	  to	  suddenly	  and	  unexpectedly	  emerge	  in	  nature,	  as	  well	  as	  free	  will	  in	  
human	  beings.	  However,	  the	  motion	  of	  the	  swerve	  is	  only	  a	  minimal	  one	  and	  ‘does	  
not	  mean	  that	  the	  universe	  is	  a	  series	  of	  completely	  random	  occurrences.	  The	  
swerve	  is	  an	  unaccountable	  variable	  in	  an	  otherwise	  normalized	  system’	  (Monk,	  
1994,	  22).	  	  
Despite	  their	  role	  as	  a	  'common	  allergen',	  questions	  revolving	  around	  
chance,	  its	  relationship	  with	  necessity,	  the	  underlying	  battle	  between	  determinism	  
and	  indeterminism	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  man	  have	  continued	  to	  crop	  up	  in	  the	  margins	  
of	  Western	  philosophy.	  These	  four	  categories,	  which	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  the	  
supernatural,	  the	  materialistic-­‐deterministic,	  the	  coincidental-­‐causal	  and	  the	  
acausal,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  later	  theories	  of	  chance	  to	  emerge.	  To	  
summarise:	  
1)	  The	  supernatural	  view	  assumes	  an	  omnipotent	  being	  as	  the	  meta-­‐cause	  of	  
all	  things.	  The	  belief	  in	  Fate	  guiding	  all	  life	  led	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  even	  the	  gods	  have	  to	  
yield	  to	  her	  remorseless	  powers.	  With	  the	  rise	  and	  rule	  of	  Christianity	  all	  powers	  of	  
the	  gods	  were	  bundled	  into	  one,	  but	  chance	  events	  continued	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	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signs	  of	  a	  higher	  will.	  In	  this	  worldview	  chance	  usually	  equates	  to	  fate,	  destiny	  and	  
providence.	  For	  example,	  in	  The	  New	  Universal	  English	  Dictionary	  from	  1755,	  it	  says:	  	  
	  
many	  things	  happen	  by	  chance	  in	  the	  world,	  with	  regard	  to	  second	  causes,	  
but	  nothing	  at	  all	  happens	  by	  chance	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  first	  cause	  (God)	  who	  
disposes	  and	  pre-­‐ordains	  all	  things	  from	  all	  eternity.	  For	  chance	  and	  fortune	  
are	  only	  to	  be	  said	  properly,	  in	  respect	  to	  him	  that	  is	  ignorant	  of	  the	  
intention	  of	  the	  director	  (Bailey,	  1755).	  
	  
2)	  In	  opposition	  to	  this	  outlook	  grew	  the	  materialistic-­‐deterministic	  stance.	  
According	  to	  Democritus	  and	  Lucretius	  the	  world	  had	  come	  into	  being	  through	  
natural	  causes,	  not	  some	  divine	  purpose.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Atomic	  conception	  of	  ‘chance’	  then	  is	  (…)	  the	  purely	  subjective	  
conception	  which	  is	  proper	  to	  a	  scientific	  view	  of	  nature.	  ‘Chance’	  is	  no	  
external	  force	  which	  comes	  in	  to	  upset	  the	  workings	  of	  ‘necessity’	  by	  
producing	  a	  causeless	  result;	  it	  is	  but	  a	  perfectly	  normal	  manifestation	  of	  that	  
‘necessity’,	  but	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  human	  understanding	  make	  it	  impossible	  for	  
us	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  cause	  is	  (Bailey,	  1964,	  143).	  
	  
This	  idea	  has	  become	  popular	  in	  philosophy,	  especially	  since	  the	  Enlightenment.	  
David	  Hume:	  'Tis	  commonly	  allowed	  by	  philosophers	  that	  what	  the	  vulgar	  call	  
chance	  is	  nothing	  but	  a	  secret	  and	  conceal'd	  cause’	  (Hajek&Hoefer,	  2006,	  125).	  
Pierre	  Simon	  de	  Laplace	  assumed	  that	  the	  inexplicable	  questions	  of	  chance	  events	  
‘entirely	  disappear	  for	  the	  sound	  philosophy	  that	  sees	  in	  them	  but	  an	  expression	  of	  
our	  ignorance	  as	  regards	  the	  real	  causes’	  (Monk,	  1994,	  18).	  Abraham	  de	  Moivre	  
called	  chance	  ‘a	  mere	  word’	  and	  Bertrand	  Russell	  still	  insisted	  that	  the	  cause	  of	  
chance	  was	  simply	  unknown	  (ibid.).	  	  
3)	  Aristotle’s	  model,	  which	  attempted	  to	  overcome	  the	  strict	  dichotomy	  
between	  the	  supernatural	  and	  the	  deterministic	  hypotheses,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  
necessity	  and	  chance,	  provides	  a	  theory	  that	  ‘grants	  it	  [chance]	  an	  objective	  
existence	  and	  experiential	  reality’	  (ibid.,	  20).	  In	  this	  interpretation	  chance	  events	  are	  
co-­‐incidences,	  intersections	  of	  events	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  separate	  causes.	  
Amongst	  those	  philosophers	  who	  followed	  the	  Aristotelian	  concept	  are	  for	  example	  
Thomas	  Aquinas	  and	  John	  Stuart	  Mill:	  ‘It	  is	  incorrect	  to	  say	  that	  any	  phenomenon	  is	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produced	  by	  chance;	  but	  we	  must	  say	  that	  two	  or	  more	  phenomena	  are	  conjoined	  
by	  chance’	  (Mill,	  1919,	  345)	  .	  	  Also,	  Antoine	  Cournot	  ‘takes	  up,	  develops	  and	  
modifies	  the	  Aristotelian	  thesis,	  maintaining	  the	  objective	  reality	  of	  chance	  and	  
noting	  that	  contingency	  and	  necessity	  do	  not	  exclude	  each	  other’	  (Bunge,	  1951,	  210-­‐
1).	  	  
4)	  Epicurus’	  hypothesis	  that	  'atoms	  occasionally	  underwent	  uncaused,	  
indeterministic	  swerves	  –	  [was]	  an	  early	  doctrine	  of	  pure	  chance’	  (Hajek&Hoefer,	  
2006,	  125).	  This	  theory	  has	  hibernated	  for	  most	  of	  history	  until	  around	  the	  turn	  of	  
the	  last	  century.	  Since	  then	  it	  has	  grown	  in	  significance	  and	  it	  can	  now	  be	  described	  
as	  the	  prevailing	  view.	  Charles	  Sanders	  Peirce	  and	  his	  friend	  William	  James	  are	  
amongst	  the	  first	  few	  who	  sought	  to	  revive	  it.	  Peirce	  called	  his	  concept	  ‘tychism’	  in	  
which	  he	  argues	  for	  pure	  chance	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  empirical	  evidence.	  William	  James	  
on	  the	  other	  hand	  ‘saw	  the	  postulation	  of	  chance	  as	  a	  way	  to	  resolve	  the	  apparent	  
conflict	  between	  determinism	  and	  free	  will’	  (ibid.,	  126).	  	  
	  
	  
1.2.	  Defining	  Chance	  through	  Key	  Concepts	  
	  
The	  previous	  section	  revealed	  that	  chance	  is	  a	  highly	  ambiguous	  concept,	  
which	  has	  been	  interpreted	  in	  widely	  differing	  ways.	  In	  common	  usage	  there	  is	  much	  
ambiguity	  as	  to	  what	  chance	  is	  too	  and	  a	  range	  of	  terms,	  such	  as	  hazard,	  fortuity,	  
randomness,	  accident	  and	  serendipity,	  are	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  chance	  phenomena.	  
Their	  different	  emphases	  further	  highlight	  the	  richness	  of	  what	  is	  understood	  to	  




The	  English	  word	  ‘chance’	  derives	  from	  the	  Latin	  verb	  cadere	  literally	  
meaning	  ‘to	  fall’.	  Chance	  therefore	  translates	  as	  an	  event	  that	  befalls	  us	  and	  its	  
course	  can	  neither	  be	  foreseen	  nor	  changed.	  Two	  dictionary	  entries	  shall	  provide	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more	  details	  on	  its	  contemporary,	  common	  use.	  The	  Shorter	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  
Historical	  Principles	  (2007)	  defines	  chance	  as:	  	  
	  
(1)	  The	  way	  things	  happen	  of	  themselves;	  the	  absence	  of	  design	  or	  
discoverable	  cause;	  the	  course	  of	  events	  regarded	  as	  a	  power;	  fortune,	  fate.	  (2)	  An	  
event	  that	  is	  without	  apparent	  cause	  or	  unexpected;	  a	  causal	  circumstance;	  an	  
accident.	  (3)	  A	  possibility,	  a	  probability.	  
	  
The	  Collins	  Dictionary	  (2007)	  writes,	  in	  comparison:	  
	  
(1)	  The	  unknown	  and	  unpredictable	  element	  that	  causes	  an	  event	  to	  result	  in	  
a	  certain	  way	  rather	  than	  another,	  spoken	  of	  as	  a	  real	  force.	  (2)	  Fortune;	  
luck;	  fate.	  (3)	  An	  opportunity	  or	  occasion.	  (4)	  A	  risk;	  a	  gamble.	  (5)	  The	  extent	  
to	  which	  an	  event	  is	  likely	  to	  occur;	  probability.	  (6)	  An	  unpredicted	  event,	  
esp.	  a	  fortunate	  one.	  (7)	  An	  unlucky	  event;	  mishap.	  
Both	  entries	  taken	  together	  convey	  the	  rich	  and	  ambiguous	  usage	  of	  chance	  in	  
everyday	  language.	  It	  can	  either	  be	  used	  to	  indicate	  the	  absence	  or	  presence	  of	  
supernatural	  powers,	  to	  a	  determined	  or	  undetermined	  event,	  and	  it	  can	  either	  be	  




‘Coincidence”’	  derives	  from	  the	  Medieval	  Latin	  coincedere	  which	  consists	  of	  
the	  prefix	  co	  (‘together,	  mutually	  or	  jointly’)	  and	  the	  verb	  incedere	  meaning	  ‘to	  fall	  
or	  drop	  into	  or	  upon,’	  ‘to	  occur’	  and	  ‘to	  meet	  with’.	  We	  can	  still	  find	  these	  roots	  of	  
meaning	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  definitions	  listed	  in	  The	  Shorter	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  
(2007):	  
	  
(1)	  Occupation	  of	  the	  same	  portion	  or	  space.	  (2)	  Correspondence	  in	  
substance,	  nature,	  character,	  value,	  etc.;	  (an	  instant	  of)	  exact	  agreement;	  b.	  
Concurrence	  in	  opinion.	  (3)	  Simultaneous	  occurrence	  or	  existence;	  an	  
instance	  of	  this.	  (4)	  A	  notable	  concurrence	  of	  events	  or	  circumstances	  




Shepherd’s	  article	  The	  History	  of	  Coincide	  and	  Coincidence	  from	  1880	  reveals	  
that	  while	  chance	  can	  encompass	  these	  meanings,	  it	  is	  ‘coincidence’	  that	  
emphasises	  the	  coming	  together	  of	  two	  or	  more	  notable	  events.	  Shepherd	  traces	  
the	  chronology	  of	  the	  two	  words	  first	  in	  Latin	  and	  then	  in	  scholarly	  English.	  ‘It	  is	  
during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  XVII	  century	  that	  coincide	  and	  coincidence	  begin	  to	  find	  
their	  way	  into	  English	  prose.	  Neither	  word	  is	  found	  in	  Shakespeare	  or	  Milton,	  nor	  is	  
either	  form	  given	  in	  the	  oldest	  regular	  English	  dictionary’	  (1880,	  274).	  It	  shows	  that	  
between	  their	  emergence	  and	  ‘the	  last	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  these	  words’,	  
they	  were	  predominantly	  used	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  points	  (1),	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  quoted	  above.	  
Shepherd	  assumes	  that	  ‘coincidence’	  has	  been	  ‘decidedly	  influenced’	  (ibid.,	  
279)	  by	  one	  particular	  event	  in	  US	  history.	  On	  the	  4th	  of	  July	  1826,	  the	  50th	  
anniversary	  of	  the	  American	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  two	  of	  its	  signatories,	  
John	  Adams	  and	  Thomas	  Jefferson,	  died	  only	  hours	  apart.	  It	  is	  in	  Daniel	  Webster’s	  
oration	  that	  ‘coincidence’	  is	  apparently	  used	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  fourth	  meaning	  
mentioned	  above:	  ‘The	  great	  objects	  of	  life	  were	  accomplished;	  (…)	  our	  patriots	  
have	  fallen;	  but	  so	  fallen	  at	  such	  age,	  with	  such	  coincidence,	  on	  such	  a	  day,	  that	  we	  
cannot	  rationally	  lament	  that	  the	  end	  has	  come,	  which	  we	  knew	  could	  not	  be	  long	  
deferred’	  (ibid.).	  Shepherd	  concludes	  from	  this	  allegedly	  first	  public	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
coincidence:	  	  
	  
The	  point	  that	  we	  have	  now	  attained	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  marking	  the	  last	  
stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  these	  words.	  The	  coincident	  death	  of	  Adams	  
and	  Jefferson,	  upon	  the	  semi-­‐centennial	  of	  American	  independence,	  exerted	  
a	  decided	  influence	  (...)	  in	  drawing	  these	  words	  out	  of	  their	  scholarly	  or	  
literary	  use	  and	  in	  giving	  them	  a	  current	  circulation	  in	  popular	  speech.	  They	  
are	  still	  employed	  in	  their	  technical	  sense,	  but	  their	  popular	  acceptation	  has	  
constantly	  gained	  ground,	  and	  few	  words	  originally	  derived	  from	  the	  
vocabulary	  of	  science	  or	  philosophy	  are	  more	  thoroughly	  engrafted	  into	  




The	  term	  contingency	  originally	  comes	  from	  philosophy	  too,	  but	  has	  since	  
then	  spread	  into	  other	  areas.	  Contingency	  is	  generally	  understood	  in	  contrast	  to	  
	  	  
23	  
necessity,	  though	  there	  is	  some	  debate	  on	  the	  usefulness	  of	  opposing	  the	  two	  in	  this	  
manner.	  The	  Cambridge	  Dictionary	  of	  Philosophy	  (1999)	  writes:	  	  
	  
The	  modal	  property	  of	  being	  contingent	  is	  attributable	  to	  a	  proposition,	  state	  
of	  affairs,	  event,	  or	  –	  more	  debatably	  –	  an	  object.	  Muddles	  about	  the	  
relationship	  between	  this	  and	  other	  modal	  properties	  have	  abounded	  ever	  
since	  Aristotle,	  who	  initially	  conflated	  contingency	  with	  possibility	  but	  later	  
realized	  that	  something	  that	  is	  possible	  may	  also	  be	  necessary,	  whereas	  
something	  that	  is	  contingent	  cannot	  be	  necessary.	  
	  
Though	  not	  the	  same,	  contingency	  still	  stems	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  possibility.	  It	  
describes	  a	  circumstance	  that	  is	  possible,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  if	  it	  will	  occur	  or	  
not.	  Today	  contingency	  planning	  is	  often	  part	  of	  risk	  assessment,	  where	  unlikely	  but	  





The	  study	  of	  probability	  emerged	  during	  the	  17th	  century,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  
chance	  was	  predominantly	  considered	  ‘unscientific,	  unphilosophical,	  the	  stuff	  of	  
superstition	  or	  ignorance’	  (Hájek&Hoefer,	  2006,	  125).	  The	  aim	  of	  probability	  theory	  
was	  to	  change	  this	  and	  to	  make	  chance	  predictable	  and	  thus	  intelligible.	  The	  
language	  of	  mathematics	  became	  the	  chosen	  medium	  to	  bring	  order	  into	  the	  
disorder	  of	  chance.	  Classical	  probability	  started	  out	  with	  trying	  to	  better	  understand	  
the	  hidden	  rules	  of	  gambling.	  Thus	  symmetry,	  equal	  possibility	  and	  equal	  
undecidedness	  played	  an	  important	  role	  when	  Laplace	  for	  example	  declared:	  	  	  
	  
The	  theory	  of	  chance	  consists	  in	  reducing	  all	  the	  events	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  to	  a	  
certain	  number	  of	  cases	  equally	  possible,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  to	  such	  as	  we	  may	  be	  
equally	  undecided	  about	  in	  regard	  to	  their	  existence,	  and	  in	  determining	  the	  
number	  of	  cases	  favourable	  to	  the	  event	  whose	  probability	  is	  sought	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
While	  the	  singular	  chance	  event	  remains	  unpredictable,	  a	  large	  number	  of,	  for	  
example,	  coin	  tosses	  suddenly	  provides	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  regularity.	  Hacking	  
furthermore	  notes	  that	  ‘Probability	  has	  two	  aspects.	  It	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  degree	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of	  belief	  warranted	  by	  evidence,	  and	  it	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  tendency,	  displayed	  by	  
some	  chance	  devices,	  to	  produce	  stable	  relative	  frequencies’	  (1975,	  1).	  
	  
1.2.5.	  Accident	  and	  Hazard	  
	  
The	  word	  'accident'	  is	  sometimes	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  
chance.	  Its	  etymology	  reveals	  how	  closely	  it	  relates	  to	  chance:	  the	  word	  originates	  
from	  the	  Latin	  accidere	  (to	  happen),	  cadere	  comes	  from	  ‘to	  fall’.	  Once	  again	  its	  
meaning	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘to	  befall’,	  referring	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  an	  event	  
coming	  upon	  us	  suddenly	  and	  unexpectedly.	  In	  philosophy	  accident	  is	  usually	  
discussed	  in	  metaphysics	  and	  has	  two	  major	  meanings,	  one	  referring	  to	  identity,	  the	  
other	  to	  events.	  For	  one	  it	  denotes	  'a	  feature	  or	  property	  of	  a	  substance	  (e.g.,	  an	  
organism	  or	  an	  artefact)	  without	  which	  the	  substance	  could	  still	  exist'	  (Audi,	  1999,	  
5).	  For	  example,	  a	  person's	  hair	  colour	  is	  an	  accident,	  whereas	  his	  humanness	  is	  not.	  
Decartes	  expressed	  this	  notion	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  thinking	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  being	  
whereas	  a	  singular	  thought	  is	  an	  accident.	  Following	  on	  from	  Aristotelian	  logic,	  in	  
this	  sense,	  accident	  refers	  to	  a	  property	  which	  can	  disappear	  or	  alter	  whereas	  the	  
essential	  property	  can	  and	  does	  not.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  uniform	  conception;	  but	  the	  Cartesian	  view,	  according	  to	  which	  
the	  accidents	  are	  modes	  of	  (ways	  of	  specifying)	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  substance,	  is	  
representative.	  (…)	  Issues	  about	  accidents	  have	  become	  peripheral	  in	  this	  
century	  because	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  traditional	  concerns	  about	  substance.	  But	  
the	  more	  general	  questions	  about	  necessity	  and	  contingency	  are	  very	  much	  
alive	  (ibid.).	  
	  
In	  the	  second	  meaning,	  accident	  as	  an	  event,	  the	  term	  denotes	  'the	  metaphysical	  
view	  that	  at	  least	  some	  events	  are	  neither	  necessitated,	  nor	  causally	  determined,	  
nor	  predictable'	  (Iannone,	  2001,	  13).	  	  
The	  word	  ‘hazard’	  comes	  from	  the	  French	  hasard,	  which	  is	  presumably	  
derived	  from	  the	  Arabic	  az-­‐zahr	  meaning	  ‘the	  die’	  and	  possibly	  ‘an	  unlucky	  throw	  (at	  
dice)’.	  In	  the	  Shorter	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  (2007)	  it	  says	  that	  hazard	  not	  only	  means	  
‘chance’	  or	  ‘venture’,	  but	  also	  refers	  to	  ‘a	  dice	  game	  in	  which	  the	  chances	  are	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complicated	  by	  arbitrary	  rules’.	  It	  is	  assumingly	  this	  element	  that	  still	  gives	  hazard	  its	  
underlying	  connotation	  of	  risk	  and	  unwelcome	  uncontrollability.	  	  
	  
1.2.6.	  Fortuity	  and	  Serendipity	  
	  
While	  accident	  and	  hazard	  are	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  negative	  experience	  of	  
chance,	  fortuity	  and	  serendipity	  describe	  good	  and	  useful	  occurrences.	  Fortuity	  
derives	  from	  the	  Latin	  noun	  fors	  (‘chance,	  luck’)	  and	  forte	  (‘by	  chance’)	  which	  at	  first	  
simply	  meant	  ‘that	  which	  is	  brought’,	  as	  well	  as	  ‘an	  event’	  and	  only	  much	  later	  took	  
on	  an	  altogether	  positive	  connotation.	  The	  Roman	  goddess	  Fortuna,	  the	  equivalent	  
to	  Tychē,	  was	  responsible	  for	  people's	  good	  or	  bad	  luck.	  The	  Shorter	  Oxford	  
Dictionary	  (2007)	  writes:	  'The	  traditional,	  etymological	  meaning	  is	  'happening	  by	  
chance'.	  In	  modern	  English,	  however,	  fortuitous	  tends	  to	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  
fortunate	  outcomes,	  and	  has	  become	  more	  or	  less	  a	  synonym	  for	  ‘lucky’	  or	  
‘fortunate’.’	  
	   Serendipity	  is	  the	  happy	  accident	  whereby	  something	  important	  or	  valuable	  
is	  found,	  without	  having	  sought	  after	  it.	  Horace	  Walpole	  coined	  the	  term	  in	  1754	  to	  
denote	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  chance	  phenomenon.	  It	  originally	  meant	  the	  'discovery	  
by	  accidents	  and	  sagacity	  of	  things	  not	  in	  quest	  of'	  (Chumaceiro,	  1999,	  543).	  The	  
term	  was	  first	  included	  in	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  in	  1833.	  In	  1940	  Walter	  
Cannon	  used	  serendipity	  to	  describe	  lucky,	  coincidental	  discoveries	  in	  the	  sciences	  





These	  introductory	  elaborations	  provide	  a	  glimpse	  into	  the	  many	  ambivalent	  
perceptions	  of	  chance.	  The	  persisting	  issue	  in	  defining	  chance	  seems	  to	  be	  its	  
relationship	  with	  necessity.	  In	  the	  Dictionary	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  Religion	  chance	  is	  
defined	  as	  'An	  uncalculated,	  and	  possibly	  incalculable,	  element	  of	  existence;	  the	  
contingent	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  necessary	  aspects	  of	  existence’	  (Reese,	  1980).	  Today	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chance	  is	  also	  frequently	  equated	  with	  indeterminism:	  'Something	  happening	  by	  
chance	  does	  not	  happen	  for	  any	  reason.	  Its	  cause	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for,	  and	  it	  is	  
an	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  rule.	  Chance	  can	  be	  either	  good	  or	  bad,	  that	  is,	  either	  
good	  luck	  or	  bad	  luck,	  fortunate	  or	  unfortunate.	  In	  ethics,	  matters	  of	  chance	  or	  luck	  
are	  uncontrolled	  events	  that	  are	  beneficial	  or	  harmful	  to	  somebody.	  In	  modern	  
philosophy,	  chance	  contrasts	  with	  determinism	  and	  is	  discussed	  without	  ethical	  
aspects	  in	  statistics	  and	  probability	  theory’	  (Bunnin&Yu,	  2004,	  110-­‐1).	  Yet	  in	  his	  
essay	  What	  is	  Chance?	  Bunge	  writes	  that	  ‘[b]oth	  deterministic	  and	  indeterministic	  
metaphysics	  define	  chance	  in	  a	  negative	  way:	  the	  accidental	  is	  that	  which	  is	  not	  
necessary,	  or	  that	  which	  is	  not	  ordered’	  (1951,	  215).	  He	  finds	  a	  way	  out	  of	  this	  
dichotomy	  with	  what	  he	  calls	  dialectical	  materialism,	  where	  chance	  and	  necessity	  
are	  no	  longer	  viewed	  as	  antagonists	  but	  are	  connected	  through	  reciprocal	  action.	  
‘The	  contingent	  has	  its	  causes	  and	  there	  are,	  in	  turn,	  accidental	  causes.	  The	  
accidental	  can	  become	  necessary	  and	  viceversa’	  (ibid.,	  218).	  	  
Taking	  this	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  term	  chance	  does	  not	  
refer	  to	  a	  single	  circumstance,	  but	  rather	  exists	  on	  a	  spectrum	  ranging	  from	  absolute	  
determinism	  to	  absolute	  indeterminism.	  All	  main	  thinkers	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  
Peirce,	  Cabot,	  Jung,	  Breton,	  Arp	  and	  Richter	  interpret	  the	  nature	  of	  chance	  slightly	  
differently,	  but	  they	  are	  all	  united	  in	  regarding	  it	  as	  a	  real	  phenomenon.	  For	  
example,	  Peirce	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  descendant	  of	  Epicurus.	  Cabot,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
was	  a	  determinist.	  Jung	  is	  mainly	  interested	  in	  coincidences,	  the	  coming	  together	  of	  
separate	  yet	  mirroring	  events.	  But	  unlike	  Aristotle,	  Jung	  hypothesised	  that	  these	  
connections	  were	  acausal.	  Breton	  remained	  unsure	  on	  the	  question	  of	  causality,	  but	  
he	  was	  leaning	  towards	  a	  deterministic	  interpretation.	  	  
Bunge	  goes	  on	  to	  define	  chance	  very	  broadly	  in	  two	  ways:	  	  
	  
Ontological	  definition:	  An	  event	  is	  accidental,	  fortuitous,	  or	  contingent	  when	  
it	  may	  be	  or	  not	  be.	  	  
Epistemological	  or	  methodological	  definition:	  Contingent	  is	  all	  that	  which	  
cannot	  be	  predicted	  with	  certainty,	  whether	  because	  it	  has	  no	  causal	  law	  of	  
its	  own,	  or	  because	  we	  are	  ignorant	  of	  its	  law,	  or	  because	  we	  do	  not	  know	  
with	  enough	  precision	  the	  circumstances	  (e.g.	  initial	  conditions)	  which	  




It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  what	  unites	  all	  these	  various	  kinds	  of	  chance	  is	  that	  
unexpectedness	  and	  spontaneity	  are	  intrinsic	  to	  their	  nature,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  they	  
remain	  uncontrollable.	  The	  nature	  of	  chance	  is	  also	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis,	  but	  
rather	  its	  relationship	  with	  man.	  The	  ethical	  aspect	  of	  chance	  has	  already	  been	  part	  
of	  the	  discussion	  in	  early	  philosophical	  theories,	  but	  lost	  its	  significance	  during	  the	  
Enlightenment	  era	  when	  chance	  was	  degraded	  to	  being	  a	  sign	  of	  ignorance	  and	  
superstition.	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  more	  recent	  years	  there	  has	  been	  a	  revival	  of	  interest	  
in	  the	  ethical	  side	  of	  chance	  and	  this	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  too,	  particularly	  with	  
regard	  to	  positive	  interpretations	  of	  chance.	  
	  
2.	  Creativity	  
2.1.	  A	  Philosophical	  Exploration	  of	  Creativity	  
	  
Similar	  to	  chance,	  creativity	  was	  at	  first	  believed	  to	  come	  from	  a	  divine	  
source.	  God	  was	  regarded	  as	  the	  only	  true	  creator	  and	  humans	  were	  merely	  vessels	  
through	  which	  its	  divine	  creativity	  flowed.	  In	  ancient	  Greek	  perception	  the	  mind	  was	  
split	  into	  two	  chambers,	  the	  first	  one	  was	  a	  receptacle	  for	  ideas	  from	  the	  gods,	  in	  
the	  second	  more	  mundane	  thoughts	  were	  produced	  by	  the	  individual	  themselves.	  
Artists	  and	  inventors	  would	  consider	  themselves	  either	  inspired	  or	  abandoned	  by	  
the	  gods,	  depending	  on	  their	  creativeness.	  This	  quality	  of	  being	  inspired	  was	  
associated	  with	  genius,	  which	  at	  first	  meant	  having	  god-­‐given	  access	  to	  mystical	  
powers.	  Even	  though	  this	  belief	  continued	  to	  predominate	  until	  the	  Enlightenment,	  
already	  for	  some	  ancient	  Greeks,	  such	  as	  Aristotle,	  the	  perception	  of	  genius	  'became	  
mundane	  and	  was	  progressively	  associated	  with	  an	  individual's	  abilities	  and	  
appetites,	  both	  destructive	  and	  constructive'	  (Runco&Albert,	  2010,	  5).	  Furthermore,	  
in	  the	  ancient	  Western	  world	  genius	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  purely	  masculine	  trait,	  a	  view	  
that	  would	  prevail	  well	  into	  the	  19th	  century.	  	  
In	  1393	  Chaucer	  used	  the	  term	  ‘create’	  for	  the	  first	  time	  and	  the	  social	  
transformations	  during	  the	  Renaissance	  included	  further	  subtle	  shifts	  towards	  an	  
understanding	  that	  the	  works	  of	  great	  artists	  were	  not	  due	  to	  some	  god,	  but	  rather	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their	  own	  abilities	  and	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  two	  chambers	  came	  to	  an	  end.	  The	  English	  
Enlightenment	  brought	  real	  major	  turns,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  what	  
we	  now	  call	  ‘creativity’.	  In	  parallel	  to	  the	  growing	  social	  resistance	  against	  the	  
oppressive	  rule	  of	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  church	  and	  the	  monarchy,	  the	  sciences	  
were	  established	  as	  a	  field	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  These	  two	  developments	  influenced	  
each	  other	  and	  both	  their	  oppositions	  against	  the	  authorities	  sparked	  off	  a	  call	  for	  
more	  freedom,	  individualism	  and	  self-­‐governance.	  Together	  they	  acquired	  the	  
conviction	  that	  'freedom	  of	  speech,	  the	  press,	  and	  the	  life	  of	  the	  individual'	  was	  
necessary	  and	  that	  'people	  had	  no	  need	  for	  artificial	  authority	  and	  social	  restraint'	  
(ibid.,	  7).	  As	  part	  of	  the	  emerging	  concept	  of	  individualism,	  questions	  of	  freedom	  cut	  
across	  into	  discussions	  on	  genius,	  imagination	  and	  talent,	  all	  concepts	  that	  preceded	  
and	  then	  fed	  into	  the	  idea	  of	  creativity.	  Therefore,	  the	  understanding	  of	  creation	  
from	  nothing	  experienced	  a	  shift	  from	  divine	  to	  personal	  creativity	  where	  humans	  
were	  no	  longer	  a	  god’s	  mouthpiece,	  but	  became	  their	  own	  agents.	  In	  this	  view	  
genius,	  imagination	  and	  the	  power	  of	  the	  mind	  in	  general	  were	  due	  to	  man’s	  
rational	  faculties	  only.	  The	  general	  conception	  was	  that	  only	  through	  logic	  and	  
reason	  could	  man	  discover	  the	  world	  and	  invent	  for	  progress.	  	  	  
Friedrich	  Schiller’s	  philosophy	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  play-­‐drive	  
(Spieltrieb)	  had	  a	  lasting	  influence	  on	  many	  thinkers	  during	  the	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  
centuries.	  The	  Romantics	  especially	  took	  a	  liking	  to	  Schiller’s	  theory	  and	  as	  we	  shall	  
later	  see,	  Peirce	  and	  Jung	  also	  incorporated	  aspects	  of	  it	  into	  their	  discussions	  on	  
creativity.	  Schiller’s	  aesthetics	  are	  based	  on	  Kant,	  who	  was	  among	  the	  first	  
philosophers	  to	  include	  aesthetics	  in	  his	  overall	  philosophical	  system.3	  In	  Schiller’s	  
writing	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  are	  very	  closely	  related	  and	  an	  aesthetic	  experience	  is	  
not	  only	  beautiful,	  but	  also	  good	  and	  the	  good	  is	  always	  beautiful.	  He	  furthermore	  
associated	  aesthetics	  with	  feeling,	  where	  it	  ‘contrasts	  with	  the	  perspective	  of	  
reason,	  whether	  in	  the	  Kantian	  moral	  sense	  or	  a	  purely	  logical	  sense’	  (Barnouw,	  
1988,	  618).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	  ‘‘The	  work	  of	  Immanuel	  Kant	  is	  often	  taken	  as	  the	  critical	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  
play,	  for	  he	  linked	  aesthetic	  judgment	  and	  art	  to	  play.	  […]	  As	  a	  form	  of	  play,	  art	  is	  spontaneous,	  free	  
and	  pleasurable	  in	  itself,	  liberated	  from	  the	  necessity	  of	  having	  to	  be	  about	  reality,	  or	  having	  to	  be	  
representational,	  or	  of	  having	  to	  say	  anything	  at	  all.’	  Thereafter	  it	  became	  increasingly	  common	  to	  
talk	  of	  play	  in	  positive	  terms	  as	  a	  form	  of	  liberation	  and	  creative	  fulfilment’	  (Pope,	  2005,	  119).	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Yet	  Schiller	  also	  criticised	  Kant’s	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  play-­‐drive.	  On	  the	  Aesthetic	  Education	  of	  Man	  in	  a	  Series	  of	  
Letters	  (1794)	  constituted	  a	  reaction	  against	  Kant’s	  duality	  of	  the	  opposing	  forces	  of	  
sensuousness	  and	  reason	  active	  within	  man.	  Schiller	  was	  puzzled	  by	  and	  
discontented	  with	  the	  duality	  of	  the	  formal-­‐drive	  (Formtrieb)	  and	  the	  sensuous-­‐
drive	  (Sinnestrieb)	  and	  asked:	  ‘How,	  then,	  are	  we	  to	  restore	  the	  unity	  of	  human	  
nature	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  utterly	  destroyed	  by	  this	  primary	  and	  radical	  opposition?’	  
(Schiller,	  1967,	  85).	  He	  therefore	  set	  out	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  ‘man	  might	  have	  
greater	  empirical	  freedom	  than	  Kant’s	  idea	  of	  nature	  allowed	  and	  that	  experience	  
could	  be	  a	  positive	  resource	  of	  moral	  as	  well	  as	  logical	  rationality.	  For	  Schiller	  that	  is	  
a	  matter	  of	  improving	  the	  quality	  and	  depth	  of	  experience	  itself,	  which	  depends	  on	  
“cultivation	  of	  the	  power	  of	  feeling”	  or	  aesthetic	  education’	  (Barnouw,	  1988,	  621-­‐2).	  	  
He	  defined	  aesthetic	  experience	  as	  follows:	  ‘Beauty	  results	  from	  the	  
reciprocal	  action	  of	  two	  opposed	  drives	  and	  from	  the	  uniting	  of	  two	  opposed	  
principles.	  The	  highest	  ideal	  of	  beauty,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  be	  sought	  in	  the	  most	  perfect	  
possible	  union	  and	  equilibrium	  of	  reality	  and	  form’	  (Schiller,	  1967,	  111).	  Unlike	  Kant,	  
Schiller	  regarded	  play	  not	  only	  to	  lead	  to	  beauty	  and	  eventually	  to	  art,	  but	  also	  to	  
regulate	  and	  mediate	  between	  the	  other	  two	  drives	  formerly	  identified	  by	  Kant.	  He	  
therefore	  established	  play	  as	  another,	  a	  third	  impulse,	  the	  play-­‐drive	  (Spieltrieb),	  
which	  he	  identified	  as	  the	  method	  for	  achieving	  aesthetic	  experiences.	  ‘But	  how	  can	  
we	  speak	  of	  mere	  play,	  when	  we	  know	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  play	  and	  play	  alone,	  which	  
makes	  him	  whole	  and	  unfolds	  both	  sides	  of	  his	  nature	  at	  once?’	  (Schiller,	  1967,	  105).	  	  
At	  the	  heart	  of	  Schiller’s	  aesthetics	  on	  the	  whole	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  play	  in	  
particular	  lies	  the	  desire	  to	  regain	  a	  unity	  that	  he	  perceived	  to	  have	  been	  lost	  in	  
Kant’s	  presentation	  of	  dichotomy.	  The	  form-­‐drive	  and	  sense-­‐drive	  describe	  the	  most	  
fundamental	  opposition	  that	  man	  can	  experience,	  such	  as	  reason	  and	  sensation,	  
form	  and	  life,	  finiteness	  and	  infinity,	  activity	  and	  passivity.	  In	  the	  play-­‐drive	  Schiller	  
found	  a	  function,	  which	  could	  balance	  out	  and	  harmonise	  these	  seemingly	  
irreconcilable	  drives,	  which	  meant	  that	  ‘[t]o	  be	  at	  once	  active	  and	  passive	  (and	  to	  




Schiller	  insists	  that	  an	  esthetic	  experience	  differs	  from	  other	  ones	  because	  it	  
has	  no	  purpose	  save	  that	  of	  synthesizing	  our	  sensual	  contingency	  and	  
intellectual	  determination.	  He	  chooses	  to	  call	  the	  method	  for	  achieving	  
esthetic	  experiences	  “play”	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  this	  best	  captures	  its	  
essence,	  which	  is	  neither	  exclusively	  contingent	  nor	  compelled.	  Through	  play	  
we	  structure	  reality	  in	  a	  way	  that	  combines	  chance	  –	  reflecting	  our	  sensual	  
contingency	  –	  and	  law	  –	  reflecting	  the	  necessity	  in	  formal	  reasoning.	  As	  the	  
agent	  of	  esthetic	  experiences,	  play	  exhibits	  the	  following	  three	  
characteristics:	  (1)	  it	  is	  not	  motivated	  by	  a	  utilitarian	  purpose;	  (2)	  it	  exercises	  
both	  our	  physical	  and	  psychical	  powers;	  (3)	  it	  produces	  freedom	  of	  action	  
based	  on	  the	  reciprocal	  conditioning	  of	  our	  sense	  and	  form	  impulses	  (Dyer,	  
1986,	  29).	  	  
	  
The	  relative	  purposelessness	  and	  freedom	  are	  the	  two	  most	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  the	  
play-­‐impulse	  and,	  unlike	  Kant,	  Schiller	  argued	  that	  freedom	  constitutes	  a	  real	  
element	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  world.	  ‘Every	  exclusive	  domination	  of	  either	  of	  his	  two	  
fundamental	  impulses	  is	  for	  him	  a	  condition	  of	  constraint	  and	  of	  force,	  and	  freedom	  
consists	  solely	  in	  the	  co-­‐operation	  of	  both	  his	  natures’	  (Schiller,	  1954,	  86).	  The	  play-­‐
impulse	  makes	  room	  for	  freedom	  because	  it	  is	  free	  from	  the	  pressures	  the	  other	  two	  
drives	  are	  subjected	  to.	  Play	  thus	  means	  ‘everything	  that	  is	  neither	  subjectively	  nor	  
objectively	  contingent,	  and	  yet	  imposes	  neither	  outward	  nor	  inward	  necessity.	  As	  
our	  nature	  finds	  itself,	  in	  the	  contemplation	  of	  the	  Beautiful,	  in	  a	  happy	  midway	  
point	  between	  law	  and	  exigency,	  so,	  just	  because	  it	  is	  divided	  between	  the	  two,	  it	  is	  
withdrawn	  from	  the	  constraint	  of	  both	  alike’	  (ibid.,	  78).	  	  
	   Play	  is	  neither	  contingent,	  nor	  compelled.	  It	  hovers	  between	  the	  two,	  thus	  
sustaining	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  characterised	  by	  greater	  freedom	  than	  being	  enslaved	  to	  
one	  of	  the	  two	  drives.	  It	  can	  therefore	  be	  argued	  that	  play,	  by	  acknowledging	  
chance’s	  existence	  as	  one	  of	  the	  elements	  governing	  our	  experience,	  also	  gives	  it	  its	  
rightful	  place	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  world.	  
During	  the	  18th	  century	  'four	  important	  acceptable	  distinctions	  [emerged],	  
which	  were	  to	  become	  the	  bedrock	  of	  our	  present-­‐day	  ideas	  about	  creativity:	  (a)	  
genius	  was	  divorced	  from	  the	  supernatural;	  (b)	  genius,	  although	  exceptional,	  was	  a	  
potential	  in	  every	  individual;	  (c)	  talent	  and	  genius	  were	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  one	  
another;	  and	  (d)	  their	  potential	  and	  exercise	  depend	  on	  the	  political	  atmosphere	  at	  
the	  time'	  (Runco&Albert,	  2010,	  9).	  The	  19th	  century	  saw	  another	  major	  shift	  in	  the	  
conception	  of	  creativity,	  with	  debates	  emerging	  on	  nature	  versus	  nurture	  as	  well	  as	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increasing	  interest	  in	  the	  unconscious.	  With	  the	  discovery	  of	  heritability	  of	  physical	  
features	  the	  belief	  grew	  that	  learned	  traits	  and	  creativity	  are	  also	  due	  to	  heredity.	  
Francis	  Galton,	  building	  on	  theories	  of	  evolution	  and	  natural	  selection,	  was	  a	  strong	  
proponent	  of	  the	  view	  that	  genius	  was	  due	  to	  heredity,	  while	  William	  James	  later	  
claimed	  that	  the	  environment	  too	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  personality.	  
What	  united	  both	  was	  the	  belief	  in	  an	  unconscious.	  Many	  Romantic	  artists	  were	  
interested	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  unconscious	  and	  often	  glorified	  this	  mysterious	  realm	  as	  
the	  sole	  begetter	  of	  creativity.	  Similar	  to	  the	  belief	  in	  divine	  inspiration,	  the	  workings	  
of	  the	  unconscious	  were	  regarded	  as	  impenetrable	  and	  some	  artists	  even	  feared	  
that	  too	  much	  scientific	  probing	  might	  destroy	  it.	  Like	  the	  muses,	  the	  unconscious	  
was	  seen	  as	  a	  moody	  entity,	  which	  had	  to	  be	  approached	  with	  due	  respect	  in	  order	  
to	  receive	  its	  favours.	  However,	  the	  Romantics	  rejected	  the	  Enlightenment's	  view	  
that	  creativity	  was	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  well-­‐educated	  and	  carefully	  trained	  only,	  
or	  that	  it	  was	  clearly	  structured	  and	  organised.	  Instead	  they	  considered	  creativity	  to	  
be	  unpredictable	  and	  uncontrolled,	  as	  well	  as	  uncontrollable	  and	  they	  continued	  to	  
propagate	  that	  it	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  irrational,	  for	  example	  through	  the	  admiration	  of	  
the	  creativity	  of	  madness.	  
Only	  in	  1926,	  with	  the	  writings	  of	  Alfred	  North	  Whitehead,	  does	  the	  actual	  
word	  ‘creativity’	  enter	  the	  English	  language	  (see	  Halewood,	  2011,	  35).	  Yet	  
Whitehead	  ascribed	  a	  very	  specific	  meaning	  to	  it	  that	  differs	  from	  the	  popular	  
understanding	  we	  have	  of	  creativity	  today.	  Within	  his	  philosophy	  of	  process	  and	  
potentiality	  ‘creativity’	  is	  one	  of	  the	  three	  categories	  of	  the	  Ultimate,	  beside	  ‘one’	  
and	  ‘many’.	  In	  Whitehead’s	  own	  words:	  ‘The	  creativity	  is	  the	  actualization	  of	  
potentiality,	  and	  the	  process	  of	  actualization	  is	  an	  occasion	  of	  experiencing	  …	  The	  
process	  of	  creation	  is	  the	  form	  of	  unity	  of	  the	  Universe’	  (Rapp&Wiehl,	  1986,	  102).	  
For	  Whitehead	  the	  movement	  of	  creativity	  governs	  all	  things	  as	  they	  exist	  in	  a	  
continuous	  process	  of	  evolution.	  It	  means	  that	  matter	  is	  never	  fully	  determined	  but	  
is	  instead	  free	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  it	  contains	  the	  potentiality	  to	  act	  or	  react	  in	  novel	  
ways.	  He	  wrote:	  ‘The	  initial	  situation	  includes	  a	  factor	  of	  activity	  which	  is	  the	  reason	  
for	  the	  origin	  of	  that	  occasion	  of	  experience.	  This	  factor	  of	  activity	  is	  what	  I	  have	  
called	  “Creativity”’	  (ibid.,	  21).	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Contemporary	  scientific	  research	  of	  creativity	  started	  with	  J.	  P.	  Guilford's	  
presidential	  address	  to	  the	  American	  Psychological	  Association	  in	  1950,	  where	  he	  
encouraged	  psychologists	  to	  start	  studying	  creativity	  as	  a	  subject	  of	  its	  own.	  Today	  
research	  into	  creativity	  is	  being	  conducted	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  fields,	  such	  as	  
psychology,	  philosophy,	  neuroscience,	  economics,	  business,	  sociology,	  
anthropology,	  education,	  the	  arts	  and	  computer	  science.	  ‘Creativity	  research’	  now	  
holds	  several	  of	  its	  own	  specific	  scholarly	  journals	  and	  psychology	  alone	  has	  seen	  a	  
fivefold	  increase	  in	  papers	  published	  on	  creativity	  since	  the	  1950s.	  Runco	  and	  Albert	  
therefore	  intimate	  that	  ‘at	  present	  the	  field	  can	  be	  described	  only	  as	  explosive’	  
(2010,	  5).	  	  
	  
	  
2.1.	  Definitions	  of	  Creativity	  
	  
For	  creativity	  two	  definitions	  shall	  be	  introduced.	  In	  the	  broad	  sense	  
Whitehead’s	  understanding	  of	  creativity	  can	  be	  adopted.	  Namely	  ‘that	  creativity	  is	  in	  
no	  way	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  human	  activity	  or	  consciousness	  and	  that	  a	  wider	  
understanding	  of	  creativity,	  based	  on	  the	  relativity	  of	  the	  potential	  and	  the	  actual,	  
must	  be	  recognized’	  (Halewood,	  2011,	  38).	  Creativity	  thus	  describes	  the	  activity	  
through	  which	  things	  come	  into	  being	  within	  the	  continual	  process	  of	  change.	  
Accordingly	  all	  natural	  processes,	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  cosmos,	  evolution	  and	  self-­‐
realisation	  are	  governed	  by	  creativity.	  	  
Yet	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense,	  creativity	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  particular	  human	  
activity.	  At	  first	  creativity	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  gift	  only	  bestowed	  on	  a	  selected	  few,	  
however	  today	  studies	  stress	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  special	  trait,	  but	  that	  it	  permeates	  all	  
aspects	  of	  life.	  It	  is	  then	  called	  ‘everyday	  creativity’	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  supposition	  
that	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  ‘a	  high	  proportion	  of	  adults	  engage	  in	  the	  production	  of	  (at	  
least	  for	  them)	  new	  ideas	  or	  products’	  (Cropley,	  1999,	  515).	  Today’s	  research	  often	  
sees	  creativity	  as	  a	  universal	  experience	  that	  not	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  population,	  
but	  every	  healthy	  individual	  experiences,	  albeit	  to	  varying	  degrees.	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Plucker	  and	  Makel	  provide	  a	  very	  broad,	  yet	  clear	  and	  concise	  definition	  
which	  most	  researchers	  agree	  on:	  ‘Creativity	  is	  the	  interaction	  among	  aptitude,	  
process,	  and	  environment	  by	  which	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  produces	  a	  perceptible	  
product	  that	  is	  both	  novel	  and	  useful	  as	  defined	  within	  a	  social	  context’	  (2010,	  49	  ).	  
We	  could	  argue,	  though,	  that	  ‘however	  we	  conceive	  of	  creativity	  we	  should	  not	  
make	  its	  existence	  dependent	  on	  its	  being	  recognised	  as	  such.	  By	  definition,	  we	  are	  
not	  aware	  of	  creativity	  that	  goes	  unnoticed,	  but	  we	  have	  every	  reason	  to	  believe	  
that	  it	  exists’	  (Nickerson,	  1999,	  394).	  This	  goes	  back	  to	  acknowledging	  Whitehead’s	  
broad	  conception	  of	  creativity	  as	  the	  backdrop	  to	  its	  narrow	  definition.	  	  
	  
	  
2.2.	  Defining	  Creativity	  through	  more	  Key	  Concepts	  
	  
Similar	  to	  the	  last	  chapter,	  in	  this	  section	  several	  key	  terms	  that	  are	  routinely	  
connected	  to	  creativity	  are	  briefly	  described	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  nearer	  to	  the	  
phenomenon.	  Some	  are	  erroneously	  used	  as	  synonyms	  for	  creativity,	  others	  denote	  
principal	  characteristics	  or	  turn	  out	  to	  refer	  to	  either	  prerequisites	  or	  outcomes	  of	  
creativity,	  rather	  than	  creativity	  itself.	  	  
	  
2.2.1.	  Genius	  and	  Talent	  
	  
In	  the	  ancient	  world	  the	  Latin	  word	  genius	  referred	  to	  the	  divine	  element	  
present	  in	  all	  worldly	  material	  and	  it	  described	  the	  guiding	  spirit	  through	  which	  the	  
individual	  was	  able	  to	  be	  creative.	  Later	  a	  shift	  took	  place	  from	  'having'	  genius	  to	  
'being'	  a	  genius	  and	  during	  the	  19th	  century	  artists	  were	  divided	  into	  two	  types:	  
those	  with	  real	  genius	  and	  those	  with	  mere	  talent.	  Robert	  Schuman	  once	  said:	  
‘Talent	  works,	  genius	  creates’,	  meaning	  that	  talent	  is	  the	  more	  mechanical	  aspect	  
and	  that	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  take	  creativity	  to	  be	  talented.	  Yet,	  talent	  often	  
fosters	  the	  creative	  process,	  which	  in	  turn	  might	  lead	  to	  someone	  being	  called	  a	  
genius.	  A	  genius	  is	  usually	  very	  talented	  in	  their	  field,	  but	  this	  talent	  is	  then	  
combined	  with	  the	  aptitude	  to	  think	  creatively,	  often	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  divergent	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thinking.	  A	  genius	  is	  someone	  who	  is	  better	  at	  problem-­‐solving,	  comes	  up	  with	  more	  
novelty	  and	  originality	  and	  displays	  extraordinarily	  high	  levels	  of	  creativity.	  ‘The	  
genius	  accomplishes	  in	  a	  brief	  space	  of	  time	  undertakings	  for	  which	  the	  life	  of	  an	  
ordinary	  man	  would	  far	  from	  suffice’	  (Mach,	  1896,	  174-­‐5).	  Creativity	  is	  therefore	  
often	  used	  as	  an	  attribute:	  the	  creative	  genius.	  Genius	  describes	  an	  individual's	  
heightened	  mental	  power	  and	  outstanding	  intellectual	  capacity,	  together	  with	  a	  
strong	  intuition.	  Its	  mental	  characteristics	  are:	  ‘fertility	  of	  mind,	  powers	  of	  ideation	  
and	  imagination,	  and	  attention’	  (Stein&Heinze,	  1960,	  344).	  Talent	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  
is	  the	  superior	  aptitude	  to	  be	  good	  at	  a	  certain	  physical	  or	  mental	  activity,	  without	  
previous	  knowledge	  or	  learning.	  A	  talented	  person	  shows	  high	  levels	  of	  competency	  
at	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  and	  it	  is	  considered	  an	  inborn	  trait,	  a	  predisposition	  for	  
learning	  and	  as	  such	  it	  has	  also	  been	  described	  as	  a	  'gift'.	  	  
	  
2.2.2.	  Imagination,	  Play	  and	  Fantasy	  
	  
Imagination	  and	  play	  are	  two	  concepts	  most	  crucial	  to	  this	  discussion	  of	  
creativity.	  Creativity	  and	  imagination	  are	  very	  frequently	  mentioned	  together,	  but	  
even	  though	  a	  strong	  relationship	  exists	  between	  them,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  equated	  
with	  each	  other.	  Singer	  suggests	  that	  ‘imagination	  is	  subsidiary	  to	  creativity	  and	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  it’	  (2011,	  xii).	  Imagination	  is	  the	  ‘entertaining	  of	  possibles’	  
(ibid.)	  and	  as	  such	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  activities	  nourishing	  creativity.	  
Kearney	  describes	  imagination	  as	  ‘the	  human	  power	  to	  convert	  absence	  into	  
presence,	  actuality	  into	  possibility,	  what-­‐is	  into	  something-­‐other-­‐than-­‐it-­‐is’	  (1998,	  
4).	  Singer	  adds	  that	  ‘[t]hese	  sensory	  derived	  images	  (‘pictures	  in	  the	  mind’s	  eye’),	  
mental	  conversations,	  or	  remembered	  or	  anticipated	  smells,	  touches,	  tastes,	  or	  
movements	  can	  be	  reshaped	  and	  recombined	  into	  new	  images	  or	  possible	  featured	  
dialogues’	  (1999,	  13).	  The	  ability	  to	  reproduce	  images	  and	  to	  reshape	  them	  
according	  to	  one’s	  liking	  is	  original	  in	  every	  person	  and	  it	  is	  this	  unique	  faculty	  that	  
lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  being	  creative.	  ‘Imagination	  is	  a	  form	  of	  playful	  analogical	  
thinking	  […].	  Obviously,	  logical	  thinking	  with	  its	  rigorous	  rules	  does	  not	  leave	  room	  
for	  free	  play,	  while	  imaginative	  thinking	  does	  allow	  for	  playful	  associations	  to	  occur	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within	  contextual	  constraints,	  leading	  to	  the	  generation	  of	  contextually	  valid	  
patterns	  of	  meaning’	  (Policastro	  &	  Gardner,	  1999,	  217).	  	  
	   The	  play	  or	  ludic4	  aspect	  of	  imagination	  is	  absolutely	  vital	  for	  creativity	  and	  
many	  scientists	  and	  artists	  have	  reported	  that	  a	  new	  idea	  or	  solution	  only	  emerged	  
through	  freely	  playing	  around	  with	  the	  material	  at	  hand.	  Lieberman,	  who	  was	  
among	  the	  first	  to	  be	  interested	  in	  links	  between	  play,	  imagination	  and	  creativity,	  
argued	  that	  playfulness,	  especially	  imaginative	  play,	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  being	  
human.	  Play	  is	  predominantly	  researched	  in	  children	  and	  Runco	  describes	  how	  
recent	  studies	  have	  revealed	  that	  a	  frequent	  engagement	  in	  inventing	  imaginary	  
worlds	  could	  later	  contribute	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  creativity.	  Five	  benefits	  have	  been	  
associated	  with	  engaging	  in	  this	  activity:	  it	  ‘exercises	  the	  imagination	  and	  
playfulness,	  it	  contributes	  to	  problem-­‐solving	  capacity,	  it	  allows	  people	  to	  revisit	  and	  
control	  their	  experiences	  and	  it	  suggests	  to	  the	  individual	  that	  there	  are	  possibilities	  
beyond	  reality	  and	  beyond	  what	  is	  given’	  (Runco,	  2007,	  377-­‐8).	  Play	  is	  furthermore	  
linked	  to	  flexibility	  and	  adaptability	  and	  ‘the	  most	  consistent	  finding	  in	  the	  literature	  
is	  that	  play	  can	  promote	  imaginativeness	  and	  divergent-­‐thinking	  skills’	  (Dansky,	  
1999,	  408).	  	  
Christie	  and	  Johnsen	  ‘noted	  that	  play	  and	  creativity	  have	  much	  in	  common.	  
In	  particular,	  play	  often	  involves	  symbolic	  transformations	  in	  which	  objects	  and	  
actions	  are	  used	  in	  new	  or	  unusual	  ways,	  similar	  to	  the	  novel,	  imaginative	  
combinations	  of	  ideas	  involved	  in	  creative	  thinking’	  (O’Quin	  &	  Derks,	  1997,	  243).	  
However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  play	  ‘almost	  never	  [occurs]	  when	  one	  is	  anxious	  or	  
narrowly	  focused	  on	  achieving	  a	  specified	  goal’,	  instead	  it	  ‘tends	  to	  occur	  in	  
environments	  and	  with	  objects	  that	  are	  already	  relatively	  familiar,	  the	  emphasis	  
changes	  from	  “What	  does	  this	  object	  do?”	  to	  “What	  can	  I	  do	  with	  this	  object?”’	  
(Dansky,	  1999,	  396).	  Play	  is	  often	  defined	  as	  engaging	  in	  an	  activity	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  
It	  is	  usually	  ‘intrinsically	  motivated,	  self-­‐directed	  and	  relatively	  free	  from	  externally	  
imposed	  rules	  or	  constraints,	  and	  that	  the	  link	  between	  means	  and	  ends	  is	  loose	  and	  
flexible’	  (ibid.,	  393).	  In	  Homo	  Ludens	  Huizinga	  analysed	  play	  as	  a	  ‘significant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  While	  ludus	  (Greek	  for	  game)	  originally	  referred	  to	  play	  with	  rules	  and	  objectives,	  in	  contrast	  to	  
paedia	  (play)	  meaning	  unstructured	  and	  free	  play,	  today	  ludic	  is	  likewise	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  any	  kind	  




function’	  of	  culture:	  ‘in	  play	  there	  is	  something	  “at	  play”	  which	  transcends	  the	  
immediate	  needs	  of	  life	  and	  imparts	  meaning	  to	  the	  action.	  All	  play	  means	  
something’	  (1966,	  1).	  Yet	  it	  is	  ‘different	  from	  ordinary	  life’,	  but	  it	  nevertheless	  
‘creates	  order,	  is	  order.	  Into	  an	  imperfect	  world	  and	  into	  the	  confusion	  of	  life	  it	  
brings	  a	  temporary,	  a	  limited	  perfection’	  (ibid.,	  10).	  As	  such	  play	  is	  an	  activity	  
absolutely	  free	  from	  the	  restrictions	  of	  everyday	  life.	  Its	  very	  nature	  is	  to	  disregard	  
the	  known	  and	  to	  violate	  conventions,	  habits	  and	  rules.	  To	  be	  playful	  furthermore	  
means	  to	  be	  able	  to	  accept	  and	  incorporate	  unforeseen	  aspects,	  for	  example	  chance	  
events,	  into	  one’s	  game	  or	  considerations.	  Imagination	  and	  play	  can	  clearly	  not	  be	  
equated	  with	  creativity,	  but	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  crucial	  prerequisites	  for	  creativity.	  
Imagination	  and	  fantasy	  often	  get	  confused	  or	  are	  used	  synonymously.	  
Fantasy,	  is	  ‘an	  imagined	  sequence	  of	  events	  that	  may	  be	  relatively	  remote	  from	  our	  
daily	  reality	  but	  which	  may	  reflect	  longstanding	  or	  recent	  unfulfilled	  wishes,	  
intentions,	  or	  current	  concerns’	  (Singer,	  1999,	  13).	  These	  fantasies	  are	  in	  one	  form	  
or	  another	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  individual	  and	  they	  can	  either	  be	  positive	  or	  
hostile.	  Policastro	  and	  Gardner	  define	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
Imagination	  should	  denote	  the	  generation	  of	  patterns	  of	  meaning	  that	  are	  
contextually	  valid	  and	  that	  serve	  an	  adaptive	  function	  towards	  reality;	  
fantasy	  should	  denote	  subjective	  expression	  of	  needs,	  conflicts,	  and	  wishes.	  
Fantasy	  also	  serves	  an	  adaptive	  function	  in	  that	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  subject's	  
intrapsychic	  equilibrium,	  in	  the	  Freudian	  sense.	  Here	  we	  stress	  that	  
imagination	  generates	  potentially	  creative	  ideas,	  while	  fantasy	  generates	  
illusions	  (Policastro&Gardner,	  1999,	  217).	  	  
	  
2.2.3.	  Inspiration,	  Insight	  and	  Intuition	  
	  
For	  a	  long	  time	  insight	  used	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  some	  external,	  usually	  divine	  
power.	  Later	  that	  view	  shifted	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  insight	  emerged	  from	  the	  
unconscious,	  beyond	  the	  individual's	  control.	  Today	  insight	  is	  defined	  as:	  	  
	  
a	  distinctive	  and	  apparently	  sudden	  realization	  of	  a	  strategy	  that	  aids	  in	  
solving	  a	  problem,	  which	  is	  usually	  preceded	  by	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  prior	  thought	  
and	  hard	  work;	  often	  involves	  reconceptualizing	  a	  problem	  or	  a	  strategy	  for	  
its	  solution	  in	  a	  totally	  new	  way;	  frequently	  emerges	  by	  detecting	  and	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combining	  relevant	  old	  and	  new	  information	  to	  gain	  a	  novel	  view	  of	  the	  
problems	  or	  of	  its	  solution	  (Sternberg&Davidson,	  1999,	  58).	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  aspects	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  ‘flash	  of	  insight’	  accompanied	  by	  strong	  
feelings	  of	  meaning	  and	  importance.	  Insight	  is	  more	  often	  used	  when	  referring	  to	  
science,	  whereas	  inspiration	  is	  generally	  used	  to	  describe	  sudden	  artistic	  
illumination.	  Inspiration	  is	  the	  least	  discussed	  in	  academic	  literature	  and	  its	  meaning	  
remains	  rather	  obscure.	  Clark	  writes	  that	  it	  is	  generally	  understood	  as	  ‘the	  
‘liberation’	  of	  a	  supposedly	  truer	  or	  deeper	  self	  from	  out	  of	  the	  pressures	  of	  
convention,	  cliché,	  tradition,	  false	  thinking	  or	  inauthenticity’	  (1997,	  5).	  He	  
furthermore	  notes	  that	  ‘[i]nspiration	  may	  bear	  a	  peculiar	  transitivity,	  one	  that	  
confounds	  distinctions	  between	  self	  and	  other.	  The	  writer	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  passively	  
inspired,	  as	  if	  by	  some	  hidden	  agent,	  yet	  the	  same	  writer	  is	  said	  actively	  to	  inspire	  
auditors	  or	  readers’	  (ibid.,	  3).	  Chance	  events	  can	  clearly	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  such	  a	  
‘hidden	  agent’	  from	  which	  sudden	  inspiration	  emerges.	  
Insight	  and	  intuition	  are	  often	  used	  to	  mean	  the	  same	  thing	  and	  though	  they	  
can	  overlap	  they	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  separate	  concepts:	  ‘Intuition	  entails	  
vague	  and	  tacit	  knowledge,	  whereas	  insight	  involves	  sudden,	  and	  unusually	  clear,	  
awareness.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  creativity,	  intuition	  may	  precede	  insight’	  (Policastro,	  
1999,	  90).	  Bunnin	  and	  Yu	  define	  intuition	  as	  ‘[t]he	  innate	  power	  of	  the	  mind	  to	  see	  
or	  directly	  apprehend	  truths,	  without	  the	  aid	  of	  sensory	  stimuli,	  and	  without	  prior	  
inference	  or	  discussion.	  It	  is	  knowing	  a	  particular	  in	  a	  universal	  in	  a	  single	  flash	  of	  
insight.	  Intuitive	  knowledge	  is	  thus	  distinguished	  from	  inferential	  knowledge’	  (2004,	  
358).	  An	  intuitively	  right	  decision	  is	  usually	  then	  taken	  when	  three	  components	  are	  
involved:	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  imaginative	  and	  playful,	  expertise	  and	  domain-­‐specificity	  
and	  thirdly,	  intrapersonal	  intelligence.	  Those	  who	  know	  their	  domain	  well	  will	  more	  
likely	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  the	  relevant	  and	  important	  elements	  from	  those	  that	  are	  
not.	  Intrapersonal	  intelligence	  ‘allows	  a	  person	  to	  understand	  his	  or	  her	  own	  
intrapsychic	  life,	  effecting	  subtle	  discriminations	  among	  different	  aspects	  of	  it’	  




2.2.4.	  Novelty	  and	  Originality	  
	  
Creativity	  is	  most	  persistently	  characterised	  by	  displaying	  novelty	  and	  
originality,	  whereby	  the	  two	  are	  often	  conflated.	  However,	  Hausman	  (1979),	  Boden	  
(2004)	  and	  Runco	  (2007)	  emphasise	  that	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  needs	  to	  be	  
made	  clear.	  ‘A	  minimal	  condition	  or	  common	  denominator	  of	  newness	  is	  that	  it	  is	  
present	  where	  something	  is	  different	  from	  its	  past.	  A	  thing	  that	  is	  new	  must	  at	  least	  
be	  different	  from	  what	  preceded	  it’	  (Hausman).	  This	  can	  simply	  be	  done	  by	  
recombining	  old	  facts	  whereas	  ‘originality	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  idea	  of	  origination,	  and	  
origination	  of	  something	  that	  contributes	  to	  an	  evolution	  in	  the	  domain	  in	  which	  it	  is	  
originated’	  (Hausman	  and	  Anderson).	  Boden	  distinguishes	  novelty	  and	  originality	  as	  
follows:	  ‘A	  merely	  novel	  idea	  is	  one	  which	  can	  be	  described	  and/or	  produced	  by	  the	  
same	  set	  of	  generative	  rules	  as	  are	  other,	  familiar,	  ideas.	  A	  radically	  original,	  or	  
creative,	  idea	  is	  one	  which	  cannot’	  (Boden,	  2004,	  51).	  	  
There	  are	  two	  main	  categories	  to	  novelty.	  First,	  what	  is	  new	  to	  the	  
experiencer	  and	  second,	  what	  is	  new	  to	  the	  world	  at	  large.	  Hausman	  describes	  the	  
radically	  new	  as	  ‘Novelty	  Proper,’	  as	  ‘a	  creation	  in	  the	  radical	  sense,	  then,	  must	  
exhibit	  structure	  that	  is	  both	  unprecedented	  and	  unpredictable’	  (1979,	  243).	  
Anderson	  stresses	  that	  ‘originality	  does	  not	  always	  entail	  ‘radical	  novelty’	  but	  when	  
it	  does,	  we	  have	  a	  case	  of	  abduction	  presenting	  us	  with	  absolute	  originality’	  (1987,	  
46).	  While	  some	  ideas	  are	  merely	  new	  or	  original	  to	  the	  experiencer,	  some	  are	  
radically	  novel	  and	  original	  on	  a	  historical	  level.	  Yet	  it	  remains	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  
determine	  the	  degree	  of	  novelty	  or	  originality	  accurately.	  
	  
2.2.5.	  Invention	  and	  Discovery	  
	  
Invention,	  or	  innovation,	  and	  discovery	  are	  two	  areas	  frequently	  linked	  to	  
creativity.	  Creative	  thinking	  can	  lead	  to	  both	  of	  them	  and	  they	  can	  therefore	  be	  
described	  as	  applications	  of	  creativity.	  Clydesdale	  suggests	  that	  creativity	  is	  usually	  
‘driven	  by	  intrinsic	  motives’	  and	  innovation	  by	  ‘extrinsic	  incentives’	  and	  ‘the	  need	  to	  




Creativity	  constitutes	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  forms	  of	  human	  expression.	  
Innovativeness	  largely	  involves	  restructuring	  and	  synthesizing	  knowledge	  
into	  new	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  of	  doing	  things.	  It	  requires	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  
cognitive	  facility	  to	  override	  established	  ways	  of	  thinking	  that	  impede	  
exploration	  of	  novel	  ideas	  and	  search	  for	  new	  knowledge.	  But	  above	  all,	  
innovativeness	  requires	  an	  unshakeable	  sense	  of	  efficacy	  to	  persist	  in	  
creative	  endeavors	  (Runco,	  2007,	  385).	  
	  
Discovery,	  in	  most	  instances,	  presupposes	  the	  activity	  of	  searching	  for	  
something	  one	  wants	  to	  find.	  This	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  something	  tangible	  like	  a	  
place	  or	  an	  object.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  an	  idea	  or	  technique.	  ‘Discovery	  often	  leads	  to	  
some	  finding	  rather	  than	  abstract	  creation,	  but	  it	  often	  depends	  heavily	  on	  creative	  
thinking	  and	  the	  creative	  process’	  (ibid.,	  391).	  Discoveries	  can	  also	  be	  made	  by	  way	  
of	  serendipity,	  when	  the	  experiencer	  stumbles	  upon	  a	  discovery	  without	  consciously	  





Like	  chance,	  creativity	  can	  also	  be	  perceived	  as	  an	  experience	  ranging	  on	  a	  
wide	  spectrum,	  from	  small,	  everyday	  creative	  behaviours	  to	  those	  rare	  occasions	  of	  
radical	  ideas	  leading	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  a	  worldview.	  Cropley	  therefore	  
distinguishes	  between	  secondary	  creativity,	  ‘a	  different	  application	  of	  the	  already	  
known’	  and	  primary	  creativity,	  the	  ‘development	  of	  new	  principles.’	  He	  continues	  to	  
say	  that	  ‘The	  highest	  form	  of	  creativity,	  which	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  “revolution”	  in	  an	  area,	  
requires	  introducing	  a	  new	  “paradigm”’	  (1999,	  514).	  Boden	  divides	  creativity	  into	  
three	  main	  sub-­‐categories:	  combination,	  exploration	  and	  transformation.	  The	  
largest	  bulk	  of	  studies	  focuses	  on	  the	  first	  type	  and	  thus	  on	  the	  ‘novel	  combinations	  
of	  old	  ideas’.	  Examples	  of	  combinational	  creativity	  are	  analogies,	  poetic	  imagery,	  
collage,	  jokes	  and	  word	  play.	  Boden	  writes	  that	  ‘these	  new	  combinations	  can	  be	  
generated	  either	  deliberately	  or,	  often,	  unconsciously’	  (2010,	  31)	  and	  for	  most	  
people	  this	  kind	  of	  creativity	  is	  part	  of	  their	  everyday	  life.	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Yet	  the	  ‘other	  two	  types	  of	  creativity	  are	  interestingly	  different	  from	  the	  first.	  
They	  involve	  the	  exploration,	  and	  in	  the	  most	  surprising	  cases	  the	  transformation,	  of	  
conceptual	  spaces	  in	  people’s	  minds’	  (ibid.).	  Exploratory	  creativity	  refers	  to	  the	  
process	  of	  probing	  into	  conceptual	  spaces.5	  Through	  exploratory	  creativity	  these	  
spaces	  become	  more	  accurately	  mapped.	  
	  
If	  the	  new	  idea	  is	  surprising	  not	  just	  in	  itself	  but	  as	  an	  example	  of	  an	  
unexpected	  general	  type,	  so	  much	  the	  better.	  […]	  Exploratory	  creativity	  is	  
valuable	  because	  it	  can	  enable	  someone	  to	  see	  possibilities	  they	  hadn’t	  
glimpsed	  before.	  They	  may	  even	  start	  to	  ask	  just	  what	  limits,	  and	  just	  what	  
potential,	  this	  style	  of	  thinking	  has	  (ibid.,	  32-­‐3).	  
	  
Finally,	  transformational	  creativity	  refers	  not	  only	  to	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  
limitations	  of	  a	  conceptual	  space,	  but	  also	  to	  its	  deconstruction.	  Instead	  a	  
fundamentally	  different	  and	  new	  construct	  takes	  its	  place:	  
	  
The	  deepest	  cases	  of	  creativity	  involve	  someone’s	  thinking	  something	  which,	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  conceptual	  spaces	  in	  their	  minds,	  they	  couldn’t	  have	  
thought	  before.	  The	  supposedly	  impossible	  idea	  can	  come	  about	  only	  if	  the	  
creator	  changes	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  style	  in	  some	  way.	  It	  must	  be	  tweaked,	  or	  
even	  radically	  transformed,	  so	  that	  thoughts	  are	  now	  possible	  which	  
previously	  (within	  the	  untransformed	  space)	  were	  literally	  unconceivable	  
(ibid.,	  35).	  	  
	  
This	  third	  category	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  the	  other	  two	  and	  rarely	  achieved.	  The	  
experience	  of	  creativity	  can	  therefore	  differ	  widely	  in	  the	  impact	  it	  has	  on	  us.	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  The	  Role	  of	  Chance	  in	  Creativity	  
	  
Literature	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  chance	  in	  creative	  processes	  is	  still	  
relatively	  sparse,	  but	  interest	  in	  the	  topic	  is	  growing.	  Within	  the	  field	  of	  academic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  ‘Conceptual	  spaces	  are	  structured	  styles	  of	  thought.	  They’re	  normally	  picked	  up	  from	  one’s	  own	  
culture	  or	  peer	  group,	  but	  are	  occasionally	  borrowed	  from	  other	  cultures.	  In	  either	  case,	  they’re	  
already	  there:	  they	  aren’t	  originated	  by	  one	  individual	  mind’	  (ibid.,	  32).	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creativity	  research	  there	  are	  only	  a	  few	  articles	  that	  have	  been	  published	  on	  this	  
subject.	  Otherwise	  it	  is	  only	  briefly	  dealt	  with	  in	  a	  few	  paragraphs	  or	  in	  even	  rarer	  
cases	  a	  whole	  chapter	  is	  given	  over	  to	  the	  topic.	  Overall,	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  literature	  is	  
about	  serendipity	  in	  discovery	  and	  invention,	  thus	  focusing	  on	  scientific	  creativity.	  A	  
number	  of	  articles	  and	  essays	  have	  been	  published	  on	  the	  topic	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
19th	  century,	  emphasising	  chance’s	  striking	  significance	  in	  scientific	  advancement.	  
However,	  it	  is	  noticeable	  that	  more	  recent	  literature,	  while	  still	  mentioning	  the	  
possibility	  that	  chance	  plays	  a	  role,	  generally	  downplays	  its	  influence	  as	  minor	  or	  
even	  insignificant.	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  shift	  might	  lie	  in	  the	  double	  aim	  that	  creativity	  
research	  pursues	  since	  its	  beginnings.	  Namely	  to	  understand	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  
what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  creative,	  but	  more	  importantly	  to	  use	  this	  information	  to	  
stimulate	  and	  induce	  creativeness	  at	  will.	  Since	  chance	  represents	  an	  influence	  that	  
can’t	  be	  controlled,	  it	  doesn’t	  fit	  in	  with	  this	  second	  aim.	  	  
As	  already	  mentioned,	  Guilford's	  keynote	  speech	  in	  1950	  marked	  the	  
beginning	  of	  creativity	  research.	  He	  explained	  that	  ‘imaginative	  solutions’	  are	  
required	  in	  order	  to	  a	  meet	  the	  military,	  technological	  and	  population	  challenges	  of	  
the	  cold-­‐war	  era.	  He	  said:	  ‘we	  are	  in	  a	  mortal	  struggle	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  our	  way	  of	  
life	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  military	  aspect	  of	  this	  struggle,	  with	  its	  race	  to	  develop	  new	  
weapons	  and	  new	  strategies,	  has	  called	  for	  a	  stepped-­‐up	  rate	  of	  invention’	  (Pope,	  
2005,	  20).	  Sawyer	  adds	  that	  ‘creativity	  research	  was	  a	  high-­‐stakes	  game	  during	  the	  
nuclear	  arms	  race:	  in	  1954,	  psychologist	  Carl	  Rogers	  warned	  that	  “the	  lights	  will	  go	  
out	  …	  international	  annihilation	  will	  be	  the	  price	  we	  pay	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  creativity”’	  
(2012,	  17).	  In	  fact,	  ‘like	  Guilford,	  many	  of	  the	  early	  creativity	  scholars	  got	  their	  start	  
during	  World	  War	  II,	  evaluating	  personality	  traits	  for	  the	  military'	  and	  it	  was	  many	  of	  
'these	  military	  psychologists	  [that]	  founded	  several	  research	  institutes	  to	  study	  
creative	  individuals’	  (ibid.).	  
	   Not	  much	  has	  changed	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  ambition	  to	  uncover	  how	  creative	  
thinking	  works.	  It	  still	  predominantly	  serves	  the	  purpose	  to	  consciously	  enhance	  
creative	  performance,	  only	  now	  attention	  has	  shifted	  even	  more	  towards	  the	  
deployment	  of	  creativity	  for	  building	  a	  more	  resistant	  workforce	  within	  increasingly	  
competitive	  markets.	  This	  becomes	  apparent	  when	  looking	  at	  recent	  popular	  
literature,	  for	  example	  Lehrer	  (2012),	  Michalko	  (2001)	  and	  (2010),	  Robinson,	  (2011),	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Tharp,	  (2007),	  as	  well	  as	  academic	  publications	  such	  as	  Rickards	  &	  Runco	  (2008),	  
Kaufman	  &	  Sternberg	  (2010),	  Sawyer	  (2012)	  and	  Paul	  &	  Kaufman	  (2014),	  where	  
authors	  always	  point	  out	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  becoming	  more	  creative.	  For	  
instance,	  in	  the	  Handbook	  of	  Research	  on	  Creativity	  Chan	  and	  Thomas	  write:	  	  
	  
	   Recent	  decades	  have	  seen	  a	  resurgence	  of	  interest	  in	  creativity	  and	  
innovation	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Although	  the	  link	  between	  the	  two	  has	  not	  
really	  been	  explored	  until	  recently,	  their	  reappearance,	  at	  least	  to	  a	  
significant	  degree,	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  new	  global	  recognition	  that	  
national,	  regional,	  corporate	  and	  commercial	  competitiveness	  now	  requires	  
innovation	  more	  than	  ever.	  From	  this	  perspective	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  
creativity	  will	  spark	  innovation,	  which	  in	  turn	  will	  create	  a	  competitive	  edge	  
for	  business.	  Creative	  workers	  in	  creative	  industries	  are	  seen	  as	  “agents	  of	  
urban	  regeneration”	  while	  creative	  ideas	  “have	  become	  economically	  vital	  in	  
late	  capitalism,	  both	  as	  products	  in	  themselves	  …	  and	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
stimulating	  new	  demand	  through	  advertising	  and	  branding”	  (2013,	  1).6	  	  
	  
This	  shows	  the	  underlying	  assumption	  is	  that	  it	  lies	  within	  conscious	  power	  
to	  become	  more	  creative.	  The	  focus	  of	  creativity	  research	  is	  therefore	  to	  find	  
reliable	  methods	  to	  control	  and	  direct	  these	  creative	  forces.	  Blackburn	  describes	  the	  
situation	  in	  creativity	  research	  as	  follows:	  ‘To	  make	  mental	  processes	  empirically	  
tractable,	  laboratory	  studies	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  problems	  and	  solutions	  that	  are	  
common	  enough	  for	  statistical	  analysis	  to	  get	  a	  foothold	  and	  generally	  replicable.	  
Beethoven-­‐scale	  creative	  moments	  are	  neither	  common	  nor	  replicable.	  So,	  instead,	  
“insight”	  studies	  concentrate	  upon	  neat,	  perplexing	  but	  soluble	  puzzles,	  and	  try	  to	  
isolate	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  solutions	  occur	  to	  people’	  (2014,	  154).	  	  
This	  is	  without	  a	  doubt	  a	  useful	  approach	  for	  understanding	  basic	  
mechanisms	  of	  being	  creative,	  but	  it	  falls	  short	  in	  capturing	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  
process.	  Specific	  setups	  might	  either	  not	  allow	  for	  detection	  of	  less	  frequent	  or	  
weaker	  characteristics,	  or	  their	  influence	  is	  regarded	  as	  statistically	  negligible.	  It	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  Cambridge	  Handbook	  of	  Creativity	  begins	  with	  a	  similar	  quote:	  ‘With	  the	  world	  changing	  more	  
rapidly	  than	  ever	  before,	  creativity	  is	  at	  a	  historical	  premium.	  As	  many	  investors	  have	  discovered,	  
yesterday’s	  investment	  strategies	  do	  not	  necessarily	  work	  anymore.	  As	  many	  politicians	  and	  citizens	  
alike	  have	  discovered,	  yesterday’s	  ideas	  about	  ethical	  behaviour	  and	  propriety	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
apply	  today.	  As	  many	  CEOs	  have	  discovered,	  the	  competition	  today	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  at	  any	  
time	  in	  history.	  […]	  we	  live	  in	  a	  society	  where	  those	  who	  do	  not	  creatively	  innovate	  risk	  failure	  in	  any	  




be	  argued	  that	  chance	  constitutes	  such	  a	  characteristic.	  It	  might	  therefore	  go	  
unnoticed	  because	  it	  is	  not	  looked	  for,	  or	  it	  might	  be	  neglected	  since	  it	  not	  only	  
represents	  an	  influence	  beyond	  conscious	  control,	  but	  also	  directly	  undermines	  the	  
ambition	  to	  detect	  features	  that	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  reliably	  utilised.	  This	  thesis	  on	  
the	  other	  hand	  concentrates	  on	  thinkers	  who	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  chance	  were	  only	  a	  
small	  and	  rare	  element,	  it	  nevertheless	  deserves	  more	  attention.	  The	  question	  of	  
how	  frequently	  chance	  intervenes	  in	  creative	  processes	  remains	  debatable,	  but	  the	  
argument	  of	  its	  insignificance	  can	  and	  should	  be	  challenged.	  By	  acknowledging	  
chance’s	  value	  these	  thinkers	  all	  rebelled	  against	  the	  rigidity	  of	  habits	  and	  pre-­‐
constructed	  methods.	  They	  advocated	  welcoming	  uncertainty,	  unpredictability	  and	  
openness	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  one’s	  individual	  process	  in	  all	  its	  uniqueness.	  The	  
artists	  experimenting	  with	  chance	  are	  an	  especially	  good	  example	  of	  how	  the	  refusal	  
to	  let	  the	  creative	  process	  be	  schematised	  or	  pressed	  into	  a	  formula	  can	  lead	  to	  
greater	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  
	  
	  
3.1.	  Creation	  Myths:	  Revealing	  the	  Underlying	  Struggle	  of	  Chaos	  and	  Order	  
	  
By	  looking	  back	  at	  creation	  myths	  some	  of	  today’s	  underlying	  assumptions	  
about	  creativity	  can	  be	  revealed.	  Myths	  are	  usually	  regarded	  as	  the	  primitive	  
ancestor	  of	  our	  rational	  and	  scientific	  worldview.	  However	  their	  value	  and	  
significance	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated,	  as	  Charles	  Long	  points	  out	  in	  his	  
influential	  book	  on	  creation	  myths:	  ‘Alongside	  of	  the	  rational	  it	  [myth]	  remains	  a	  
mode	  through	  which	  we	  have	  to	  access	  the	  real.	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  our	  modern	  cultural	  
life	  presupposes	  the	  equation	  of	  literalness	  =	  truth.	  (…)	  [However,]	  there	  are	  human	  
experiences	  on	  the	  personal	  and	  cultural	  levels	  that	  can	  only	  be	  expressed	  in	  
symbolic	  forms’	  (Long,	  1963,	  13).	  To	  understand	  how	  the	  world	  works,	  the	  
literalness	  of	  logic	  appears	  to	  make	  more	  sense	  to	  us	  today	  than	  deciphering	  
mythical	  symbolism,	  but	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  also	  means	  a	  loss	  of	  abundance	  
in	  our	  ways	  of	  thinking.	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Across	  cultures	  creation	  myths	  are	  considered	  the	  most	  sacred	  and	  all	  other	  
myths	  are	  built	  upon	  them.	  Researchers	  have	  identified	  several	  basic	  categories	  of	  
creation	  myths.	  Long’s	  classification	  of	  five	  types	  is	  most	  widely	  accepted	  and	  the	  
focus	  will	  be	  on	  two	  of	  them:	  creation	  from	  nothing	  (ex	  nihilo)	  and	  creation	  from	  
chaos.	  Both	  are	  greatly	  relevant	  to	  our	  Western	  understanding	  of	  creation	  and	  as	  we	  
shall	  see	  they	  are	  consciously	  and	  unconsciously	  still	  underlying	  our	  views	  on	  
creativity	  today.	  Creation	  from	  nothing	  is	  described	  as	  ‘particularly	  popular	  in	  
monotheistic	  religions,	  but	  it	  exists	  elsewhere	  as	  well	  and	  is	  sometimes	  difficult	  to	  
differentiate	  from	  creation	  from	  the	  primal	  void	  or	  chaos	  when	  those	  terms	  refer	  to	  
essential	  nonexistence’	  (Leeming&Leeming,	  1994,	  61).	  In	  stories	  of	  creation	  ex	  nihilo	  
it	  is	  an	  ur-­‐divinity	  who	  transforms	  the	  potential	  it	  holds	  within	  into	  actuality.	  The	  
process	  of	  evolution	  is	  initiated	  through	  one	  of	  its	  actions,	  of	  which	  speaking,	  
dreaming	  and	  thinking	  are	  the	  most	  common.	  It	  shows	  that	  already	  then,	  creation	  
was	  linked	  to	  mental	  activity.	  	  	  
The	  images	  of	  this	  mental	  activity	  (imagination)	  then	  materialise	  and	  turn	  
into	  physical	  reality,	  thus	  the	  world	  is	  being	  created	  from	  mind.	  Maclagan	  interprets	  
this	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  very	  phrase	  ‘creation	  myth’	  conjures	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  
two	  senses	  of	  ‘creation’	  –	  the	  cosmogonic	  and	  the	  imaginative	  –	  may	  somehow	  have	  
got	  confused,	  so	  that	  what	  we,	  like	  Narcissus,	  take	  to	  be	  something	  quite	  other	  
turns	  out	  to	  be	  our	  own	  image	  in	  reflection’	  (1977,	  6).	  Marie-­‐Louise	  von	  Franz	  
similarly	  infers	  that	  creation	  myths	  ‘describe	  not	  the	  origin	  of	  our	  cosmos,	  but	  the	  
origin	  of	  man’s	  conscious	  awareness	  of	  the	  world’	  (1972,	  8).	  They	  can	  therefore	  be	  
described	  as	  records	  of	  our	  earliest	  intuitions	  about	  man’s	  own	  ability	  to	  be	  creative.	  
	  In	  creation	  from	  chaos	  ‘it	  is	  the	  indeterminate,	  undifferentiated	  no-­‐thing-­‐
ness	  before	  some	  power	  or	  force	  gives	  it	  form	  and	  reality	  and	  thus	  turns	  it	  into	  
cosmos.	  Some	  have	  included	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  chaos	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  material	  of	  
creation	  was	  always	  there	  along	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  creation	  itself’	  
(Leeming&Leeming,	  1994,	  60).	  Chaos	  is	  either	  perceived	  negatively	  as	  pure	  disorder,	  
an	  undifferentiated	  mass	  that	  threatens	  to	  swallow	  order,	  or	  positively,	  holding	  all	  
possibilities	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  order	  to	  emerge	  from	  within	  it.	  As	  such	  it	  is	  
regarded	  as	  the	  precursor	  of	  being	  that	  differentiates	  itself	  out	  of	  chaos.	  For	  most	  of	  
Western	  history	  this	  conceptualisation	  took	  the	  form	  of	  dichotomies:	  light	  is	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separated	  from	  darkness,	  heaven	  from	  earth,	  good	  from	  bad,	  masculine	  from	  
feminine,	  matter	  from	  spirit	  and	  life	  from	  death.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  creativity	  can	  
therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  we	  become	  self-­‐conscious	  by	  perceiving	  a	  separation	  
between	  'I'	  and	  'other'.	  Comparing	  the	  two	  types,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  in	  the	  creation	  
myth	  from	  nothing,	  matter	  emerges	  from	  mind	  and	  the	  god	  as	  an	  immaterial,	  
spiritual	  entity	  predates	  the	  material	  world,	  whereas	  in	  the	  chaos	  version	  matter	  
precedes	  mind.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  two	  types	  of	  creation	  myth	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  
precursors	  of	  the	  later	  emerging	  dichotomy	  between	  idealism	  and	  materialism.	  
However	  not	  all	  creation	  myths	  fall	  strictly	  within	  one	  category	  and	  some,	  if	  not	  
most,	  mix	  the	  two.	  Leeming	  and	  Leeming	  conclude:	  	  
	  
Behind	  the	  many	  individual	  creation	  myths	  is	  a	  shadow	  myth	  that	  is	  the	  
world	  culture’s	  collective	  dream	  of	  differentiation	  (cosmos)	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  
original	  and	  continually	  threatening	  disorder	  (chaos).	  The	  basic	  creation	  
story,	  then,	  is	  that	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  chaos	  becomes	  cosmos,	  no-­‐thing	  
becomes	  some-­‐thing.	  In	  a	  real	  sense	  this	  is	  the	  only	  story	  we	  have	  to	  tell.	  […]	  
The	  longing	  for	  re-­‐creation	  lies	  behind	  the	  painter’s	  attempt	  to	  wrest	  
significance	  from	  the	  resisting	  chaos	  of	  the	  blank	  canvas,	  behind	  the	  poet’s	  
struggle	  to	  convey	  meaning	  in	  overused	  words	  […].	  It	  lies	  behind	  our	  
attempts	  to	  “make	  something”	  of	  our	  lives,	  that	  is,	  to	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  
spite	  of	  the	  seemingly	  universal	  drive	  toward	  meaninglessness	  or	  mere	  
routine.	  In	  short,	  the	  archetype	  of	  the	  creation	  myth	  speaks	  to	  the	  equally	  
universal	  drive	  for	  differentiation	  from	  nothingness	  that	  is	  expressed	  by	  
everything	  that	  exists	  in	  the	  universe	  (1994,	  viii).	  
	  
This	  shows	  that	  creation	  myths	  not	  only	  metaphorically	  revealed	  the	  meaning	  of	  
creativity,	  but	  they	  were	  at	  the	  same	  time	  amongst	  our	  earliest	  expressions	  of	  our	  
drive	  to	  comprehend	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  This	  happens	  through	  differentiation,	  the	  
realisation	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘other’,	  to	  perceive	  a	  separation	  
between	  consciousness	  and	  the	  unconscious,	  between	  being	  and	  non-­‐being,	  chaos	  
and	  order.	  Yet	  this	  separation	  is	  never	  absolute.	  The	  seemingly	  opposite	  elements	  
remain	  in	  a	  dynamic,	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  each	  other	  and	  looking	  at	  these	  
creation	  myths	  reveals	  that	  our	  earliest	  ancestors	  had	  recognised	  this.	  	  
	   This	  understanding	  seems	  to	  have	  gotten	  side-­‐lined	  during	  the	  scientific	  
ascent	  in	  the	  Enlightenment	  period,	  when	  belief	  shifted	  towards	  a	  static	  and	  
mechanistic-­‐determinist	  system	  view	  of	  the	  universe.	  Yet	  a	  renaissance	  of	  the	  
	  	  
46	  
mythic	  recognition	  of	  greater	  wholeness,	  flexibility,	  adaptability	  and	  fluidity	  can	  be	  
perceived	  in	  postmodern	  science.	  Today	  chaos,	  or	  nonlinear	  dynamical	  systems,	  are	  
again	  understood	  to	  ‘demonstrate	  order,	  complexity,	  and	  self-­‐organization’	  
(Schuldberg,	  1999,	  260).	  Thus	  there	  is	  a	  regained	  understanding	  that	  the	  universe	  is	  
governed	  by	  an	  underlying	  constant	  interplay	  between	  chaos	  and	  order	  that	  not	  
even	  deterministic	  processes	  are	  free	  from:	  ‘For	  chaos	  theorists,	  complex	  systems	  
have	  an	  underlying	  order,	  and	  conversely,	  even	  the	  most	  simple	  deterministic	  
system	  can	  be	  highly	  complex	  and	  unpredictable	  in	  their	  operation’	  (Best	  &	  Kellner,	  
1997,	  219).	  This	  shift	  towards	  giving	  serious	  attention	  to	  chaos	  and	  complexity	  led	  to	  
the	  insight	  that	  hitherto	  unknown,	  deeper	  structures	  and	  patterns	  of	  order	  are	  
contained	  within,	  as	  well	  as	  produced	  by,	  this	  apparent	  chaos.	  	  
	  
Previously	  chaos	  and	  complexity	  were	  seen	  as	  negative,	  as	  limits	  to	  good	  
science,	  as	  noise	  to	  filter	  out	  or	  to	  overcome.	  (…)	  But	  comprehending	  
complexity	  and	  chaos	  created	  not	  only	  a	  new	  optic,	  but	  new	  ways	  of	  
conceptualizing	  and	  interpreting	  natural	  processes.	  Examining	  
indeterminacies,	  seeming	  randomness,	  chance,	  and	  disorder	  reveals	  new	  
forms	  of	  order,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  disorder	  and	  order	  could	  coexist	  (ibid.,	  220).	  	  
	  
	   The	  process	  is	  one	  of	  transformation	  of	  potentiality	  into	  actuality	  and	  as	  Best	  
and	  Kellner	  write	  ‘[c]haos	  theory	  applies	  to	  any	  system	  with	  unpredictability’	  (ibid.,	  
219),	  thus	  it	  also	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  creativity.	  ‘Works	  of	  art,	  new	  scientific	  theories,	  and	  
novel	  solutions	  to	  engineering	  problems	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  emergent	  structures.	  (…)	  
Emergence	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  conceptualizing	  the	  new	  information	  produced	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  culture’	  (Schuldberg,	  1999,	  269).	  Schuldberg	  furthermore	  explains	  that	  
‘several	  characteristics	  of	  chaos	  are	  relevant	  to	  creative	  processes	  and	  products,’	  for	  
example	  its	  tendency	  to	  self-­‐organise	  as	  well	  as	  being	  ‘very	  sensitive	  to	  stimuli’	  that	  
are	  ‘unpredictable	  but	  not	  random’	  (ibid.,	  267).	  This	  clearly	  suggests	  that	  chance	  can	  
by	  all	  means	  be	  an	  important	  agent	  in	  advancing	  the	  creative	  process.	  	  
Yet,	  on	  an	  experiential	  level,	  when	  chance	  crosses	  with	  one’s	  purpose,	  it	  
usually	  appears	  at	  first	  as	  if	  it	  undermines	  one’s	  vision	  of	  a	  particular	  outcome,	  as	  if	  
chance	  throws	  one	  back	  into	  a	  state	  of	  chaos.	  However,	  if	  one	  is	  open	  to	  change	  the	  
initial	  vision,	  the	  chance	  event	  can	  yield	  new	  insights	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  greater,	  maybe	  
even	  more	  integrated	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation.	  The	  struggle	  between	  order	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and	  chaos	  is	  a	  continuous	  one	  and	  chance,	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  chaos,	  contains	  the	  
potential	  for	  order	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  made	  use	  of	  in	  creative	  processes.	  In	  
conclusion,	  ex	  nihilo	  myths	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  first	  examples	  of	  our	  own	  
becoming	  conscious	  of	  being	  creative	  beings	  and	  the	  images	  they	  convey	  are	  mirror-­‐
images	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  they	  are	  telling	  us	  about	  ourselves.	  Chaos	  myths	  on	  
the	  other	  hand	  are	  about	  the	  underlying	  struggle	  between	  order	  and	  chaos	  and	  our	  
intuitive	  ambition	  to	  tame	  the	  chaos	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  order.	  We	  do	  this	  
primarily	  through	  story-­‐telling	  and	  whether	  they	  are	  myths	  or	  scientific	  accounts,	  
the	  purpose	  and	  the	  function	  they	  serve	  is	  the	  same:	  creating	  order	  through	  the	  
process	  of	  making	  meaning.	  
	  
	  
3.2.	  Contemporary	  Views	  	  
	   	  
Interest	  in	  chance’s	  impact	  on	  man	  is	  slowly	  growing	  and	  a	  few	  essays	  on	  the	  
subject	  can	  now	  be	  found	  across	  disciplines	  such	  as	  sociology,	  psychology	  and	  
history.	  In	  1982	  Bandura	  published	  an	  article	  entitled	  ‘The	  Psychology	  of	  Chance	  
Encounters	  and	  Life	  Paths’	  in	  which	  he	  argues	  that	  ‘chance	  encounters	  play	  a	  
prominent	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  course	  of	  human	  lives’	  (747).	  He	  writes	  that:	  ‘some	  
fortuitous	  encounters	  touch	  only	  lightly,	  others	  leave	  more	  lasting	  effects,	  and	  still	  
others	  branch	  people	  into	  new	  trajectories	  of	  life.	  A	  science	  of	  psychology	  cannot	  
shed	  much	  light	  on	  the	  occurrence	  of	  fortuitous	  encounters,	  but	  it	  can	  provide	  the	  
basis	  for	  predicting	  the	  impact	  they	  will	  have	  on	  human	  lives’	  (ibid.).	  The	  publication	  
of	  Smith’s	  article	  ‘Changing	  Sociological	  Perspectives	  on	  Chance’	  was	  crucial	  in	  
acknowledging	  that	  chance	  needs	  to	  receive	  more	  attention	  in	  sociological	  research.	  
He	  explained	  that	  besides	  agency	  and	  conditions,	  chance	  is	  an	  important	  ‘trigger	  
mechanism	  within	  process	  transformation’	  where	  it	  is	  ‘of	  greatest	  significance	  for	  
occasions	  of	  ‘becoming’	  rather	  than	  of	  ‘being’’	  (1993,	  528).	  In	  ‘Chance	  in	  Human	  
Affairs’	  Manis	  and	  Meltzer	  similarly	  aimed	  ‘to	  fill	  a	  lacuna	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  chance	  
in	  sociology’	  (1994,	  45)	  and	  argue	  that	  instead	  of	  being	  viewed	  as	  a	  negligible	  
‘residual	  deviance’	  (ibid.,	  53)	  chance	  needs	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  genuine	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influence.	  Yet	  they	  do	  distinguish	  between	  ‘real’	  and	  ‘epistemic’	  chance,	  but	  don’t	  
perceive	  ‘any	  practical	  difference’	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  two	  (ibid.).	  Chance’s	  
interference	  needs	  to	  be	  recognised	  in	  both	  the	  ‘substantive’	  and	  the	  
‘methodological’	  field,	  that	  is	  in	  social	  behaviour	  itself	  as	  well	  as	  part	  of	  the	  research	  
process	  (ibid.,	  54).	  Katz’s	  essay	  ‘Taming	  Chance:	  Social	  Science	  and	  Everyday	  
Narrative’	  (1998),	  Bandura’s	  response	  ‘Exploration	  of	  Fortuitous	  Determinants	  of	  
Life	  Paths’	  (1998)	  and	  Daston’s	  ‘Life,	  Chance	  &	  Life	  Chances’	  (2008)	  similarly	  discuss	  
the	  value	  of	  taking	  chance’s	  influential	  impact	  on	  our	  lives	  into	  account.	  In	  the	  field	  
of	  history,	  chance	  also	  just	  begins	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  debate.	  In	  ‘Chance	  as	  
Motivational	  Trace	  in	  Historical	  Writing’	  Koselleck	  explains	  that	  ‘talking	  about	  
chance	  in	  historiography	  is	  difficult,	  for	  while	  chance	  has	  its	  own	  history	  in	  the	  
writing	  of	  history,	  it	  is	  a	  history	  yet	  to	  be	  written’	  (2004).	  
As	  already	  mentioned	  in	  the	  field	  of	  creativity	  research,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  
role	  chance	  plays	  in	  creative	  processes	  is	  only	  of	  marginal	  interest	  and	  usually	  
cautiously	  presented	  as	  a	  possibility,	  but	  overall	  as	  a	  rather	  insignificant	  influence.	  In	  
his	  chapter	  ‘Definitions	  of	  Creativity’	  Cropley	  briefly	  discusses	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  creativity	  can	  occur	  by	  chance.	  Although	  he	  notes	  that	  ‘there	  are	  many	  
examples	  of	  apparently	  lucky	  combinations	  of	  events	  that	  led	  to	  acknowledged	  
creative	  solutions’	  (1999,	  515),	  he	  ultimately	  leaves	  the	  question	  if	  creativity	  can	  
occur	  through	  chance	  open.	  	  
Yet	  he	  mentions	  that	  ‘what	  is	  meant	  by	  chance	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  four	  sets	  
of	  circumstances:	  blind	  chance,	  serendipity,	  luck	  of	  the	  diligent,	  self-­‐induced	  luck’	  
(ibid.).	  These	  four	  forms	  of	  luck,	  or	  ‘chance	  with	  a	  positive	  outcome’,	  were	  first	  
described	  by	  Austin	  in	  his	  book	  Chase,	  Chance,	  and	  Creativity:	  The	  Lucky	  Art	  of	  
Novelty	  (1987).	  He	  distinguishes	  between	  Chance	  I	  to	  IV	  and	  describes	  different	  
personality	  traits	  and	  behaviour	  patterns	  as	  important	  variables	  in	  determining	  the	  
type	  of	  chance.	  Chance	  I	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  pure	  accident,	  ‘blind	  luck’,	  where	  the	  
individual	  has	  no	  part	  in	  the	  outcome	  and	  thus	  no	  particular	  character	  trait	  is	  
needed.	  Chance	  II	  describes	  chance	  in	  the	  form	  of	  serendipity,	  where	  the	  person	  
finds	  something	  of	  value	  that	  was	  not	  actually	  looked	  for.	  General	  curiosity	  and	  the	  
motion	  of	  the	  individual	  are	  the	  most	  crucial	  determining	  factors.	  Chance	  III	  needs	  
sagacity	  and	  some	  particular	  background	  knowledge.	  Chance	  IV	  is	  based	  on	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Pasteur's	  principle	  that	  chance	  only	  favours	  the	  prepared	  mind.	  ‘Fortuitous	  events	  
occur	  when	  you	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  highly	  distinctive	  of	  you	  as	  a	  person’	  
(Austin,	  1978,	  78).	  These	  different	  mind-­‐sets	  form	  an	  essential	  component	  in	  
influencing	  the	  experience	  of	  chance,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  outcome.	  However	  it	  is	  
confusing	  that	  he	  named	  the	  classifications	  themselves	  ‘chance’,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  
actually	  the	  element	  of	  chance	  that	  differs,	  but	  the	  mental	  outlook	  of	  the	  perceiver.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Simonton	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  researchers	  who,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  psychology,	  
developed	  a	  systematic	  study	  of	  the	  role	  of	  chance	  in	  creativity.	  His	  ‘chance	  
configuration	  theory’	  builds	  on	  Campbell's	  (1960)	  work	  about	  blind-­‐variation	  and	  the	  
selective-­‐retention	  model	  of	  creative	  thought.	  It	  suggests	  that	  creativity	  emerges	  
from	  an	  uncontrollable	  process	  in	  which	  stored	  memories	  and	  knowledge	  are	  by	  
chance	  combined	  and	  recombined	  in	  the	  unconscious.	  From	  all	  these	  chance	  
permutations	  only	  the	  most	  stable	  ones	  reach	  consciousness	  and	  are	  then	  
translated	  into	  verbal	  and	  symbolical	  descriptions.	  Focusing	  particularly	  on	  scientific	  
creativity,	  Simonton	  argues	  that	  ‘the	  creative	  process	  is	  contingent	  on	  so	  many	  
complex	  and	  interacting	  factors	  that	  it	  necessarily	  behaves	  as	  if	  it	  operated	  via	  a	  
random	  combinatorial	  mechanism’	  (2004,	  163).	  Though	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  
promising	  theory	  of	  chance's	  role	  in	  creativity,	  Sawyer	  writes	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  
'random	  subconscious	  recombination	  (…)	  has	  largely	  been	  rejected	  by	  psychologists	  
because	  it	  conflicts	  with	  everything	  we	  know	  about	  how	  the	  mind	  works’	  (2012,	  
101).	  	  
Boden,	  researching	  creativity	  in	  the	  field	  of	  cognitive	  and	  computing	  science,	  
includes	  a	  chapter	  on	  chance,	  chaos,	  randomness	  and	  unpredictability	  in	  her	  book	  
The	  Creative	  Mind	  (2004).	  Boden	  focuses	  on	  serendipity	  and	  coincidence,	  but	  she	  
takes	  a	  very	  cautious	  approach	  as	  to	  when	  creativity	  is	  really	  due	  to	  chance.	  Like	  
most	  other	  researchers,	  she	  mainly	  stresses	  chance's	  limited	  range	  of	  influence.	  She	  
writes	  that	  an	  apparent	  serendipity	  may	  actually	  be	  due	  to	  ''low-­‐level'	  associative	  
memory'	  and	  'parallel	  processing	  of	  various	  kinds'	  (236).	  Coincidences	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
simultaneous	  discoveries	  could	  more	  often	  be	  due	  to	  zeitgeist	  and	  a	  particular	  
intellectual	  atmosphere	  than	  true	  improbable	  concurrence.	  Yet	  generally	  she	  does	  




Both	  serendipity	  and	  coincidence,	  then,	  are	  in	  practice	  unpredictable.	  So	  the	  
countless	  creative	  ideas	  that	  owe	  something	  to	  these	  two	  sources	  are,	  in	  
some	  respect,	  unpredictable,	  too.	  If	  science	  must	  be	  predictive,	  then	  the	  
influence	  of	  chance	  in	  many	  cases	  of	  creativity	  ensures	  that	  those	  who	  seek	  a	  
scientific	  understanding	  of	  creation	  will	  necessarily	  be	  disappointed	  (ibid.,	  
237).	  
	  
Boden	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  discuss	  chaos,	  mentioning	  its	  two	  familiar	  meanings	  
of	  disorder	  and	  precursor	  of	  order.	  She	  states	  that	  chaos	  ‘may	  be	  an	  essential	  
precondition	  of	  some	  creations’	  but	  that	  ‘passing	  from	  chaos	  to	  creation	  requires	  
the	  formative	  hand	  of	  judgment,	  or	  what	  Coleridge	  called	  the	  poetic	  imagination’	  
(ibid.,	  238).	  Runco	  similarly	  writes	  that	  ‘the	  creative	  process	  frequently	  appears	  to	  
be	  chaotic,	  but	  there	  may	  be	  order	  in	  the	  disorder.	  […]	  Creative	  ideas	  that	  come	  out	  
of	  nowhere	  that	  reflect	  intuition	  or	  a	  huge	  leap,	  may	  in	  fact	  merely	  reflect	  chaos	  at	  





By	  far	  the	  most	  articles	  and	  books	  that	  have	  been	  written	  on	  links	  between	  
creativity	  and	  chance	  are	  about	  serendipitous	  discovery,	  predominantly	  in	  the	  
sciences.	  The	  term	  was	  coined	  by	  Horace	  Walpole	  in	  1754	  as	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  
chance	  phenomena	  and	  originally	  meant	  the	  ‘discovery	  by	  accidents	  and	  sagacity	  of	  
things	  not	  in	  quest	  of’	  (Chumaceiro,	  1999,	  543).	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  cases	  
of	  serendipity	  are	  for	  example	  Fleming’s	  discovery	  of	  penicillin,	  Roentgen’s	  X-­‐ray	  and	  
Spencer’s	  microwave	  oven.	  Its	  main	  characteristic	  in	  all	  cases	  is	  the	  experiencer's	  
unintentionality.	  Runco	  (2007)	  acknowledges	  the	  existence	  of	  serendipity,	  but	  
cautions	  that	  great	  care	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  when	  interpreting	  accidental	  discoveries,	  
emphasising	  that	  ‘serendipitous	  discoveries	  are	  almost	  certainly	  not	  representative	  
of	  all	  discoveries’	  (394).	  
Two	  of	  the	  first	  modern	  texts	  considering	  links	  between	  chance	  and	  
creativity	  in	  this	  way	  were	  Souriau’s	  ‘Theory	  of	  Invention’	  (1881)	  and	  Mach's	  1896	  
article	  ‘On	  the	  Part	  played	  by	  Accident	  in	  Invention	  and	  Discovery’.	  Mach’s	  main	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argument	  is	  that	  ‘it	  is	  by	  accidental	  circumstances,	  that	  is,	  by	  such	  as	  lie	  without	  his	  
[the	  experiencer]	  purpose,	  foresight,	  and	  power,	  that	  man	  is	  gradually	  led	  to	  the	  
acquaintance	  of	  improved	  means	  of	  satisfying	  his	  wants’	  (164).	  He	  hypothesised	  that	  
chance	  has	  always	  influenced	  our	  thinking	  and	  led	  to	  the	  inventions	  and	  discoveries	  
of	  the	  world.	  He	  stresses,	  however,	  that	  chance	  often	  operates	  ‘by	  imperceptible	  
degrees’	  (ibid.,	  165)	  and	  it	  alone	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  lead	  to	  novelty.	  Man	  plays	  an	  
important	  role	  and	  here	  he	  listed	  those	  requirements	  that	  empirical	  studies	  shall	  
later	  confirm:	  the	  experiencer	  is	  first	  of	  all	  driven	  by	  ‘intense	  interest’	  (internal	  
motivation)	  and	  needs	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  openness	  to	  notice	  the	  uncommon	  feature.	  
He	  then	  has	  to	  grasp	  its	  advantageous	  features,	  have	  the	  mental	  capacity	  to	  
interweave	  these	  with	  existing	  knowledge	  (imagination)	  and	  be	  able	  to	  turn	  the	  
perceived	  purpose	  into	  reality.	  This	  requires	  persistent	  labour	  and	  the	  more	  
imaginary	  the	  individual	  the	  more	  likely	  the	  chance	  event	  will	  be	  of	  use.	  Mach	  also	  
noticed	  that	  chance	  can	  occur	  during	  any	  stage	  of	  the	  creative	  process	  and	  he	  
therefore	  wondered	  ‘whether	  accident	  leads	  the	  discoverer,	  or	  the	  discoverer	  
[leads]	  accident,	  to	  a	  successful	  outcome	  in	  scientific	  quest’	  (ibid.,	  170).	  In	  his	  
conclusion	  he	  emphasised	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  our	  
imagination,	  the	  ability	  to	  logically	  deduce	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  chance.	  It	  forms	  
the	  basis	  for	  the	  shift	  from	  chaos	  to	  order:	  we	  are	  deeply	  indebted	  to	  accident	  –	  
‘that	  singular	  conflux	  of	  the	  physical	  and	  the	  psychical	  life	  in	  which	  the	  continuous	  
but	  yet	  imperfect	  and	  never-­‐ending	  adaptation	  of	  the	  latter	  to	  the	  former	  finds	  its	  
distinct	  expression’	  (ibid.,	  175).	  
In	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Chance	  in	  Discovery’	  (1940)	  Cannon	  argues	  that	  serendipity	  
frequently	  advanced	  scientific	  discovery	  and	  he	  gives	  several	  examples	  to	  prove	  his	  
point.	  Similar	  to	  Mach,	  he	  writes	  that	  a	  prepared	  mind	  is	  essential	  in	  not	  only	  
recognising	  the	  lucky	  accident	  but	  even	  more	  so	  in	  making	  good	  use	  of	  it.	  He	  lists	  
good	  knowledge	  of	  the	  past,	  an	  open	  attitude,	  flexibility,	  tolerance	  and	  
experimentation	  as	  necessary	  traits	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  use	  of	  serendipities.	  ‘Chance	  
throws	  peculiar	  conditions	  in	  our	  way	  and,	  if	  we	  have	  alert	  and	  acute	  vision,	  we	  see	  
their	  importance	  and	  use	  the	  opportunity	  which	  chance	  provides’	  (207)	  and	  ‘We	  
must	  not	  dismiss	  the	  unusual	  and	  the	  extraordinary	  aspects	  of	  experience	  as	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unworthy	  of	  attention;	  they	  may	  be	  the	  little	  beginnings	  of	  trails	  leading	  to	  great	  
unexplored	  ranges	  of	  achievement’	  (208).	  	  
In	  1976	  the	  Nobel	  laureate	  Alan	  Lloyd	  Hodgkin	  published	  an	  article	  entitled	  
‘Chance	  and	  Design	  in	  Electrophysiology’	  where	  he	  details	  his	  own	  experience	  of	  the	  
coming	  together	  of	  accident	  and	  careful	  planning.	  In	  his	  introduction	  he	  explained:	  	  
	  
In	  writing	  papers,	  authors	  are	  encouraged	  to	  be	  logical,	  and,	  even	  if	  they	  
wished	  to	  admit	  that	  some	  experiment	  was	  done	  for	  a	  perfectly	  dotty	  
reason,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  encouraged	  to	  ‘clutter-­‐up’	  the	  literature	  with	  
irrelevant	  personal	  reminiscences.	  But	  over	  a	  long	  period	  I	  have	  developed	  a	  
feeling	  of	  guilt	  about	  suppressing	  the	  part	  which	  chance	  and	  good	  fortune	  
played	  in	  what	  now	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  rather	  logical	  development	  (1).	  
	  
Shapiro’s	  book	  A	  Skeleton	  in	  the	  Darkroom:	  Stories	  of	  Serendipity	  in	  Science	  (1986)	  
describes	  seven	  instances	  of	  gaining	  new	  insights	  while	  looking	  for	  something	  else.	  
Like	  all	  writers	  on	  serendipity	  mentioned	  here,	  he	  stressed	  that	  only	  through	  the	  
vital	  combination	  of	  chance	  and	  a	  prepared	  mind	  does	  the	  unintended	  interruption	  
come	  to	  fruition.	  	  
In	  1988	  Garfield	  followed	  with	  a	  brief	  article	  on	  ‘Recognizing	  the	  Role	  of	  
Chance’.	  He	  criticised	  that	  the	  passive	  language	  of	  scientific	  writing	  is	  unhelpful	  
because	  it	  leaves	  out	  the	  human	  element	  in	  research	  and	  omits	  that	  some	  
fascinating	  results	  were	  actually	  obtained	  through	  experiments	  not	  going	  according	  
to	  plan.	  ‘There	  ought	  to	  be	  room	  for	  some	  of	  what	  lay	  behind	  a	  question	  and	  behind	  
the	  experiment	  designed	  to	  answer	  it.	  For	  those	  interested	  in	  understanding	  the	  
discovery	  process	  and	  what	  makes	  for	  scientific	  creativity	  and	  even	  genius	  (…)	  these	  
immaculate	  but	  doctored	  accounts	  are	  inadequate	  because	  they	  are	  too	  restrictive’	  
(297).	  In	  his	  chapter	  ‘Serendipity	  and	  Scientific	  Discovery’	  (2001)	  Rosenman	  also	  
criticised	  that	  the	  format	  of	  presenting	  scientific	  findings	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  
irrational	  element	  of	  chance	  to	  be	  included.	  ‘Real	  life	  science	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  
the	  neat	  logical	  process	  conveyed	  in	  journal	  articles’	  (191).	  Grant	  proposals,	  for	  
example,	  call	  for	  clearly	  defined	  set-­‐ups	  and	  anticipated	  results,	  thus	  leaving	  little	  
room	  for	  the	  interjection	  of	  the	  unexpected.	  Roseman	  therefore	  recommends:	  
‘Scientists	  have	  the	  analytical	  training	  and	  the	  keen	  intelligence	  necessary	  for	  their	  
exploratory	  voyages.	  By	  realizing	  that	  discovery	  involves	  a	  dynamic	  interplay	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between	  conventional	  scientific	  methods	  and	  chance	  in	  all	  of	  its	  forms,	  and	  by	  
cultivating	  an	  aptitude	  for	  serendipity,	  scientists	  can	  greatly	  enhance	  their	  





The	  term	  aleatoricism	  derives	  from	  alea	  ‘the	  die’	  and	  aleator	  ‘the	  dice-­‐
player’	  and	  it	  is	  used	  particularly	  to	  describe	  the	  conscious	  integration	  of	  chance	  in	  
artistic	  creativity.	  It	  has	  its	  beginnings	  in	  modern	  avant-­‐garde	  art	  and	  refers	  to	  a	  
range	  of	  techniques	  that	  invite	  chance	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  artist’s	  creative	  process.	  
These	  are	  for	  example	  throwing	  dice,	  the	  cut-­‐up	  method,	  using	  the	  I-­‐Ching,	  or	  more	  
recently	  generating	  poetry	  through	  specially	  devised	  computer	  programmes.	  The	  
aim	  of	  the	  early	  avant-­‐garde	  artists	  was	  ‘to	  explore	  the	  aesthetic	  potential	  of	  a	  
discourse	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  no	  authorial	  intention	  –	  a	  discourse	  not	  for	  
communicating	  an	  expressive	  sensibility,	  but	  for	  generating	  unexpected	  coincidence’	  
(Bök,	  2006,	  25).	  The	  artistic	  medium	  of	  for	  example	  paint,	  words	  or	  notes,	  combined	  
with	  the	  factor	  of	  chance	  becomes	  self-­‐revelatory,	  opening	  up	  to	  new	  combinations	  
of	  the	  old	  and	  in	  their	  unexpectedness	  they	  strike	  the	  artist	  and	  the	  reader	  alike.	  
Bök	  suggests	  that	  ‘[s]uch	  writing	  strives	  to	  provide	  an	  anarchistic	  alternative	  to	  the	  
ideological	  constraints	  normally	  enforced	  by	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  of	  language’	  
(ibid.,	  26).	  
In	  his	  book	  Virtual	  Muse	  Hartman	  mentions	  that	  already	  the	  Cumaean	  Sybil,	  
an	  ancient	  Greek	  prophetress,	  would	  write	  words	  on	  oak	  leaves	  and	  leave	  them	  in	  
front	  of	  her	  cave.	  Yet	  if	  the	  wind	  rearranged	  the	  leaves,	  it	  was	  the	  task	  of	  the	  seeker	  
to	  construct	  coherent	  meaning	  from	  them	  (1996,	  29).	  This	  oracle	  could	  therefore	  be	  
described	  as	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  examples	  to	  generate	  aleatory	  writing.	  This	  form	  of	  
random	  assembly	  can	  be	  used	  to	  create	  completely	  unpredictable	  texts.	  	  
	  
The	  aleatory	  may	  be	  attractive	  to	  writers	  because	  it	  promises	  a	  liberation,	  
even	  if	  a	  momentary	  one,	  from	  the	  bondage	  of	  tradition	  and	  from	  the	  
thoughtful,	  conscious	  working	  out	  and	  working	  through	  that	  writing	  usually	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requires.	  By	  using	  aleatory	  techniques	  authors	  hope	  to	  abstract	  their	  words	  
from	  the	  burden	  of	  their	  usual	  meanings,	  and	  also	  from	  associations	  with	  
earlier	  tradition	  (Mikics,	  2010,	  6).	  
	  
The	  meaning	  thus	  created	  might	  at	  first	  appear	  contingent	  too,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  it	  
will	  remain	  so.	  Yet	  in	  others,	  freed	  from	  the	  habitual	  connections	  our	  minds	  tend	  to	  
draw,	  new	  and	  inspiring	  significance	  can	  be	  distilled	  once	  the	  text	  is	  given	  the	  space	  
to	  unfold	  of	  its	  own	  accord.	  ‘Through	  juxtaposition	  the	  poet	  lets	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
language	  do	  the	  work	  of	  a	  lot	  of	  explanation.	  And	  in	  the	  process	  the	  poet	  enlists	  the	  
reader’s	  help	  in	  making	  the	  connections	  that	  make	  meaning’	  (Hartman,	  1996,	  17).	  	  
Dada	  and	  Surrealism	  were	  among	  the	  first	  artistic	  movements	  pioneering	  the	  
use	  of	  aleatory	  techniques.	  Since	  they	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  on,	  some	  
of	  their	  most	  well-­‐known	  successors	  shall	  be	  briefly	  mentioned	  here.	  In	  music	  John	  
Cage	  employed	  the	  I-­‐Ching	  to	  compose	  Music	  of	  Changes	  (1951)	  and	  Karlheinz	  
Stockhausen	  wrote	  19	  fragments	  for	  solo	  piano,	  Klavierstück	  XI	  (1956),	  which	  can	  be	  
played	  in	  any	  order.	  In	  literature	  William	  Burroughs	  popularised	  the	  cut-­‐up	  method	  
where	  text	  fragments	  are	  reassembled	  by	  chance.	  In	  The	  Soft	  Machine	  (1961),	  The	  
Ticket	  That	  Exploded	  (1962),	  and	  Nova	  Express	  (1964)	  Burroughs	  uses	  this	  technique	  
most	  persistently.	  In	  The	  Man	  in	  the	  High	  Castle	  (1962)	  by	  Phillip	  K.	  Dick	  not	  only	  the	  
characters	  use	  the	  I-­‐Ching	  for	  decision-­‐making,	  but	  the	  author	  himself	  employed	  the	  
Book	  of	  Changes	  to	  determine	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  plot.	  In	  1969	  B.	  S.	  Johnson’s	  
The	  Unfortunates	  (1969)	  was	  published,	  where	  all	  chapters	  between	  the	  first	  and	  
last	  can	  be	  read	  at	  random.	  In	  film	  there	  is	  Andy	  Voda’s	  Chance	  Chants	  (1979),	  
where	  a	  variety	  of	  chance	  techniques,	  such	  as	  the	  I-­‐Ching,	  coin	  tossing	  or	  selecting	  
words	  at	  random,	  were	  used	  to	  decide	  on	  plot,	  style	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  the	  Virtual	  Muse	  
(1996)	  Hartman	  introduces	  several	  different	  computer	  programs	  that	  can	  assist	  the	  






Comparing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  chance	  and	  creativity	  shows	  that	  
their	  developments	  parallel	  each	  other	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  interest	  they	  attracted	  since	  
around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  last	  century.	  The	  research	  that	  was	  conducted	  and	  the	  
theories	  that	  were	  developed	  between	  then	  and	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century	  were	  decisive	  
building	  blocks	  for	  how	  we	  explain	  creativity	  and	  chance	  today.	  Even	  though	  
creativity	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  distinctively	  human	  trait	  until	  
recently,	  it	  starts	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  embedded	  within	  an	  intricate	  web	  of	  
connections	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  their	  environment.	  Over	  the	  past	  few	  
decades	  it	  ‘has	  been	  suggested	  that	  psychologists	  would	  have	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  who	  becomes	  creative	  and	  how	  creative	  people	  operate	  if	  
creativity	  was	  studied	  as	  an	  ecological	  system,	  with	  attention	  to	  flow	  between	  
creative	  processes	  and	  personal	  and	  ecosystem	  resources’	  (Helson,	  1999,	  365).	  
It	  is	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  a	  broader	  acceptance	  and	  recognition	  of	  man's	  place	  
in	  the	  intricate	  web	  of	  life,	  where	  so	  many	  more	  invisible	  threads	  connect	  to	  one	  
another	  than	  we	  can	  possibly	  imagine.	  Ripple	  explains	  that	  there	  is	  an	  overall	  	  
	  
shift	  away	  from	  quantitative	  psychometric	  testing	  and	  theory-­‐based	  efforts	  
to	  construct	  nomothetic	  nets	  with	  accompanying	  generalized	  principles.	  
Current	  emphases	  in	  method	  tend	  toward	  the	  idiographic,	  biographical,	  case	  
study	  qualitative	  mode.	  Inquiry	  has	  focused	  on	  domain-­‐specific	  creative	  
activities	  and	  away	  from	  notions	  of	  generalized	  creative	  abilities.	  In	  part	  this	  
shift	  in	  approach	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  qualitative	  methods	  in	  
the	  social	  sciences	  generally	  (Ripple,	  1999,	  633).	  
	  
This	  sounds	  like	  a	  promising	  prospect,	  especially	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  research	  on	  the	  
impact	  of	  chance	  in	  creativity,	  because	  even	  if	  chance	  appears	  as	  statistically	  
minute,	  there	  are	  enough	  individual	  cases	  of	  its	  involvement	  to	  suggest	  that	  closer	  
inspection	  would	  result	  in	  interesting	  findings.	  Jung	  in	  his	  essay	  on	  synchronicity	  
already	  argued	  that	  the	  experimental	  method	  in	  science	  created	  
	  
in	  the	  laboratory	  situation	  which	  compels	  Nature	  to	  give	  an	  unequivocal	  
answer.	  The	  workings	  of	  Nature	  in	  her	  unrestricted	  wholeness	  are	  
completely	  excluded.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  know	  what	  these	  workings	  are,	  we	  need	  
a	  method	  of	  inquiry	  which	  imposes	  the	  fewest	  possible	  conditions,	  or	  if	  
possible	  no	  conditions	  at	  all,	  and	  then	  leaves	  Nature	  to	  answer	  out	  of	  her	  




Peirce,	  Cabot,	  Jung	  and	  Breton	  all	  shared	  the	  opinion	  that	  knowledge	  derived	  
from	  real,	  personal	  experience	  has	  a	  much	  higher	  significance	  than	  when	  acquired	  
from	  theory.	  These	  experiences	  are	  generally	  considered	  a	  lot	  more	  meaningful	  too.	  
Yet,	  ‘in	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  thought,	  “meaning,	  respectable	  meaning,	  was	  
identified	  with	  the	  logical	  thinking	  of	  humankind,	  while	  human	  imaginative	  thought	  
was	  identified	  with	  the	  animistic,	  the	  irrational,	  the	  illogical,	  the	  instinctual,	  the	  
repressible,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  dangerous”’	  (Policastro&Gardner,	  1999,	  217).	  Chance	  
also	  used	  to	  fall	  into	  this	  latter	  category,	  but	  all	  thinkers	  mentioned	  above	  were	  
keen	  to	  show	  the	  value	  of	  this	  irrational	  ‘other’.	  Whilst	  conscious	  techniques	  and	  
step-­‐by-­‐step	  instructions	  can	  help	  to	  increase	  creative	  behaviours,	  they	  are	  no	  
guarantee	  that	  the	  desired	  outcome	  is	  really	  creative.	  The	  conscious	  approach	  is	  
therefore	  only	  one	  aspect	  and	  creativity	  can	  also	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  primarily	  
unconscious,	  chaotic	  or	  unstructured	  processes.	  Chance	  can	  play	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  
either	  of	  them,	  but	  only	  if	  its	  interference	  is	  allowed	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  potentially	  
beneficial.	  	  
The	  bottom	  line	  is	  that	  for	  creativity	  there	  is	  no	  magic	  formula	  that	  can	  
guarantee	  success.	  It	  is	  a	  very	  individual	  process	  embedded	  in	  the	  complex	  web	  of	  
personal	  and	  environmental	  conditions.	  It	  is	  very	  promising	  that	  recent	  research	  has	  
begun	  to	  be	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  exploration	  of	  these	  dynamic	  fields,	  instead	  of	  
basing	  knowledge	  on	  artificial	  situations	  that	  are	  laboratory-­‐based	  and	  isolated	  from	  
real	  life.	  It	  demonstrates	  a	  shift	  towards	  greater	  acknowledgment	  that	  creativity	  
cannot	  be	  isolated	  from	  this	  web.	  In	  this	  regard	  even	  Sternberg	  wrote:	  ‘Creative	  
contributions,	  almost	  by	  definition,	  are	  unpredictable	  because	  they	  violate	  the	  
norms	  established	  by	  the	  forerunners	  and	  the	  contemporaries	  of	  the	  creator.	  
Among	  the	  many	  attributes	  of	  creative	  individuals	  are	  the	  abilities	  to	  make	  
serendipitous	  discoveries	  and	  to	  pursue	  such	  discoveries	  actively’	  








Part	  II.	  Tychism:	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Chance	  and	  Creativity	  	  
1.	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Chance	  	  
	  
The	  last	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  during	  the	  19th	  century	  an	  enormous	  shift	  
took	  place	  regarding	  the	  perception	  of	  determinism,	  chance	  and	  their	  relationship.	  
Charles	  Sanders	  Peirce	  was	  part	  of	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  modern	  intellectuals	  questioning	  
the	  accuracy	  of	  a	  wholly	  mechanical	  system.	  The	  problem	  of	  chance	  was	  often	  the	  
linchpin	  for	  challenging	  the	  old	  theories	  and	  consequently	  it	  also	  attracted	  renewed	  
interest	  to	  discover	  its	  own	  inner	  workings.	  For	  most	  of	  his	  life	  Peirce	  called	  himself	  
a	  determinist	  and	  for	  most	  of	  his	  contemporaries	  it	  was	  odd	  that	  he,	  who	  remains	  
best	  known	  today	  for	  his	  writings	  on	  pragmatism	  and	  semiotics,	  should	  suddenly	  
concern	  himself	  with	  metaphysics.	  Regarding	  this	  swerve	  from	  one	  end	  of	  the	  
spectrum	  to	  the	  other,	  from	  determinism	  to	  absolute	  chance,	  Hookway	  asks:	  ‘Are	  
there	  questions	  which	  became	  pressing	  for	  Peirce	  in	  the	  early	  1880s	  which	  can	  only	  
be	  answered	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  system	  of	  metaphysics?’	  (1997,	  3).7	  He	  argues	  that	  
around	  this	  time	  Peirce	  became	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  questions	  regarding	  the	  
origin	  and	  properties	  of	  natural	  laws.	  He	  began	  to	  wonder	  why	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  
are	  the	  way	  they	  are	  and	  why	  regular	  patterns	  seem	  to	  structure	  the	  world	  in	  the	  
way	  they	  do.	  While	  pondering	  these	  questions,	  chance	  emerged	  as	  a	  pivotal	  
element	  and	  as	  a	  result	  he	  concluded	  that	  it	  must	  be	  more	  important	  to	  scrutinise	  
the	  existence	  of	  regularity	  rather	  than	  irregularity.	  	  
The	  first	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  Peirce’s	  own	  development	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  
chance	  and	  its	  role	  as	  a	  real	  and	  vital	  element	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  universe.	  
Chapter	  2	  looks	  at	  the	  workings	  of	  chance	  in	  human	  affairs.	  Peirce	  discussed	  chance	  
as	  well	  as	  free	  will,	  aesthetics	  and	  play	  only	  separately.	  Yet	  it	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  
that	  intrinsic	  links	  between	  them	  do	  exist	  in	  his	  philosophy.	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  are	  
both	  extensions	  to	  Peirce’s	  own	  writing,	  in	  order	  to	  include	  philosophical	  discussions	  
on	  the	  relationship	  of	  chance	  in	  scientific	  as	  well	  as	  artistic	  creativity.	  Chapter	  3	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  ‘Peirce’s	  metaphysics	  was	  considered	  as	  one	  more	  example	  of	  a	  philosophy	  alienated	  from	  reality.	  
But,	  in	  fact,	  today	  Peirce’s	  work	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  pioneering	  step	  toward	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  
pluralism	  involved	  in	  physical	  laws’	  (Prigogine&Stengers,	  1984,	  303).	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about	  Ella	  Lyman	  Cabot	  and	  her	  essay	  Chance	  and	  Purpose	  in	  Invention	  where	  the	  
relationship	  between	  chance	  and	  teleology	  is	  addressed	  in	  more	  depth.	  Chapter	  4	  
suggests	  that	  Peirce’s	  scientific	  method	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  artistic	  creativity	  and	  




1.1.	  Making	  a	  Case	  against	  Determinism	  
	  
In	  1884	  William	  James	  wrote	  in	  The	  Dilemma	  of	  Determinism	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  
chance	  existing	  as	  a	  real	  phenomenon	  is	  what	  worries	  determinists	  the	  most.	  He	  
argued	  that	  the	  quarrel	  determinism	  has	  with	  chance	  is	  at	  its	  base	  a	  metaphysical	  
one.	  Peirce,	  a	  good	  friend	  of	  James,	  agreed	  with	  him	  and	  wrote:	  ‘Find	  a	  scientific	  
man	  who	  proposes	  to	  get	  along	  without	  any	  metaphysics…and	  you	  have	  found	  one	  
whose	  doctrines	  are	  thoroughly	  vitiated	  by	  the	  crude	  and	  uncriticised	  metaphysics	  
with	  which	  they	  are	  packed’	  (CP,	  [1905],	  1.129).8	  The	  concept	  of	  chance	  forms	  one	  
key	  element	  in	  Peirce’s	  late	  metaphysics	  and	  its	  discussion	  provides	  a	  good	  starting	  
point	  for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  exploration	  of	  its	  interpretation	  as	  a	  creative	  and	  meaningful	  
element	  in	  life.	  From	  Peirce’s	  ponderings	  on	  the	  dilemma	  of	  chance’s	  role	  in	  the	  
universe	  emerged	  not	  only	  a	  strong	  argument	  against	  the	  existence	  of	  universal	  
mechanical	  determinism,	  but	  also	  for	  tychism,	  the	  theory	  that	  cases	  of	  absolute	  
chance	  do	  occur	  in	  the	  natural	  world.	  The	  ideas	  expressed	  in	  Design	  and	  Chance	  
(1884)	  are	  a	  first	  precursor	  to	  his	  system	  of	  tychism,	  but	  he	  only	  develops	  them	  
explicitly	  further	  a	  little	  short	  of	  ten	  years	  later.	  That	  is	  between	  1891	  and	  1893	  in	  a	  
series	  of	  five	  essays	  published	  in	  The	  Monist,9	  where	  tychism	  is	  then	  firmly	  
established	  within	  Peirce’s	  philosophical	  system.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  All	  citations	  from	  Peirce’s	  writing	  generally	  follow	  the	  standard	  notation,	  with	  the	  exception	  that	  the	  
original	  date	  of	  publication	  is	  included.	  This	  helps	  to	  provide	  a	  clearer	  sense	  of	  Peirce’s	  development	  
of	  thought	  over	  time.	  The	  abbreviations	  used	  refer	  to	  the	  following	  sources:	  CP	  for	  The	  Collected	  
Papers	  of	  Charles	  Sanders	  Peirce	  and	  EP	  for	  The	  Essential	  Peirce.	  
9	  	  Later	  known	  as	  his	  ‘metaphysical	  series’:	  ‘The	  Architecture	  of	  Theories’	  (1891),	  ‘The	  Doctrine	  of	  
Necessity	  Examined’	  (1892),	  ‘The	  Law	  of	  Mind’	  (1892),	  ‘Man's	  Glassy	  Essence’	  (1892)	  and	  
‘Evolutionary	  Love’	  (1893).	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It	  is	  important	  to	  know	  that	  Peirce	  was	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  logician	  and	  his	  
approach	  was	  rooted	  in	  mathematics	  and	  science.	  He	  intended	  to	  understand	  and	  
justify	  the	  world	  through	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  phenomenology,	  systematic	  inquiry	  
and	  logic.	  Potter	  explains	  that	  ‘for	  Peirce,	  philosophy	  is	  a	  theoretical	  science	  of	  
discovery	  …	  that	  deals	  with	  ordinary	  facts	  of	  man’s	  everyday	  existence,	  open	  to	  all	  at	  
any	  time	  to	  observe’	  (1997,	  8).	  For	  Peirce	  doing	  metaphysics	  meant	  ‘to	  study	  the	  
most	  general	  features	  of	  reality	  and	  real	  objects’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.6).	  He	  therefore	  
developed	  a	  systematic	  procedure	  to	  determine	  truth	  which	  he	  called	  scientific	  
method10.	  Yet,	  Hacking	  explains:	  ‘Peirce	  seldom	  discussed	  truth.	  He	  did	  teach	  that	  
truth	  is	  the	  opinion	  that	  people	  would	  settle	  down	  on	  if	  they	  settle	  down	  on	  
anything.	  Early	  and	  nominalistically	  he	  wrote	  that	  truth	  is	  what	  we	  are	  fated	  to	  
believe’	  (1990,	  212).	  
	  His	  scientific	  method	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  phenomenology,	  
logic	  and	  empiricism,	  the	  belief	  that	  observation	  together	  with	  reasoning	  and	  testing	  
can	  be	  applied	  to	  any	  area	  of	  philosophy	  and	  shall	  ultimately	  apply	  to	  metaphysics	  
too.	  ‘Peirce	  was	  an	  empiricist	  of	  a	  kind	  who	  did	  not	  deny	  that	  ideas	  might	  be	  innate,	  
but	  insisted	  that	  they	  could	  be	  justified	  in	  experience	  only	  by	  means	  of	  systematic	  
inquiry’	  (Brent,	  1998,	  352).	  There	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  human	  inquiry	  can	  find	  an	  
answer	  to	  every	  question,	  but	  Peirce	  declared	  that	  one	  nevertheless	  needs	  to	  keep	  
posing	  all	  kinds	  of	  questions.	  Otherwise	  the	  road	  to	  enquiry	  is	  blocked	  from	  the	  very	  
start.11	  Rationality	  requires	  the	  prospect	  that	  each	  question	  we	  encounter	  is	  capable	  
of	  eventually	  being	  answered	  by	  responsible	  human	  enquiry.	  A	  metaphysical	  
hypothesis	  deserves	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  if	  it	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  how	  these	  hopes	  
might	  be	  true	  -­‐	  although,	  of	  course,	  it	  should	  only	  be	  accepted	  if	  it	  survives	  rigorous	  
empirical	  testing	  (see	  Hookway,	  1997,	  22).	  
Peirce’s	  philosophy	  was	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  evolution	  and	  
Peirce	  read	  Darwin’s	  Origin	  of	  Species	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  became	  available	  in	  the	  autumn	  
of	  1859.	  He	  was	  immediately	  impressed	  by	  two	  things.	  Firstly	  its	  suggestion	  of	  
fortuitous	  variation	  in	  nature	  created	  by	  the	  continuous	  flow	  of	  evolution	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Peirce’s	  philosophical	  methodology	  dividing	  inference	  into	  three	  stages:	  abduction,	  deduction	  and	  
induction.	  	  




secondly	  the	  method	  of	  positive	  observation	  through	  which	  Darwin	  had	  reached	  his	  
conclusions.	  Peirce	  valued	  the	  mathematical	  underpinnings	  that	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
statistics	  in	  Darwin’s	  work,	  but	  he	  parted	  with	  him	  where	  he	  felt	  his	  theory	  was	  too	  
rigid	  and	  too	  closely	  associated	  with	  ‘necessitarianism’12.	  While	  Peirce	  advocated	  
the	  scientific	  method,	  he	  rejected	  overtly	  scientific-­‐philosophical	  trends	  at	  the	  time,	  
such	  as	  materialism,	  necessitarianism	  and	  above	  all	  nominalism,13	  because	  they	  
leave	  no	  room	  for	  genuine	  freedom.	  	  
	  
Like	  Darwin,	  Peirce	  was	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  any	  metaphysical	  or	  religious	  
doctrine	  which	  did	  not	  face	  up	  to	  the	  chilling	  implications	  of	  scientific	  
knowledge	  [...].	  Unlike	  Darwin,	  he	  believed	  that	  Aristotelian	  and	  medieval	  
realism	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge,	  
not	  only	  consistent	  with	  but	  embodied	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  science	  itself.	  Peirce	  
fervently	  believed	  that	  he	  had	  discovered	  a	  model	  of	  thinking	  which	  
exemplified	  this	  belief	  and	  which	  was,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  key	  to	  
understanding	  the	  way	  the	  universe	  is	  made.	  (Brent,	  1998,	  4).	  
	  
Reynolds	  points	  out	  that	  overall:	  ‘Peirce’s	  own	  sympathies	  lay	  much	  nearer	  to	  
Lamarck’s	  teleological	  account	  than	  to	  Darwin’s	  mechanistic	  theory	  of	  natural	  
selection.	  Peirce,	  however,	  was	  struck	  by	  the	  essentially	  statistical	  nature	  of	  
Darwin’s	  explanation	  of	  how	  evolution	  occurs	  within	  natural	  populations’	  (2002,	  6).	  
Britton	  summarised	  his	  idiosyncratic	  understanding	  of	  metaphysics	  as	  follows:	  ‘to	  
Peirce	  it	  still	  seemed	  that	  even	  the	  absolute	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  
"observable,"	  and	  that	  a	  science	  of	  metaphysics	  was	  still	  possible’	  (1939,	  443).	  
As	  already	  mentioned,	  Peirce	  arrived	  at	  his	  theory	  of	  tychism	  by	  questioning	  
the	  validity	  of	  the	  deterministic	  interpretation	  and	  that	  despite	  the	  ‘powerful	  
currents	  of	  determinism	  that	  derived	  from	  the	  Enlightenment	  philosophy	  of	  the	  
eighteenth	  century’	  (Burch,	  2014).	  More	  than	  any	  other	  theory,	  tychism	  reveals	  
Peirce’s	  unconventional	  way	  of	  thinking	  and	  that	  he	  was	  out	  of	  line	  with	  the	  
mainstream	  philosophical-­‐scientific	  currents	  of	  the	  age.	  While	  largely	  rejected	  or	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  ‘Necessitarianism,	  as	  Peirce	  called	  it,	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  results	  of	  the	  combination	  of	  mechanical	  
laws	  with	  initial	  conditions	  follow	  of	  necessity.	  Necessitarianism	  and	  the	  mechanical	  philosophy	  were	  
intimately	  related	  doctrines	  and	  composed	  the	  accepted	  background	  of	  belief	  against	  which	  Peirce	  
set	  his	  own	  philosophy.’	  (Reynolds,	  2002,	  9).	  
13	  Peirce	  rejected	  nominalism	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  negates	  the	  existence	  of	  general	  laws	  as	  well	  as	  
regularity	  and	  continuity.	  For	  Peirce	  nominalism	  is	  ‘false	  in	  all	  its	  shades	  and	  degrees	  …	  [and	  which]	  
has	  had	  a	  baleful	  influence	  on	  civilization’	  (Letter	  to	  C.J.	  Keyser,	  10	  April	  1908).	  
	  	  
61	  
least	  disregarded	  by	  his	  peers,	  in	  retrospect	  Peirce	  appears	  as	  a	  man	  ahead	  of	  his	  
time,	  who	  with	  his	  radical	  suggestions	  contributed	  to	  the	  subversion	  and	  later	  fall	  of	  
the	  mechanical-­‐deterministic	  model.	  In	  Design	  and	  Chance	  (1883-­‐4)	  and	  The	  
Doctrine	  of	  Necessity	  Examined	  (1892)	  Peirce	  began	  his	  enquiry	  into	  the	  beginnings	  
of	  the	  universe	  by	  challenging	  the	  scientific	  axiom	  ‘that	  every	  event	  has	  a	  cause’:	  
	  
Among	  the	  things	  that	  demand	  explanation,	  then,	  are	  the	  laws	  of	  physics;	  
and	  not	  this	  law	  or	  that	  law	  only	  but	  every	  single	  law.	  Why	  are	  the	  three	  laws	  
of	  mechanics	  as	  they	  are	  and	  not	  otherwise?	  What	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  
restriction	  of	  extended	  bodies	  to	  three	  dimensions?	  And	  then	  the	  general	  
fact	  that	  there	  are	  laws,	  how	  is	  that	  to	  be	  explained?	  (EP	  1,	  [1883-­‐4],	  218).	  
	  
In	  the	  deterministic	  model,	  regularity	  forms	  the	  norm	  and	  starting	  point	  for	  
scholarly	  investigation.	  Peirce	  turned	  this	  idea	  on	  its	  head	  by	  claiming	  that	  
everything	  started	  from	  irregularity	  and	  that	  instead	  of	  a	  consistently	  regular	  
system,	  the	  universe	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  moving	  from	  an	  initial	  state	  of	  irregularity	  
towards	  more	  and	  more	  regularity.	  Peirce	  summarised	  the	  viewpoint	  he	  set	  out	  to	  
dismantle	  as	  follows:	  	  
	   	  
The	  proposition	  in	  question	  is	  that	  the	  state	  of	  things	  existing	  at	  any	  time,	  
together	  with	  certain	  immutable	  laws,	  completely	  determine	  the	  state	  of	  
things	  at	  every	  other	  time.	  [...]	  In	  that	  case,	  that	  instantaneous	  state	  of	  
things	  from	  which	  every	  other	  state	  of	  things	  is	  calculable	  consists	  in	  the	  
positions	  and	  velocities	  of	  all	  the	  particles	  at	  any	  instant.	  This,	  the	  usual	  and	  
most	  logical	  form	  of	  necessitarianism,	  is	  called	  the	  mechanical	  philosophy	  
(CP,	  [1892],	  6.37-­‐38).	  
	  
This	  shows	  that	  his	  main	  focus	  was	  not	  on	  critiquing	  determinism	  per	  se,	  but	  the	  
particular	  doctrine	  of	  mechanical	  determinism.	  Peirce’s	  argumentation	  against	  
mechanical	  determinism	  was	  twofold.	  Firstly	  it	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  
where	  and	  how	  the	  necessitarians	  follow	  assumptions	  rather	  than	  logic	  and	  
secondly,	  it	  suggested	  that	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  mechanical	  determinism	  can	  be	  
resolved	  through	  the	  theory	  of	  absolute	  chance.	  In	  fact,	  Peirce’s	  arguments	  not	  only	  
conveyed	  the	  idea	  that	  scientific	  evidence	  for	  determinism	  is	  missing,	  but	  that	  the	  
scientific	  evidence	  actually	  speaks	  against	  it.	  Peirce	  therefore	  set	  out	  to	  test	  some	  




1) That	  it	  is	  a	  ‘postulate’	  or	  ‘presupposition’	  of	  scientific	  reasoning.	  
2) That	  determinism	  proves	  true	  or	  highly	  probable	  ‘by	  the	  observation	  of	  
nature’.	  
3) That	  determinism	  is	  self-­‐evident,	  a	  ‘natural	  belief’	  and	  therefore	  must	  be	  
true.	  
	  
Peirce	  first	  examined	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  postulate	  and	  gives	  examples,	  
showing	  that	  even	  if	  determinism	  were	  a	  presupposition	  of	  scientific	  reasoning	  it	  
would	  still	  not	  prove	  the	  theory:	  ‘to	  “postulate”	  a	  proposition	  is	  no	  more	  than	  to	  
hope	  it	  is	  true’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.39).	  He	  furthermore	  points	  out	  that	  such	  a	  
presupposition	  doesn’t	  advance	  scientific	  enquiry,	  but	  instead	  blocks	  it	  and	  that	  
therefore	  ‘the	  principle	  of	  universal	  necessity	  cannot	  be	  defended	  as	  being	  a	  
postulate	  of	  reasoning’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.43).	  Determinists	  furthermore	  expect	  to	  find	  
mathematical	  exactitude	  in	  continuous	  quantities	  every	  time	  these	  are	  measured.	  
Aberrations	  are	  considered	  mere	  imprecisions	  due	  to	  inadequate	  methods	  of	  
measurement.	  Peirce	  counter-­‐argued	  that	  the	  more	  precise	  the	  tools	  of	  observation	  
become,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  measurements	  actually	  diverge.	  From	  that	  he	  
concluded:	  ‘Trace	  their	  causes	  [of	  aberration]	  back	  far	  enough,	  and	  you	  will	  be	  
forced	  to	  admit	  they	  are	  always	  due	  to	  arbitrary	  determination,	  or	  chance’	  (CP,	  
[1892],	  6.46).	  Thirdly,	  even	  though	  Peirce	  agreed	  with	  the	  view	  that	  ‘the	  exact	  
regularity	  of	  the	  world	  is	  a	  natural	  belief,	  and	  that	  natural	  beliefs	  have	  generally	  
been	  confirmed	  by	  experience’,	  he	  emphasised	  that	  these	  intuitive	  assumptions	  
need	  to	  be	  verified	  just	  as	  vigorously	  as	  any	  other	  hypothesis,	  since	  errors	  due	  to	  
‘natural	  illusions’	  are	  nonetheless	  equally	  likely	  to	  occur.	  ‘[T]he	  argument	  is	  quite	  
against	  the	  absolute	  exactitude	  of	  any	  natural	  belief,	  including	  that	  of	  the	  principle	  
of	  causation’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.50).	  
	  
	  




Peirce’s	  thoughts	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  chance	  underwent	  a	  significant	  
transformation	  and	  he	  didn’t	  develop	  his	  theory	  of	  tychism	  until	  late.14	  Fisch	  (1971)	  
and	  Apel	  (1981)	  remark	  that	  Peirce	  started	  his	  philosophical	  endeavours	  as	  a	  firm	  
believer	  in	  determinism	  and	  what	  he	  later	  called	  necessitarianism,	  the	  principle	  of	  
universal	  lawfulness.	  It	  was	  during	  his	  cosmopolitan	  period	  that	  these	  convictions	  
slowly	  began	  to	  break	  up	  and	  for	  some	  time	  he	  considered	  ‘chance	  [as]	  that	  
diversity	  in	  the	  universe	  which	  laws	  leave	  room	  for.	  […]	  It	  was	  recognizing	  that	  
chance	  does	  play	  a	  part	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  apart	  from	  what	  we	  may	  know	  or	  be	  
ignorant	  of’	  (CP,	  [1893],	  6.602).	  Only	  in	  Design	  and	  Chance	  Peirce	  advocated	  the	  
existence	  of	  chance	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  law,	  or	  as	  he	  called	  it	  ‘the	  law	  of	  lawlessness’	  
(Anderson,	  1987,	  100).	  Now	  convinced	  that	  chance	  as	  a	  Real	  is	  present	  in	  nature,	  he	  
suggested	  that	  a	  distinction	  between	  what	  he	  called	  ordinary	  and	  absolute	  chance	  
should	  be	  made:	  ‘I	  suppose	  that	  on	  excessively	  rare	  sporadic	  occasions	  a	  law	  of	  
nature	  is	  violated	  in	  some	  infinitesimal	  degree;	  that	  may	  be	  called	  absolute	  chance;	  
but	  ordinary	  chance	  is	  merely	  relative	  to	  the	  causes	  that	  are	  taken	  into	  account’	  (EP	  
1,	  [1883-­‐4],	  219).	  
Ordinary	  chance	  describes	  probabilistic	  events	  that	  come	  about	  by	  causes	  in	  
which	  the	  outcome	  cannot	  be	  determined	  by	  that	  cause.	  For	  example,	  when	  
throwing	  a	  die	  or	  tossing	  a	  coin,	  all	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  can	  be	  previously	  
determined	  whereas	  the	  actual	  outcome	  is	  due	  to	  chance.	  Large	  numbers	  of	  throws	  
or	  tosses	  then,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  ‘supposed	  to	  happen	  by	  pure	  chance’	  (EP	  1,	  
[1883-­‐4],	  220),	  can	  be	  determined	  through	  probability	  calculations.	  Absolute	  chance	  
on	  the	  other	  hand	  can	  never	  be	  predicted	  and	  it	  is	  without	  any	  cause	  entirely.	  
According	  to	  Peirce	  it	  is	  this	  kind	  of	  chance	  that	  forms	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  a	  new	  
trajectory	  of	  events.	  Peirce	  suggests	  that	  everything	  was	  once	  due	  to	  chance	  and	  he	  
therefore	  concluded	  ‘that	  chance	  is	  the	  one	  essential	  agency	  upon	  which	  the	  whole	  
process	  [of	  evolution]	  depends’	  (EP	  1,	  [1883-­‐4],	  219).	  In	  The	  Doctrine	  of	  Necessity	  
Examined	  Peirce	  expanded	  on	  this	  idea	  and	  this	  is	  where,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  he	  used	  
the	  term	  ‘tychism.’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Fisch	  (1971)	  divides	  Peirce’s	  philosophy	  into	  three	  periods:	  the	  ‘Cambridge	  period’	  from	  1851-­‐1870,	  
the	  ‘cosmopolitan	  period’	  from	  1870-­‐1887	  and	  the	  ‘Arisbe	  period’	  from	  1887	  until	  his	  death	  in	  1914.	  
The	  development	  of	  his	  tychistic	  theory	  falls	  into	  the	  last	  period.	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Peirce	  devised	  ‘tychism’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  absolute	  
chance	  in	  the	  universe.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Peirce	  used	  the	  words	  tychism	  and	  
(absolute)	  spontaneity	  interchangeably.	  To	  make	  the	  relationship	  clearer	  Anderson	  
once	  described	  spontaneity	  as	  ‘the	  active	  side	  of	  chance’	  (1987,	  131).	  Peirce	  
distinguished	  between	  tychism	  and	  tychasticism,	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  are	  no	  laws	  at	  
all	  and	  that	  natural	  processes	  are	  entirely	  governed	  by	  absolute	  chance.	  Tychism	  on	  
the	  other	  hand	  refers	  to	  the	  rare,	  indeterministic	  swerve	  within	  an	  otherwise	  
deterministic	  and	  habit-­‐driven	  system.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  Peirce	  
was	  not	  trying	  to	  deny	  laws	  of	  nature	  on	  the	  whole.	  His	  claim	  is	  simply	  that	  the	  laws	  
of	  nature	  are	  such	  that	  they	  are	  constantly	  being	  violated	  to	  some	  degree	  (see	  6.59	  
and	  6.588).	  According	  to	  tychism,	  nature	  is	  literally	  infected	  with	  "infinitesimal	  
departures	  from	  law"	  (6.59).	  These	  departures	  from	  law	  are	  not	  rarities	  in	  Peirce	  's	  
universe;	  they	  constantly	  occur.’	  (Cosculluela,	  1992,	  742).	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  Peirce’s	  metaphysical	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  
where	  to	  locate	  tychism	  in	  it,	  it	  helps	  to	  take	  a	  look	  at	  his	  system	  of	  categories,	  
which	  he	  started	  to	  develop	  from	  1867	  in	  On	  a	  New	  List	  of	  Categories.	  Fisch	  (1971,	  
189–90)	  suggests	  that	  Peirce’s	  considerations	  regarding	  the	  categories	  led	  him	  more	  
concretely	  to	  question	  the	  doctrine	  of	  determinism	  and	  in	  turn	  to	  consider	  absolute	  
chance	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Epicurean	  swerve	  as	  an	  alternative	  explanation.	  By	  1891	  
his	  list	  consists	  of	  three	  elements:	  Firstness,	  Secondness	  and	  Thirdness.	  This	  
tripartite	  structure	  underpins	  all	  his	  theories	  that	  follow.	  He	  sees	  these	  categories	  
‘perpetually	  turning	  up	  at	  every	  point	  in	  every	  theory	  of	  logic,	  and	  in	  the	  most	  
rounded	  systems	  they	  occur	  in	  connection	  with	  one	  another’	  (CP,	  [1891],	  6.32).	  That	  
is,	  ideally	  they	  are	  intrinsically	  interrelated,	  forming	  a	  whole	  that	  is	  more	  than	  its	  
parts.	  	  
In	  The	  Architecture	  of	  Theories	  Peirce	  gives	  a	  few	  examples	  illustrating	  the	  
application	  of	  his	  categories:	  	  
	  
In	  psychology	  Feeling	  is	  First,	  Sense	  of	  reaction	  is	  Second,	  General	  
conception	  Third,	  or	  mediation.	  In	  biology,	  the	  idea	  of	  arbitrary	  sporting15	  is	  
First,	  heredity	  is	  Second,	  the	  process	  whereby	  the	  accidental	  characters	  
become	  fixed	  is	  Third.	  Chance	  is	  First,	  Law	  is	  Second,	  the	  tendency	  to	  take	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Peirce’s	  term	  for	  ‘fortuitous	  variation’.	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habits	  is	  Third.	  Mind	  is	  First,	  Matter	  is	  Second,	  Evolution	  is	  Third	  (CP,	  [1891],	  
6.32).	  
	  
The	  categories,	  Firstness	  in	  particular,	  shall	  be	  described	  in	  some	  more	  detail	  in	  
order	  to	  further	  delineate	  the	  characteristics	  of	  chance.	  Hausman	  explains	  that	  the	  
categories	  ‘are	  conditions	  of	  intelligibility,	  because	  propositions	  are	  the	  basic	  
products	  of	  the	  articulation	  of	  knowledge.	  They	  are	  expressions,	  or	  the	  meanings	  
and	  utterances,	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  truly	  or	  falsely	  to	  what	  we	  experience’	  (1993,	  
96).16	  Firstness,	  Secondness	  and	  Thirdness	  are	  therefore	  ‘fundamental	  categories	  of	  
thought’	  (CP,	  [1905],	  1.561),	  but	  their	  elements,	  which	  Peirce	  classified	  as	  Firsts,	  
Seconds	  and	  Thirds	  are	  to	  be	  considered	  real.	  Peirce	  described	  them	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
First	  is	  the	  conception	  of	  being	  or	  existing	  independent	  of	  anything	  else.	  
Second	  is	  the	  conception	  of	  being	  relative	  to,	  the	  conception	  of	  reaction	  
with,	  something	  else.	  Third	  is	  the	  conception	  of	  mediation,	  whereby	  a	  first	  
and	  second	  are	  brought	  into	  relation.	  The	  origin	  of	  things,	  considered	  not	  as	  
leading	  to	  anything,	  but	  in	  itself,	  contains	  the	  idea	  of	  First,	  the	  end	  of	  things	  
that	  of	  Second,	  the	  process	  mediating	  between	  them	  that	  of	  Third	  (CP,	  
[1891],	  6.32).	  
	  
Stearns	  remarks	  that	  ‘Firstness	  is	  without	  any	  doubt	  the	  most	  elusive	  of	  
Peirce's	  categories’	  (Rosenthal,	  1972,	  39),	  because	  as	  soon	  as	  you	  begin	  to	  describe	  
it,	  it	  stops	  to	  be	  a	  First	  and	  manifests	  itself	  by	  entering	  into	  the	  actuality	  of	  
Secondness.17	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  First	  thus	  encapsulates	  that	  difficult	  to	  grasp	  ‘initiating	  
spark’	  (Hausman,	  1993,	  123),	  as	  it	  can	  be	  perceived	  only	  in	  the	  brief	  moment	  of,	  for	  
example,	  a	  sudden	  chance	  event	  or	  a	  moment	  of	  inspiration.	  Peirce	  defines	  Firstness	  
as	  being	  marked	  by	  ‘positive	  qualitative	  possibility’	  (CP,	  [1903],	  1.25),	  thus	  
presenting	  itself	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  act	  freely	  and	  autonomously	  in	  order	  to	  realise	  
a	  new	  way	  of	  being.	  On	  an	  experiential	  level	  this	  means	  for	  example,	  a	  moment	  of	  
chance	  suddenly	  opens	  up	  the	  potential	  to	  see	  things	  in	  a	  new	  light,	  to	  draw	  new	  
connections	  (the	  mediating	  role	  of	  Thirdness)	  and	  this	  realisation	  of	  something	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Peirce:	  ‘Giving	  to	  being	  the	  broadest	  possible	  sense,	  to	  include	  ideas	  as	  well	  as	  things,	  and	  ideas	  
that	  we	  fancy	  we	  have	  just	  as	  much	  as	  ideas	  we	  do	  have’	  (Letter	  to	  Lady	  Welby,	  12	  Oct.	  1904)	  .	  
17	  ’Stop	  to	  think	  of	  it,	  and	  it	  has	  flown!	  What	  the	  world	  was	  to	  Adam	  on	  the	  day	  he	  opened	  his	  eyes	  to	  
it,	  before	  he	  had	  drawn	  any	  distinctions,	  or	  had	  become	  conscious	  of	  his	  own	  existence	  –	  that	  is	  first,	  
present,	  immediate,	  fresh,	  new,	  initiative,	  original,	  spontaneous,	  free,	  vivid,	  conscious,	  evanescent.	  
Only,	  remember	  that	  every	  description	  of	  it	  must	  be	  false	  to	  it’	  (CP,	  [1887],	  1.357).	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previously	  unimagined	  can	  lead	  to	  its	  actualisation	  (Secondness).	  However,	  as	  Ibri	  
points	  out,	  Firstness	  encapsulates:	  	  
	  
[m]ore	  than	  a	  category	  of	  spontaneity,	  of	  deviation	  in	  relation	  to	  law,	  of	  the	  
diversity	  and	  multiplicity	  present	  in	  phenomena,	  [it]	  genuinely	  houses	  the	  
classical	  ideas	  of	  freedom	  and	  unconditionality,	  thanks	  to	  its	  appearing	  both	  
on	  the	  internal	  and	  the	  external	  side	  of	  the	  mind,	  taken	  in	  a	  general	  
ontological	  sense.	  …	  the	  experience	  that	  typifies	  Firstness	  in	  its	  pure	  state	  is	  
one	  of	  non-­‐differentiation	  between	  subjective	  and	  objective	  aspects	  of	  
phenomena	  (2009,	  282–3).	  
	  
This	  characterisation	  is	  crucial	  in	  understanding	  chance	  in	  Peirce’s	  philosophy	  and	  it	  
describes	  the	  radical	  reinterpretation	  of	  it	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  perception	  of	  chance	  
was	  still	  predominately	  a	  negative	  one.	  In	  The	  Doctrine	  of	  Necessity	  Examined	  Peirce	  
makes	  it	  very	  explicit	  that	  absolute	  chance	  (here	  spontaneity)	  is	  not	  only	  the	  source	  
of	  variety	  and	  diversity	  but	  also	  the	  driver	  for	  mind,	  in	  the	  metaphysical	  sense,	  to	  
come	  into	  existence:	  
	  
By	  thus	  admitting	  pure	  spontaneity	  or	  life	  as	  a	  character	  of	  the	  universe,	  
acting	  always	  and	  everywhere	  though	  restrained	  within	  narrow	  bounds	  by	  
law,	  producing	  infinitesimal	  departures	  from	  law	  continually,	  and	  great	  ones	  
with	  infinite	  infrequency,	  I	  account	  for	  all	  the	  variety	  and	  diversity	  of	  the	  
universe,	  in	  the	  only	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  really	  sui	  generis	  and	  new	  can	  be	  said	  
to	  be	  accounted	  for.	  [...]	  by	  supposing	  the	  rigid	  exactitude	  of	  causation	  to	  
yield,	  I	  care	  not	  how	  little—be	  it	  but	  by	  a	  strictly	  infinitesimal	  amount—we	  
gain	  room	  to	  insert	  mind	  into	  our	  scheme,	  and	  to	  put	  it	  into	  the	  place	  where	  
it	  is	  needed,	  into	  the	  position	  which,	  as	  the	  sole	  self-­‐intelligible	  thing,	  it	  is	  
entitled	  to	  occupy,	  that	  of	  the	  fountain	  of	  existence	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.59-­‐61).	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  profound	  statement	  and	  encapsulates	  the	  wide-­‐reaching	  powers	  Peirce	  
assigned	  to	  chance.	  It	  also	  demonstrates	  Peirce’s	  keen	  foresight,	  because	  what	  he	  
describes	  here	  can	  be	  recognised	  as	  the	  basic	  principle	  later	  brought	  forward	  in	  
chaos	  theory.	  Chance	  becomes	  the	  element	  in	  nature	  that	  makes	  the	  existence	  of	  
real	  variety,	  diversity,	  novelty	  and	  freedom	  possible.	  For	  Peirce	  freedom	  is	  inherent	  
in	  Firstness:	  freedom	  to	  access	  a	  state	  of	  homogenous	  unity	  containing	  all	  and	  every	  
possibility.	  Chance	  is	  the	  activator	  that	  transports	  elements	  from	  this	  realm	  of	  
possibility	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  experience.	  Peirce	  even	  equated	  chance	  with	  freedom:	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‘when	  I	  speak	  of	  chance,	  I	  only	  employ	  a	  mathematical	  term	  to	  express	  with	  
accuracy	  the	  characteristics	  of	  freedom	  and	  spontaneity’	  (CP,	  [1898],	  6.201).	  	  
	   It	  should	  also	  be	  stressed	  that	  by	  describing	  chance,	  feeling	  and	  mind	  as	  
Firsts	  alike,	  Peirce	  conceives	  them	  as	  sharing	  the	  same	  attributes.	  In	  the	  
metaphysical	  sense	  Peirce	  understands	  feeling	  as	  a	  basic	  ground	  of	  being.	  In	  its	  
immediacy	  it	  constitutes	  the	  elemental	  relationship	  between	  things,	  between	  the	  
world	  and	  us	  and	  between	  each	  other.	  Feeling	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  form	  of	  two	  basic	  
kinds,	  these	  being	  pleasure	  and	  pain.	  Peirce	  does	  not	  clearly	  distinguish	  feeling	  from	  
mind	  (or	  consciousness)	  and	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  his	  earlier	  writings	  he	  even	  equates	  the	  two,	  
whereas	  later	  feeling	  becomes	  an	  element	  of	  consciousness.	  In	  1902	  he	  concluded:	  
‘What	  is	  meant	  by	  consciousness	  is	  really	  in	  itself	  nothing	  but	  feeling’	  (CP,	  7.364).	  
However,	  in	  1910	  he	  writes:	  ‘The	  whole	  content	  of	  consciousness	  is	  made	  up	  of	  
qualities	  of	  feeling,	  as	  truly	  as	  the	  whole	  of	  space	  is	  made	  up	  of	  points	  or	  the	  whole	  
of	  time	  of	  instants’	  (CP,	  1.317).	  As	  a	  quality	  of	  consciousness,	  feeling	  itself	  is	  not	  
conscious.	  It	  is	  merely	  characterised	  by	  its	  simple	  and	  instantaneous	  presence.	  In	  
this	  regard	  Peirce	  finds	  very	  direct	  words	  to	  link	  feeling	  to	  chance:	  'Chance	  itself	  
pours	  in	  at	  every	  avenue	  of	  sense:	  it	  is	  of	  all	  things	  the	  most	  obtrusive’	  (CP,	  [1893],	  
6.612)	  and	  ‘wherever	  chance-­‐spontaneity	  is	  found,	  there	  in	  the	  same	  proportion	  
feeling	  exists.	  In	  fact,	  chance	  is	  but	  the	  outward	  aspect	  of	  that	  which	  within	  itself	  is	  
feeling’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.265).	  	  
	   Since	  Peirce	  considered	  that	  chance,	  feeling	  and	  mind	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  
category,	  it	  can	  be	  inferred	  that	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  they	  are	  inherently	  similar	  in	  
nature.	  The	  characteristics	  that	  they	  all	  share	  are	  immediacy,	  spontaneity,	  
autonomy,	  diversity,	  variety,	  novelty	  and	  freedom.	  They	  constitute	  the	  source	  of	  
new	  phenomena	  in	  ways	  which	  remain	  utterly	  unpredictable.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  
chapter	  following	  this	  next	  section,	  Peirce	  does	  not	  only	  attribute	  these	  features	  to	  
the	  metaphysical	  concepts	  of	  feeling	  and	  mind,	  but	  to	  their	  psychological	  
counterparts	  too.	  Peirce’s	  theory	  might	  therefore	  provide	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  





1.3.	  Tyche	  in	  Peirce’s	  Cosmogony	  and	  Evolutionary	  Theory	  
	  
More	  concrete	  links	  between	  chance	  and	  creativity,	  creativity	  in	  the	  broader,	  
Whiteheadian	  sense,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  his	  cosmogony.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  Peirce	  
proposed	  a	  theory	  where	  tyche	  not	  only	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  during	  the	  formation	  
of	  the	  universe,	  but	  continues	  to	  influence	  all	  processes	  of	  evolution.	  Peirce	  
therefore	  hypothesised	  that	  everything	  began	  with:	  
	  
a	  chaos	  of	  unpersonalised	  feeling,	  which	  being	  without	  connection	  or	  
regularity	  would	  properly	  be	  without	  existence.	  This	  feeling,	  sporting	  here	  
and	  there	  in	  pure	  arbitrariness,	  would	  have	  started	  the	  germ	  of	  a	  
generalising	  tendency.	  Its	  other	  sportings	  would	  be	  evanescent,	  but	  this	  
would	  have	  a	  growing	  virtue.	  Thus,	  the	  tendency	  to	  habit	  would	  be	  started;	  
and	  from	  this	  with	  the	  other	  principles	  of	  evolution	  all	  the	  regularities	  of	  the	  
universe	  would	  be	  evolved.	  At	  any	  time,	  however,	  an	  element	  of	  pure	  chance	  
survives	  and	  will	  remain	  until	  the	  world	  becomes	  an	  absolutely	  perfect,	  
rational,	  and	  symmetrical	  system,	  in	  which	  mind	  is	  at	  last	  crystallised	  in	  the	  
infinitely	  distant	  future	  (CP,	  [1891],	  6.33).18	  
	  
It	  shows	  that	  Peirce	  understood	  tyche	  as	  the	  primal	  mover	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  in	  
this	  interpretation	  it	  becomes	  the	  catalyst	  for	  the	  operation	  of	  creativity	  to	  be	  set	  in	  
motion.	  Peirce	  again:	  ‘The	  very	  first	  and	  most	  fundamental	  element	  that	  we	  have	  to	  
assume	  is	  a	  Freedom	  or	  Chance,	  or	  Spontaneity,	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  the	  general	  
vague	  nothing-­‐in-­‐particularness	  that	  preceded	  the	  chaos	  took	  a	  thousand	  definite	  
qualities’	  (CP,	  [1898],	  6.200).	  	  
Peirce	  divided	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  universe	  into	  three	  stages:	  at	  first	  there	  is	  
‘the	  utter	  vagueness	  of	  completely	  undetermined	  and	  dimensionless	  potentiality’	  
(CP,	  [1898],	  6.193).	  Anderson	  and	  Hausman	  also	  call	  it	  ‘the	  continuum	  of	  pure	  and	  
undifferentiated	  firsts’	  (Anderson&Hausman,	  2012,	  170).	  The	  second	  stage	  is	  the	  
emergence	  of	  initial	  chaos:	  ‘Out	  of	  this	  real	  possibility	  or	  potentiality	  developed	  a	  
particular	  chaos	  or	  world	  of	  firsts’	  (ibid.).	  These	  Firsts	  are	  yet	  still	  undifferentiated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  ‘Hamblin	  explains	  this	  quote	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  universe	  is	  now	  somewhere	  between	  the	  limits	  of	  
complete	  indeterminacy	  and	  complete	  determinacy.	  But	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  universe	  in	  time	  is	  
concerned,	  the	  limit	  of	  indeterminacy	  was	  never	  actual	  nor	  will	  the	  limit	  of	  determinacy	  ever	  be	  
reached.	  They	  are	  simply	  ideal	  limits,	  never	  experienced	  in	  themselves,	  but	  pointed	  to	  by	  our	  
experience,	  since	  recognition	  of	  them	  enables	  us	  to	  explain	  what	  we	  do	  experience,	  namely,	  both	  
regularity	  and	  irregularity’	  (1945,	  381).	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and	  ‘[t]he	  spontaneous	  relationships	  –	  what	  Peirce	  thought	  of	  as	  developing	  habits	  –	  
of	  these	  firsts,	  or	  ideas,	  then	  yielded	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  reaction	  –	  the	  evolution	  of	  
our	  real	  and	  existent	  universe	  in	  which	  time	  comes	  into	  play’	  (ibid.).	  This	  describes	  
how	  Peirce	  conceived	  order	  to	  emerge	  from	  chaos.	  Whereas	  before	  scientists	  
assumed	  that	  only	  order	  can	  generate	  more	  order,	  Peirce	  concluded	  that	  
heterogeneity	  grew	  out	  of	  homogeneity.	  Peirce	  even	  declared	  that	  ‘the	  idea	  that	  
chance	  begets	  order,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  corner-­‐stones	  of	  modern	  physics’	  (CP,	  [1893],	  
6.297)	  and	  with	  this	  statement	  he	  radically	  opposed	  the	  current	  scientific	  view.	  	  
It	  is	  thus	  by	  pure	  chance	  that	  the	  tendency	  to	  regularity	  emerged	  and	  he	  
therefore	  wrote	  that	  it	  had	  a	  ‘growing	  virtue’	  (CP,	  [1891],	  6.33).	  Hamblin	  writes:	  ‘in	  
that	  original	  chaos	  there	  happened,	  by	  chance,	  to	  be	  a	  tendency	  toward	  uniformity,	  
a	  tendency	  of	  things	  to	  take	  habits.	  And	  this	  habit-­‐taking	  tendency	  grew	  ever	  
stronger	  until	  we	  get	  the	  emergence	  of	  law	  as	  we	  know	  it’	  (Hamblin,	  1945,	  381).	  
Peirce	  did	  not	  start	  his	  examination	  from	  a	  universe	  governed	  by	  static	  laws,	  but	  he	  
sought	  to	  reach	  further	  back	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  explain	  how	  these	  laws	  came	  into	  
existence	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  For	  Peirce	  even	  laws	  evolve	  and	  change	  over	  time	  and	  he	  
argued	  that	  this	  is	  also	  how	  inaccuracies	  in	  experimental	  measurements	  can	  be	  
explained.19	  
Peirce	  rejected	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  diversity	  and	  arbitrary	  specifications	  were	  
only	  active	  factors	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  since	  then	  have	  remained	  
stable	  and	  unchanged.	  Instead	  he	  advocated	  that	  the	  process	  of	  diversification	  is	  
ongoing	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.57)	  and	  that	  variety	  is	  constantly	  increasing	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.58),	  
meaning	  that	  all	  elements	  in	  nature	  are	  subject	  to	  evolution	  and	  continuity.	  
Hausman	  and	  Anderson	  argue	  that	  these	  considerations	  can	  be	  deemed	  a	  precursor	  
to	  the	  later	  emerging	  theory	  of	  the	  big	  bang	  (1997,	  87).	  Peirce:	  ‘I	  must	  acknowledge	  
there	  is	  an	  approximate	  regularity,	  and	  that	  every	  event	  is	  influenced	  by	  it.	  But	  the	  
diversification,	  specificalness,	  and	  irregularity	  of	  things	  I	  suppose	  is	  chance’	  (CP,	  
[1892],	  6.54).	  He	  consequently	  maintained	  that	  mechanical	  determinism	  does	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Dearmont	  tested	  this	  hypothesis	  and	  draws	  the	  following	  conclusion:	  ‘My	  calculations	  show	  how	  
habit-­‐taking	  and	  chance	  can	  yield	  Peirce's	  results.	  Thus,	  my	  calculations	  suggest	  how	  Peirce	  might	  
have	  arrived	  at	  his	  doctrine	  of	  tychism.	  The	  simulations	  and	  examples	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  
demonstrate	  that	  when	  absolute	  chance	  and	  habit-­‐taking	  operate,	  unexpected	  patterns	  can	  arise.	  
Such	  patterns	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  evolved	  from	  absolute	  
chance’	  (1995,	  197-­‐8).	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elucidate	  the	  existence	  of	  irregularity,	  novelty,	  complexity,	  growth	  and	  
consciousness	  and	  instead	  argued	  in	  preference	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  it	  is	  absolute	  
chance	  which	  accounts	  more	  logically	  for	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  universe:	  ‘I	  have	  begun	  
by	  showing	  that	  tychism	  must	  give	  birth	  to	  an	  evolutionary	  cosmology,	  in	  which	  all	  






Up	  to	  this	  point	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  Peirce	  established	  chance	  in	  a	  new,	  
ground-­‐breaking	  context,	  a	  view	  that	  would	  take	  on	  more	  and	  more	  momentum	  
during	  the	  following	  decades.	  Chance	  is	  reinterpreted	  as	  an	  all-­‐pervasive	  element	  
that	  coexists	  together	  with	  chains	  of	  causal	  effect.	  Peirce	  therefore	  acknowledged	  
that	  we	  live	  in	  a	  world	  of	  flux	  and	  constant	  change.	  Absolute	  chance	  continues	  to	  
interrupt	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  natural	  laws	  are	  no	  longer	  stable	  truths,	  but	  reliable	  
habits.	  By	  postulating	  a	  theory	  that	  recognises	  the	  existence	  of	  actual	  chance	  as	  the	  
‘initiating	  spark’,	  Peirce	  could	  then	  account	  for	  the	  following	  phenomena	  in	  the	  
universe:	  
	  
1)	  The	  general	  prevalence	  of	  growth,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  opposed	  to	  the	  
conservation	  of	  energy.	  
2)	  The	  variety	  of	  the	  universe,	  which	  is	  chance,	  and	  is	  manifestly	  inexplicable.	  
3)	  Law,	  which	  requires	  to	  be	  explained,	  and	  like	  everything	  which	  is	  to	  be	  
explained	  must	  be	  explained	  by	  something	  else,	  that	  is,	  by	  non-­‐law	  or	  real	  
chance.	  
4)	  Feeling,	  for	  which	  room	  cannot	  be	  found	  if	  the	  conservation	  of	  energy	  is	  
maintained	  (CP,	  [1893],	  6.613).	  
	  
Implicitly	  Peirce’s	  hypothesis	  dashed	  the	  scientists’	  hope	  that	  by	  discovering	  
more	  and	  more	  chains	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  one	  will	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  the	  future,	  
thus	  gaining	  further	  control	  over	  oneself	  and	  nature.	  Instead	  Peirce’s	  model	  speaks	  
of	  sustained	  surprises	  and	  the	  continuous	  emergence	  of	  anomalies	  provides	  an	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endless	  stream	  for	  new	  discoveries.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  we	  shall	  take	  a	  leap	  from	  
how	  chance	  acts	  on	  the	  cosmos	  to	  how	  it	  influences	  the	  human	  mind.	  
	  
2.	  Chance	  in	  Human	  Affairs	  
	  
Peirce	  was	  not	  only	  interested	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  physical	  world,	  but	  
also	  how	  new	  ideas	  are	  generated.	  In	  his	  psychological	  discussions	  Peirce	  does	  not	  
mention	  tychism	  and	  he	  only	  indirectly	  refers	  to	  chance	  by	  speaking	  about	  
‘spontaneity’.	  In	  this	  regard	  Anderson	  explains	  that	  ‘spontaneity,	  which	  is	  the	  active	  
side	  of	  chance,	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  mental	  activity	  (6.148)’	  (1987,	  131).	  Turley	  adds	  
that	  ‘Peirce	  maintains	  that	  the	  spontaneity	  of	  the	  psychical	  realm	  is	  not	  essentially	  
different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  physical	  realm.	  This	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Epicurean	  view	  
that	  human	  freedom	  is	  the	  analogue	  of	  the	  primordial	  atom's	  “swerve.”’	  (1969,	  
247).	  This	  suggests	  that	  while	  he	  did	  not	  specifically	  link	  tychism	  to	  human	  creativity,	  
we	  shall	  see	  that	  there	  are	  some	  implicit	  connections	  contained	  within	  his	  
discussions	  on	  free	  will,	  developmental	  teleology,	  pure	  play,	  abduction	  and	  
musement.	  In	  turn,	  these	  are	  all	  essential	  features	  in	  Peirce’s	  philosophy	  that	  can	  
now	  be	  understood	  to	  link	  to	  human	  creativity.	  
	  
	  
2.1.	  Free	  Will,	  Habit	  and	  Developmental	  Teleology	  
	  
As	  the	  previous	  chapter	  has	  shown	  in	  his	  attack	  on	  determinism	  Peirce	  
established	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  chance	  and	  freedom.	  Even	  
though	  Peirce	  did	  not	  elaborate	  on	  links	  between	  tychism	  and	  free	  will	  at	  length,	  he	  
commented	  on	  it	  in	  passing.	  In	  The	  Doctrine	  of	  Necessity	  Examined	  Peirce	  for	  
example	  mentioned	  that	  a	  genuine	  free	  will	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Aristotle	  and	  Epicurus	  
(CP,	  [1892],	  6.36),	  both	  of	  which	  were	  also	  important	  sources	  for	  Peirce’s	  view	  on	  
chance.	  He	  was	  furthermore	  familiar	  with	  contemporary	  debates	  on	  the	  question	  of	  
free	  will	  through	  the	  writings	  of	  his	  friend	  William	  James,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  French	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philosophers	  Joseph	  Delboeuf,	  Emile	  Boutroux,	  Charles	  Renouvier	  and	  Emile	  Fouille.	  
In	  their	  discussions	  they	  criticized	  determinism	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  immanent	  denial	  
of	  free	  will.	  Since	  Peirce	  named	  the	  Frenchmen	  ‘antecedents’	  (5.508	  and	  6.238n1)	  to	  
his	  own	  ideas	  on	  absolute	  chance,	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  Peirce	  agreed	  with	  them	  
on	  a	  link	  between	  chance	  and	  free	  will	  too.	  	  
Besides,	  Peirce	  wrote	  that	  if	  invariable	  chains	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  governed	  
the	  world,	  the	  notion	  that	  we	  are	  free	  to	  decide	  would	  be	  an	  illusion	  (CP,	  [1892],	  
6.61).	  In	  The	  Law	  of	  Mind	  (1892)	  Peirce	  expanded	  on	  this	  and	  developed	  a	  
hypothesis	  of	  mental	  activity.	  	  He	  explained	  that	  the	  law	  of	  mind	  is	  similar	  to	  natural	  
laws	  in	  that	  both	  grew	  out	  of	  an	  inherent	  ground	  of	  chaos	  and	  uncertainty	  and	  that	  
both	  share	  the	  tendency	  to	  take	  habits,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  at	  the	  same	  time	  under	  the	  
continuous	  influence	  of	  growth	  and	  diversification.	  Yet,	  they	  differ	  in	  that	  the	  law	  of	  
mind	  exhibits	  more	  flexibility:	  
	  
But	  no	  mental	  action	  seems	  to	  be	  necessary	  or	  invariable	  in	  its	  character.	  In	  
whatever	  manner	  the	  mind	  has	  reacted	  under	  a	  given	  sensation,	  in	  that	  
manner	  it	  is	  the	  more	  likely	  to	  react	  again;	  were	  this,	  however,	  an	  absolute	  
necessity,	  habits	  would	  become	  wooden	  and	  ineradicable,	  and	  no	  room	  
being	  left	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  habits,	  intellectual	  life	  would	  come	  to	  a	  
speedy	  close.	  Thus,	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  mental	  law	  is	  no	  mere	  defect	  of	  it,	  
but	  is	  on	  the	  contrary	  of	  its	  essence.	  The	  truth	  is,	  the	  mind	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  
"law,”	  in	  the	  same	  rigid	  sense	  that	  matter	  is.	  It	  only	  experiences	  gentle	  forces	  
which	  merely	  render	  it	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  in	  a	  given	  way	  than	  it	  otherwise	  
would	  be.	  There	  always	  remains	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  arbitrary	  spontaneity	  in	  
its	  action,	  without	  which	  it	  would	  be	  dead	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.148).	  
	  
He	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘mental	  law’	  is	  even	  more	  strongly	  directed	  by	  chance	  than	  
matter	  and	  it	  is	  this	  element	  of	  ‘arbitrary	  spontaneity’	  that	  allows	  the	  mind	  to	  be	  
free	  from	  strict	  predetermination:	  ‘The	  tychastic	  development	  of	  thought,	  then,	  will	  
consist	  in	  slight	  departures	  from	  habitual	  ideas	  in	  different	  directions	  indifferently,	  
quite	  purposeless	  and	  quite	  unconstrained	  whether	  by	  outward	  circumstances	  or	  by	  
force	  of	  logic’	  (CP,	  [1893],	  6.307).	  Freedom	  of	  thought	  is	  closely	  tied	  up	  with	  
creativity	  and	  where	  the	  imagination	  is	  allowed	  to	  play	  freely	  creativity	  flourishes.	  	  
Peirce	  furthermore	  argued	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  ideas	  is	  never	  a	  feat	  of	  
one’s	  mind	  alone	  and	  that	  independent	  of	  purpose,	  it	  also	  depends	  on	  unexpected	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influences	  from	  within	  the	  unknown	  depths	  of	  the	  unconscious,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  
external	  world.	  	  	  	  
	  
Direct	  endeavour	  can	  achieve	  almost	  nothing.	  It	  is	  as	  easy	  by	  taking	  thought	  
to	  add	  a	  cubit	  to	  one’s	  stature	  as	  it	  is	  to	  produce	  an	  idea	  acceptable	  to	  any	  of	  
the	  Muses	  by	  merely	  straining	  for	  it	  before	  it	  is	  ready	  to	  come.	  We	  haunt	  in	  
vain	  the	  sacred	  well	  and	  throne	  of	  Mnemosyne;	  the	  deeper	  workings	  of	  the	  
spirit	  take	  place	  in	  their	  own	  slow	  way,	  without	  our	  connivance.	  […]	  Besides	  
this	  inward	  process,	  there	  is	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  environment,	  which	  goes	  to	  
break	  up	  habits	  destined	  to	  be	  broken	  up	  and	  so	  to	  render	  the	  mind	  lively	  
(CP,	  [1893],	  6.301).	  
	  
It	  suggests	  that	  Peirce	  assumed	  chance	  is	  not	  only	  operating	  on	  an	  external	  level,	  
but	  also	  on	  an	  internal	  level.	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  outcome	  is	  the	  same:	  habits	  are	  
broken	  and	  these	  interruptions	  offer	  new	  starting	  points	  for	  fresh	  ideas.	  He	  
continued	  the	  paragraph	  with:	  	  
	  
Everybody	  knows	  that	  the	  long	  continuance	  of	  a	  routine	  of	  habit	  makes	  us	  
lethargic,	  while	  a	  succession	  of	  surprises	  wonderfully	  brightens	  the	  ideas.	  […]	  
A	  portion	  of	  mind	  abundantly	  commissured	  to	  other	  portions	  works	  almost	  
mechanically.	  It	  sinks	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  a	  railway	  junction.	  But	  a	  portion	  of	  
mind	  almost	  isolated,	  a	  spiritual	  peninsula,	  or	  cul-­‐de-­‐sac,	  is	  like	  a	  railway	  
terminus.	  Now	  mental	  commissures	  are	  habits.	  Where	  they	  abound,	  
originality	  is	  not	  needed	  and	  is	  not	  found;	  but	  where	  they	  are	  in	  defect,	  
spontaneity	  is	  set	  free.	  Thus,	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  Lamarckian	  evolution	  of	  
mind	  is	  the	  putting	  of	  sundry	  thoughts	  into	  situations	  in	  which	  they	  are	  free	  
to	  play	  (CSP,	  [1893],	  6.301).	  
	  
In	  his	  psychological	  discussion	  Peirce	  also	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  purpose	  
in	  relation	  to	  free	  will.20	  Peirce	  himself	  only	  discusses	  teleology	  in	  regards	  to	  human	  
volition	  and	  even	  though	  there	  are	  some	  Peirceans	  (e.g.	  Hawkins	  (2007)	  and	  
Anderson	  (1987))	  who	  understand	  that	  his	  particular	  view	  on	  teleology	  can	  be	  
transferred	  to	  natural	  processes,	  these	  speculations	  will	  be	  left	  aside	  here.	  	  In	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  ‘[M]any	  contemporary	  philosophers	  regard	  final	  causality	  as,	  at	  best,	  an	  odd	  relic	  from	  an	  
enchanted,	  pre-­‐modern	  world.	  At	  worst,	  final	  causality	  is	  thought	  a	  metaphysical	  stowaway	  on	  that	  
anti-­‐foundational	  barge	  guided	  so	  skilfully	  by	  Quine	  and	  his	  mates.	  Even	  'Continental'	  philosophers	  
(e.g.	  Heidegger,	  Deleuze)	  tend	  to	  be	  suspicious	  of	  final	  causality.	  To	  them,	  final	  cause	  is	  a	  concept	  
incompatible	  with	  our	  experience	  of	  freedom	  and	  novelty.	  Further,	  they	  fear	  that	  the	  ultimate	  
interpretation	  of	  final	  causality	  will	  be	  theological.	  Lastly,	  not	  even	  common	  sense	  seems	  to	  endorse	  
final	  causality.	  …	  In	  Peirce's	  view,	  our	  pursuit	  of	  scientific	  explanation	  leads	  us	  to	  conclude	  that	  final	  
causality	  is	  indeed	  operative	  in	  our	  world’	  (Hawkins,	  2007,	  522).	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Law	  of	  Mind	  Peirce	  explains	  personality	  as	  ‘some	  kind	  of	  coördination	  or	  connection	  
of	  ideas’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.155)	  and	  later	  adds	  that	  ‘the	  word	  coördination	  […]	  implies	  a	  
teleological	  harmony	  in	  ideas,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  personality	  this	  teleology	  is	  more	  
than	  a	  mere	  purposive	  pursuit	  of	  a	  predeterminate	  end;	  it	  is	  a	  developmental	  
teleology’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.156).	  It	  suggests	  that	  while	  we	  are	  driven	  by	  ideas	  and	  aims,	  
these	  are	  only	  relatively	  stable	  and	  enough	  room	  needs	  to	  be	  left	  for	  them	  to	  adapt	  
and	  change	  with	  time	  and	  according	  to	  new	  circumstances.	  ‘Were	  the	  ends	  of	  a	  
person	  already	  explicit,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  room	  for	  development,	  for	  growth,	  for	  
life;	  and	  consequently	  there	  would	  be	  no	  personality.	  The	  mere	  carrying	  out	  of	  
predetermined	  purposes	  is	  mechanical’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.157).	  	  
	  	   This	  was	  a	  unique	  understanding	  of	  teleology	  and	  shows	  that	  once	  again	  
Peirce	  regarded	  the	  elements	  of	  change	  and	  variability	  to	  be	  more	  dominant	  than	  
stability.	  He	  acknowledged	  that	  both	  these	  opposing	  forces	  are	  active,	  but	  cautioned	  
that	  the	  drive	  for	  permanence	  should	  not	  become	  overpowering.	  Peirce	  argued	  that	  
naturally	  ‘a	  purpose	  essentially	  involves	  growth’	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.466)	  and	  while	  one’s	  
ambitions	  do	  display	  a	  certain	  continuity,	  he	  cautioned	  that	  they	  need	  to	  be	  flexible	  
enough	  to	  accommodate	  the	  unexpected,	  chance	  occurrences	  for	  example,	  in	  order	  
to	  adjust	  to	  what	  cannot	  be	  foreseen.	  ‘Peirce’s	  teleology,	  therefore,	  is	  characterized	  
by	  its	  open-­‐endedness’	  (Wang,	  2005,	  616).	  	  
	  
	  
2.2.	  Aesthetics	  and	  Pure	  Play	  
	  
In	  Peirce’s	  philosophical	  model	  aesthetics	  holds	  an	  ambiguous	  position.	  On	  
the	  one	  hand	  it	  remained	  ‘one	  of	  the	  least	  developed	  sciences	  within	  his	  system’	  
(Ibri,	  2009,	  296)	  and	  on	  the	  other	  Peirce	  described	  it	  as	  the	  ‘“heart,	  soul	  and	  spirit”	  
of	  the	  normative	  sciences’21	  (Conway,	  2008,	  297).	  Overall	  he	  didn’t	  discuss	  
aesthetics	  until	  late	  and	  his	  views	  remained	  undeveloped	  and	  fragmentary.22	  His	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  For	  Peirce	  the	  normative	  sciences	  consist	  of	  aesthetics,	  ethics	  and	  logic.	  	  
22	  ‘As	  for	  esthetics,	  although	  the	  first	  year	  of	  my	  study	  of	  philosophy	  was	  devoted	  to	  this	  branch	  
exclusively,	  yet	  I	  have	  since	  then	  so	  completely	  neglected	  it	  that	  I	  do	  not	  feel	  entitled	  to	  have	  any	  
confident	  opinions	  about	  it’	  (CP,	  [1903],	  5.129).	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views	  were	  principally	  influenced	  by	  Schiller,	  since	  he	  had	  read	  his	  Aesthetic	  Letters	  
as	  a	  senior	  student.	  23	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  Lady	  Welby	  (1908)	  Peirce	  further	  explained	  the	  
strong	  and	  lasting	  influence	  Schiller’s	  Letters	  had	  on	  him:	  ‘[a]s	  to	  the	  word	  “play”,	  
the	  first	  book	  of	  philosophy	  I	  ever	  read	  …	  was	  Schiller’s	  Aesthetische	  Briefe,	  where	  
he	  has	  so	  much	  to	  say	  about	  the	  Spiel-­‐Trieb;	  and	  it	  made	  so	  much	  impression	  upon	  
me	  as	  to	  have	  thoroughly	  soaked	  my	  notion	  of	  “play”	  to	  this	  day’	  (Peirce,	  1953,	  27).	  
As	  already	  mentioned,	  for	  Schiller	  play	  constitutes	  the	  mediator	  between	  the	  
opposite	  faculties	  of	  the	  form-­‐	  and	  the	  sense-­‐drive,	  continually	  attempting	  to	  bring	  
them	  into	  a	  state	  of	  harmony	  and	  equilibrium.	  Both	  Peirce	  and	  Schiller	  considered	  
aesthetics	  the	  realm	  where	  habits	  of	  feeling	  need	  to	  be	  formed	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  
this	  function.	  	  
The	  play-­‐drive	  is	  characterized	  by	  freedom	  because	  it	  limits	  the	  other	  two	  
drives	  in	  their	  influence	  and	  prevents	  them	  from	  developing	  one-­‐sidedly,	  thus	  
becoming	  too	  rigid	  and	  overpowering.	  Schiller	  actually	  located	  the	  freedom	  gained	  
through	  aesthetic	  contemplation	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  human	  experience.	  Freedom	  in	  
this	  context	  means	  being	  free	  from	  one-­‐sidedness,	  being	  free	  from	  rigid	  habits	  and	  it	  
describes	  a	  certain	  fluidity	  in	  experiencing	  the	  world,	  an	  attitude	  of	  openness	  
towards	  what	  is	  happening	  within	  oneself	  and	  in	  the	  world	  around.	  ‘For	  Peirce	  as	  for	  
Schiller	  aesthetics	  is	  precisely	  meant	  to	  overcome	  the	  coerciveness	  of	  experience	  
within	  and	  for	  experience.	  Aesthetics	  then	  not	  only	  contains	  the	  emphatic	  dualism	  
of	  good	  and	  bad,	  but	  points	  beyond	  the	  brute	  oppositions	  of	  Secondness	  to	  
mediation,	  the	  development	  of	  concrete	  reasonableness	  in	  the	  world’	  (Barnouw,	  
1988,	  613).	  
	   While	  Schiller’s	  influence	  is	  very	  present	  in	  Peirce’s	  writing,	  there	  are	  some	  
aspects	  that	  are	  unique	  to	  his	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics.	  Since	  he	  first	  and	  
foremost	  considered	  himself	  a	  logician,	  he	  also	  approached	  aesthetics	  with	  the	  eyes	  
of	  one.	  He	  therefore	  described	  aesthetics	  as	  ‘the	  science	  of	  ideals,	  or	  of	  that	  which	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  ‘It	  is	  now	  forty-­‐seven	  years	  ago	  that	  I	  undertook	  to	  expound	  Schiller’s	  Aesthetische	  Briefe	  to	  my	  
dear	  friend,	  Horatio	  Paine.	  We	  spent	  every	  afternoon	  for	  long	  months	  upon	  it,	  picking	  the	  matter	  to	  
pieces	  as	  well	  as	  we	  boys	  knew	  how	  to	  do.	  In	  those	  days,	  I	  read	  various	  works	  on	  esthetics;	  but	  on	  the	  
whole,	  I	  must	  confess	  that,	  like	  most	  logicians,	  I	  have	  pondered	  that	  subject	  far	  too	  little.	  …	  And	  then	  
esthetics	  and	  logic	  seem,	  at	  first	  blush,	  to	  belong	  to	  different	  universes.	  It	  is	  only	  very	  recently	  that	  I	  
have	  become	  persuaded	  that	  that	  seeming	  is	  illusory,	  and	  that,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  logic	  needs	  the	  help	  
of	  esthetics’	  (CP,	  [1902],	  2.197).	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objectively	  admirable	  without	  any	  ulterior	  reason’	  (CP,	  [1903],	  1.191).	  Lefebvre	  
explains:	  
	  
Such	  an	  ideal	  is	  precisely	  the	  object	  of	  esthetics	  and	  this	  is	  why	  both	  ethics	  
and	  logic	  can	  be	  said	  to	  require	  the	  help	  of	  the	  first	  of	  the	  three	  normative	  
sciences.	  No	  longer	  the	  science	  of	  the	  beautiful	  in	  the	  fine	  arts,	  esthetics	  
becomes	  for	  Peirce	  the	  science	  of	  the	  admirable	  in	  itself,	  the	  science	  of	  ends,	  
of	  which	  the	  good	  in	  ethics	  and	  truth	  in	  logic	  constitute	  further,	  specialized,	  
determinations.	  More	  specifically,	  esthetics	  is	  the	  science	  that	  studies	  the	  
formation	  of	  ideals	  and	  of	  the	  supreme	  ideal,	  the	  summum	  bonum	  (2007,	  
323).24	  
	  
It	  is	  this	  interpretation	  of	  aesthetics	  that	  locates	  it	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  his	  philosophical	  
system.	  The	  other	  unique	  take	  on	  it	  is	  that	  these	  ideals	  are	  not	  abstract	  forms,	  but	  
can	  directly	  be	  experienced:	  	  
	  
The	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  its	  method,	  as	  he	  saw	  it,	  would	  be	  observation	  
of	  aesthetic	  phenomena.	  This	  presupposes	  that	  aesthetic	  values	  are	  
immanent	  within	  the	  phenomenal	  field,	  there	  to	  be	  discovered,	  not	  put	  into	  
the	  phenomena	  by	  the	  observing	  subject.	  A	  certain	  type	  of	  emotional	  
response	  to	  phenomena,	  provided	  it	  has	  arisen	  under	  the	  proper	  conditions,	  
constitutes	  evidence	  of	  aesthetic	  value.	  The	  “proper”	  conditions	  are	  
detachment	  and	  naiveté	  in	  the	  contemplation	  of	  qualitied	  objects’	  (Hocutt,	  
1962,	  165).25	  	  
	  
The	  emotive	  response,	  triggered	  by	  observation,	  determines	  the	  degree	  of	  
aesthetics.	  Ibri	  therefore	  describes	  the	  aesthetic	  experience	  as	  ‘a	  state	  of	  
enchantment	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  pure	  qualities,	  a	  unity	  of	  feeling	  with	  the	  object	  of	  
senses’	  (2009,	  276).	  This	  is	  where	  chance	  encounters	  come	  in,	  because	  they	  are	  
usually	  accompanied	  by	  strong	  feelings.	  Chance	  is	  therefore	  one	  example	  of	  a	  
starting	  point	  for	  play,	  especially	  when	  one	  faculty	  has	  become	  too	  one-­‐sidedly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  ‘If	  conduct	  is	  to	  be	  thoroughly	  deliberate,	  the	  ideal	  must	  be	  a	  habit	  of	  feeling	  which	  has	  grown	  up	  
under	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  course	  of	  self-­‐	  criticism	  and	  of	  heterocriticisms;	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  
deliberate	  formation	  of	  such	  habits	  of	  feeling	  is	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  meant	  by	  esthetics’	  (EP	  2,	  
[1906],	  377-­‐8).	  
25	  ‘although	  I	  am	  still	  a	  perfect	  ignoramus	  in	  esthetics,	  I	  venture	  to	  think	  that	  the	  esthetic	  state	  of	  
mind	  is	  purest	  when	  perfectly	  naïve	  without	  any	  critical	  pronouncement,	  and	  that	  the	  esthetic	  
critic	  founds	  his	  judgments	  upon	  the	  result	  of	  throwing	  himself	  back	  into	  such	  a	  pure	  naïve	  state’	  
(CP,	  [1903],	  5.111).	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emphasised	  and	  rigid.	  Chance,	  as	  the	  opposite	  to	  law,	  can	  stimulate	  play	  and	  create	  
the	  space	  to	  balance	  out	  the	  drives.	  	  	  
In	  The	  Law	  of	  Mind	  Peirce	  explained	  that	  the	  mind	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  
strictures	  of	  mechanical	  law	  as	  matter	  is.	  Instead	  he	  explained	  that	  an	  element	  of	  
uncertainty	  allows	  for	  fluidity	  within	  the	  law,	  thus	  leaving	  room	  for	  more	  freedom	  
than	  matter	  enjoys.	  Schiller	  had	  drawn	  similar	  conclusions:	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  mind	  in	  its	  aesthetic	  condition,	  although	  it	  certainly	  acts	  freely	  and	  is	  in	  
the	  highest	  degree	  free	  from	  all	  restraint,	  is	  by	  no	  means	  free	  from	  laws	  ….	  
This	  aesthetic	  freedom	  is	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  logical	  necessity	  of	  
thinking	  and	  the	  moral	  necessity	  of	  willing	  only	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  laws	  
which	  guide	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  not	  realized,	  and	  because	  they	  
meet	  with	  no	  resistance	  do	  not	  appear	  as	  compulsion	  (Schiller,	  1954,	  99n1).	  
	  
This	  shows	  that	  while	  the	  mind	  is	  never	  completely	  free	  from	  influences,	  in	  pure	  
play	  it	  is	  free	  from	  the	  restrictions	  of	  reason,	  logic	  and	  purpose.	  Peirce	  argued	  that	  
only	  through	  the	  pure	  play	  of	  thoughts	  do	  truly	  novel	  ideas	  arise,	  leading	  to	  new	  
theories,	  inventions,	  artworks	  and	  so	  forth.	  Play	  fosters	  deviation	  and	  thus	  leads	  to	  
habits	  being	  broken.	  The	  deviation	  would	  be	  considered	  a	  mistake	  in	  the	  existing	  
system,	  but	  instead	  it	  holds	  the	  possibility	  to	  be	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  a	  new	  system.	  
‘This	  tendency	  to	  error,	  when	  you	  put	  it	  under	  the	  microscope	  of	  reflection,	  is	  seen	  
to	  consist	  of	  fortuitous	  variations	  of	  our	  actions	  in	  time.	  But	  it	  is	  apt	  to	  escape	  our	  
attention	  that	  on	  such	  fortuitous	  variation	  our	  intellect	  is	  nourished	  and	  grows.	  For	  
without	  such	  fortuitous	  variation,	  habit-­‐taking	  would	  be	  impossible;	  and	  intellect	  
consists	  in	  a	  plasticity	  of	  habit’	  (CP,	  [1898],	  6.86).	  	  
The	  next	  two	  sections	  look	  at	  abduction	  and	  musement,	  two	  concepts	  that	  
are	  closely	  linked	  to	  pure	  play.	  Peirce	  used	  the	  terminology	  rather	  loosely	  without	  
explicitly	  defining	  them	  and	  he	  often	  used	  play	  and	  musement	  interchangeably.	  
Generally	  though,	  pure	  play	  can	  be	  considered	  the	  umbrella	  term	  under	  which	  
abduction	  and	  musement	  fall.	  Pure	  play	  refers	  most	  generally	  to	  the	  free	  play	  of	  





2.3.	  Abduction	  and	  Musement	  
	  
Peirce	  not	  only	  criticised	  the	  one-­‐sidedness	  of	  determinism,	  but	  also	  the	  
methods	  of	  philosophical	  enquiry.	  Traditionally	  the	  focus	  lies	  on	  deduction	  and	  
induction	  where	  preconceived	  results	  are	  tested	  for	  their	  validity.	  Peirce	  argued	  that	  
with	  this	  approach	  no	  really	  new	  information	  can	  be	  discovered	  and	  knowledge	  
won’t	  significantly	  increase	  either.	  This	  is	  why	  he	  suggested	  a	  different	  procedure	  
that	  combines	  three	  approaches	  in	  the	  quest	  for	  truth.	  He	  called	  the	  procedure	  
scientific	  method	  and	  added	  abduction	  as	  the	  first	  step	  to	  deduction	  and	  induction	  
as	  the	  second	  and	  third.	  Abduction26	  describes	  the	  stage	  of	  responding	  to	  a	  
surprising	  and	  unexpected	  fact	  by	  spontaneously	  devising	  a	  provisional	  hypothesis	  
as	  a	  possible	  explanation.	  Deduction	  means	  to	  gather	  more	  information	  and	  
arguments	  as	  to	  what	  the	  situation	  would	  be	  like	  if	  the	  initial	  hypothesis	  was	  true.	  
These	  details	  must	  be	  of	  such	  a	  nature	  that	  they	  can	  be	  subjected	  to	  empirical	  
testing.	  Induction	  then	  is	  the	  stage	  where	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  tested	  and	  the	  
experiments	  carried	  out	  shall	  yield	  the	  results	  of	  its	  validity.	  	  
Peirce	  regretted	  that	  in	  the	  scientific	  world	  there	  was	  a	  one-­‐sided	  emphasis	  
on	  logic.	  With	  his	  scientific	  method	  he	  sought	  to	  remedy	  this	  by	  presenting	  a	  
method	  that	  merged	  imagination,	  logic	  and	  empiricism.	  Newcomb,	  referring	  to	  
musement,	  which	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  abduction,	  comments:	  ‘The	  
fact	  that	  Musement	  does	  not	  start	  with	  a	  presupposed	  goal	  may	  be	  the	  simplest,	  but	  
also	  most	  striking,	  difference	  between	  Peircian	  argument	  and	  argument	  as	  it	  is	  
explained	  in	  the	  textbooks’	  (2009,	  56).	  As	  already	  mentioned	  in	  Part	  I,	  several	  
authors	  still	  criticise	  that	  protocols	  for	  scientific	  research	  are	  too	  strictly	  guided	  by	  a	  
logic	  that	  stifles	  the	  more	  natural	  approach	  that	  includes	  fortuitous	  inspiration	  and	  
chance	  encounters.	  By	  adding	  the	  abductive	  stage	  to	  the	  method	  of	  inference,	  
Peirce	  explicitly	  made	  room	  for	  such	  unplanned	  phenomena,	  which	  might	  ultimately	  
deliver	  some	  central	  findings,	  which	  would	  otherwise	  remain	  undiscovered.	  
Furthermore,	  Brent	  explains	  that	  for	  Peirce	  ‘[a]ll	  three	  elements	  are	  constantly	  
interwoven	  and	  integrated	  in	  the	  process	  of	  inquiry.’	  (Brent,	  1996,	  304).	  This	  means	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Peirce	  also	  referred	  to	  it	  as	  retroduction.	  
	  	  
79	  
that	  if	  the	  experiments	  don’t	  obtain,	  the	  scientist	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  deduction	  stage	  
to	  consider	  other	  scenarios	  that	  can	  then	  again	  be	  tested,	  or	  if	  induction	  does	  not	  
yield	  satisfactory	  results	  to	  revert	  back	  to	  abduction	  in	  order	  to	  revise	  one’s	  initial	  
hypothesis.	  	  	  
While	  Anderson	  describes	  abduction	  as	  the	  ‘source	  of	  scientific	  creativity’	  
(1986,	  13),	  Dyer	  points	  out	  that	  ‘Peirce	  is	  claiming	  that	  abduction	  occurs	  in	  all	  kinds	  
of	  cognitions,	  not	  just	  scientific	  inquiry’	  (1986,	  25).	  However,	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  
imaginative	  guesses	  as	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  some	  experienced	  fact	  occur	  all	  the	  time,	  
abduction	  seems	  to	  be	  specifically	  tied	  into	  the	  scientific	  method.	  In	  1908,	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  arguing	  for	  a	  hypothesis	  of	  god,27	  Peirce	  introduced	  the	  term	  musement	  
to	  refer	  to	  'religious	  meditation	  […]	  to	  grow	  up	  spontaneously	  out	  of	  Pure	  Play'	  (CP,	  
[1908],	  6.458).	  	  
Peirce	  didn't	  write	  extensively	  on	  musement	  and	  he	  did	  not	  discuss	  it	  in	  
direct	  relation	  to	  chance	  or	  creativity	  either,	  but	  Kaag	  clearly	  identifies	  it	  as	  an	  
example	  of	  ‘the	  free	  play	  involved	  in	  sustaining	  chance	  encounters’	  (2008,	  400).	  
Salas	  describes	  musement	  as	  ‘a	  kind	  of	  rational	  intuition’	  and	  ‘a	  special	  case	  of	  
abduction’	  (2009,	  459).	  Peirce	  used	  the	  term	  musement	  to	  specifically	  refer	  to	  the	  
aesthetic	  contemplation	  leading	  to	  a	  rational	  belief	  in	  God.	  For	  Peirce	  the	  belief	  in	  
the	  reality	  of	  god	  was	  a	  beautiful	  one,	  which	  is	  why	  he	  considered	  it	  to	  be	  part	  of	  
aesthetics.	  In	  this	  respect	  Kaag	  interprets	  musement	  as	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  that	  can	  
open	  ‘an	  individual	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  Divine’	  more	  generally,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  it	  
‘reflects	  a	  type	  of	  ethical	  attunement	  that	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  respond	  to	  novel	  
circumstances’	  (2011,	  81).	  	  	  
While	  Peirce	  introduced	  musement	  in	  this	  particular	  context,	  he	  more	  
generally	  considered	  it	  a	  mental	  activity	  to	  vitalise	  any	  kind	  of	  reflection.	  He	  also	  
called	  it	  ‘a	  certain	  agreeable	  occupation	  of	  mind’	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.458).	  It	  therefore	  
remains	  vague	  how	  Peirce	  actually	  considered	  abduction	  and	  musement	  different	  
from	  each	  other	  and	  what	  really	  distinguishes	  the	  two.	  Since	  they	  share	  the	  same	  
basic	  characteristics	  they	  shall	  here	  be	  introduced	  together.	  Yet	  for	  Peirce	  it	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Peirce	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  god	  has	  not	  been	  found	  yet	  and	  he	  
therefore	  contents	  himself	  with	  a	  'strictly	  hypothetical	  God'	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.466).	  This	  is	  connected	  to	  
Peirce’s	  maxim	  of	  fallibility.	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important	  to	  separate	  musement	  from	  vacancy	  of	  mind	  or	  dreaminess.	  On	  the	  
contrary,	  he	  identified	  it	  as	  a	  certain	  active	  engagement	  of	  one’s	  faculties,	  but	  free	  
enough	  not	  to	  be	  subordinated	  to	  the	  rigors	  of	  scientific	  scrutiny.	  Salas	  defines	  this	  
particular	  state	  of	  mind	  as	  ‘active	  receptivity’:	  ‘While	  in	  a	  sense	  passive	  and	  
receptive,	  musement	  is	  also	  that	  in	  which	  “logical	  analysis	  can	  be	  put	  to	  its	  full	  
efficiency”	  (6.461).	  We	  might	  say	  that	  while	  “musing”	  one	  is	  both	  “active”	  and	  
“contemplative”’	  (2009,	  468).	  Dyer	  agrees	  and	  writes	  about	  musement	  and	  
abduction	  that	  ‘[t]he	  fundamental	  notion	  in	  both	  concepts	  is	  a	  synthesis	  of	  passive	  
perception	  and	  active	  thinking’	  (1986,	  30).	  
Peirce	  also	  emphasised	  that	  musement	  must	  be	  free	  from	  strict	  rules	  and	  
regulations.	  He	  wrote:	  'There	  is	  no	  kind	  of	  reasoning	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  discourage	  in	  
Musement;	  and	  I	  should	  lament	  to	  find	  anybody	  confining	  it	  to	  a	  method	  of	  such	  
moderate	  fertility	  as	  logical	  analysis'	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.461).	  He	  later	  added:	  ‘Different	  
people	  have	  such	  wonderfully	  different	  ways	  of	  thinking	  that	  it	  would	  be	  far	  beyond	  
my	  competence	  to	  say	  what	  courses	  Musement	  might	  not	  take’	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.462).	  
For	  Conway	  this	  suggests	  that	  ‘even	  if	  Musement	  were	  not	  ruleless	  he	  is	  not	  up	  to	  
discerning	  what	  these	  rules	  might	  be’	  (2008,	  294).	  Peirce	  also	  encouraged	  the	  muser	  
to	  take	  the	  time	  to	  let	  the	  process	  of	  playful	  thinking	  develop:	  ‘I	  would	  suggest	  that	  
the	  Muser	  be	  not	  too	  impatient	  to	  analyze	  these	  [impressions],	  lest	  some	  significant	  
ingredient	  be	  lost	  in	  the	  process;	  but	  that	  he	  begin	  by	  pondering	  them	  from	  every	  
point	  of	  view,	  until	  he	  seems	  to	  read	  some	  truth	  beneath	  the	  phenomena’	  (CP,	  
[1908],	  6.463).	  	  
Davis	  described	  abduction	  as:	  ‘a	  creative	  probe	  into	  the	  unknown.	  It	  is	  based	  
upon	  nothing	  else	  but	  our	  feel	  for	  the	  situation,	  our	  sense	  of	  appropriateness.’	  
(Dyer,	  1986,	  26).	  Peirce	  assumed	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  imaginative	  hypotheses	  
about	  man	  and	  the	  wider	  world	  is	  actually	  a	  human	  instinct.28	  For	  the	  Century	  
Dictionary	  he	  wrote:	  ‘nature	  and	  the	  mind	  have	  such	  a	  community	  as	  to	  impart	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  ‘Our	  faculty	  of	  guessing	  corresponds	  to	  a	  bird’s	  musical	  and	  aeronautical	  powers;	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  to	  us,	  
as	  those	  are	  to	  them,	  the	  loftiest	  of	  our	  merely	  instinctive	  powers’	  (CP,	  [1907],	  7.48).	  And:	  ‘The	  
strength	  of	  the	  impulse	  is	  a	  symptom	  of	  its	  being	  instinctive.	  Animals	  of	  all	  races	  rise	  far	  above	  the	  
general	  level	  of	  their	  intelligence	  in	  those	  performances	  that	  are	  their	  proper	  function,	  such	  as	  
flying	  and	  nest-­‐building	  for	  ordinary	  birds;	  and	  what	  is	  man’s	  proper	  function	  if	  it	  be	  not	  to	  




our	  guesses	  a	  tendency	  toward	  the	  truth,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  require	  the	  
confirmation	  of	  empirical	  science’	  (Brent,	  1996,	  304).	  He	  considered	  man’s	  ability	  to	  
instinctively	  perceive	  connections	  between	  facts	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  distinguishing	  
human	  traits.	  ‘For	  Peirce,	  people’s	  intuitions	  or	  instincts	  about	  connections	  and	  
hypotheses	  are	  right	  a	  surprising	  amount	  of	  the	  time.	  He	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  
because	  we	  have	  evolved	  this	  ability	  for	  survival;	  what	  often	  happens	  is	  that	  people	  
make	  reasonable	  connections	  below	  the	  conscious	  level’	  (Newcomb,	  2009,	  56).29	  	  
Even	  though	  Peirce	  considered	  there	  to	  be	  a	  special	  communion	  between	  
man	  and	  nature,	  he	  always	  stressed	  that	  abduction	  is	  only	  the	  first	  step	  in	  scientific	  
enquiry	  and	  that	  its	  creative	  hypotheses	  need	  to	  withstand	  the	  rigorous	  probing	  of	  
the	  other	  two	  phases	  before	  being	  granted	  validity.	  ‘His	  call	  for	  abductive	  liberty	  
could	  be	  misconstrued	  as	  a	  call	  for	  careless	  speculation’	  (Dyer,	  1986,	  26),	  but	  Peirce	  
was	  always	  very	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  fallibility	  is	  an	  important	  characteristic	  of	  
abduction	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  He	  acknowledged	  that	  these	  initial	  
hypotheses	  were	  rather	  fallible,	  but	  it	  was	  still	  vital	  for	  him	  that	  these	  avenues	  were	  
explored,	  otherwise	  the	  road	  to	  inquiry	  would	  be	  blocked.	  He	  wrote:	  ‘The	  abductive	  
suggestion	  comes	  to	  us	  like	  a	  flash.	  It	  is	  an	  act	  of	  insight,	  although	  of	  extremely	  
fallible	  insight’	  (CP,	  [1903],	  5.181).	  	  
Abduction	  and	  musement	  therefore	  begin	  with	  an	  impression	  or	  a	  feeling	  
which	  leads	  to	  a	  closer	  observation	  of	  some	  ‘surprising	  phenomenon,	  some	  
experience	  which	  either	  disappoints	  an	  expectation,	  or	  breaks	  in	  upon	  some	  habit	  of	  
expectation’	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.469).	  Then,	  only	  if	  one	  is	  open	  enough	  and	  the	  startling	  
event	  awakens	  one’s	  curiosity	  does	  it	  compel	  the	  experiencer	  to	  probe	  deeper	  into	  
the	  subject	  matter.	  He	  further	  specified	  that	  ‘[a]bduction	  makes	  its	  start	  from	  the	  
facts,	  without,	  at	  the	  outset,	  having	  any	  particular	  theory	  in	  view,	  though	  it	  is	  
motived	  by	  the	  feeling	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  needed	  to	  explain	  the	  surprising	  facts’	  (CP,	  
[1901],	  7.219).	  Besides	  one’s	  curiosity,	  it	  is	  imagination30	  that	  starts	  off	  the	  process	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  ‘Peirce	  thinks	  the	  abductive	  impulse	  is	  thus	  analogous;	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  human	  mind	  is	  naturally	  
disposed	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  nature.	  As	  evidence	  for	  its	  existence	  he	  points	  out	  that	  over	  the	  
course	  of	  human	  history,	  “the	  well-­‐prepared	  mind	  has	  wonderfully	  soon	  guessed	  each	  secret	  of	  
nature”	  (CP	  6.476).’	  (Kruse,	  2010,	  390).	  
30	  ‘When	  a	  man	  desires	  ardently	  to	  know	  the	  truth,	  his	  first	  effort	  will	  be	  to	  imagine	  what	  that	  truth	  
can	  be.	  He	  cannot	  prosecute	  his	  pursuit	  long	  without	  finding	  that	  imagination	  unbridled	  is	  sure	  to	  
carry	  him	  off	  the	  track.	  Yet	  nevertheless,	  it	  remains	  true	  that	  there	  is,	  after	  all,	  nothing	  but	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to	  discover	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  surprising	  phenomenon	  one	  has	  just	  encountered.	  
As	  we	  know	  imagination	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  free	  play	  of	  thoughts	  and	  it	  is	  
therefore	  the	  element	  that	  makes	  abduction	  creative.	  ‘It’s	  the	  surprise	  that	  
refreshes.	  It	  evokes,	  it	  provokes,	  it	  pushes	  toward	  who	  knows	  where	  or	  when.	  It	  
creates	  that	  moment	  when	  many	  possibilities	  are	  there	  and	  waiting;	  then	  something	  
spontaneous	  and	  new	  suddenly	  makes	  its	  appearance’	  (Merrell,	  2009,	  100-­‐1).	  
	  	   Spontaneity	  and	  surprise	  are	  therefore	  two	  other	  important	  characteristics	  
of	  abduction	  and	  musement	  and	  they	  are	  also	  closely	  connected	  to	  chance	  and	  
imaginativeness.	  ‘Musement	  is	  an	  activity	  in	  which	  we	  may	  choose	  in	  a	  self-­‐	  
controlled	  fashion	  to	  engage,	  but	  it	  leaves	  room	  for	  tychistic	  development,	  for	  ideas	  
“to	  grow	  up	  spontaneously	  out	  of	  Pure	  Play	  without	  any	  breach	  of	  continuity”’	  
(Anderson,	  1995,	  146).	  The	  uniqueness	  of	  abductive	  inference	  therefore	  is	  that	  it	  
allows	  seemingly	  irrational	  elements,	  such	  as	  the	  purposeless	  wandering	  of	  the	  mind	  
or	  chance,	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  process.	  It	  ‘involves	  no	  purpose	  save	  that	  of	  casting	  
aside	  all	  serious	  purpose’	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.458)	  whereby	  it	  becomes	  the	  activity	  of	  
thinking	  for	  thinking’s	  sake.	  The	  affinity	  with	  Schiller’s	  Spieltrieb	  becomes	  apparent	  
when	  Peirce	  defines	  musement	  as	  follows:	  ‘In	  fact,	  it	  is	  Pure	  Play.	  Now,	  Play,	  we	  all	  
know,	  is	  a	  lively	  exercise	  of	  one’s	  powers.	  Pure	  Play	  has	  no	  rules,	  except	  this	  very	  
law	  of	  liberty.	  …	  [it]	  may	  take	  either	  the	  form	  of	  esthetic	  contemplation,	  or	  that	  of	  
distant	  castle-­‐building	  (whether	  in	  Spain	  or	  within	  one’s	  own	  moral	  training)’	  (ibid.).	  
Peirce	  explained	  it	  as	  a	  clash	  of	  two	  realities,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  one’s	  own	  
expectations	  and	  nature’s	  separate	  drive	  on	  the	  other:	  	  
	  
Examine	  the	  Percept	  in	  the	  particularly	  marked	  case	  in	  which	  it	  comes	  as	  a	  
surprise.	  Your	  mind	  was	  filled	  [with]	  an	  imaginary	  object	  that	  was	  expected.	  
At	  the	  moment	  when	  it	  was	  expected	  the	  vividness	  of	  the	  representation	  is	  
exalted,	  and	  suddenly	  when	  it	  should	  come	  something	  quite	  different	  comes	  
instead.	  I	  ask	  you	  whether	  at	  that	  instant	  of	  surprise	  there	  is	  not	  a	  double	  
consciousness,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  of	  an	  Ego,	  which	  is	  simply	  the	  expected	  idea	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
imagination	  that	  can	  ever	  supply	  him	  an	  inkling	  of	  the	  truth.	  He	  can	  stare	  stupidly	  at	  phenomena;	  but	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  imagination	  they	  will	  not	  connect	  themselves	  together	  in	  any	  rational	  way.	  […]	  It	  is	  
not	  too	  much	  to	  say	  that	  next	  after	  the	  passion	  to	  learn	  there	  is	  no	  quality	  so	  indispensable	  to	  the	  
successful	  prosecution	  of	  science	  as	  imagination’	  (CP,	  [1896],	  1.46-­‐48).	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suddenly	  broken	  off,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Ego,	  which	  is	  the	  Strange	  
Intruder,	  in	  his	  abrupt	  entrance	  (EP	  2,	  [1903],	  154).31	  	  
	  
Peirce	  argued	  that	  only	  through	  these	  fortuitous	  elements	  true	  novelty,	  
growth	  and	  variety	  can	  emerge.	  ‘He	  sees	  abduction	  as	  the	  most	  significant	  phase	  of	  
inquiry,	  as	  the	  only	  phase	  of	  reasoning	  that	  “contributes	  a	  single	  new	  concept	  to	  the	  
structure”	  of	  man’s	  knowledge’	  (Dyer,	  1986,	  24).	  It	  is	  the	  direct	  experience	  of	  
unexpected	  circumstances	  that	  can	  reveal	  something	  as	  yet	  unknown	  and	  in	  this	  
respect	  chance	  is	  a	  vital	  example	  of	  a	  surprising,	  unanticipated	  circumstance.	  
Musement	  and	  abduction	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  descriptions	  of	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  that	  
aids	  the	  recognition	  and	  appreciation	  of	  such	  unpredictable	  encounters.	  The	  basic	  
characteristics	  that	  they	  share	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows:	  they	  require	  the	  
experiencer	  to	  be	  a	  good	  observer,	  to	  be	  curious,	  imaginative,	  open	  to	  the	  
unexpected,	  playful	  and	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  a	  loose	  sense	  of	  purpose	  only.	  Since	  the	  
initial	  insights	  and	  conclusions	  are	  nevertheless	  highly	  fallible,	  they	  need	  further	  
consideration	  and	  testing	  before	  new	  facts	  can	  be	  added	  to	  existing	  knowledge.	  
Peirce’s	  admittance	  that	  at	  first	  seemingly	  irrational	  elements	  can	  actually	  bear	  
greater	  rationality	  was	  a	  very	  progressive	  suggestion	  at	  the	  time.	  He	  made	  it	  very	  
clear	  that	  a	  different	  approach	  which	  expands	  on	  the	  limiting	  protocol	  of	  traditional	  
logic	  is	  needed,	  otherwise	  nothing	  truly	  novel	  could	  be	  created.	  In	  his	  opinion	  any	  





In	  Peirce’s	  writing	  the	  theory	  of	  tychism	  is	  aimed	  at	  explaining	  chance’s	  
fundamental	  role	  in	  natural	  creation.	  Free	  will,	  habits,	  abduction	  and	  musement	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  This	  idea	  of	  two	  states	  of	  consciousness	  also	  appears	  in	  Jung	  and	  shall	  be	  explored	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  
Part	  III.	  
32	  To	  remind	  ourselves,	  Rosenman	  wrote	  in	  2001:	  ‘Real	  life	  science	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  neat	  
logical	  process	  conveyed	  in	  journal	  articles.	  […]	  Humphrey	  (1984)	  states	  that	  an	  ideal	  [grant]	  
application	  would	  read	  “these	  are	  the	  lines	  along	  which	  I	  expect	  to	  begin	  my	  experiments,	  but	  I	  
really	  hope	  an	  unforeseen	  observation	  will	  prompt	  an	  unexpected	  idea,”	  but	  he	  realizes	  only	  an	  
unusually	  enlightened	  committee	  would	  award	  such	  a	  grant.	  Yet	  this	  is	  how	  breakthrough	  
discoveries	  are	  usually	  made’	  (191-­‐2).	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discussed	  separately	  and	  only	  implicit	  links	  can	  be	  drawn	  between	  these	  two	  areas.	  
While	  Peirce	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  challenging	  determinism	  and	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  
especially	  the	  question	  of	  free	  will	  led	  a	  range	  of	  other	  thinkers	  to	  doubt	  its	  validity,	  
his	  model	  of	  tychism	  as	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  was	  radically	  unique	  at	  the	  time.	  
In	  combination	  with	  his	  proposition	  of	  the	  scientific	  method,	  a	  form	  of	  inference	  
that	  leaves	  room	  for	  imagination	  and	  the	  unpredictable,	  he	  further	  pinpointed	  the	  
shortcomings	  of	  the	  philosophical	  and	  scientific	  communities	  of	  the	  age.	  With	  the	  
abduction-­‐musement	  stage	  he	  described	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  that	  can	  be	  above	  all	  
characterised	  by	  openness,	  curiosity	  and	  the	  deliberate	  free	  play	  of	  thoughts	  and	  
images.	  Peirce	  shrank	  from	  any	  clear	  cut	  definitions	  as	  to	  what	  abduction-­‐musement	  
exactly	  looks	  like,	  thus	  acknowledging	  the	  freedom	  and	  diversity	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  
the	  activity	  itself.	  He	  argued	  that	  only	  through	  the	  combination	  of	  some	  surprising	  
phenomenon,	  for	  example	  chance,	  and	  abduction-­‐musement	  do	  true	  novelty	  and	  
innovation	  come	  about.	  	  
‘The	  musing	  process	  is	  above	  all	  a	  matter	  of	  Peirce's	  Firstness-­‐becoming’	  
(Merrell,	  2009,	  92)	  and	  it	  therefore	  encapsulates	  the	  initiating	  spark	  of	  novel	  ideas	  
and	  new	  connections	  drawn.	  Therefore	  ‘[m]using,	  chiefly	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  Firstness,	  
is	  subtle,	  supple,	  rich,	  and	  pregnant	  with	  possibilities’	  (ibid.).	  Since	  abduction-­‐
musement	  and	  tychism	  both	  belong	  to	  Firstness,	  it	  can	  be	  inferred	  that	  they	  are	  
bound	  together	  by	  some	  deep,	  underlying	  similarities.	  Whereas	  sporting	  triggered	  
the	  evolution	  of	  the	  universe,	  in	  abduction-­‐musement	  the	  mind	  is	  allowed	  to	  enter	  
into	  a	  state	  of	  freedom	  and	  through	  this	  purposeless	  drifting	  one	  is	  able	  to	  tap	  into	  
the	  pool	  of	  ultimate	  possibilities.	  Some	  of	  these	  might	  actually	  sprout	  into	  fruitful	  
realisations.	  Merrell	  furthermore	  explains	  musement	  as	  follows:	  ‘A	  playful	  mood	  
allows	  for,	  and	  is	  usually	  able	  to	  cope	  with,	  what	  might	  happen	  to	  happen.	  It	  is	  free,	  
spontaneous,	  improvising,	  and	  inventive;	  in	  short,	  it	  is	  creative.	  In	  its	  creative	  
moments,	  what	  happens,	  happens,	  as	  if	  it	  were	  beyond	  our	  conscious	  and	  
conscientious	  control’	  (ibid.,	  89).	  It	  thus	  describes	  an	  attitude	  that	  is	  open	  to	  the	  
interjection	  of	  chance	  and	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  unexpected	  might	  carry	  the	  seed	  
to	  new	  and	  meaningful	  interpretations	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  While	  in	  Peirce	  these	  
two	  elements	  remain	  largely	  separate,	  they	  are	  the	  building	  blocks	  for	  a	  
philosophical	  discussion	  more	  specifically	  on	  chance	  and	  creativity.	  The	  next	  two	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chapters	  provide	  two	  such	  discussions.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  on	  Ella	  Lyman	  Cabot	  and	  her	  
argument	  that	  chance	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  scientific	  invention	  and	  the	  second	  




3.	  Chance’s	  Involvement	  in	  the	  Creative	  Process	  
	  
If	  you	  sit	  by	  the	  stream	  without	  any	  rod	  you	  will	  probably	  see	  plenty	  of	  
chances	  to	  catch	  trout,	  but	  they	  won't	  be	  chances	  for	  you.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  
if	  you	  resolutely	  and	  stubbornly	  thrust	  a	  clearly-­‐hooked	  line	  into	  the	  water	  
and	  push	  it	  deliberately	  toward	  each	  trout	  you	  see,	  you	  won't	  catch	  any	  
either.	  New	  ideas	  are	  shyer	  than	  trout	  and	  even	  if	  they	  glide	  for	  a	  second	  
into	  the	  hand	  of	  a	  man	  without	  a	  rod,	  he	  can't	  hold	  them	  unless	  he	  has	  the	  
hook	  of	  purpose.	  Nevertheless,	  and	  here	  is	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  situation,	  we	  must	  
conceal	  the	  hook	  and	  make	  random	  gyrating,	  illusive	  movements,	  almost	  
forgetting	  that	  we	  are	  not	  the	  fly	  instead	  of	  the	  fisherman.	  (Cabot	  in	  Kaag,	  
2011,	  198–199).	  
	  
Since	  Peirce’s	  discussion	  of	  tychism	  remained	  largely	  metaphysical,	  the	  writing	  of	  
Ella	  Lyman	  Cabot	  provides	  a	  valuable	  extension	  because	  she	  was	  more	  interested	  in	  
the	  practical	  and	  experiential	  side	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  chance	  and	  creativity.	  
Ella	  Lyman	  Cabot	  is	  still	  a	  relatively	  obscure	  figure	  in	  American	  philosophy	  and	  if	  
John	  Kaag	  did	  not,	  by	  accident,	  stumble	  upon	  her	  name	  in	  Royce's	  documents	  and	  
investigated	  further	  from	  there,	  her	  works	  might	  still	  remain	  largely	  undiscovered	  to	  
this	  day.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  question	  if	  Cabot	  was	  familiar	  with	  Peirce’s	  writings,	  Kaag	  
explains	  that	  ‘[w]hile	  Cabot	  seems	  relatively	  unaware	  of	  Peirce’s	  work,	  her	  writing	  
allows	  us	  to	  extend	  his	  tychistic	  hypothesis	  in	  new	  and	  interesting	  directions’	  (ibid.,	  
65).	  	  
This	  chapter	  then	  focuses	  on	  a	  shift	  further	  away	  from	  a	  metaphysical	  
analysis	  of	  chance	  and	  even	  more	  strongly	  towards	  the	  role	  of	  the	  perceiver,	  
building	  on	  the	  last	  chapter’s	  conclusions	  on	  abduction-­‐musement.	  Cabot's	  essay	  
The	  Relation	  of	  Chance	  to	  Purpose	  in	  Invention	  offers	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  
exploration	  of	  how	  different	  mind-­‐sets	  can	  influence	  the	  perception	  and	  the	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evaluation	  of	  a	  chance	  encounter.	  Since	  most	  of	  Cabot’s	  examples	  are	  from	  the	  field	  
of	  science,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  scientific	  creativity.	  Kaag	  is	  thus	  far	  the	  only	  authority	  
on	  Cabot,	  re-­‐introducing	  her	  life	  and	  forgotten	  works	  into	  the	  scholarly	  debate	  on	  
Classical	  American	  Philosophy.	  His	  writings	  will	  therefore	  remain	  a	  steadfast	  port	  of	  
call	  throughout	  this	  section.	  
	  
	  
3.1.	  Cabot’s	  Essay	  on	  ‘The	  Relation	  of	  Chance	  to	  Purpose	  in	  Invention’	  	  
	  
Cabot's	  writing	  shows	  that	  she	  considered	  personal	  development,	  creativity	  
and	  individual	  freedom	  –	  and	  that	  is	  men's	  and	  women's	  equally	  –	  	  the	  rights	  and	  
necessities	  of	  a	  fulfilled	  life.	  She	  viewed	  these	  concepts	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  
and	  she	  was	  mainly	  interested	  in	  how	  these	  values	  can	  be	  transferred	  and	  applied	  to	  
everyday	  life.	  It	  was	  important	  to	  her	  that	  they	  did	  not	  remain	  lifeless,	  but	  to	  turn	  
them	  into	  something	  real	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  grasped	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now.33	  In	  her	  
approach	  to	  new	  ideas	  resonates	  Peirce's	  guiding	  principle	  of	  ‘do	  not	  block	  the	  road	  
to	  inquiry’.	  She	  for	  example	  wrote:	  ‘My	  first	  thought	  on	  a	  new	  subject	  or	  book	  is	  
never	  criticism.	  That	  comes	  later,	  it	  is	  what	  I	  call	  insight.	  I	  seek	  instinctively	  to	  make	  
myself	  one	  with	  it;	  to	  share	  its	  feeling	  through	  realization,	  and	  then	  gradually	  to	  
judge	  it’	  and	  ‘One	  needs	  freedom	  from	  inspection	  in	  order	  to	  grow'	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  10).	  
It	  implies	  that	  both	  Peirce	  and	  Cabot	  shared	  a	  similar	  openness,	  flexibility	  and	  
receptivity	  towards	  the	  unfamiliar	  and	  it	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  first	  example	  of	  how	  the	  
experiencer’s	  attitude	  influences	  the	  meaning-­‐making	  process.	  It	  can	  be	  suggested	  
that	  it	  was	  this	  particular	  attitude	  that	  also	  kindled	  their	  interest	  in	  chance	  events.	  	  
The	  following	  sections	  focus	  on	  Cabot’s	  essay	  The	  Relation	  of	  Chance	  to	  
Purpose	  in	  Invention	  (1900-­‐1902)	  in	  which	  she	  investigates	  this	  particular	  
concurrence	  of	  human	  purpose	  and	  chance	  encounters.	  Her	  main	  interest	  is	  the	  
origin	  of	  novelty	  and	  this	  paper	  was	  submitted	  as	  a	  correction	  to	  her	  earlier	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  'While	  contemporary	  philosophers	  might	  accuse	  Cabot	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  technical	  sophistication,	  it	  is	  
clear	  that	  the	  philosophers	  of	  her	  time	  took	  her	  seriously	  and	  respected	  her	  work.	  George	  Herbert	  
Palmer,	  Josiah	  Royce,	  John	  Dewey,	  Alfred	  North	  Whitehead,	  William	  Torrey	  Harris,	  and	  others	  read	  
and	  reviewed	  her	  writings,	  reflecting	  the	  opinion	  that	  her	  sophistication	  could	  be	  subtle	  and,	  
moreover,	  did	  not	  have	  to	  stand	  against	  practical	  purposes.'	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  xi)	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hypothesis	  that	  novelty	  is	  a	  result	  of	  purpose.	  Instead	  she	  then	  argued	  that	  the	  new	  
and	  original	  is	  generated	  through	  the	  agency	  of	  chance.	  She	  begins	  her	  essay	  by	  
defining	  the	  three	  terms	  of	  invention,	  purpose	  and	  chance.	  Since	  ‘there	  is	  nothing	  
absolutely	  the	  same	  twice	  and	  nothing	  absolutely	  disconnected	  from	  the	  past’,	  
invention	  means	  ‘a	  relatively	  significant	  variation’	  (ibid.,	  189).	  She	  furthermore	  
distinguished	  between	  ‘an	  invention	  for	  the	  individual	  who	  creates	  it	  and	  what	  is	  
really	  new	  to	  society.’34	  She	  decided	  to	  focus	  on	  ‘anything	  new	  and	  relatively	  
valuable	  to	  the	  individual	  who	  works	  it	  out’	  (ibid.),	  yet	  the	  majority	  of	  her	  examples	  
actually	  refer	  to	  well-­‐known	  feats	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  science	  or	  engineering.	  
In	  defining	  purpose	  she	  acknowledged	  the	  difficulty	  to	  determine	  where	  
one’s	  sense	  of	  purpose	  begins,	  but	  then	  settled	  on	  the	  simple	  statement	  that:	  ‘[a]n	  
individual	  has	  a	  purpose	  when	  he	  has	  a	  deliberate	  plan	  of	  action’	  (ibid,	  189).	  
Purpose	  forms	  the	  vital	  guide	  that	  drives	  curiosity	  and	  the	  search	  for	  insights.	  In	  an	  
essay	  on	  Royce’s	  The	  World	  and	  the	  Individual	  Cabot	  notes	  that	  ‘to	  have	  a	  purpose	  is	  
to	  look	  and	  order	  and	  learn	  eagerly	  from	  these	  strange	  facts	  of	  beauty	  and	  terror’	  
and	  that	  ‘our	  whole	  life’s	  work	  is	  to	  find	  out	  who	  we	  are	  and	  what	  we	  mean’	  (ibid,	  
188).	  	  
Unlike	  Peirce,	  Cabot	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  absolute	  chance,	  but	  instead	  adhered	  
to	  mechanical	  determinism	  in	  nature	  and	  teleological	  determinism	  in	  man:	  
	  
All	  effects	  in	  nature	  however	  complicated,	  have	  causes	  and	  hence	  there	  is	  no	  
chance	  in	  the	  outer	  world.	  Again	  all	  human	  actions	  are	  determined	  by	  ends	  
and	  there	  is	  no	  chance	  in	  the	  world	  of	  men	  though	  here,	  as	  in	  any	  
complicated	  natural	  event,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  tracing	  intricate	  relations	  may	  
give	  the	  appearance	  of	  lack	  of	  motive	  or	  cause.	  […]	  The	  idea	  of	  chance	  as	  
something	  without	  cause	  is	  illusory.	  But	  our	  perpetual	  ignorance,	  both	  of	  
external	  events	  and	  of	  the	  full	  meaning	  of	  our	  own	  plans,	  makes	  what	  
appears	  as	  chance	  a	  necessary	  and	  permanent	  factor	  in	  experience.	  (Kaag,	  
2011,	  190–191).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  This	  is	  still	  a	  common	  classification	  today:	  Boden	  (2004;	  2010)	  identifies	  two	  main	  types	  of	  
creativity,	  which	  she	  describes	  as	  Personality-­‐creativity	  (P)	  and	  Historical-­‐creativity	  (H).	  Cropley	  
(1999)	  similarly	  divides	  creativity	  into	  two	  kinds	  and	  differentiates	  between	  the	  “ordinary”	  and	  
“sublime”	  type.	  He	  focuses	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  product	  when	  he	  describes	  ordinary	  creativity	  as	  
novel,	  but	  of	  little	  relevance	  or	  effectiveness	  at	  large.	  Whereas	  the	  sublime	  kind	  is	  not	  only	  new,	  
but	  is	  regarded	  by	  a	  wide	  audience	  to	  enlarge	  human	  perspectives	  via	  some	  previously	  unknown	  




Yet	  Kaag	  further	  explains:	  ‘While	  at	  first	  glance,	  it	  may	  appear	  that	  Cabot	  holds	  the	  
Roycean	  position	  that	  chance	  is	  an	  illusion	  produced	  by	  an	  individual’s	  limited	  
perspective,	  Cabot	  maintains	  that	  chance	  is	  real,	  beneficial,	  and	  underpins	  the	  
possibility	  of	  human	  creativity’	  (ibid,	  65).	  	  
Therefore,	  with	  regard	  to	  metaphysics,	  Cabot	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  she	  
ultimately	  adheres	  to	  the	  deterministic	  view	  where	  exact	  causes	  may	  never	  be	  
discovered.	  Yet	  her	  last	  sentence	  in	  the	  above	  quote	  is	  crucial	  because	  it	  illustrates	  
that	  for	  her	  it	  matters	  less	  what	  chance	  really	  is	  than	  the	  effect	  it	  has	  on	  us.	  It	  can	  be	  
inferred	  that,	  as	  intriguing	  as	  these	  metaphysical	  considerations	  are,	  on	  an	  
immediate	  experiential	  level	  they	  don’t	  really	  matter	  because	  the	  striking	  feelings	  of	  
surprise	  and	  significance	  are	  the	  same	  regardless	  of	  one’s	  belief.	  However	  these	  
metaphysical	  considerations	  become	  relevant	  again	  in	  the	  evaluation	  stage,	  when	  
one	  rationalises	  the	  chance	  event.	  It	  is	  here	  where	  it	  might	  be	  reduced	  to	  ‘mere’	  
chance	  without	  further	  significance	  or	  where	  after	  some	  pondering	  the	  experiencer	  
begins	  to	  see	  value	  and	  meaning	  in	  it.	  	  
	  
	  
3.2.	  The	  Attitude	  of	  the	  Experiencer	  in	  Relation	  to	  Chance	  
	  
The	  perceiver's	  mind-­‐set,	  behaviour	  patterns	  and	  personality	  traits	  are	  of	  
crucial	  importance	  in	  order	  to	  harness	  some	  insights	  from	  the	  unexpected.	  Feist’s	  
metastudy	  (1998)	  on	  creative	  behaviour	  suggests	  that	  most	  creative	  people	  have	  ‘a	  
personality	  structure	  that	  is	  tolerant	  and	  open-­‐minded,	  self-­‐accepting,	  outgoing,	  
confident,	  ambitious,	  persistent	  and	  [are]	  good	  judge[s]	  of	  character’	  (Guastello,	  
2009,	  271).	  Feist	  explains	  that	  from	  all	  traits	  openness	  correlates	  most	  consistently	  
with	  measured	  creative	  behaviour,	  describing	  it	  as	  ‘the	  breadth,	  depth,	  originality,	  
and	  complexity	  of	  an	  individual's	  mental	  and	  experiential	  life,’	  (2010,	  120).	  More	  
specifically,	  openness	  is	  characterised	  by	  ‘a	  rich	  fantasy	  life,	  aesthetic	  sensitivity,	  
awareness	  of	  inner	  feelings,	  need	  for	  variety	  in	  actions,	  intellectual	  curiosity,	  and	  
liberal	  value	  systems’	  (Helson,	  1999,	  368).	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Cabot	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  first	  precondition	  is	  that	  one’s	  purpose	  is	  open	  
and	  flexible,	  writing	  that	  ‘the	  necessity	  of	  a	  purpose	  [is]	  to	  grasp	  the	  opportunity	  of	  
the	  unexpected.	  It	  is	  perfectly	  true	  that	  the	  poet	  or	  artist	  who	  so	  fixedly	  plans	  his	  
poem	  or	  picture	  that	  he	  leaves	  nothing	  open	  to	  chance	  will	  not	  be	  original’	  (Kaag,	  
2011,	  197).	  Cabot	  gives	  different	  examples	  of	  how	  chance	  interacts	  with	  the	  
experiencer.	  They	  can	  be	  classified	  according	  to	  Austin’s	  aforementioned	  four	  
different	  categories	  of	  blind	  chance,	  serendipity,	  the	  luck	  of	  the	  diligent	  and	  self-­‐
induced	  luck.	  Since	  in	  blind	  chance	  ‘the	  good	  luck	  that	  occurs	  is	  completely	  
accidental’	  and	  there	  is	  ‘no	  particular	  personality	  trait	  in	  operation’	  (Austin,	  1978,	  
73),	  it	  will	  be	  left	  aside	  here,	  but	  descriptions	  of	  the	  other	  three	  types	  can	  be	  found	  
in	  Cabot’s	  essay.	  	  
Austin	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  second	  type	  of	  chance	  as	  the	  ‘Kettering-­‐Principle’	  
according	  to	  his	  dictum:	  ‘keep	  on	  going,	  and	  you’ll	  stumble	  on	  something’	  (ibid.,	  74).	  
Here	  the	  basic	  necessary	  traits	  are	  to	  stay	  in	  motion,	  a	  persistent	  curiosity	  and	  a	  
willingness	  to	  explore.	  Cabot	  wrote:	  ‘Novelty	  is	  found	  by	  one	  who	  roves	  the	  world,	  
not	  by	  one	  who	  stays	  always	  at	  home’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  190)	  and	  this	  is	  the	  main	  idea	  
behind	  this	  type.	  The	  purpose	  can	  be	  described	  as	  loose	  and	  diffuse,	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  
find	  something,	  but	  the	  person	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  anything	  specific	  in	  mind.	  
The	  aspect	  of	  motivation	  is	  crucial	  here	  and	  research	  has	  found	  that	  intrinsic	  
motivation	  usually	  leads	  to	  more	  creative	  outcomes	  than	  being	  driven	  by	  extrinsic	  
goals	  (Helson,	  1999,	  370-­‐1).	  To	  remain	  in	  motion	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  an	  
encounter	  with	  a	  chance	  event	  than	  statically	  waiting	  to	  be	  inspired.	  Thus	  ‘the	  initial	  
purpose	  was	  not	  the	  final	  purpose’	  (Runco,	  2007,	  394)	  and	  only	  through	  the	  chance	  
encounter	  does	  the	  more	  refined	  purpose	  come	  into	  clear	  view.	  Cabot	  wrote	  that	  
‘[i]t	  is	  wide	  awake	  vividness	  of	  interest	  that	  makes	  chance	  of	  value’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  
197).	  It	  therefore	  calls	  for	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  unforeseeable	  and	  trust	  into	  the	  
moment,	  free	  from	  the	  rational	  mind’s	  fear	  to	  lose	  control	  over	  the	  situation.	  Austin	  
gives	  the	  example	  of	  Paul	  Ehrlich,	  who	  searched	  for	  a	  treatment	  for	  syphilis	  but	  was	  
only	  lucky	  enough	  to	  find	  it	  after	  having	  tested	  over	  600	  compounds.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  
purpose	  was	  clear	  but	  in	  order	  to	  find	  it	  Ehrlich	  had	  to	  be	  open	  to	  experiment	  with	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  substances	  as	  well	  as	  sustain	  ‘a	  persistent	  willingness	  to	  try	  until	  
chance	  turns	  up	  a	  lucky	  combination’	  (Austin,	  1978,	  90).	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Chance	  III	  is	  based	  on	  Pasteur’s	  phrase:	  ‘Where	  observation	  is	  concerned,	  
chance	  only	  favours	  the	  prepared	  mind.’	  The	  experiencer’s	  requirements	  are	  
therefore	  not	  only	  a	  general	  curiosity,	  but	  also	  to	  be	  equipped	  with	  a	  particular	  set	  
of	  skills,	  techniques	  or	  knowledge	  and	  to	  be	  able	  to	  ‘quickly	  form	  significant	  new	  
associations’	  (ibid.,	  77)	  when	  confronted	  with	  unexpected	  circumstances.	  Cabot	  
wrote	  that	  for	  the	  curious	  person	  the	  world	  will	  be	  full	  of	  suggestions	  and	  when	  
chance	  encounters	  then	  leap	  at	  them	  they	  are	  not	  only	  ready	  to	  recognise	  them,	  but	  
also	  to	  make	  use	  of	  them	  in	  novel	  and	  creative	  ways.	  It	  is	  the	  individual's	  
opportunity	  to	  incorporate	  the	  moment	  into	  the	  larger	  scheme	  of	  what	  one	  seeks.	  
The	  history	  of	  science	  provides	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  examples	  for	  this	  type	  of	  chance	  
encounter,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  interplay	  between	  an	  unexpected	  event	  and	  the	  
ability	  to	  incorporate	  it	  into	  one's	  existing	  frame	  of	  mind	  can	  be	  crucial.	  Cabot	  gave	  
the	  example	  of	  Daguerre’s	  discovery	  of	  a	  new	  photographic	  process	  and	  comments:	  
‘Now,	  of	  course,	  there	  was	  “chance”	  in	  this,	  but	  it	  would	  only	  reveal	  its	  message	  to	  
the	  seeker	  who	  had	  a	  definite	  intent.	  Chances	  leap	  to	  meet	  the	  man	  with	  a	  strong	  
purpose’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  198).	  The	  discoveries	  of	  the	  X-­‐ray,	  penicillin,	  Velcro	  or	  the	  
microwave	  oven	  are	  some	  other	  well-­‐known	  examples	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  accidental	  
finding.	  Kaag	  analyses	  chance’s	  role	  in	  such	  discoveries	  as	  follows:	  ‘chance	  sets	  the	  
stage	  for	  novel	  modes	  of	  inquiry,	  investigation	  and	  action.	  In	  short,	  chance	  provides	  
and	  underscores	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  genuine	  growth	  in	  its	  encounter	  with	  the	  field	  
of	  possibility’	  (ibid.,	  68).	  
The	  fourth	  type,	  or	  ‘Disraeli-­‐Principle’	  (‘we	  make	  our	  fortunes	  and	  we	  call	  
them	  fate’	  (Austin,	  1978,	  76)),	  is	  described	  as	  an	  encounter	  with	  chance	  that	  is	  most	  
specific	  to	  the	  individual	  experiencing	  it.	  It	  is	  highly	  personal	  and	  ‘comes	  to	  you,	  
unsought,	  because	  of	  who	  you	  are	  and	  how	  you	  behave’	  (ibid.).	  Cabot	  wrote	  in	  this	  
respect:	  ‘Any	  interest,	  affection	  or	  purpose	  is	  like	  a	  magnet	  to	  circumstance.	  In	  
proportion	  to	  its	  strength	  and	  width	  it	  attracts	  to	  itself	  from	  greater	  and	  greater	  
distances	  all	  that	  is	  akin’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  197).	  Recent	  studies	  on	  the	  creative	  
personality	  conclude	  that	  ‘[h]ighly	  creative	  people	  doubt,	  question,	  and	  often	  reject	  
norms,	  traditions,	  and	  conservative	  ideology’	  (Manimala,	  2009,	  122)	  and	  therefore	  
usually	  think	  and	  behave	  in	  very	  distinct	  ways.	  This	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  divergent	  
thinking,	  meaning	  ‘less	  adherence	  to	  the	  usual,	  habitual	  type	  of	  thinking,	  a	  certain	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imaginative	  freedom,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  cognitive	  inhibition’	  (Eysenk,	  1997,	  42).	  In	  this	  
regard	  Cabot	  wrote	  that	  ‘[a]ny	  purpose	  in	  proportion	  to	  its	  width	  and	  strength	  
changes	  chance	  to	  my	  chance’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  196).	  This	  is	  a	  very	  important	  point	  that	  
Cabot	  is	  making	  here	  and	  it	  shall	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  As	  
an	  example	  of	  this	  type,	  both	  Cabot	  and	  Austin	  mention	  Darwin	  and	  his	  lifelong	  
journey	  in	  discovering	  evolution	  and	  natural	  selection.35	  Cabot	  explained	  that	  
‘invention	  is	  the	  product	  of	  the	  whole	  man	  rather	  than	  of	  thought	  or	  will	  alone,	  and	  
hence	  if	  anyone	  conceives	  his	  plan	  narrowly	  as	  attainable	  by	  deliberation	  alone,	  
other	  elements	  in	  his	  nature,	  feelings,	  traditions,	  instincts	  will	  come	  forward	  to	  mold	  
it’	  (ibid.,	  199).	  	  
	  
	  
3.3.	  More	  on	  the	  Interplay	  between	  Chance	  and	  Purpose	  
	  
In	  the	  last	  part	  of	  her	  essay	  Cabot	  focused	  more	  generally	  on	  the	  relationship	  
between	  chance	  and	  teleology.	  While	  she	  identified	  purpose	  as	  the	  elemental	  
driving	  force	  in	  our	  quest	  for	  knowledge	  and	  truth,	  she	  also	  expressed	  reservations	  
about	  its	  ability	  to	  bring	  about	  truly	  new	  insights.	  She	  asks:	  ‘Is	  not	  the	  starting	  point	  
of	  invention	  the	  imperfect,	  the	  chaotic,	  the	  disorderly	  rather	  than	  the	  exclusively	  
deliberate	  and	  definite?’	  (ibid.,	  192).	  Since	  her	  earlier	  elaborations	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  
not	  deliberate	  thought,	  she	  argued	  instead:	  ‘to	  succeed	  in	  being	  original,	  he	  must	  be	  
open	  to	  chance	  suggestions’	  (ibid.,	  189)	  and	  later	  added	  that	  ‘when	  we	  rigidly	  
exclude	  chance,	  originality	  dies’	  (ibid.,	  191).	  Cabot	  underpinned	  her	  hypothesis	  with	  
ideas	  taken	  from	  Josiah	  Royce	  and	  Paul	  Souriau,	  who	  both	  argued	  that	  the	  new	  can	  
neither	  be	  willed	  nor	  created	  by	  thought	  alone.	  	  
Like	  Peirce,	  Cabot	  explained	  that	  the	  human	  mind	  is	  prone	  to	  habit	  and	  
routine:	  ‘When	  our	  purpose	  draws	  its	  exclusive	  iron	  bands	  about	  us,	  we	  kill	  the	  life-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  ‘Charles	  Darwin	  was	  nearly	  dissuaded	  from	  taking	  the	  voyage	  in	  the	  Beagle	  (the	  critical	  event	  of	  his	  
life	  which	  he	  spoke	  of	  later	  as	  his	  second	  birth),	  because	  his	  father	  thought	  it	  would	  appear	  
disreputable	  that	  one	  who	  was	  to	  be	  a	  clergyman	  should	  be	  associated	  with	  roving	  explorers	  and	  
rowdy	  sailors.	  Chance	  brought	  in	  his	  path	  friends	  who	  overcame	  his	  father’s	  opposition,	  but	  even	  
after	  the	  important	  decision	  to	  take	  the	  voyage	  was	  made,	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  definite	  place	  to	  trace	  
the	  origin	  of	  species	  was	  due	  to	  an	  influx	  of	  chaotic	  facts	  (e.g.	  the	  myriad	  specimens	  drawn	  up	  by	  
chance	  from	  the	  deep	  sea),	  rather	  than	  solely	  to	  a	  fixed	  intention’	  (Cabot	  in	  Kaag,	  2011,	  192).	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giving	  tissues	  in	  our	  efforts	  to	  kill	  the	  invading	  germs	  of	  the	  haphazard’	  (ibid.,	  196).	  
Only	  some	  sudden	  interjections	  of	  the	  unanticipated	  are	  capable	  of	  redirecting	  one's	  
focus.	  Similarly,	  in	  The	  Law	  of	  Mind	  Peirce	  argued:	  ‘In	  whatever	  manner	  the	  mind	  
has	  reacted	  under	  a	  given	  sensation,	  in	  that	  manner	  it	  is	  the	  more	  likely	  to	  react	  
again;	  were	  this,	  however,	  an	  absolute	  necessity,	  habits	  would	  become	  wooden	  and	  
ineradicable,	  and	  no	  room	  being	  left	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  habits,	  intellectual	  life	  
would	  come	  to	  a	  speedy	  close’	  (CP,	  [1892],	  6.148).	  
While	  habits	  are	  a	  strong	  force	  aiming	  to	  obtain	  stability	  within	  any	  given	  
system,	  chance-­‐spontaneity	  acts	  as	  an	  equally	  strong	  counterforce	  that	  keeps	  
interjecting	  and	  thus	  in	  intervals	  unbalances	  the	  system.	  If	  these	  interjections	  are	  
given	  enough	  space	  to	  unfold,	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  forces	  creates	  a	  
dynamic	  state	  of	  flux,	  with	  new	  sets	  of	  possibility	  opening	  up	  all	  along	  the	  way.	  
Peirce:	  
	  
Everybody	  knows	  that	  the	  long	  continuance	  of	  a	  routine	  of	  habit	  makes	  us	  
lethargic,	  while	  a	  succession	  of	  surprises	  wonderfully	  brightens	  the	  ideas.	  
Where	  there	  is	  a	  motion,	  where	  history	  is	  a-­‐making,	  there	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  
mental	  activity,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  said	  that	  the	  arts	  and	  sciences	  reside	  within	  
the	  temple	  of	  Janus,	  waking	  when	  that	  is	  open,	  but	  slumbering	  when	  it	  is	  
closed	  (CP,	  [1893],	  6.301).	  
	  
Cabot	  also	  recommended	  that	  ‘a	  certain	  loosening	  of	  purpose	  and	  “abandon”	  is	  
essential	  to	  originality’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  193).	  Both	  Peirce	  and	  Cabot	  regretted	  that	  
habitual	  behaviour,	  inflexibility	  and	  rigid	  protocols	  were	  too	  widespread	  in	  the	  
sciences,	  as	  well	  as	  society	  on	  the	  whole.	  Embracing	  chance	  was	  still	  highly	  
unpopular	  at	  the	  time	  and	  to	  do	  so	  was	  also	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  
social	  norms	  that	  held	  the	  mind	  in	  the	  fetters	  of	  rationality	  and	  logic.	  This	  becomes	  
clear	  when	  Cabot	  quoted	  Emerson36	  and	  Stevenson37	  to	  further	  underpin	  her	  
position.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  “Power	  keeps	  quite	  another	  road	  than	  the	  turnpikes	  of	  choice	  and	  will,	  namely,	  the	  subterranean	  
and	  invisible	  tunnels	  and	  channels	  of	  life.	  …	  Nature	  hates	  calculators,	  our	  chief	  experiences	  have	  
been	  casual”	  (ibid.).	  
37	  “Look	  at	  your	  industrious	  fellows.	  They	  have	  no	  curiosity,	  they	  cannot	  give	  themselves	  over	  to	  




Cabot	  thus	  cautioned	  against	  dogmatic	  beliefs,	  which	  would	  pose	  the	  
greatest	  threat	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  originality.	  Instead	  Cabot	  stressed	  the	  
importance	  of	  being	  able	  to	  surrender	  one’s	  beliefs:	  ‘a	  man	  may	  start	  to	  defend	  a	  
dogma	  which	  he	  thinks	  essential	  and	  finding	  it	  to	  be	  false,	  abandon	  it	  because	  to	  get	  
at	  the	  truth	  is	  his	  deepest	  purpose’	  (ibid.,	  197).	  Yet	  as	  long	  as	  the	  individual	  is	  unable	  
to	  renounce	  one’s	  old	  convictions	  this	  deeper	  purpose	  remains	  hidden	  from	  sight,	  
even	  if	  something	  new	  and	  interesting	  has	  been	  revealed.	  She	  advocated	  that	  a	  
‘looseness	  or	  indefiniteness	  of	  any	  plan	  which	  might	  be	  considered	  a	  lack,	  is	  the	  
centre	  of	  radiating	  opportunity.	  Each	  step	  in	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  a	  purpose	  suggests	  a	  
partially	  new	  plan	  to	  the	  open-­‐eyed’	  (ibid.,	  195).	  	  
Her	  considerations	  in	  regard	  to	  these	  two	  forces	  actually	  led	  her	  to	  the	  
crucial	  conception	  that	  the	  moment	  originality	  and	  novelty	  are	  born	  lies	  at	  the	  point	  
of	  intersection	  between	  purpose	  and	  chance,	  where	  the	  inner	  and	  the	  outer	  world	  
meet.	  In	  defining	  chance	  she	  wrote:	  ‘Chance	  is	  the	  encounter	  of	  factors	  outside	  of	  
our	  plans	  with	  our	  special	  end’	  (ibid.,	  189).	  As	  we	  shall	  later	  see,	  this	  definition	  
echoes	  Jung’s	  as	  well	  as	  Breton’s	  understanding	  of	  chance	  and	  this	  distinct	  
interpretation	  shall	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Part	  V.	  	  
The	  creation	  of	  novel	  invention	  is	  thus	  a	  product	  of	  what	  is	  conceived	  in	  the	  
communion	  of	  man	  being	  aligned	  with	  his	  environment.	  She	  wrote:	  ‘We	  take	  the	  
credit	  but	  the	  impetus	  and	  suggestion	  is	  forever	  flowing	  in	  from	  an	  endless,	  dazzling	  
flight	  of	  objects	  of	  beauty	  or	  curiosity’	  (ibid.).	  Cabot	  also	  observed	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  
the	  meeting	  of	  inner	  and	  outer,	  but	  also	  unconscious	  material	  together	  with	  
consciousness	  that	  brings	  forth	  the	  genuinely	  new	  and	  original.	  ‘It	  is	  most	  often	  out	  
of	  the	  dark	  of	  unconsciousness	  that	  the	  greatest	  thoughts	  grow	  and	  the	  poems	  
written	  for	  occasions	  and	  the	  deliberately	  commemorative	  pictures	  are	  usually	  the	  
least	  original’	  (ibid.,	  193).	  Originality	  	  	  
	  
cannot	  be	  due	  to	  will	  for	  I	  cannot	  will	  to	  do	  anything	  until	  I	  know	  what	  I	  am	  
to	  do	  and	  I	  can	  only	  know	  by	  having	  done	  the	  act	  before.	  The	  initial	  act	  of	  the	  
series	  must	  have	  been	  involuntary.	  “We	  imagine	  the	  will	  to	  be	  originative	  
merely	  because	  very	  often	  by	  repeating	  old	  deeds	  we	  can	  get	  ourselves	  into	  
unheard	  of	  situations,	  but	  it	  is	  life	  in	  such	  cases	  that	  contains	  novelties,	  it	  is	  




For	  this	  to	  happen	  however,	  one	  needs	  enough	  freedom	  from	  restrictions	  in	  order	  
to	  let	  one’s	  thoughts	  roam	  freely,	  so	  that	  they	  might	  then	  be	  sparked	  off	  by	  some	  
random	  encounter.	  The	  involvement	  of	  the	  unconscious	  is	  an	  interesting	  one	  and	  
shall	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  part	  on	  Jung	  and	  synchronicity.	  	  
	  
4.	  Using	  Peircean	  Theory	  to	  Explain	  Artistic	  Creativity	  
	  
While	  the	  last	  section	  focused	  on	  science,	  in	  this	  part	  attention	  is	  turned	  
towards	  art,	  thus	  providing	  a	  philosophical	  overview	  of	  two	  key	  areas	  persistently	  
associated	  with	  creativity.	  Peirce	  once	  wrote:	  ‘The	  work	  of	  the	  poet	  or	  novelist	  is	  not	  
so	  utterly	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  scientific	  man’	  (CP,	  [c.	  1890],	  1.383).	  Although	  
both	  fields	  share	  many	  similarities,	  there	  are	  also	  some	  important	  differences	  
between	  scientific	  and	  artistic	  creativity	  and	  these	  will	  be	  introduced	  in	  the	  
following	  section.	  In	  Conversations	  on	  Peirce	  Hausman	  and	  Anderson	  for	  example	  
explain	  that	  ‘Our	  exploration	  of	  Peirce’s	  cosmological	  writings	  initially	  developed	  out	  
of	  our	  shared	  interest	  in	  artistic	  creativity.	  We	  suspected	  that	  Peirce’s	  speculative	  
story	  of	  creative	  evolution	  might	  offer	  some	  insights	  into	  how	  humans	  create.	  In	  
Peirce’s	  conceptions	  of	  metaphor,	  firstness,	  spontaneity,	  agape,	  and	  developmental	  
teleology	  we	  believe	  we	  have	  found	  a	  few	  such	  insights.’	  (Anderson&Hausman,	  
2012,	  166).	  Although	  Peirce	  wrote	  very	  little	  about	  art	  and	  creativity	  and	  the	  few	  
comments	  he	  did	  make	  are	  scattered	  across	  his	  whole	  body	  of	  work,	  Anderson	  
argues	  in	  Creativity	  and	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  C.S.	  Peirce	  that	  ‘there	  is	  an	  implicit	  theory	  
of	  artistic	  creativity	  in	  Peirce’s	  system’	  (1987,	  2).	  Yet	  since	  the	  following	  descriptions	  
are	  only	  loosely	  built	  on	  Peirce’s	  own	  system,	  they	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  
Hausman’s	  and	  Anderson’s	  extensions.38	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Anderson	  explicitly	  writes:	  ‘I	  want	  to	  acknowledge	  two	  important	  and	  related	  dangers	  in	  
undertaking	  this	  project.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  hubris	  involved	  in	  putting	  words	  into	  
Peirce’s	  mouth.	  I	  must	  be	  careful	  to	  remain	  within	  a	  Peircean	  framework’	  (1987,	  10).	  I	  think	  
Anderson	  addresses	  the	  danger	  but	  does	  not	  actually	  avoid	  it,	  which	  is	  why	  I	  consider	  Anderson’s	  
hypotheses	  as	  extensions	  to	  Peirce	  rather	  than	  extractions	  from	  his	  writing.	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4.1.	  Applying	  Peirce’s	  Scientific	  Method	  to	  Artistic	  Creativity	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  workings	  of	  artistic	  creativity	  Anderson	  uses	  the	  
three-­‐part	  model	  of	  the	  scientific	  method	  as	  an	  analogy.	  His	  descriptions	  cover	  the	  
whole	  process	  of	  creativity:	  from	  the	  initiating	  spark	  to	  the	  artist’s	  final	  judgement	  
of	  the	  work	  that	  has	  been	  created.	  Anderson	  bases	  this	  metaphorical	  approach	  on	  
Peirce’s	  own	  habit	  to	  draw	  parallels	  between	  developments.	  Peirce	  wrote:	  ‘For	  
Normative	  Sciences	  in	  general	  being	  the	  science	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  conformity	  of	  things	  
to	  ends,	  esthetics	  considers	  those	  things	  whose	  ends	  are	  to	  embody	  qualities	  of	  
feeling,	  ethics	  those	  things	  whose	  ends	  lie	  in	  action,	  and	  logic	  those	  things	  whose	  
end	  is	  to	  represent	  something’	  (CP,	  [1903],	  5.129).	  Anderson	  takes	  this	  definition	  of	  
logic	  and	  aesthetics	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  his	  comparison	  between	  science	  and	  art:	  ‘I	  
have	  been	  dealing	  with	  artistic	  creativity	  in	  its	  formal	  appearance.	  That	  is,	  I	  have	  
been	  treating	  it	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  esthetics	  as	  a	  normative	  science	  in	  analogy	  
to	  science	  as	  a	  logic	  of	  inquiry’	  (1987,	  85).	  	  
Since	  Peirce	  discussed	  the	  scientific	  method	  at	  length,	  Anderson	  uses	  these	  
elaborations	  to	  apply	  them	  to	  the	  artistic	  process.	  The	  overall	  distinction	  between	  
the	  two	  methods	  is	  that	  the	  scientific	  method	  can	  be	  described	  as	  ‘analogical	  
reasoning’	  while	  the	  artistic	  method	  is	  better	  defined	  by	  ‘metaphorical	  reasoning’	  
(ibid.,	  5).	  To	  remind	  ourselves,	  while	  the	  three	  stages	  are	  presented	  in	  a	  linear	  
fashion,	  in	  reality	  they	  are	  much	  more	  dynamic	  and	  keep	  overlapping	  and	  
interweaving.	  For	  example,	  abduction	  can	  suddenly	  occur	  and	  interject	  deductive	  
reasoning,	  possibly	  leading	  to	  a	  different	  line	  of	  enquiry.	  	  	  
Anderson	  writes	  that	  ‘abduction	  is	  the	  necessary	  condition	  of	  scientific	  
creativity’	  (ibid.,	  50)	  and	  it	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ‘sensuous	  form	  of	  reasoning’	  (ibid.,	  
41).	  Abduction	  requires	  close	  observation	  skills	  and	  Peirce	  thought	  that	  ‘[t]he	  artist’s	  
eye	  was	  best	  equipped	  for	  “seeing	  what	  stares	  one	  in	  the	  face”	  (5.41-­‐42)’	  (Smith,	  
1972,	  22).	  It	  suggests	  that	  abduction	  proper	  is	  actually	  modelled	  on	  the	  receptive	  
and	  imaginative	  perception	  of	  the	  artist	  and	  Peirce	  transferred	  these	  qualities	  to	  
enrich	  the	  process	  of	  scientific	  research.	  Both	  are	  furthermore	  similar	  in	  being	  an	  
activity	  that	  is	  both	  active	  and	  passive.	  Artists	  consciously	  steer	  their	  thoughts	  and	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emotions	  while	  being	  highly	  responsive	  to	  influences	  from	  the	  unconscious,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  environment.	  	  
However	  scientific	  abduction	  usually	  begins	  with	  a	  surprising	  new	  fact,	  
whereas	  artistic	  abduction	  starts	  with	  an	  unsettling	  feeling,	  the	  feeling	  that	  
‘something	  is	  missing’	  (Anderson,	  1987,	  63).	  The	  artist	  lets	  these	  feelings	  arise	  and	  
gives	  in	  to	  a	  free	  and	  random	  play	  of	  thoughts	  and	  ideas	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  ‘pure	  
possibilities’.	  While	  the	  scientist	  is	  bound	  by	  possibilities	  matching	  the	  reality	  as	  it	  
can	  be	  observed	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  artist	  is	  not	  necessarily	  constrained	  by	  physical	  
reality.	  The	  artist’s	  imagination	  has	  much	  greater	  play	  and	  Anderson	  argues	  that,	  in	  
consequence,	  artistic	  creativity	  possesses	  ‘the	  highest	  degree	  of	  freedom’	  (ibid.,	  64).	  
It	  is	  true,	  the	  artist’s	  freedom	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  scientist’s,	  but	  overall	  it	  is	  still	  
restrained	  by	  factors	  such	  as	  experience,	  talent,	  motivation	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
Artistic	  abduction	  is	  only	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  process	  and	  deduction	  and	  
induction	  need	  to	  follow	  for	  an	  actual	  work	  of	  art	  to	  be	  created.	  In	  science	  the	  
deduction	  stage	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  clarification	  and	  concretisation	  of	  those	  new	  ideas	  
and	  feelings	  conceived	  during	  abduction.	  Anderson	  argues	  that	  artistic	  deduction	  is	  
different	  from	  deduction	  proper	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  while	  the	  scientist	  defines	  formal	  
hypotheses,	  the	  artist	  refines	  imaginative	  projections.	  The	  scientist	  and	  the	  artist	  
examine	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  possibilities	  and	  both	  evaluate	  the	  viability	  of	  some	  of	  
them.	  ‘Deduction	  helps	  render	  this	  indefiniteness	  definite	  or	  precise’	  (ibid.,	  78),	  
meaning	  that	  it	  is	  the	  stage	  where	  one	  limits	  and	  selects	  from	  this	  vast	  pool	  of	  
possibilities.	  One’s	  vision	  begins	  to	  take	  on	  more	  concrete	  shape.	  Yet	  again,	  while	  
the	  scientist	  has	  to	  consider	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  real	  phenomena	  in	  the	  world,	  the	  
artist	  projects	  more	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  work	  of	  art	  itself.	  The	  whole	  process	  is	  
therefore	  more	  self-­‐referential.	  Peirce’s	  emphasis	  that	  the	  ideas	  received	  during	  
abduction	  are	  ‘act[s]	  of	  insight,	  although	  of	  extremely	  fallible	  insight’	  (CP,	  [1903],	  
5.181)	  should	  be	  stressed	  once	  more.	  	  
	  
An	  artist	  begins	  with	  an	  indeterminate	  abduction	  which	  may	  not	  fulfil	  the	  
telos	  in	  the	  long	  run;	  that	  is,	  it	  may	  fail	  in	  its	  mission	  to	  embody	  a	  quality	  of	  
feeling	  in	  an	  esthetically	  valuable	  way.	  This,	  of	  course,	  parallels	  a	  scientist’s	  
fallibility.	  Therefore,	  the	  deductive	  stage	  is	  critical	  for	  artistic	  creativity	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insofar	  as	  it	  allows	  an	  artist	  to	  narrow	  his	  work	  of	  art	  and	  telos	  into	  
something	  which	  has	  a	  chance	  of	  success	  (Anderson,	  1987,	  137).	  
	  
Then,	  during	  induction,	  the	  scientist’s	  aim	  is	  to	  experientially	  determine	  the	  
correctness	  and	  accuracy	  of	  the	  hypothesis.	  The	  process	  is	  ultimately	  guided	  by	  the	  
search	  for	  truth.	  The	  artist	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  searches	  for	  something	  that	  is	  true	  to	  
itself,	  where	  truth	  emerges	  as	  self-­‐adequacy.	  ‘Unlike	  a	  scientist,	  an	  artist	  has	  no	  
analogue	  against	  which	  to	  test	  his	  creation’s	  correctness	  or	  worth’	  (ibid.,	  79).	  
Induction	  is	  the	  stage	  where	  the	  actual	  work	  of	  art	  comes	  into	  being.	  While	  the	  
artist	  is	  creating	  they	  scrutinise	  their	  work	  in	  terms	  of	  “esthetic	  goodness”.39	  Peirce	  
was	  inconsistent	  in	  what	  he	  exactly	  meant	  by	  ‘esthetic	  goodness’,	  but	  he	  generally	  
‘tried	  to	  avoid	  providing	  a	  condition	  of	  esthetic	  goodness	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense	  
that	  beauty	  was	  held	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  such	  goodness’	  (ibid.,	  81).	  Peirce	  
wrote:	  ‘I	  am	  seriously	  inclined	  to	  doubt	  there	  being	  any	  distinction	  of	  pure	  esthetic	  
betterness	  or	  worseness.	  My	  notion	  would	  be	  that	  there	  are	  innumerable	  varieties	  
of	  esthetic	  quality,	  but	  no	  purely	  esthetic	  grade	  of	  excellence’	  (ibid.).	  Peirce	  tried	  to	  
keep	  esthetic	  goodness	  separate	  from	  traditional	  morality,	  because	  it	  would	  
obstruct	  one’s	  view	  and	  stifle	  the	  very	  personal,	  but	  more	  natural	  way	  of	  individual	  
perception.	  	  
In	  his	  final	  comparison	  Anderson	  explains	  that	  scientific	  creativity	  leads	  to	  
discovery,	  whereas	  the	  result	  of	  the	  artistic	  process	  can	  be	  more	  directly	  called	  
creation.	  The	  two	  main	  characteristics	  that	  distinguish	  the	  artistic	  from	  the	  scientific	  
are	  its	  greater	  freedom	  in	  imagining	  and	  realising	  possibilities,	  as	  well	  as	  it	  being	  
more	  clearly	  self-­‐representative.	  Anderson	  therefore	  points	  out	  that:	  	  
	  
whereas	  science	  tries	  to	  bring	  order	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  ideas	  (to	  the	  world),	  art	  
tries	  to	  fragment	  the	  world,	  to	  bring	  new	  diversities	  to	  life	  which	  cut	  through	  
the	  regularity	  and	  unity	  imposed	  by	  science.	  There	  is	  clearly	  a	  need	  for	  this	  
function	  of	  art	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Peirce’s	  architectonic.	  In	  his	  cosmology	  
Peirce	  argued	  for	  an	  open	  and	  evolving	  universe	  which	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  ‘“In	  the	  light	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  categories	  I	  should	  say	  that	  an	  object,	  to	  be	  esthetically	  good,	  
must	  have	  a	  multitude	  of	  parts	  so	  related	  to	  one	  another	  as	  to	  impart	  a	  positive	  simple	  immediate	  
quality	  to	  their	  totality:	  and	  whatever	  does	  this	  is,	  in	  so	  far,	  esthetically	  good,	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  
particular	  quality	  of	  the	  total	  may	  be”	  (CP,	  [1903],	  5.132)	  and	  “the	  total	  unanalyzable	  impression	  




time	  is	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  regular	  and	  more	  and	  more	  diverse.	  […]	  
Thus,	  with	  its	  metaphorical	  nature,	  its	  greater	  freedom,	  and	  its	  concern	  for	  
the	  sui	  generis,	  artistic	  creativity	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  increasing	  diversity	  among	  
ideas	  (ibid.,	  154).	  
	  
	  
4.2.	  The	  Interplay	  of	  Chance,	  Telos	  and	  Imagination	  in	  Artistic	  Creativity	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  the	  particular	  interplay	  between	  chance,	  purpose	  and	  
imagination	  in	  artistic	  creation	  shall	  be	  looked	  at	  in	  more	  detail.	  Cabot	  wrote	  that	  	  
‘[t]he	  poet	  who	  knows	  beforehand	  precisely	  what	  he	  has	  to	  say	  will	  not	  write	  a	  truly	  
original	  poem.	  To	  succeed	  in	  being	  original,	  he	  must	  be	  open	  to	  chance	  suggestions’	  
(Kaag,	  2011,	  189).	  She	  also	  assumed	  that	  ‘[i]n	  artistic	  work	  the	  dawning	  of	  a	  plan	  
seems	  often	  due	  to	  chance	  elements’	  (ibid.,	  192).	  Since	  the	  artist	  is	  less	  often	  driven	  
to	  realise	  preconceived	  outcomes,	  they	  can	  more	  freely	  incorporate	  such	  chance	  
elements.	  The	  artist	  could	  have	  a	  very	  clear	  idea	  of	  what	  they	  want	  to	  create	  or	  at	  
first	  there	  might	  only	  be	  the	  wish	  to	  create	  ‘something’,	  without	  initially	  having	  a	  
clear	  sense	  of	  what	  this	  something	  shall	  be.	  The	  famous	  glass	  artist	  Dale	  Chihuly	  
describes	  the	  experience	  as	  follows:	  
	  
[S]omething	  might	  happen	  from	  what	  starts	  as	  one	  idea	  but	  may	  end	  up	  as	  
something	  entirely	  different,	  something	  I	  didn't	  expect.	  (…)	  What	  may	  start	  
as	  an	  accident	  sometimes	  becomes	  a	  valuable	  exercise	  and,	  by	  trying	  it	  over	  
and	  over,	  can	  turn	  into	  something	  that	  you	  can	  control.	  So	  you	  might	  say	  
that	  a	  lot	  of	  our	  work	  is	  the	  result	  of	  sort	  of	  controlled	  accidents	  
(Meyers&Gerstman,	  2007,	  38).	  
	  
This	  perspective	  reminds	  of	  Peirce’s	  aforementioned	  view	  that	  chance	  stands	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  a	  new	  chain	  of	  habits.	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  if	  the	  artist’s	  purpose	  is	  
flexible	  and	  they	  are	  open	  to	  chance,	  one	  gains	  access	  to	  more	  possibilities.	  The	  
sudden	  arrival	  of	  chance	  can	  then	  help	  to	  guide	  one’s	  purpose.	  Anderson	  writes:	  
‘chance	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  letting	  arise	  spontaneously	  what	  first	  appears	  to	  solve	  an	  
artist’s	  problematic	  telos’	  (Anderson,	  1987,	  130).	  If	  the	  artist	  gives	  in	  to	  the	  pure	  
play	  of	  the	  imagination,	  the	  spark	  that	  arose	  by	  chance	  can	  grow	  into	  more	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elaborate	  ideas	  and	  images	  that	  are	  new	  and	  original.	  It	  is	  only	  through	  the	  
imagination	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  chance	  encounter	  can	  be	  harnessed.	  	  
	  
When	  chance	  facts	  break	  into	  our	  usual	  routine,	  as	  they	  invariably	  do,	  it	  is	  
the	  imagination	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  respond	  to	  these	  interruptions	  as	  real	  
opportunities.	  It	  is	  the	  imagination	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  take	  a	  turn	  in	  her	  
thinking	  that	  is	  motivated	  by	  a	  chance	  encounter.	  Instead	  of	  passively	  
ignoring	  or	  actively	  destroying	  a	  chance,	  the	  imagination	  seizes	  upon	  the	  
unexpected,	  and	  recognizes	  the	  possibilities	  that	  it	  affords	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  78).	  
	  
Whilst	  during	  the	  abduction	  stage	  the	  artist’s	  imagination	  is	  essentially	  
unbound,	  in	  induction	  it	  is	  still	  for	  example	  restricted	  by	  talent,	  expertise	  or	  time:	  ‘A	  
painter	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  embody	  a	  quality	  of	  feeling	  without	  first	  knowing	  
something	  of	  technique	  in	  brush-­‐strokes,	  medium	  application,	  and	  so	  on.	  Nor	  can	  an	  
artist	  proceed	  without	  some	  familiarity	  with	  the	  tradition	  (…)	  it	  is	  this	  mundane	  side	  
of	  science	  and	  art	  which	  must	  precede	  the	  inception	  of	  any	  creative	  act’	  (Anderson,	  
1987,	  148-­‐9).	  Yet	  within	  these	  bounds	  the	  artist’s	  imagination	  is	  free	  and	  as	  Cabot	  
explains	  ‘imagination	  is	  the	  power	  to	  be	  in	  whatever	  we	  touch.	  It	  is	  through	  
imagination	  that	  we	  fill	  the	  gaps	  and	  out	  of	  fragments	  make	  a	  whole’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  
79).	  It	  can	  therefore	  be	  said	  that	  it	  is	  through	  the	  unique	  interplay	  of	  chance,	  
purpose	  and	  the	  pure	  play	  of	  imagination	  that	  real	  novelty	  and	  originality	  are	  made	  
possible.	  Thus	  when	  Cabot	  wrote	  about	  chance	  changing	  to	  ‘my	  chance’,	  this	  
transformation	  occurs	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  purpose	  and	  imagination.	  Through	  an	  
open	  and	  flexible	  telos,	  the	  imagination	  is	  set	  free	  to	  explore	  what	  is	  relevant	  and	  
meaningful	  to	  the	  individual.	  	  	  	  
	   In	  this	  context	  it	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  it	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  ‘my	  chance’	  
that	  is	  most	  often	  misconstrued	  as	  fate.	  This	  sense	  of	  ‘my	  chance’	  often	  emerges	  as	  
a	  revelation	  accompanied	  by	  strong	  feelings	  of	  significance	  and	  deeper	  meaning.	  Yet	  
Anderson	  argues	  that	  for	  the	  artist,	  the	  particular	  artwork	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one	  that	  
could	  have	  answered	  the	  feeling	  of	  ‘something	  is	  missing’	  and	  thus	  fulfil	  his	  telos.	  ‘In	  
artistic	  creativity	  a	  work	  of	  art	  does	  not	  constitute	  “the	  best	  of	  all	  possible	  worlds”	  
but	  “one	  of	  many	  best	  possible	  worlds”’	  (Anderson,	  1987,	  153).	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  
perception	  of	  ‘what	  happened	  was	  meant	  to	  happen	  in	  this	  way	  and	  no	  other’	  
comes	  from	  the	  satisfying	  feeling	  of	  accomplishment	  and	  completion.	  Even	  if	  the	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artist	  was	  initially	  not	  sure	  what	  they	  were	  looking	  for,	  when	  the	  actual	  artwork	  
feels	  like	  it	  answers	  what	  one	  was	  unknowingly	  longing	  for	  it	  can	  easily	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  inevitable.	  While	  a	  different	  event	  or	  thought	  might	  have	  produced	  
the	  same	  exact	  effect,	  it	  is	  this	  feeling	  of	  revelation	  and	  significance	  that	  counts.	  
Ilana	  Goor,	  a	  designer	  and	  sculptor,	  describes	  it	  as	  follows:	  ‘I'm	  searching	  for	  
something	  that	  does	  not	  exist.	  (…)	  And	  that	  often	  leads	  to	  unexpected	  happy	  
accidents’	  (Meyers	  &	  Gerstman,	  2007,	  203).	  
	   While	  the	  interplay	  between	  chance,	  purpose	  and	  imagination	  plays	  a	  similar	  
role	  in	  science	  and	  art,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  artistic	  telos	  is	  generally	  more	  oriented	  
towards	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  Peircean	  sense,	  more	  playful	  and	  possibly	  also	  more	  
subversive.	  The	  artist	  is	  less	  inspired	  to	  discover	  something	  useful	  than	  to	  create	  
something	  unique.	  The	  artwork	  can	  therefore	  also	  be	  intended	  to	  raise	  questions	  or	  
to	  shock	  its	  audience.	  This	  is	  an	  aspect	  that	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  Part	  
IV	  on	  Dada	  and	  Surrealism.	  Furthermore,	  Anderson	  explains	  that	  ‘developmental	  
telelogy	  squares	  with	  Peirce’s	  claim	  that	  artists,	  in	  being	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  
the	  category	  of	  firstness,	  seek	  to	  articulate	  what	  is	  indefinite’	  (ibid.,	  6).	  This	  is	  
another	  aspect	  unique	  to	  artistic	  creativity,	  especially	  since	  modern	  art,	  where	  the	  
artist	  aims	  to	  translate	  into	  actuality	  something	  from	  the	  vast	  realm	  of	  imagination	  
itself.	  The	  intention	  then	  becomes	  to	  depict	  the	  impossible,	  the	  magical	  and	  
otherworldly	  that	  is	  contained	  within	  one’s	  own	  imagination.	  This	  also	  links	  back	  to	  
Schiller,	  who	  already	  believed	  that	  ‘art	  could	  awaken	  feelings	  of	  the	  infinite’	  
(Conway,	  2008,	  298),	  because	  aspects	  of	  the	  infinite	  can	  be	  accessed	  through	  the	  
free	  play	  of	  one’s	  imagination.	  In	  this	  regard	  Gerhard	  Richter	  once	  said:	  	  
	  
A	  picture	  presents	  itself	  as	  the	  Unmanageable,	  the	  Illogical,	  the	  Meaningless.	  
It	  demonstrates	  the	  endless	  multiplicity	  of	  aspects;	  it	  takes	  away	  our	  
certainty,	  because	  it	  deprives	  a	  thing	  of	  its	  meaning	  and	  its	  name.	  It	  shows	  us	  
the	  thing	  in	  all	  the	  manifold	  significance	  and	  infinite	  variety	  that	  preclude	  the	  






Peirce’s	  concept	  of	  tychism	  introduced	  an	  elaborate	  metaphysics	  of	  absolute	  
chance	  into	  a	  philosophical	  debate	  that	  was	  still	  dominated	  by	  a	  belief	  in	  
determinism.	  His	  elaborations	  that	  tychism	  is	  operative	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  would	  
only	  later	  be	  confirmed	  through	  quantum	  mechanics.	  In	  Peirce’s	  own	  writing	  there	  
are	  only	  some	  implicit	  suggestions	  that	  tychism	  also	  operates	  on	  a	  human	  level,	  but	  
his	  writings	  on	  pure	  play,	  abduction	  and	  musement	  are	  useful	  elements	  for	  a	  more	  
in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  links	  between	  chance	  and	  creativity.	  Cabot	  disagreed	  with	  
Peirce	  on	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  chance	  and	  her	  writings	  provide	  an	  important	  shift	  
towards	  the	  experience	  and	  ethics	  of	  chance	  encounters.	  Through	  her	  argument	  
that	  novelty	  can	  only	  emerge	  through	  the	  interjection	  of	  the	  unexpected,	  chance	  
takes	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  crucial	  agent	  without	  which	  we	  would	  live	  in	  a	  static	  world	  
ruled	  by	  habits	  and	  laws.	  The	  ability	  to	  be	  open	  to	  chance	  and	  to	  see	  connections	  
that	  weren't	  visible	  before	  are	  key	  factors	  for	  creativity.	  Considering	  artistic	  and	  
scientific	  creativity	  showed	  that	  the	  unique	  interaction	  of	  chance,	  developmental	  
teleology	  and	  the	  free	  play	  of	  imagination	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  true	  
novelty	  and	  originality.	  While	  these	  two	  types	  of	  creativity	  share	  many	  similarities,	  it	  
surfaced	  that	  art	  generally	  enjoys	  more	  freedom	  than	  science.	  	  
	   Both	  Peirce	  and	  Cabot	  were	  united	  in	  rebelling	  against	  the	  complacency	  of	  
scientific	  research	  and	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  their	  discussions	  of	  chance	  were	  
instrumental	  in	  this	  regard.	  At	  the	  time	  considering	  chance	  seriously	  was	  still,	  at	  the	  
least,	  frowned	  upon	  and	  it	  implied	  that	  one	  did	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  questioning	  
traditions,	  norms	  and	  the	  status	  quo.	  Both	  also	  referred	  to	  the	  unconscious,	  another	  
concept	  that	  was	  only	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  more	  depth.	  Cabot	  for	  example	  wrote:	  
‘when	  we	  exclude	  all	  chance	  elements	  from	  the	  birth	  of	  our	  purpose,	  we	  are	  
decidedly	  apt	  not	  to	  get	  novelty	  at	  all.	  (…)	  An	  element	  of	  mystery	  and	  even	  of	  
unconsciousness	  hangs	  over	  the	  moment	  of	  creation’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  193).	  Since	  up	  to	  
this	  point	  links	  between	  chance	  and	  creativity	  have	  been	  predominantly	  discussed	  
on	  a	  level	  of	  consciousness,	  the	  next	  part	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  unconscious	  in	  








Part	  III.	  The	  Creative	  Psyche	  and	  Synchronicity:	  Exploring	  
the	  Unconscious	  Aspect	  
	  
	  
1.	  The	  Creative	  Psyche	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Like	  Peirce	  and	  Cabot,	  Jung	  was	  interested	  in	  fostering	  observation	  and	  an	  
attitude	  of	  openness	  towards	  phenomena	  we	  encounter	  internally	  as	  well	  as	  
externally.	  Zabriskie	  summarises	  Jung’s	  quest	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  demand	  to	  
understand	  his	  state	  of	  mind,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  state	  of	  the	  world,	  precipitated	  
a	  life-­‐long	  exploration	  of	  psychic	  chaos	  as	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  creation,	  and	  a	  
scientific	  pursuit	  to	  understand	  a-­‐causal	  correspondences	  and	  seemingly	  magical	  
coincidences’	  (Zabriskie,	  2012,	  123).	  It	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  this	  quote	  that	  the	  two	  
concepts	  of	  chance	  and	  creativity	  were	  of	  fundamental	  significance	  to	  him.	  This	  part	  
then	  continues	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  psychological	  dynamics	  involved	  in	  
creativity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  workings	  of	  chance,	  but	  this	  time	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  
unconscious	  will	  be	  added	  to	  the	  discussion.	  
Jung	  hypothesised	  that	  the	  psyche	  is	  inherently	  creative	  and	  creativity	  is	  
therefore	  not	  only	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  for	  art	  and	  science,	  but	  also	  lies	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  therapy,	  healing	  and	  self-­‐realisation.	  Comparing	  Jung	  and	  Freud,	  Tacey	  
explains:	  ‘Freud	  seemed	  to	  want	  to	  link	  everything	  back	  to	  early	  childhood;	  Jung	  
sought	  to	  show	  that	  the	  psyche	  was	  urging	  us	  onward	  to	  create	  a	  new	  and	  broader	  
personality’	  (2007,	  4).	  From	  early	  on	  Jung	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  psyche’s	  ability	  to	  
generate	  images	  autonomously	  and	  already	  wrote	  about	  fantasy-­‐thinking	  in	  1912.	  
Later	  he	  wrote	  in	  a	  letter:	  ‘I	  am	  indeed	  convinced	  that	  creative	  imagination	  is	  the	  
only	  primordial	  phenomenon	  accessible	  to	  us,	  the	  real	  Ground	  of	  the	  psyche,	  the	  
only	  immediate	  reality’	  (Letters	  1,	  [1929],	  60).	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Even	  though	  Jung	  had	  been	  interested	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  coincidences	  where	  
internal	  contents,	  for	  example	  a	  dream,	  mirror	  external	  events,	  he	  only	  made	  his	  
hypothesis	  on	  synchronicity	  public	  from	  1951	  onwards.	  Synchronicity	  belongs	  to	  
Jung’s	  most	  metaphysical	  concepts	  and	  through	  it	  he	  sought	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  
must	  be	  closer,	  acausal	  connections	  between	  mind	  and	  matter.	  Yet	  he	  wanted	  
synchronicity	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  attempt	  at	  an	  initial	  explanation	  of	  a	  complex	  
problem,	  which	  would	  need	  further	  elucidation.	  Jung	  was	  also	  very	  critical	  of	  the	  
general	  one-­‐sided	  emphasis	  on	  rationality	  and	  logic	  in	  science	  and	  with	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  synchronicity	  principle	  he	  wanted	  to	  show	  that	  value	  and	  
meaning	  can	  be	  found	  in	  unique	  and	  seemingly	  irrational	  experiences	  too.	  
The	  first	  chapter	  looks	  at	  a	  range	  of	  aspects	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  Jung’s	  
theory	  that	  the	  psyche	  is	  inherently	  creative.	  The	  second	  chapter	  examines	  the	  
metaphysics	  and	  workings	  of	  synchronicity,	  while	  the	  third	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  draw	  
connections	  between	  the	  two	  areas.	  Jung	  himself	  only	  indicated	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  
relationship	  when	  he	  wrote:	  ‘It	  seems	  to	  me	  synchronicity	  represents	  a	  direct	  act	  of	  
creation	  which	  manifests	  itself	  as	  chance’	  (	  CW	  18,	  [1950],	  1198).	  40	  Yet	  it	  seems	  that	  
his	  theories	  on	  creativity	  and	  synchronicity	  contain	  rich	  suggestions	  that	  there	  might	  
be	  more	  inherent	  links	  between	  the	  two.	  	  
	  
	  
1.1.	  Jung’s	  Model	  of	  the	  Psyche	  
	  
At	  first	  it	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  for	  Jung	  ‘observations	  came	  first	  and	  
then	  theoretical	  constructions.	  Jung	  started	  by	  making	  association	  experiments	  on	  
healthy	  and	  pathological	  persons,	  went	  on	  to	  practise	  psychoanalysis	  and	  later	  
gained	  knowledge	  from	  his	  own	  self-­‐analysis.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  experiences	  derived	  
from	  these	  sources	  he	  developed	  generalizations	  about	  the	  structures	  and	  processes	  
within	  the	  psyche’	  (Fordham,	  1986,	  3).	  In	  Jung's	  model	  the	  psyche	  consists	  of	  three	  
main	  layers:	  consciousness,	  personal	  unconscious	  and	  collective	  unconscious.	  All	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Quotes	  from	  Jung’s	  Collected	  Works	  are	  referenced	  with	  CW	  and	  volume	  number,	  year	  of	  original	  
publication,	  paragraph	  number.	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three	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  independent	  realms	  with	  specific	  contents.	  Yet	  they	  are	  
not	  wholly	  separate,	  but	  permeable	  and	  in	  constant	  relationships	  with	  each	  other.	  
For	  Jung,	  understanding	  the	  interactions	  between	  them	  was	  even	  more	  important	  
than	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  realms	  themselves.	  The	  relationships	  between	  
consciousness	  and	  the	  two	  layers	  of	  the	  unconscious	  are	  shaped	  by	  conflict	  and	  
compensation,	  a	  constant	  struggle	  for	  psychic	  equilibrium	  and	  it	  is	  this	  struggle	  that	  
renders	  the	  psyche	  alive.	  
Consciousness	  is	  the	  realm	  of	  awareness	  and	  being	  conscious	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  
register	  inner	  and	  outer	  sensations,	  processes	  and	  events.	  The	  specific	  contents	  of	  
consciousness	  are	  for	  example	  memories,	  thoughts,	  images	  and	  emotions.	  The	  
central	  agent	  of	  consciousness	  is	  the	  ego,	  an	  innate	  structure	  through	  which	  the	  
individual	  recognises	  oneself	  as	  ‘I’	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  perceived	  as	  the	  centre	  of	  our	  
being	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  ego	  serves	  several	  functions:	  to	  comprehend	  
conscious	  contents,	  as	  well	  as	  internal	  and	  external	  stimuli	  and	  it	  is	  responsible	  for	  
organising	  and	  responding	  to	  these	  needs	  and	  wishes.	  The	  ego	  is	  very	  important	  
because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  agency	  to	  bring	  light	  into	  the	  darkness	  of	  psychic	  processes	  
and	  to	  negotiate	  between	  conflicting	  inner	  demands,	  environmental	  interests	  and	  
the	  pressures	  of	  the	  unconscious’	  contents.	  However,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  
ego	  is	  never	  in	  full	  control	  and	  it	  can	  only	  comprehend	  a	  section	  of	  the	  whole	  at	  any	  
given	  time.	  The	  ego's	  freedom	  is	  not	  only	  limited	  through	  environmental	  restrictions	  
but	  also	  internal,	  unconscious	  constraints.	  	  
	   Below	  consciousness	  one	  finds	  the	  personal	  unconscious.	  Difficult	  or	  
traumatic	  memories	  are	  repressed,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  do	  not	  disappear	  but	  
continue	  to	  exist	  in	  this	  layer	  of	  the	  psyche.	  It	  contains	  everything	  from	  memories,	  
forgotten	  and	  repressed	  material	  as	  well	  as	  subliminal	  perceptions.	  With	  the	  
description	  of	  the	  collective	  unconscious	  Jung	  diverged	  from	  Freud’s	  theory,	  who	  
hypothesised	  that	  there	  is	  only	  a	  personal	  unconscious.	  The	  collective	  unconscious	  
refers	  to	  the	  deepest	  layer	  of	  the	  psyche.	  Instead	  of	  containing	  contents	  that	  are	  
unique	  to	  the	  individual,	  it	  is	  the	  psychic	  substratum	  universally	  shared	  by	  all	  
humanity.	  Its	  contents	  are	  the	  so-­‐called	  archetypes:	  ‘[t]he	  archetypes	  are	  in	  no	  way	  
inherited	  ideas,	  they	  are	  inherited	  potential	  structures	  which	  express	  themselves	  in	  
compulsive	  necessities’	  (Gieser,	  2005,	  214).	  These	  archetypes	  are	  universal	  symbols	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of	  human	  experiences	  such	  as	  birth,	  death,	  childhood,	  ageing,	  love,	  hate,	  rites	  of	  
passage,	  the	  shadow,	  the	  mother,	  the	  hero	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  this	  regard	  Jung	  wrote:	  ‘In	  
itself,	  an	  archetype	  is	  neither	  good	  nor	  evil.	  It	  is	  morally	  neutral	  (…)	  and	  becomes	  
good	  or	  evil	  only	  by	  contact	  with	  the	  conscious	  mind’	  (CW	  15,	  [1930]	  160).	  	  
Archetypes	  can	  never	  be	  perceived	  ‘as	  they	  are’	  because	  they	  are	  
potentiality	  only.	  They	  describe	  the	  innate	  possibility	  of	  producing	  ideas,	  images,	  
behaviours	  and	  experiences,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  represent	  those	  images	  in	  themselves.	  
They	  reach	  consciousness	  always	  filtered	  and	  assimilated.	  First	  they	  are	  manipulated	  
through	  the	  personal	  unconscious,	  where	  some	  of	  its	  own	  contents	  inevitably	  attach	  
to	  the	  archetypal	  material.	  Then	  they	  reach	  consciousness	  and	  the	  material	  is	  
further	  filtered	  through	  conscious	  attitudes.	  ‘While	  the	  objectivity	  of	  experience	  is	  
determined	  by	  the	  archetypes,	  its	  subjectivity	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  one’s	  
personal	  complexes’	  (Salman,	  2008,	  66).	  All	  these	  personal	  distortions	  need	  to	  be	  
taken	  into	  account	  and	  Jung	  therefore	  called	  the	  archetypal	  material	  that	  ultimately	  
reaches	  consciousness	  ‘archetypal	  image’,	  since	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  pure	  material	  but	  
something	  specific	  to	  the	  individual.	  	  
Jung	  also	  described	  the	  archetypal	  material	  as	  ‘independent	  personalities’	  
and	  he	  deduced	  from	  his	  experience	  with	  patients	  that	  ‘the	  tendency	  to	  autonomy	  is	  
a	  more	  or	  less	  general	  peculiarity	  of	  the	  unconscious’	  (CW	  9i,	  [1939],	  496).	  He	  
noticed	  that	  this	  tendency	  occurred	  especially	  in	  heightened	  emotional	  states	  and	  
concluded	  that	  ‘the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  unconscious	  therefore	  begins	  where	  emotions	  
are	  generated.	  Emotions	  are	  instinctive,	  involuntary	  reactions	  which	  upset	  the	  
rational	  order	  of	  consciousness	  by	  their	  elemental	  outbursts.	  Affects	  are	  not	  “made”	  
or	  wilfully	  produced;	  they	  simply	  happen’	  (ibid.,	  497).	  He	  furthermore	  wrote:	  ‘So	  
long	  as	  the	  unconscious	  is	  in	  a	  dormant	  condition,	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  there	  were	  
absolutely	  nothing	  in	  this	  hidden	  region.	  Hence	  we	  are	  continually	  surprised	  when	  
something	  unknown	  suddenly	  appears	  “from	  nowhere”.	  […]	  We	  call	  the	  unconscious	  
“nothing,”	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  a	  reality	  in	  potentia’	  (ibid.,	  497-­‐8).	  This	  reminds	  of	  the	  two	  
perceptions	  of	  creation	  in	  myth	  and	  suggests	  once	  more	  that	  creativity	  does	  not	  
spring	  from	  nothing,	  but	  rather	  the	  chaotic	  realm	  of	  the	  unconscious.	  
	   Though	  Jung	  was	  positive	  about	  the	  generally	  chaotic	  character	  of	  the	  
unconscious,	  he	  was	  convinced	  that	  there	  must	  nevertheless	  be	  an	  agent	  containing	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it	  (see	  CW	  9i,	  [1939],	  503).	  Jung	  called	  this	  agent	  the	  Self,	  and	  it	  encompasses	  the	  
realms	  of	  consciousness	  as	  well	  as	  the	  unconscious	  into	  a	  united	  whole	  and	  it	  
therefore	  describes	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  person.	  The	  Self	  is	  associated	  with	  unity	  and	  
wholeness	  because	  it	  enables	  the	  consolidation	  of	  those	  conflicts	  and	  oppositions	  
that	  the	  ego	  uses	  to	  grow	  in	  strength.	  ‘From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  Self,	  the	  ego	  is	  a	  
working	  hypothesis.	  The	  ego	  has	  no	  substantive	  reality,	  but	  is	  an	  enabling	  fiction	  
that	  allows	  something	  greater	  to	  express	  itself’	  (Tacey,	  2006,	  48).	  For	  Jung	  the	  
realisation	  that	  the	  ego	  is	  not	  in	  overall	  control	  of	  what	  is	  happening	  inside	  the	  
psyche,	  that	  it	  is	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  consciousness	  and	  that	  in	  turn	  consciousness	  
only	  constitutes	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  psyche,	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  
discovery	  that	  the	  earth	  is	  neither	  the	  centre	  of	  our	  solar	  system,	  nor	  our	  sun	  the	  
centre	  of	  the	  universe.	  	  
Jung	  stressed	  that	  the	  Self	  in	  its	  reconciling	  and	  unifying	  function	  does	  not	  
present	  a	  fixed	  entity	  that	  can	  be	  approached	  as	  it	  is	  because	  in	  its	  dynamic	  function	  
it	  keeps	  constantly	  changing.	  This	  path	  leading	  towards	  Self-­‐realisation	  and	  
integration	  is	  called	  the	  individuation	  process.	  Individuation	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  struggle	  
to	  balance	  out	  conscious	  attitudes	  and	  unconscious	  constellations.	  The	  psyche	  is	  
therefore	  also	  described	  as	  a	  self-­‐regulating	  feedback	  system	  where	  imbalances	  are	  
continually	  sought	  to	  be	  readjusted	  and	  compensated	  for.	  The	  process	  is	  also	  
described	  as	  a	  striving	  towards	  wholeness	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  as	  much	  unconscious	  
material	  as	  possible	  is	  being	  brought	  into	  conscious	  awareness.	  Ideally,	  
consciousness	  and	  the	  unconscious	  are	  in	  continuous	  dialogue	  with	  each	  other	  and	  
psychic	  energy	  can	  flow	  freely	  between	  them.	  	  
Therefore,	  ‘the	  chaotic	  life	  of	  the	  unconscious	  should	  be	  given	  the	  chance	  of	  
having	  its	  way	  too	  –	  as	  much	  as	  we	  can	  stand.	  This	  means	  open	  conflict	  and	  open	  
collaboration	  at	  once’	  (CW	  9i,	  [1939],	  522).	  Individuation	  is	  therefore	  marked	  by	  a	  
continual	  recognition	  of	  societal	  and	  unconscious	  pressures	  fragmenting	  the	  whole,	  
as	  well	  as	  compensation	  between	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  forces.	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	  individuation	  occurs	  naturally	  and	  without	  the	  conscious	  effort	  of	  the	  
individual	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  can	  become	  the	  deliberate	  striving	  towards	  more	  






Jung’s	  typology	  helps	  to	  elucidate	  how	  different	  personality	  types	  can	  
influence	  the	  tendency	  to	  be	  imaginative	  and	  creative.	  It	  already	  emerged	  in	  
previous	  sections	  that	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  experiencer	  plays	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  
how	  chance	  encounters	  are	  evaluated	  and	  utilised	  and	  this	  section	  will	  not	  only	  look	  
at	  one’s	  conscious	  attitudes	  but	  also	  innate	  character	  traits.	  Jung	  first	  published	  his	  
theory	  of	  psychological	  types	  in	  1921	  and	  he	  explained	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  fundamental	  
differences	  between	  characters	  has	  occupied	  thinkers	  since	  antiquity.	  Jung	  
distinguished	  between	  two	  basic	  psychological	  types,	  extroversion	  and	  introversion,	  
and	  they	  describe	  the	  habitual	  tendency	  to	  perceive	  and	  process	  information	  in	  
some	  characteristic	  ways.	  
For	  Jung	  the	  two	  types	  determine	  all	  internal	  processes	  and	  one’s	  individual	  
expression	  of	  creativity	  is	  therefore	  also	  filtered	  through	  them.	  While	  the	  extravert’s	  
attention	  generally	  turns	  towards	  the	  outside	  world	  and	  the	  objects	  in	  it,	  the	  
introvert	  receives	  more	  stimulation	  from	  subjective	  impressions	  bouncing	  off	  the	  
object.	  ‘If	  a	  man	  thinks,	  feels,	  acts,	  and	  actually	  lives	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  directly	  
correlated	  with	  the	  objective	  conditions	  and	  their	  demands,	  he	  is	  extraverted	  …	  ‘his	  
inner	  live	  is	  subordinated	  to	  external	  necessity’	  (CW6,	  [1921],	  563).	  The	  introvert	  on	  
the	  other	  hand	  ‘relies	  principally	  on	  what	  the	  sense	  impression	  constellates	  in	  the	  
subject’	  (ibid.,	  621).	  This	  subjective	  view,	  through	  which	  the	  external	  world	  is	  
filtered,	  appears	  more	  real	  to	  the	  introvert.	  ‘The	  introverted	  attitude	  is	  normally	  
oriented	  by	  the	  psychic	  structure’	  (ibid.,	  623),	  which	  means	  not	  only	  by	  the	  ego	  but	  
rather	  the	  whole	  Self.	  For	  the	  introverted	  
	  
	   [t]he	  contents	  of	  the	  collective	  unconscious	  are	  represented	  in	  consciousness	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  pronounced	  preferences	  and	  definite	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  
things.	  These	  subjective	  tendencies	  and	  views	  are	  generally	  regarded	  by	  the	  
individual	  as	  being	  determined	  by	  the	  object	  –	  incorrectly,	  since	  they	  have	  
their	  source	  in	  the	  unconscious	  structure	  of	  the	  psyche	  and	  are	  merely	  




Jung	  described	  four	  basic	  functions	  constellated	  within	  both	  types,	  though	  their	  
particular	  characteristics	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  introverted	  or	  extraverted	  trend.	  
These	  four	  functions	  are:	  thinking,	  feeling,	  sensation	  and	  intuition.	  The	  first	  pair	  are	  
described	  as	  ‘rational’	  or	  ‘functions	  of	  judgment’,	  meaning	  they	  relate	  more	  closely	  
to	  consciousness,	  while	  the	  second	  pair,	  ‘functions	  of	  perception’,	  relates	  more	  
strongly	  to	  the	  unconscious	  and	  is	  thus	  called	  ‘irrational’.	  Intuition	  shall	  later	  be	  
considered	  in	  more	  detail	  because	  it	  is	  the	  function	  that	  relates	  most	  directly	  to	  
fantasy,	  image-­‐creation	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  creative	  process.	  
Thinking	  is	  an	  apperceptive	  activity	  that	  ‘brings	  the	  contents	  of	  ideation	  into	  
conceptual	  connection	  with	  one	  another’	  (ibid.,	  830).	  As	  will	  be	  described	  later	  on,	  it	  
subdivides	  into	  directed	  and	  intuitive	  thinking.	  Of	  all	  the	  functions,	  the	  description	  
of	  feeling	  and	  its	  distinction	  from	  affect	  and	  emotion	  has	  led	  to	  most	  confusion.	  Jung	  
defined	  it	  as	  ‘a	  process	  that	  takes	  place	  between	  the	  ego	  and	  a	  given	  content,	  a	  
process,	  moreover,	  that	  imparts	  to	  the	  content	  a	  definite	  value	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  
acceptance	  or	  rejection	  (“like”	  or	  “dislike”)’	  (ibid.,	  724).	  Feeling	  can	  also	  be	  
described	  as	  a	  wholly	  subjective	  judgement	  of	  one’s	  personal	  preferences.	  	  
Sensation	  refers	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  physical	  internal	  and	  external	  stimuli	  
that	  can	  be	  taken	  in	  through	  one’s	  sense	  organs.	  In	  comparison	  to	  intuition	  Jung	  
wrote:	  ‘I	  regard	  sensation	  as	  conscious	  and	  intuition	  as	  unconscious,	  perception’	  
(ibid.,	  795).	  Like	  thinking	  and	  feeling	  they	  form	  a	  pair	  of	  opposites,	  two	  mutually	  
compensating	  functions,	  whereas	  intuition	  mediates	  perceptions	  in	  an	  unconscious	  
way.	  The	  contents	  of	  intuition	  and	  sensation	  appear	  to	  be	  ‘given’	  or	  ‘received’,	  
whereas	  thinking	  and	  feeling	  seem	  ‘derived’	  or	  ‘produced’.	  Jung	  distinguished	  
between	  subjective	  and	  objective	  intuition,	  where	  the	  former	  refers	  to	  the	  
recognition	  of	  unconscious	  impressions	  and	  processes	  within	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  
latter	  to	  ‘a	  perception	  of	  data	  dependent	  on	  subliminal	  perceptions	  of	  the	  object	  
and	  on	  the	  feelings	  and	  thoughts	  they	  evoke’	  (ibid.,	  771).	  	  
Furthermore,	  intuition	  may	  appear	  as	  concrete	  or	  abstract.	  ‘Concrete	  
intuition	  mediates	  perceptions	  concerned	  with	  the	  actuality	  of	  things,	  abstract	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intuition	  mediates	  perceptions	  of	  ideational	  connections’	  (ibid.).41	  Intuition	  reaches	  
deep	  down	  into	  the	  unconscious	  and	  reveals	  those	  contents	  that	  usually	  remain	  
hidden.	  Due	  to	  its	  unconscious	  nature,	  intuition	  usually	  appears	  in	  consciousness	  as	  
an	  attitude	  of	  expectancy,	  vision	  and	  penetration	  of	  the	  object.	  Jung	  also	  claimed	  
that	  ‘[i]n	  intuition	  a	  content	  presents	  itself	  whole	  and	  complete,	  without	  our	  being	  
able	  to	  explain	  or	  discover	  how	  this	  content	  came	  into	  existence’	  (ibid.,	  770).	  This	  
deduction	  should	  be	  considered	  with	  care.	  Intuition	  is	  not	  free	  from	  misperception	  
and	  should	  therefore	  not	  in	  principal	  be	  considered	  whole	  or	  intrinsically	  true.	  As	  we	  
have	  already	  seen	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  Peirce’s	  scientific	  method,	  abduction,	  which	  is	  
equally	  sparked	  off	  through	  a	  surprising	  phenomenon,	  relies	  on	  the	  intuitive	  grasp.	  
However	  this	  sudden	  initial	  idea	  is	  highly	  fallible	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  further	  scrutinised	  
by	  consciousness	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  these	  intuitive	  insights	  are	  only	  of	  value	  after	  a	  
process	  of	  refinement.	  	  
	  
1.2.1.	  Intuition	  as	  Primary	  Function	  
	  
Intuition	  as	  primary	  function	  means	  that	  it	  is	  the	  dominant	  way	  of	  getting	  in	  
contact	  with	  the	  world.	  Differences	  between	  the	  intuitive	  extravert	  and	  the	  intuitive	  
introvert	  need	  to	  be	  described	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  personality	  traits	  can	  
influence	  one’s	  creativity.	  Both	  types	  are	  marked	  by	  the	  intuition’s	  characteristic	  
striving	  to	  seek	  out	  novelty	  and	  new	  approaches	  and	  solutions.	  ‘Intuition	  tries	  to	  
apprehend	  the	  widest	  range	  of	  possibilities,	  since	  only	  through	  envisioning	  
possibilities	  is	  intuition	  fully	  satisfied.	  It	  seeks	  to	  discover	  what	  possibilities	  the	  
objective	  situation	  holds	  in	  store’	  (CW	  6,	  [1921],	  612).	  Both	  sensation	  and	  intuition	  
are	  modes	  of	  instinctive	  perception	  and	  Jung	  therefore	  also	  described	  them	  as	  
‘aesthetic	  functions’	  (Van	  den	  Berk,	  2012,	  93).	  In	  a	  state	  of	  intuitive	  perception	  the	  
individual	  does	  not	  reason	  or	  moralise,	  but	  takes	  the	  contents	  in	  as	  they	  are.	  ‘By	  not	  
being	  “distracted”	  by	  details	  in	  the	  everyday	  world,	  intuition	  runs	  free	  and	  mixes	  in	  
with	  everything	  that	  is	  hidden,	  invisible,	  or	  behind	  the	  scenes	  and	  senses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  ‘Concrete	  intuition	  is	  a	  reactive	  process,	  since	  it	  responds	  directly	  to	  the	  given	  facts;	  abstract	  
intuition,	  like	  abstract	  sensation,	  needs	  a	  certain	  element	  of	  direction,	  an	  act	  of	  the	  will,	  or	  an	  aim’	  
(CW	  6,	  [1921],	  771).	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Accordingly,	  ‘intuitive-­‐types	  see	  “connections”	  everywhere’	  (Spoto,	  1995,	  47).	  The	  
person	  dominated	  by	  the	  intuitive	  function	  ‘can	  see	  abstract,	  theoretical,	  even	  
universal	  relationships	  that	  convey	  meaning	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  obvious’	  (ibid.)	  
without	  having	  conscious	  knowledge	  if	  these	  connections	  really	  exist.	  The	  
descriptions	  remind	  of	  Peirce’s	  abduction	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  intuitive	  function	  
can	  be	  described	  as	  an	  important	  prerequisite	  for	  abductive	  reasoning.	  	  
The	  extravert’s	  intuition	  is	  primarily	  directed	  towards	  the	  external	  object,	  
viewing	  it	  according	  to	  its	  suitability	  to	  explain	  the	  yet	  unknown,	  to	  provide	  
solutions	  and	  to	  discover	  hidden	  potentialities.	  Jung	  wrote	  that	  the	  extraverted	  
intuitive	  type	  ‘seizes	  on	  new	  objects	  or	  situations	  with	  great	  intensity,	  sometimes	  
with	  extraordinary	  enthusiasm,	  only	  to	  abandon	  them	  cold-­‐bloodedly,	  without	  any	  
compunction	  and	  apparently	  without	  remembering	  them,	  as	  soon	  as	  their	  range	  is	  
known	  and	  no	  further	  developments	  can	  be	  divined’	  (CW	  6,	  [1921],	  613).	  The	  
introverted	  intuitive	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  directs	  most	  energy	  towards	  the	  inner	  
objects	  of	  psychic	  reality,	  the	  unconscious	  and	  collective	  unconscious	  in	  particular.42	  
Furthermore,	  to	  the	  intuitive	  introvert	  psychic	  images	  ‘appear	  as	  though	  detached	  
from	  the	  subject,	  as	  though	  existing	  in	  themselves	  without	  any	  relation	  to	  him’	  
(ibid.,	  657).	  	  
Jung	  suggested	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  intuitive	  extravert	  is	  most	  likely	  
connected	  to	  a	  fascination	  with	  physical	  discoveries	  and	  this	  type	  would	  therefore	  
more	  often	  be	  driven	  to	  be	  interested	  in	  science	  than	  other	  types.	  The	  intuitive	  
introvert,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  shows	  a	  stronger	  tendency	  to	  engage	  in	  artistic	  
activities.	  It	  appears	  that	  it	  is	  this	  preference	  for	  unconscious	  images	  and	  their	  
power	  to	  reveal	  hidden	  insights	  that	  constitutes	  the	  potential	  to	  create	  what	  has	  
previously	  been	  unimaginable.	  However,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  stressed	  that	  it	  is	  neither	  a	  
rule	  nor	  a	  necessity	  that	  the	  intuitive	  extravert	  leans	  towards	  science	  and	  the	  
intuitive	  introvert	  towards	  art.	  The	  type	  only	  constitutes	  a	  general	  leaning	  towards	  
certain	  interests,	  but	  of	  course	  one	  will	  find	  scientists	  and	  artists	  of	  all	  types.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  ‘The	  archetype	  would	  thus	  be,	  to	  borrow	  from	  Kant,	  the	  noumenon	  of	  the	  image	  which	  intuition	  
perceives	  and,	  in	  perceiving,	  creates.	  […]	  Its	  prophetic	  foresight	  is	  explained	  by	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  




function	  of	  intuition	  simply	  seems	  to	  stimulate	  activities	  requiring	  creativity	  more	  
than	  the	  other	  functions.	  Jung	  wrote:	  
	  
	   The	  primary	  function	  of	  intuition	  is	  simply	  to	  transmit	  images,	  or	  perceptions	  of	  
relations	  between	  things,	  which	  could	  not	  be	  transmitted	  by	  the	  other	  functions	  
or	  only	  in	  a	  very	  roundabout	  way.	  These	  images	  have	  the	  value	  of	  specific	  
insights	  which	  have	  a	  decisive	  influence	  on	  action	  whenever	  intuition	  is	  given	  
priority	  (ibid.,	  611).	  
	  
1.3.	  Fantasy	  and	  Imagination	  
Fantasy	  and	  imagination	  hold	  a	  crucial	  position	  in	  Jung’s	  model	  of	  the	  
psyche.	  Especially	  through	  the	  observation	  of	  his	  patients,	  but	  also	  himself,	  he	  came	  
to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  imagination	  is	  the	  central	  activity	  of	  the	  psyche	  on	  which	  
sanity,	  healing	  and	  creativity	  depend.	  Salman	  puts	  it	  in	  a	  nutshell:	  	  	  
	  
In	  his	  ongoing	  efforts	  to	  understand	  psychological	  transformation	  and	  the	  
mechanisms	  of	  therapeutic	  action,	  Jung	  often	  privileged	  the	  imagination.	  In	  
Jungian	  analysis,	  fantasies,	  dreams,	  symptomology,	  defences,	  and	  resistance	  
are	  all	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  creative	  function	  and	  teleology.	  The	  
assumption	  is	  that	  they	  reflect	  the	  psyche’s	  attempts	  to	  overcome	  obstacles,	  
make	  meaning,	  and	  provide	  potential	  options	  for	  the	  future.	  Jung	  zeroed	  in	  
on	  the	  mythopoetic	  capacity	  of	  the	  psyche	  to	  spin	  healing	  fictions,	  to	  re-­‐
transcribe	  memory	  and	  experience	  (Salman,	  2008,	  69).	  
	  
It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  for	  Jung	  everything	  starts	  and	  ends	  with	  imagination,	  it	  lies	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  and	  the	  external	  world	  is	  mediated	  through	  it.	  It	  
should	  be	  noted	  that	  Jung	  used	  imagination	  (Imagination)	  and	  fantasy	  (Phantasie)	  
differently	  to	  the	  definition	  given	  in	  Part	  I.	  In	  his	  Definitions	  (CW	  6)	  he	  explained	  that	  
by	  fantasy	  he	  means	  two	  different	  things,	  namely	  ‘imaginative	  activity’	  and	  
‘fantasm’.	  Fantasy	  as	  imaginative	  activity	  ‘is	  the	  direct	  expression	  of	  psychic	  life,	  of	  
psychic	  energy	  which	  cannot	  appear	  in	  consciousness	  except	  in	  the	  form	  of	  images	  
or	  contents’	  (CW	  6,	  722).43	  It	  is	  a	  pervasive	  mental	  activity	  and	  is	  therefore	  present	  
in	  all	  the	  four	  functions	  of	  thinking,	  feeling,	  sensation	  and	  intuition.	  ‘Imagination	  is	  
the	  reproductive	  or	  creative	  activity	  of	  the	  mind	  in	  general’	  and	  ‘[f]antasy	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  The	  Definitions	  are	  undated.	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imaginative	  activity	  is	  identical	  with	  the	  flow	  of	  psychic	  energy’	  (ibid.).	  This	  
understanding	  of	  imagination	  is	  markedly	  different	  from	  the	  one	  given	  in	  Part	  I	  
because	  here	  it	  is	  the	  most	  fundamental	  activity	  of	  the	  mind	  that	  drives	  all	  the	  other	  
mental	  functions	  forward.	  
	  	   Fantasy	  as	  fantasm,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  defined	  as	  ‘a	  complex	  of	  ideas	  that	  
is	  distinguished	  from	  other	  such	  complexes	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  no	  objective	  
referent’	  (ibid.,	  711)	  and	  it	  therefore	  refers	  to	  the	  activity	  that	  is	  by	  most	  
psychologists	  today	  described	  as	  ‘imagination’.	  Yet	  Jung	  is	  not	  consistent	  and	  he	  
usually	  used	  the	  term	  fantasy,	  not	  fantasm,	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  particular	  activity	  of	  the	  
mind.	  It	  may	  be	  ‘based	  on	  memory-­‐images	  of	  actual	  experiences’	  but	  it	  generally	  has	  
no	  ‘objective	  referent’	  (ibid.).	  Fantasy	  is	  both	  forward	  and	  backward	  looking.	  It	  takes	  
its	  material	  from	  past	  experiences	  as	  well	  as	  fantasy	  projects	  its	  material	  into	  the	  
future.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  psyche	  is	  not	  only	  capable	  of	  reproducing,	  but	  also	  of	  
generating	  psychic	  content.	  Overall	  then,	  he	  concluded	  that	  ‘fantasy	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  
a	  fantasm	  is	  a	  definite	  sum	  of	  libido	  that	  cannot	  appear	  in	  consciousness	  in	  any	  
other	  way	  than	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  image.	  A	  fantasm	  is	  an	  idée	  –force’	  (ibid.,	  722).	  
In	  order	  to	  reach	  deeper	  into	  the	  heart	  of	  creativity	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  take	  an	  
even	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  production	  of	  images.	  Jung	  was	  a	  psychiatrist	  and	  he	  mainly	  
worked	  with	  psychotic	  patients.	  They	  often	  lived	  in	  their	  own	  imaginary	  worlds	  and	  
to	  Jung	  it	  seemed	  that	  they	  ‘were	  stuffed	  full	  of	  fantasies’	  (CW	  8,	  [1946/1954],	  400).	  
At	  first	  there	  was	  no	  apparent	  order	  to	  them,	  only	  a	  seemingly	  infinite,	  chaotic	  array	  
of	  images.	  While	  in	  actual	  reality	  ‘[t]heir	  variety	  defies	  description’	  (ibid.,	  401),	  Jung	  
nevertheless	  noticed	  after	  many	  hours	  of	  observation	  that	  there	  were	  certain	  
themes	  and	  elements	  that	  repeated	  themselves.	  Amongst	  the	  most	  basic	  and	  typical	  
features	  that	  he	  could	  abstract	  were	  ‘chaotic	  multiplicity	  and	  order;	  duality;	  the	  
opposition	  of	  light	  and	  dark;	  (…)	  the	  union	  of	  opposites	  in	  a	  third;	  the	  quaternity	  
(square,	  cross);	  rotation	  (circle,	  sphere);	  and	  finally	  the	  centering	  process’	  (ibid.).	  	  
Jung	  furthermore	  noticed	  that	  this	  imagery	  was	  often	  made	  up	  of	  
mythological	  motifs	  without	  the	  patient	  having	  conscious	  knowledge	  of	  these	  
myths.	  It	  is	  from	  these	  similarities	  that	  he	  inferred	  that	  the	  images	  come	  from	  some	  
deeper	  layers	  of	  the	  unconscious,	  which	  at	  their	  core	  must	  be	  identical	  in	  all	  
humans:	  they	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  collective	  unconscious.	  ‘Myth	  is	  the	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primordial	  language	  natural	  to	  these	  psychic	  processes,	  and	  no	  intellectual	  
formulation	  comes	  anywhere	  near	  the	  richness	  and	  expressiveness	  of	  mythological	  
imagery.	  Such	  processes	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  primordial	  images,	  and	  these	  are	  
best	  and	  most	  succinctly	  reproduced	  by	  figurative	  language’	  (CW	  12,	  [1943],	  28).	  
Thus	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  images	  in	  dreams,	  myths,	  visions,	  day-­‐dreams	  and	  
other	  types	  of	  reveries	  spring	  from	  the	  unconscious	  with	  certain	  elements	  reaching	  
down	  into	  the	  collective	  unconscious.	  	  
As	  already	  mentioned	  in	  Part	  I,	  creation	  myths	  in	  fact	  reveal	  less	  about	  how	  
the	  earliest	  humans	  imagined	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  world,	  but	  rather	  more	  about	  the	  
faculty	  of	  being	  creative	  itself.	  Jung	  saw	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  myths	  of	  
prehistoric	  peoples	  and	  his	  patients	  in	  that	  the	  former	  actively	  wove	  these	  images	  
into	  stories	  while	  the	  latter	  had	  no	  control	  over	  them,	  they	  simply	  arose	  without	  
conscious	  volition.	  This	  led	  Jung	  to	  distinguish	  between	  active	  and	  passive	  fantasy.	  	  
For	  Jung	  the	  close	  examination	  of	  these	  images	  became	  the	  key	  to	  reaching	  a	  
deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  psyche.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  his	  observations	  he	  concluded	  
that	  ‘the	  psyche	  consists	  essentially	  of	  images.	  It	  is	  a	  series	  of	  images	  in	  the	  truest	  
sense,	  not	  an	  accidental	  juxtaposition	  or	  sequence,	  but	  a	  structure	  that	  is	  
throughout	  full	  of	  meaning	  and	  purpose;	  it	  is	  a	  “picturing”	  of	  vital	  activities’	  (CW	  8,	  
[1926],	  618).	  The	  ability	  to	  imagine	  is	  therefore	  the	  primary	  activity	  that	  moves	  the	  
whole	  of	  the	  psyche	  forward.	  The	  person	  can	  also	  consciously	  decide	  to	  let	  their	  
fantasy	  play	  and	  thus	  create	  images	  at	  will,	  while	  others	  arise	  uncalled	  for	  and	  are	  
the	  result	  of	  ‘a	  passive	  process	  of	  perception’	  (Walker,	  2002,	  19).	  Within	  the	  activity	  
of	  fantasy	  thinking	  there	  is	  all	  this	  variety,	  but	  it	  comes	  down	  to	  the	  following:	  	  
	  
The	  psyche	  creates	  reality	  every	  day.	  The	  only	  expression	  I	  can	  use	  for	  this	  
activity	  is	  fantasy.	  (…)	  There	  is	  no	  psychic	  function	  that,	  through	  fantasy,	  is	  
not	  inextricably	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  other	  psychic	  functions.	  (…)	  Fantasy,	  
therefore,	  seems	  to	  me	  the	  clearest	  expression	  of	  the	  specific	  activity	  of	  the	  
psyche.	  It	  is,	  pre-­‐eminently,	  the	  creative	  activity	  (schöpferische	  Tätigkeit)	  
from	  which	  the	  answers	  to	  all	  answerable	  questions	  come	  (CW	  6,	  [1921],	  78).	  	  
	  




Fantasy	  as	  fantasm	  splits	  into	  active	  and	  passive	  fantasy,	  and	  they	  describe	  
two	  different	  types	  through	  which	  unconscious	  images	  reach	  consciousness.	  The	  
latter	  is	  described	  as	  a	  dissociated	  psychic	  state,	  where	  the	  individual's	  attitude	  is	  
more	  or	  less	  completely	  passive,	  as	  if	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  the	  psychic	  material.	  It	  
spontaneously	  erupts	  into	  consciousness	  while	  the	  individual	  has	  no	  control	  over	  it.	  
Dreams	  or	  psychic	  automatisms	  for	  example	  belong	  to	  this	  category.	  During	  passive	  
fantasy	  psychic	  energy	  is	  directed	  towards	  the	  unconscious,	  which	  is	  why	  it	  can	  be	  
said	  that	  the	  material	  stems	  purely	  from	  the	  unconscious.	  The	  material	  is	  always	  
visual	  first	  and	  Jung	  claimed	  that	  its	  imagery	  is	  usually	  marked	  by	  a	  morbid,	  strange	  
or	  abnormal	  character,	  though	  this	  might	  be	  debated	  (see	  Samuels	  et.	  al,	  1986,	  58-­‐
9).	  Passive	  fantasies	  require	  further	  judgment,	  criticism	  or	  refinement	  from	  
consciousness	  in	  order	  to	  be	  understood	  by	  the	  ego.	  	  
Active	  fantasies	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  'owe	  their	  existence	  not	  so	  much	  to	  this	  
unconscious	  process	  as	  to	  a	  conscious	  propensity	  to	  assimilate	  hints	  or	  fragments	  of	  
lightly-­‐toned	  unconscious	  complexes	  and	  by	  associating	  them	  with	  parallel	  elements	  
to	  elaborate	  them	  in	  clearly	  visual	  form'	  (CW	  6,	  [1921],	  713).	  They	  are	  either	  
material	  from	  the	  personal	  unconscious,	  images	  from	  the	  collective	  unconscious	  or	  a	  
mixture	  of	  both.	  These	  materials	  are	  then	  recombined	  through	  conscious	  volition.	  It	  
therefore	  constitutes	  one	  of	  the	  'highest	  forms	  of	  psychic	  activity'	  (ibid.,	  714)	  
because	  it	  is	  in	  active	  fantasy	  that	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  contents	  are	  
compensated	  for	  and	  united	  into	  a	  new	  whole.	  The	  ability	  to	  create	  something	  novel	  
and	  unique,	  instead	  of	  mere	  reproduction,	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  Jung	  also	  wrote:	  	  
	  
Because	  active	  fantasy	  is	  the	  chief	  mark	  of	  the	  artistic	  mentality,	  the	  artist	  is	  
not	  just	  a	  reproducer	  of	  appearances	  but	  a	  creator	  and	  educator,	  for	  his	  
works	  have	  the	  value	  of	  symbols	  that	  adumbrate	  lines	  of	  future	  
development.	  Whether	  the	  symbols	  will	  have	  a	  limited	  or	  a	  general	  social	  
validity	  depends	  on	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  creative	  individual	  (ibid.,	  720).	  
	  
Jung	  considered	  myths	  as	  ‘an	  archaic	  form	  of	  artistic	  activity’	  because	  it	  is	  an	  




Since	  active	  fantasy	  describes	  ‘a	  fusion	  of	  the	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  
areas	  of	  the	  psyche’	  (Samuels	  et.	  al.,	  1986,	  58)	  it	  can	  also	  be	  compared	  to	  abduction-­‐
musement.	  Peirce	  emphasised	  that	  it	  is	  ‘a	  certain	  agreeable	  occupation	  of	  the	  mind’	  
that	  is	  characterised	  by	  ‘no	  purpose,	  unless	  recreation'	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.458)	  and	  by	  
the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  strictures	  of	  logical	  thinking.	  While	  these	  images	  arise	  only	  
semi-­‐consciously,	  they	  can	  then	  be	  processed	  by	  the	  rational	  mind	  and	  thus	  be	  
turned	  into	  something	  meaningful	  and	  real.	  Through	  Jung’s	  suggestions	  we	  now	  
know	  that	  this	  loosening	  means	  a	  flow	  of	  libido	  from	  consciousness	  into	  the	  
unconscious,	  which	  constitutes	  the	  source	  of	  image	  formation.	  In	  an	  uncommonly	  
lyrical	  tone	  Peirce	  seemed	  to	  have	  intuitively	  captured	  this	  when	  he	  wrote:	  ‘Enter	  
your	  skiff	  of	  Musement,	  push	  off	  into	  the	  lake	  of	  thought,	  and	  leave	  the	  breath	  of	  
heaven	  to	  swell	  your	  sail.	  With	  your	  eyes	  open,	  awake	  to	  what	  is	  about	  or	  within	  
you,	  and	  open	  conversation	  with	  yourself;	  for	  such	  is	  all	  meditation’	  (CP,	  [1908],	  
6.461).	  
	   Yet	  both	  active	  and	  passive	  fantasy	  involve	  a	  certain	  lowering	  of	  
consciousness,	  or	  what	  Jung	  called	  abaissement	  du	  niveau	  mental.	  The	  initial	  
impulse	  to	  be	  creative	  therefore	  arises	  out	  of	  the	  unconscious.	  Although	  we	  will	  
later	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  formation	  of	  images,	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  process	  that	  
lies	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  fantasy	  are	  still	  undiscovered.	  Cabot	  and	  Jung	  regard	  this	  
incomprehensible	  and	  possibly	  irrational	  core	  of	  creativity	  as	  something	  positive.	  
Cabot	  wrote	  in	  this	  regard:	  ‘The	  sense	  that	  the	  deliberate	  watching	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  
novelty	  kills	  it	  has	  wrought	  itself	  into	  the	  proverb,	  “A	  watched	  pot	  never	  boils.”	  An	  
element	  of	  mystery	  and	  even	  of	  unconsciousness	  hangs	  over	  the	  moment	  of	  
creation’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  193).	  She	  accepts	  that	  deliberation	  is	  not	  the	  key	  to	  creativity	  
and	  it	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  forced,	  it	  needs	  to	  arise	  naturally.	  Jung	  similarly	  
explained:	  ‘As	  long	  as	  we	  ourselves	  are	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  process	  of	  creation,	  we	  
neither	  see	  nor	  understand;	  indeed	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  understand,	  for	  nothing	  is	  more	  
injurious	  to	  immediate	  experience	  than	  cognition’	  (Jung,	  [1922],	  121).	  The	  notion	  
that	  the	  core	  of	  creation	  is	  irrational,	  which	  has	  to	  arise	  spontaneously	  and	  out	  of	  its	  
own	  accord,	  seems	  to	  reflect,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  mechanism	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  chance	  




1.4.	  Two	  Kinds	  of	  Thinking	  
	  
In	  1912	  Jung	  published	  the	  essay	  ‘Two	  Kinds	  of	  Thinking’	  in	  which	  he	  
described	  two	  major	  modes	  of	  mental	  activity	  or	  internal	  discourse.	  He	  called	  them	  
directed	  or	  logical	  thinking	  and	  dreaming	  or	  fantasy	  thinking.	  At	  the	  time	  Jung	  had	  
not	  yet	  developed	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  collective	  unconscious	  and	  the	  archetypes	  but	  
he	  was	  already	  hinting	  at	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  archaic	  layer.	  Directed	  thinking	  
describes	  linear,	  structured	  and	  deliberate	  ‘thinking	  in	  words’,	  used	  for	  focused	  
trains	  of	  thought	  such	  as	  problem	  solving,	  decision	  making	  or	  any	  other	  analytical	  
and	  rational	  mental	  task.	  Fantasy	  thinking	  refers	  to	  thinking	  in	  images	  and	  it	  is	  free	  
from	  linear	  logic	  and	  morality.	  	  	  
Directed	  thinking	  uses	  words	  because	  its	  expressions	  are	  usually	  meant	  to	  be	  
directed	  outwards	  in	  order	  to	  be	  shared	  with	  others.	  In	  this	  regard	  Jung	  described	  it	  
as	  ‘manifestly	  an	  instrument	  of	  culture’,	  grown	  through	  education	  ‘from	  the	  
subjective,	  individual	  sphere	  to	  the	  objective,	  social	  sphere'	  leading	  to	  'modern	  
empiricism	  and	  techniques’	  (CW	  5,	  [1912],	  17).	  Directed	  thinking	  is	  an	  acquired	  or	  
learnt	  mode	  of	  thinking	  that	  has	  developed	  over	  time	  and	  through	  ‘dialectical	  
training’.	  Logical	  discourse	  is	  the	  language	  of	  science	  and	  empiricism.	  It	  is	  applied	  to	  
describe	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  perceived	  through	  the	  senses	  and	  judged	  by	  
consciousness.	  It	  relies	  on	  what	  can	  be	  measured	  and	  proven	  through	  controlled	  
experiments.	  Directed	  thinking	  is	  therefore	  marked	  by	  its	  cohesive	  and	  continuous	  
character.	  It	  follows	  a	  logical	  sequence	  in	  order	  to,	  for	  example,	  narrate	  events	  or	  to	  
build	  an	  argument.	  This	  requires	  effort,	  high	  levels	  of	  concentration	  and	  is	  thus	  
generally	  an	  exhausting	  activity.	  
Jung	  argued	  that	  directed	  thinking	  is	  a	  psychological	  trait	  that	  has	  been	  
cultured	  over	  the	  centuries	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  one	  of	  humankind’s	  more	  recent	  
developments.	  It	  evolved	  out	  of	  fantasy	  thinking	  when	  the	  need	  for	  a	  more	  coherent	  
and	  differentiated	  form	  of	  communication	  arose.	  Fantasy	  thinking	  is	  therefore	  the	  
anterior	  mode	  of	  discourse,	  not	  only	  as	  part	  of	  the	  individual	  evolution	  of	  the	  child,	  
but	  humankind	  in	  general.	  Yet	  it	  is	  not	  lost	  through	  the	  acquisition	  of	  logical	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thinking,	  but	  still	  appears	  in	  alternation	  with	  it.	  Lack	  of	  concentration,	  disinterest,	  
stress,	  fatigue	  or	  crucial	  life	  events	  are	  all	  factors	  that	  often	  terminate	  the	  rather	  
strenuous	  activity	  of	  directed	  thinking:	  ‘We	  wander	  from	  the	  subject	  and	  let	  our	  
thoughts	  go	  their	  own	  way;	  if	  the	  slackening	  of	  attention	  continues,	  we	  gradually	  
lose	  all	  sense	  of	  the	  present,	  and	  fantasy	  gains	  the	  upper	  hand’	  (ibid.,	  25).	  It	  is	  
identifiable	  by	  its	  predominantly	  feeling-­‐toned,	  image-­‐based	  content	  and	  its	  
‘spontaneous’,	  ‘effortless’	  nature	  (see	  ibid.,	  20),	  where	  suddenly	  ‘regardless	  of	  the	  
actual	  conditions,	  a	  world	  of	  impossibilities	  takes	  the	  place	  of	  reality’	  (ibid.,	  25).	  
Directed	  thinking	  is	  marked	  by	  progression,	  whereas	  fantasy	  thinking	  constitutes	  the	  
reverse,	  regression	  to	  unconscious	  material.	  ‘Through	  fantasy	  thinking,	  directed	  
thinking	  is	  brought	  into	  contact	  with	  the	  oldest	  layers	  of	  the	  human	  mind,	  long	  
buried	  beneath	  the	  threshold	  of	  consciousness’	  (ibid.,	  39).	  Fantasy	  thinking	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  day-­‐dreaming	  often	  serves	  the	  function	  of	  compensation,	  where	  a	  negative	  
trait	  or	  event	  is	  balanced	  out	  through	  imagining	  the	  opposite	  or	  any	  other	  pleasant	  
outcome	  (ibid.,	  33).	  Jung	  described	  these	  types	  of	  fantasies	  as	  ‘untroubled	  by	  the	  
outward	  course	  of	  things,	  well[ing]	  up	  from	  an	  inner	  source	  to	  produce	  an	  ever-­‐
changing	  succession	  of	  plastic	  or	  phantasmal	  form’	  (ibid.,	  24).	  	  
The	  year	  1912,	  when	  this	  text	  was	  written,	  marks	  the	  date	  when	  Jung	  and	  
Freud	  eventually	  parted	  ways	  and	  even	  though	  the	  text	  still	  carries	  the	  flavour	  of	  
Freudian	  theory,	  some	  comments	  already	  point	  towards	  his	  theory	  of	  a	  collective	  
unconscious.	  Thus,	  when	  Jung	  answered	  the	  question	  of	  where	  those	  fantasies	  get	  
their	  material	  from,	  he	  explained	  that	  
	  
whereas	  directed	  thinking	  is	  an	  altogether	  conscious	  phenomenon,	  the	  same	  
cannot	  be	  said	  of	  fantasy-­‐thinking.	  Much	  of	  it	  belongs	  to	  the	  conscious	  sphere,	  
but	  at	  least	  as	  much	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  half-­‐shadow,	  or	  entirely	  in	  the	  unconscious,	  
and	  can	  therefore	  be	  inferred	  only	  indirectly.	  Through	  fantasy-­‐thinking,	  directed	  
thinking	  is	  brought	  into	  contact	  with	  the	  oldest	  layers	  of	  the	  human	  mind,	  long	  
buried	  beneath	  the	  threshold	  of	  consciousness	  (ibid.,	  39).	  
	  
Jung	  graded	  types	  of	  fantasies	  according	  to	  how	  unconscious	  they	  are.	  Whereas	  
waking	  and	  day-­‐dreams	  are	  usually	  conscious,	  night-­‐dreams	  and	  complexes	  are	  less	  
so.	  Even	  though	  he	  still	  assumed	  a	  purely	  personal	  unconscious,	  he	  appears	  to	  have	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already	  suspected	  that	  there	  must	  be	  some	  deeper	  layers	  that	  come	  into	  play.	  To	  
this	  effect	  he	  wrote	  that	  through	  fantasy-­‐thinking	  the	  individual	  ‘regresses	  back	  to	  
infantile	  reminiscences	  which,	  though	  derived	  from	  the	  individual’s	  past,	  generally	  
have	  a	  slight	  archaic	  tinge.	  With	  stronger	  introversion	  and	  regression	  the	  archaic	  
features	  become	  more	  pronounced’	  (ibid.,	  40).	  This	  type	  of	  thinking	  is	  therefore	  
considered	  instinctive,	  because	  it	  appears	  naturally	  and	  effortlessly	  in	  comparison	  to	  
the	  later	  acquired	  directed	  thinking.	  	  
These	  descriptions	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  similarities	  with	  abduction-­‐
musement	  and	  this	  state	  of	  mind	  could	  be	  explained	  through	  the	  activity	  of	  fantasy	  
thinking.	  It	  is	  characterised	  by	  unbound	  imagination,	  thoughts	  are	  free	  to	  roam	  
unrestricted	  and	  it	  allows	  the	  individual	  to	  access	  images	  that	  are	  otherwise	  hidden	  
from	  sight.	  In	  regard	  to	  fantasy	  thinking,	  Jung	  based	  himself	  in	  part	  on	  the	  writings	  
of	  William	  James	  and	  in	  a	  later	  work	  refers	  to	  Friedrich	  Schiller’s	  play	  drive.44	  It	  is	  
therefore	  possible	  that	  both	  Peirce	  and	  Jung	  took	  their	  ideas	  on	  pure	  play	  and	  
fantasy	  thinking,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  from	  the	  same	  sources.	  Jung	  quoted	  James	  to	  refer	  
to	  the	  two	  kinds	  as	  ‘thinking	  with	  directed	  attention’	  (CW	  5,	  [1912],	  11)	  and	  ‘merely	  
associative’	  thinking	  (ibid.,	  18-­‐9).45	  However,	  Jung	  criticised	  James	  for	  regarding	  
purely	  associative	  thinking	  as	  unproductive:	  	  
	  
It	  is	  no	  doubt	  true	  that	  fantasy-­‐thinking	  is	  not	  immediately	  productive,	  i.e.	  is	  
unadapted	  and	  therefore	  useless	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes.	  But	  in	  the	  long	  
run	  the	  play	  of	  fantasy	  uncovers	  creative	  forces	  and	  contents,	  just	  as	  dreams	  
do.	  Such	  contents	  cannot	  as	  a	  rule	  be	  realized	  except	  through	  passive,	  
associative,	  and	  fantasy-­‐thinking	  (ibid.,	  20).	  
	  
Here	  again	  Jung	  and	  Peirce	  seem	  to	  have	  argued	  along	  similar	  lines,	  namely	  that	  in	  
itself	  the	  pure	  play	  of	  thoughts	  is	  purposeless,	  whereas	  novelty	  and	  originality	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  ‘Besides	  the	  will	  –	  whose	  importance	  should	  not	  on	  that	  account	  be	  denied	  –	  we	  also	  have	  creative	  
fantasy,	  an	  irrational,	  instinctive	  function	  which	  alone	  has	  the	  power	  to	  supply	  the	  will	  with	  a	  content	  
of	  such	  a	  nature	  that	  it	  can	  unite	  the	  opposites.	  This	  is	  the	  function	  that	  Schiller	  intuitively	  
apprehended	  as	  the	  source	  of	  symbols;	  but	  he	  called	  it	  the	  “play	  instinct”	  […]’	  (CW	  6,	  [1920],	  185).	  
45	  ‘Much	  of	  our	  thinking	  consists	  of	  trains	  of	  images	  suggested	  one	  by	  another,	  of	  a	  sort	  of	  
spontaneous	  revery	  […]	  This	  sort	  of	  thinking	  leads	  nevertheless	  to	  rational	  conclusions	  both	  practical	  
and	  theoretical’	  (ibid.).	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spring	  from	  this	  loosening	  of	  rationality	  and	  goal-­‐oriented	  thinking.46	  This	  material	  
can	  then	  further	  be	  processed	  through	  directed	  thinking,	  to	  which	  deduction	  and	  
induction	  would	  belong,	  and	  thus	  be	  turned	  into	  something	  real	  and	  concrete.	  	  
	   Fantasy	  thinking	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  deeper	  engagement	  with	  the	  
unknown	  mysteries	  of	  the	  unconscious.	  The	  unconscious	  ‘has	  no	  differentiated	  
functions,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  “think”	  as	  we	  understand	  “thinking.”	  It	  simply	  creates	  an	  
image	  that	  answers	  the	  conscious	  situation.	  This	  image	  contains	  as	  much	  thought	  as	  
feeling,	  and	  is	  anything	  rather	  than	  a	  product	  of	  rationalistic	  reflection.	  Such	  an	  
image	  would	  be	  better	  described	  as	  an	  artistic	  vision’	  (CW	  7,	  [1934],	  289).	  Fantasy	  
thinking	  therefore	  enables	  the	  individual	  to	  imagine	  the	  world	  not	  as	  it	  is	  but	  as	  it	  
can	  be.	  Jung	  is	  keen	  to	  stress	  that	  this	  activity	  is	  ‘nothing	  more	  than	  a	  distortion	  of	  
the	  objective	  world-­‐picture’	  (CW	  5,	  [1912],	  37)	  and	  therefore	  not	  in	  any	  way	  to	  be	  
confused	  with	  pathology.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  portraying	  one’s	  environment	  and	  
circumstances	  differently	  to	  how	  they	  currently	  are	  lies	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  power	  of	  
creativity.	  To	  imagine	  what	  isn’t,	  is	  always	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  a	  new	  invention	  or	  
artwork.	  	  
As	  already	  mentioned	  Jung	  assumed	  that	  fantasy-­‐thinking	  was	  the	  instinctive	  
way	  of	  thinking	  which	  governed	  the	  mind	  before	  the	  need	  for	  more	  complex	  
communication	  arose:	  ‘This	  activity	  of	  the	  early	  classical	  mind	  was	  in	  the	  highest	  
degree	  artistic:	  the	  goal	  of	  its	  interest	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  how	  to	  
understand	  the	  real	  world	  as	  objectively	  and	  accurately	  as	  possible,	  but	  how	  to	  
adapt	  it	  aesthetically	  to	  subjective	  fantasies	  and	  expectations’	  (ibid.,	  24).	  Jung’s	  
suggestion	  that	  the	  mental	  manipulation	  of	  reality	  had	  priority	  over	  understanding	  
the	  status	  quo	  reinforces	  the	  intuitive	  nature	  of	  creativity.	  Jung	  then	  reinforced	  the	  
idea	  that	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  does	  not	  lie	  outside	  of	  the	  human	  mind,	  but	  
asserted	  that	  it	  is	  removed	  from	  volition	  and	  not	  directly	  accessible	  to	  the	  ego.	  
However	  humans	  don't	  create	  from	  nothing,	  but	  from	  a	  psychological	  reality	  that	  
lies	  deep	  within	  them,	  hidden	  in	  the	  unconscious,	  until	  some	  elements	  rise	  to	  the	  
surface	  and	  can	  then	  be	  utilised	  by	  consciousness.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  ‘those	  problems	  that	  at	  first	  blush	  appear	  utterly	  insoluble	  receive,	  in	  that	  very	  circumstance	  […]	  
their	  smoothly	  –fitting	  key.	  This	  particularly	  adapts	  them	  to	  the	  Play	  of	  Musement.	  Forty	  or	  fifty	  
minutes	  of	  vigorous	  and	  unslackened	  analytic	  thought	  bestowed	  upon	  one	  of	  them	  usually	  suffices	  to	  
educe	  from	  it	  all	  there	  is	  to	  educe,	  its	  general	  solution’	  (CP,	  [1908],	  6.461).	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‘Directed	  and	  fantasy	  thinking	  are	  stated	  to	  co-­‐exist	  as	  two	  separate	  and	  
equal	  perspectives47	  –	  though	  the	  latter	  is	  closer,	  as	  it	  were,	  to	  archetypal	  layers	  of	  
the	  psyche’	  (Samuels	  et.	  al.,	  1986,	  46).	  In	  fantasy	  thinking	  the	  person	  experiences	  a	  
certain	  lowering	  of	  consciousness	  (abaissement	  du	  niveau	  mental)	  and	  this	  
relaxation	  means	  that	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  for	  unconscious	  contents	  to	  arise.	  That	  the	  
archetypes	  are	  autonomous	  means	  that	  archetypal	  images	  appear	  new	  and	  
surprising,	  thus	  constituting	  novel	  insights	  for	  consciousness.	  Through	  the	  further	  
play	  of	  the	  imagination,	  these	  insights	  can	  be	  tied	  into	  one’s	  creative	  work.	  Although	  
archetypal	  material	  does	  not	  necessarily	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  fantasy	  thinking,	  as	  the	  
next	  section	  will	  show,	  Jung	  regarded	  art	  that	  comes	  from	  an	  archetypal	  basis	  as	  the	  
most	  interesting	  kind.	  	  
	  
	  
1.5.	  Types	  of	  Artistic	  Creation	  
	   	  
Jung	  frequently	  referred	  to	  art,	  predominantly	  poetry	  and	  fiction,	  in	  order	  to	  
illustrate	  his	  abstract	  descriptions	  of	  psychic	  processes.	  Art,	  myths,	  story-­‐telling	  and	  
imagery	  were	  very	  important	  to	  Jung	  because	  they	  are	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  being	  
human	  and	  Jung	  considered	  that	  they	  have	  a	  lot	  to	  say	  about	  how	  the	  psyche	  
functions	  as	  a	  whole.	  For	  Jung,	  connections	  between	  psychology	  and	  art	  ‘arise	  from	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  art	  is	  a	  psychological	  activity	  and,	  as	  such,	  can	  be	  
approached	  from	  a	  psychological	  angle’	  (CW	  15,	  [1922],	  97).	  Yet	  it	  was	  important	  to	  
him	  that	  art	  is	  not	  viewed	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  pathology,	  but	  as	  part	  of	  any	  healthy	  
society:	  ‘In	  order	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  analytical	  psychology	  must	  rid	  itself	  
entirely	  of	  medical	  prejudice;	  for	  a	  work	  of	  art	  is	  not	  a	  disease,	  and	  consequently	  
requires	  a	  different	  approach	  from	  the	  medical	  one’	  (ibid.,	  107).	  
	   In	  two	  essays,	  On	  the	  Relation	  of	  Analytical	  Psychology	  to	  Poetry	  (1922)	  and	  
Psychology	  and	  Literature	  (1930),	  Jung	  suggested	  that	  art	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  
broad	  categories.	  He	  based	  himself	  on	  Schiller’s	  classification	  of	  sentimental	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  ‘This	  even-­‐handedness	  brings	  Jung’s	  ideas	  close	  to	  what	  we	  now	  know	  about	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  
two	  cerebral	  hemispheres,	  the	  interaction	  of	  which	  is	  central	  to	  human	  mental	  functioning’	  
(Samuels	  et.	  al.,	  1986,	  46).	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naïve	  art,	  when	  he	  first	  distinguished	  between	  the	  extroverted	  and	  introverted	  
artist.	  In	  1930	  he	  changed	  these	  terms	  to	  psychological	  and	  visionary	  art,	  but	  they	  
continue	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  types	  respectively.	  In	  1922	  Jung	  defined	  the	  two	  types	  
as	  follows:	  ‘The	  introverted	  attitude	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  subject’s	  assertion	  of	  his	  
conscious	  intentions	  and	  aims	  against	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  object,	  whereas	  the	  
extraverted	  attitude	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  subject’s	  subordination	  to	  the	  demands	  
which	  the	  object	  makes	  upon	  him’	  (ibid.,	  111).	  
In	  1930	  Jung	  extended	  his	  definitions	  and	  emphasised	  that	  psychological	  
literature	  ‘works	  with	  materials	  drawn	  from	  man’s	  conscious	  life	  –	  with	  crucial	  
experiences,	  powerful	  emotions,	  suffering,	  passion,	  the	  stuff	  of	  human	  fate	  in	  
general’	  (CW	  15,	  [1930],	  139).	  He	  described	  the	  psychological	  artist	  as	  more	  or	  less	  
identical	  with	  his	  work	  and	  the	  artistic	  product	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  author’s	  
particular	  intention.	  The	  artist	  ‘adds	  to	  it	  and	  subtracts	  from	  it,	  emphasizing	  one	  
effect,	  toning	  down	  another	  […]	  all	  the	  time	  carefully	  considering	  the	  over-­‐all	  result	  
and	  paying	  strict	  attention	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  form	  and	  style.	  He	  exercises	  the	  keenest	  
judgment	  and	  chooses	  his	  words	  with	  complete	  freedom’	  (CW	  15,	  [1922],	  109).	  	  	  
The	  visionary	  artist	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  completely	  subordinated	  to	  their	  
work	  of	  art,	  ‘a	  living	  being	  that	  uses	  man	  only	  as	  a	  nutrient	  medium,	  employing	  his	  
capacities	  according	  to	  its	  own	  laws	  and	  shaping	  itself	  to	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  its	  own	  
creative	  purpose’	  (ibid.,	  108).	  Jung	  insisted	  that	  the	  material	  of	  the	  visionary	  artist	  
comes	  from	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  unconscious	  and	  that	  in	  its	  strangeness	  it	  often	  rather	  
resembles	  dreams	  and	  nightmares.	  It	  is	  ‘sublime,	  pregnant	  with	  meaning,	  yet	  chilling	  
the	  blood	  with	  strangeness,	  it	  arises	  from	  timeless	  depths;	  glamorous,	  daemonic,	  
and	  grotesque,	  it	  bursts	  asunder	  our	  human	  standards	  of	  value	  and	  aesthetic	  form,	  a	  
terrifying	  tangle	  of	  eternal	  chaos’	  (CW	  15,	  [1930],	  141).	  For	  the	  artist	  it	  is	  a	  profound	  
experience	  where	  	  	  
	  
he	  is	  overwhelmed	  by	  a	  flood	  of	  thoughts	  and	  images	  which	  he	  never	  
intended	  to	  create	  and	  which	  his	  own	  will	  could	  never	  have	  brought	  into	  
being.	  Yet	  in	  spite	  of	  himself	  he	  is	  forced	  to	  admit	  that	  it	  is	  his	  own	  self	  
speaking,	  his	  own	  inner	  nature	  revealing	  itself	  and	  uttering	  things	  which	  he	  




Jung	  was	  particularly	  interested	  in	  this	  type	  of	  art	  because	  he	  felt	  that	  it	  revealed	  
most	  about	  the	  dark	  and	  inaccessible	  recesses	  of	  the	  unconscious	  that	  he	  sought	  to	  
map	  out.	  Jung	  considered	  visionary	  art	  as	  the	  truly	  magnificent	  types	  because	  
‘[w]hoever	  speaks	  in	  primordial	  images	  speaks	  with	  a	  thousand	  voices;	  (…)	  That	  is	  
the	  secret	  of	  great	  art,	  and	  of	  its	  effects	  upon	  us’	  (CW	  15,	  [1922],	  129).	  
It	  remains	  to	  be	  debated	  if	  a	  clear	  line	  can	  be	  drawn	  between	  these	  two	  
types.	  It	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  a	  work	  of	  visionary	  art	  does	  not	  also	  contain	  elements	  
of	  the	  psychological	  variety.	  Jung	  explained	  that	  the	  visionary	  artist	  is	  split	  between	  
being	  man	  and	  seer	  and	  continues	  to	  struggle	  between	  these	  two	  roles	  until	  the	  
artwork	  is	  finished,	  because	  their	  libido	  urges	  them	  to	  keep	  going,	  even	  if	  the	  
created	  appears	  foreign	  to	  the	  artist	  themselves.	  Jung’s	  interpretation	  of	  artistic	  
creativity	  was	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  Romantics	  and	  his	  view	  of	  the	  wildly	  
inspired	  artist	  is	  highly	  idealised.	  It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  there	  is	  not	  much	  difference	  
between	  the	  view	  of	  antiquity	  that	  the	  artist	  is	  seized	  by	  the	  muses	  and	  Jung’s	  
explanation	  that	  the	  artist	  becomes	  the	  mouthpiece	  of	  the	  archetypes.	  There	  are,	  of	  
course,	  examples	  of	  artists	  reporting	  that	  they	  felt	  as	  if	  guided	  by	  an	  independent	  
agency,	  but	  the	  exact	  mechanisms	  would	  have	  to	  be	  examined	  in	  more	  depth.	  	  
Yet	  it	  seems	  unquestionable	  that	  artists	  are	  generally	  more	  easily	  inclined	  to	  
let	  go	  of	  conscious	  control	  and	  to	  follow	  one’s	  intuition,	  so	  that	  thoughts	  can	  play	  
freely.	  Through	  this	  letting	  go	  more	  psychic	  energy	  flows	  back	  into	  the	  unconscious	  
and	  some	  of	  its	  contents	  are	  therefore	  stimulated	  and	  made	  available	  to	  
consciousness.	  Jung	  considered	  that	  if	  these	  contents	  are	  of	  an	  archetypal	  nature,	  
they	  not	  only	  have	  personal	  significance	  for	  the	  artists	  themselves,	  but	  they	  have	  a	  
socio-­‐cultural	  dimension	  too.	  Jung	  wrote:	  	  
	  
By	  giving	  it	  shape,	  the	  artist	  translates	  it	  into	  the	  language	  of	  the	  present,	  
and	  so	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  find	  our	  way	  back	  to	  the	  deepest	  springs	  of	  
life.	  Therein	  lies	  the	  social	  significance	  of	  art;	  it	  is	  constantly	  at	  work	  
educating	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  age,	  conjuring	  up	  the	  forms	  in	  which	  the	  age	  is	  
most	  lacking.	  The	  unsatisfied	  yearning	  of	  the	  artist	  reaches	  back	  to	  the	  
primordial	  image	  in	  the	  unconscious	  which	  is	  best	  fitted	  to	  compensate	  the	  
inadequacy	  and	  one-­‐sidedness	  of	  the	  present.	  (…)	  Thus,	  just	  as	  the	  one-­‐
sidedness	  of	  the	  individual’s	  conscious	  attitude	  is	  corrected	  by	  reactions	  
from	  the	  unconscious,	  so	  art	  represents	  a	  process	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  in	  the	  life	  




Art	  becomes	  the	  mirror	  of	  the	  culture	  it	  emerged	  from.	  This	  can	  either	  happen	  
unconsciously	  or	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  part	  on	  Dada	  and	  Surrealism,	  become	  
the	  conscious	  goal	  as	  it	  did	  for	  these	  particular	  groups	  of	  artists.	  	  
	  
2.	  Chance	  in	  the	  Form	  of	  Meaningful	  Coincidence	  
	  
Although	  one	  finds	  synchronicity	  mentioned	  in	  passing	  a	  handful	  of	  times	  
since	  1928	  (‘synchronism’)	  and	  1929	  (‘synchronicity’),	  Jung	  only	  published	  his	  
observations	  and	  theories	  on	  the	  topic	  around	  twenty	  years	  later.	  Over	  the	  years	  he	  
had	  collected	  many	  cases	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  chance	  that	  he	  or	  his	  patients	  had	  
experienced.	  He	  spoke	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  depth	  at	  the	  Eranos	  Conference	  in	  1951	  and	  
his	  monograph	  entitled	  Synchronicity:	  An	  Acausal	  Connecting	  Principle	  followed	  in	  
1952.	  In	  his	  Foreword	  Jung	  explained	  his	  long	  hesitation	  with	  the	  fear	  of	  burdening	  
himself	  with	  intellectual	  responsibility	  and	  his	  lack	  of	  scientific	  training	  (CW	  8,	  
[1952],	  816).	  Jung	  had	  been	  exchanging	  letters	  with	  Wolfgang	  Pauli	  in	  irregular	  
intervals	  since	  1932	  and	  it	  was	  this	  correspondence	  that	  encouraged	  Jung	  to	  make	  
his	  long	  kept	  thoughts	  public.	  Pauli	  had	  helped	  Jung	  to	  gain	  more	  insights	  into	  the	  
emerging	  field	  of	  quantum	  physics	  and	  his	  criticisms	  further	  clarified	  and	  sharpened	  
Jung’s	  arguments.	  His	  essay	  was	  then	  jointly	  published	  with	  Wolfgang	  Pauli’s	  The	  
Influence	  of	  Archetypal	  Ideas	  on	  the	  Scientific	  Theories	  of	  Kepler.	  They	  wanted	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  psychology	  and	  science	  can	  be	  brought	  closer	  together	  in	  new,	  
thought-­‐provoking	  ways.	  	  
	  
	  
2.1.	  Definitions	  and	  Types	  of	  Synchronicity	  
	  
Synchronicity	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  define	  and	  Jung	  himself	  provided	  
several	  different	  descriptions,	  which	  will	  be	  introduced	  here.	  In	  his	  lecture	  On	  
Synchronicity	  first	  given	  in	  1951	  Jung	  explained:	  ‘As	  its	  etymology	  shows,	  this	  term	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has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  time	  or,	  to	  be	  more	  accurate,	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  simultaneity.	  
Instead	  of	  simultaneity	  we	  could	  also	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  meaningful	  coincidence	  
(sinngemäße	  Koinzidenz)	  of	  two	  or	  more	  events,	  where	  something	  other	  than	  the	  
probability	  of	  chance	  is	  involved’	  (CW8,	  [1951],	  969).	  In	  his	  1952	  essay	  it	  is	  defined	  
as	  ‘an	  acausal	  connecting	  principle’,	  which	  describes	  ‘the	  simultaneous	  occurrence	  
of	  a	  certain	  psychic	  state	  with	  one	  or	  more	  external	  events	  which	  appear	  as	  
meaningful	  parallels	  to	  the	  momentary	  subjective	  state	  –	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  vice	  
versa’	  (CW	  8,	  [1952],	  850).	  Furthermore,	  ‘the	  synchronicity	  principle	  asserts	  that	  the	  
terms	  of	  a	  meaningful	  coincidence	  are	  connected	  by	  simultaneity	  and	  meaning	  
(Gleichzeitigkeit	  und	  Sinn)’	  (CW	  8,	  [1952],	  916).	  All	  these	  phenomena	  display	  the	  
same	  ‘improbable	  character	  of	  a	  “lucky	  hit”	  or	  accident	  (den	  Charakter	  eines	  
unwahrscheinlichen	  Zufalls)’(CW	  8,	  [1951],	  980).	  Jung	  also	  explained	  that:	  
	  
	   All	  natural	  phenomena	  of	  this	  kind	  are	  unique	  and	  exceedingly	  curious	  
combinations	  of	  chance,	  held	  together	  by	  the	  common	  meaning	  of	  their	  
parts	  to	  form	  an	  unmistakable	  whole.	  Although	  meaningful	  coincidences	  are	  
infinitely	  varied	  in	  their	  phenomenology,	  as	  acausal	  events	  they	  nevertheless	  
form	  an	  element	  that	  is	  part	  of	  the	  scientific	  picture	  of	  the	  world	  (ibid.,	  995).	  	  
	  
The	  definition	  becomes	  very	  broad	  when	  Jung	  wrote	  that	  ‘the	  innumerable	  cases	  of	  
meaningful	  coincidence	  that	  have	  been	  observed	  […]	  include	  everything	  that	  goes	  
by	  the	  name	  of	  clairvoyance,	  telepathy,	  etc.’	  (ibid.,	  983).	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  
accommodate	  for	  these	  different	  kinds	  of	  synchronicities,	  Jung	  divided	  the	  
experience	  of	  phenomena	  into	  three	  categories:	  
	  
1. The	  coincidence	  of	  a	  psychic	  state	  in	  the	  observer	  with	  a	  simultaneous,	  
objective,	  external	  event	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  psychic	  state	  or	  content,	  
where	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  a	  causal	  connection	  between	  the	  psychic	  state	  
and	  the	  external	  event,	  and	  where,	  considering	  the	  psychic	  relativity	  of	  space	  
and	  time,	  such	  a	  connection	  is	  not	  even	  conceivable.	  
2. The	  coincidence	  of	  a	  psychic	  state	  with	  a	  corresponding	  (more	  or	  less	  
simultaneous)	  external	  event	  taking	  place	  outside	  the	  observer’s	  field	  of	  
perception,	  i.e.,	  at	  a	  distance,	  and	  only	  verifiable	  afterward.	  
3. The	  coincidence	  of	  a	  psychic	  state	  with	  a	  corresponding,	  not	  yet	  existent	  
future	  event	  that	  is	  distant	  in	  time	  and	  can	  likewise	  only	  be	  verified	  




In	  the	  broadest	  sense,	  Jung	  therefore	  understood	  synchronicity	  to	  be	  ‘an	  act	  of	  
ordering	  (Anordnung)’	  by	  means	  of	  which	  ‘similar	  things	  coincide,	  without	  there	  
being	  any	  apparent	  cause’	  (Gieser,	  2005,	  290).	  	  
In	  order	  to	  provide	  more	  clarity	  Gieser,	  based	  on	  Jung,	  divides	  it	  into	  two	  
main	  categories:	  the	  spontaneous	  and	  the	  induced.	  The	  spontaneous	  just	  happens	  
and	  takes	  the	  experiencer	  by	  surprise.	  The	  psychic	  state	  paralleling	  an	  external	  
event	  or	  another	  psychic	  state	  can	  be	  a	  dream,	  a	  vision,	  the	  content	  of	  a	  
conversation	  or	  simply	  a	  thought	  or	  image.	  Jung’s	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  synchronicity	  
belongs	  to	  the	  spontaneous	  type:	  a	  patient	  is	  telling	  Jung	  her	  dream	  in	  which	  she	  is	  
given	  a	  golden	  scarab	  beetle,	  when	  at	  that	  moment	  Jung	  hears	  a	  knocking	  behind	  
him.	  He	  turns	  around	  and	  sees	  that	  a	  big	  insect	  keeps	  flying	  against	  the	  
windowpane.	  He	  catches	  it	  and	  finds	  that	  it	  is	  a	  common	  rose-­‐chafer,	  a	  beetle	  that	  
belongs	  to	  the	  scarab	  family.	  He	  hands	  it	  to	  the	  patient	  and	  says:	  ‘Here	  is	  your	  
scarab.’	  Another	  example	  of	  spontaneous	  synchronicity	  that	  Jung	  gave	  is	  
Swedenborg’s	  vision	  of	  the	  great	  fire	  in	  Stockholm	  while	  he	  was	  400	  kilometres	  
away	  at	  a	  dinner	  gathering.	  The	  news	  confirming	  Swedenborg’s	  vision	  only	  reached	  
the	  party	  a	  few	  days	  later.	  
The	  induced	  type	  includes	  certain	  ESP	  experiments	  and	  other	  divination	  
practices	  such	  as	  for	  example	  telepathy	  or	  the	  use	  of	  the	  I	  Ching.	  Telepathy	  basically	  
refers	  to	  the	  acausal	  coincidence	  of	  two	  mental	  states.	  Jung	  hypothesised	  that	  these	  
latter	  methods	  of	  prophecy	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  ‘an	  internal	  state	  and	  the	  external	  
pattern	  which	  is	  formed	  by	  the	  equipment	  used	  by	  the	  diviner	  –	  such	  as	  randomly	  
thrown	  coins,	  bones,	  sticks	  or	  cards	  drawn	  from	  a	  well	  shuffled	  pack’	  (Gieser,	  2005,	  
288).	  In	  his	  Foreword	  to	  Wilhelm’s	  translation	  of	  the	  I	  Ching,	  Jung	  wrote:	  	  
	  
While	  the	  Western	  mind	  carefully	  sifts,	  weighs,	  selects,	  classifies,	  isolates,	  
the	  Chinese	  picture	  of	  the	  moment	  encompasses	  everything	  down	  to	  the	  
minutest	  nonsensical	  detail,	  because	  all	  of	  the	  ingredients	  make	  up	  the	  
observed	  moment.	  Thus	  it	  happens	  that	  when	  one	  throws	  the	  three	  coins,	  or	  
counts	  through	  the	  forty-­‐nine	  yarrow-­‐stalks,	  these	  chance	  details	  enter	  into	  
the	  picture	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  observation	  and	  form	  a	  part	  of	  it	  (CW	  11,	  




It	  therefore	  appears	  that	  instead	  of	  a	  prediction	  for	  the	  future,	  the	  I	  Ching	  rather	  
mirrors	  the	  particular	  psychic	  constellation	  not	  through	  causality	  but	  meaning.	  ‘Now	  
the	  sixty-­‐four	  hexagrams	  of	  the	  I	  Ching	  are	  the	  instrument	  by	  which	  the	  meaning	  of	  
sixty-­‐four	  different	  yet	  typical	  situations	  can	  be	  determined.	  These	  interpretations	  
are	  equivalent	  to	  causal	  explanations’	  (ibid.,	  974).	  
The	  distinction	  between	  spontaneous	  and	  induced	  chance	  phenomena	  is	  a	  
useful	  one	  and,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  Part	  IV,	  also	  underlies	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  artistic	  use	  
of	  chance.	  Another	  yet	  more	  difficult	  way	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  types	  of	  
synchronicities	  would	  be	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  emotional	  charge.	  Some	  are	  only	  
lightly	  feeling-­‐toned	  while	  others	  result	  in	  such	  a	  shock,	  positively	  or	  negatively,	  that	  
the	  person	  will	  always	  remember	  the	  experience	  as	  a	  pivotal	  moment	  in	  their	  life.	  
While	  this	  wholly	  depends	  on	  subjective	  perception,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  
devise	  categories	  according	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  emotion.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
remember	  that	  individual	  reaction	  ranges	  over	  a	  spectrum	  of	  affective	  response.	  
The	  aspect	  of	  feeling	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  section	  on	  archetypes.	  	  
	  
	  
2.2.	  Jung’s	  Metaphysical	  Basis:	  Causality,	  Teleology	  and	  Acausality	  	  
	  
Jung	  acknowledged	  that	  ‘it	  is	  often	  very	  difficult	  to	  decide	  whether	  an	  
autonomous	  manifestation	  of	  the	  unconscious	  should	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  effect	  
(and	  therefore	  historical)	  or	  as	  an	  aim	  (and	  therefore	  teleological	  and	  anticipatory)’	  
(CW	  9i,	  [1939],	  499).	  The	  influence	  of	  both	  causality	  and	  teleology	  formed	  an	  
important	  base	  for	  Jung’s	  overall	  psychology,	  while	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  forward-­‐
looking	  telos	  gained	  more	  relevance	  over	  the	  years.	  In	  this	  paragraph	  then	  we	  shall	  
trace	  how	  Jung	  came	  to	  relativise	  causality	  as	  he	  developed	  the	  theory	  of	  
synchronicity.	  Through	  his	  interest	  in	  Eastern	  philosophy,	  the	  innovations	  in	  
contemporary	  physics,	  his	  meeting	  with	  Albert	  Einstein	  and	  especially	  the	  
correspondence	  with	  Wolfgang	  Pauli,	  Jung	  saw	  enough	  evidence	  to	  consider	  the	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existence	  of	  acausality	  more	  seriously.	  48	  What	  Peirce	  had	  already	  argued	  around	  
fifty	  years	  earlier,	  Jung	  also	  wrote	  in	  his	  essay	  on	  synchronicity,	  namely	  that	  
‘[n]atural	  laws	  are	  statistical	  truths’	  (CW	  8,	  [1952],	  818)	  and	  that	  this	  makes	  
causality	  ‘only	  relatively	  true’	  (ibid.	  819).	  He	  used	  Rhine’s	  parapsychological	  
experiments	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  acausality	  on	  a	  macrophysical	  level	  
(CW8,	  [1952],	  833-­‐840).	  At	  a	  later	  point	  Jung	  even	  considered	  that	  it	  is	  ‘not	  even	  
conceivable’	  (CW	  8,	  [1951],	  984)	  that	  causality	  has	  a	  part	  in	  synchronicity.	  Instead	  he	  
concluded	  that	  synchronicities	  must	  always	  come	  about	  through	  acausality.	  	  
Main	  points	  out	  that	  Jung’s	  understanding	  of	  physics	  was	  limited	  and	  his	  
elaborations,	  especially	  his	  interpretation	  of	  the	  results	  from	  Rhine’s	  experiments	  
would	  have	  to	  be	  evaluated	  more	  carefully.	  Furthermore,	  he	  criticises	  Jung’s	  
deduction	  that	  if	  acausality	  works	  on	  a	  subatomic	  level,	  that	  it	  must	  then	  also	  exist	  
within	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  experience	  (Main,	  2004,	  53-­‐6).	  While	  Jung	  was	  certain	  
about	  the	  validity	  of	  acausality,	  he	  was	  aware	  that	  in	  some	  instances	  it	  would	  be	  
almost	  impossible	  to	  ascertain	  if	  a	  specific	  event	  was	  ultimately	  caused	  or	  uncaused.	  
In	  a	  letter	  Jung	  therefore	  wrote	  that	  ‘it	  is	  altogether	  possible	  that	  cases	  which	  we	  
today	  explain	  as	  synchronistic	  will	  tomorrow	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  causal	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  
cannot	  yet	  be	  foreseen’	  (Letters	  2,	  [1958],	  439).	  
Psychic	  developments,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  always	  motivated	  by	  the	  two	  
forces	  of	  causality	  and	  teleology.	  In	  1916	  Jung	  for	  example	  wrote:	  ‘Causality	  is	  only	  
one	  principle	  and	  psychology	  essentially	  cannot	  be	  exhausted	  by	  causal	  methods	  
only,	  because	  the	  mind	  lives	  by	  aims	  as	  well’	  (quoted	  in	  Bishop,	  2000,	  27).	  In	  On	  
Psychic	  Energy	  he	  suggested	  that	  ‘every	  event	  requires	  the	  mechanistic-­‐causal	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  energic-­‐final	  point	  of	  view’	  (CW8,	  [1928],	  6),	  thus	  introducing	  two	  ways	  
in	  which	  libido	  can	  be	  activated	  and	  channelled	  in	  certain	  directions.	  Jung	  was	  not	  
only	  interested	  in	  where	  certain	  symptoms	  come	  from,	  but	  also	  what	  their	  purpose	  
is	  and	  what	  direction	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  individual	  they	  point	  towards.	  He	  
believed	  that	  it	  was	  not	  even	  always	  necessary	  to	  find	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  symptom	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Einstein	  attended	  a	  dinner	  at	  Jung’s	  house	  and	  Jung	  later	  wrote	  the	  following	  about	  this	  encounter:	  
‘It	  was	  Einstein	  who	  first	  started	  me	  off	  thinking	  about	  a	  possible	  relativity	  of	  time	  as	  well	  as	  
space,	  and	  their	  psychic	  conditionality.	  More	  than	  thirty	  years	  later	  this	  stimulus	  led	  to	  my	  
relation	  with	  the	  physicist	  Professor	  W.	  Pauli	  and	  to	  my	  thesis	  of	  psychic	  synchronicity’	  (quoted	  in	  
Gieser,	  2005,	  274).	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order	  to	  make	  healing	  possible,	  which	  indicates	  that	  at	  least	  in	  a	  therapeutic	  context	  
teleology	  carried	  equal,	  if	  not	  more	  weight	  than	  causality.	  	  
Yet	  until	  around	  1929	  Jung	  avoided	  using	  the	  term	  teleology,	  instead	  
referring	  to	  final	  causation	  to	  appear	  more	  scientific	  and	  to	  avoid	  association	  with	  
the	  implications	  of	  religion	  and	  mysticism.49	  By	  that	  time	  then	  Jung	  had	  advanced	  his	  
theory	  of	  individuation	  and	  the	  Self	  so	  that	  the	  ‘purposive	  functioning	  of	  the	  psyche’	  
seemed	  so	  convincing	  that	  he	  began	  to	  speak	  of	  their	  inherent	  teleology	  again	  
(Nagy,	  1991,	  213).	  Overall,	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  principles	  of	  causality	  
and	  teleology	  remained	  guiding	  for	  Jung’s	  whole	  model	  of	  the	  psyche	  and	  the	  
individuation	  process	  in	  particular,	  but	  he	  was	  careful	  not	  to	  ‘project	  purpose	  and	  
meaning	  into	  natural	  processes.	  He	  does	  not	  regard	  the	  final-­‐energic	  view	  as	  
teleological,	  in	  the	  religious	  sense	  of	  natural	  and	  historical	  processes	  aiming	  for	  and	  
seeking	  a	  meaningful	  spiritual	  conclusion.	  He	  is	  simply	  speaking	  here	  of	  a	  viewpoint	  
that	  observes	  the	  transfer	  of	  energy	  from	  less	  probable	  to	  more	  probable	  states’	  
(Stein,	  1998,	  72).	  	  	  
	  
2.2.1.	  Acausal	  Orderedness,	  Tychism	  and	  Synchronicity	  
	  
In	  his	  essay	  on	  synchronicity	  Jung	  also	  discussed	  ‘general	  acausal	  
orderedness’,	  a	  much	  broader	  concept	  of	  acausality,	  which	  he	  integrated	  into	  his	  
theory	  after	  having	  been	  encouraged	  by	  Pauli	  to	  make	  it	  clearer	  that	  there	  are	  links	  
between	  synchronicity	  and	  the	  physical	  laws	  more	  generally	  (see	  Gieser,	  2005,	  294–
5).	  Pauli	  argued	  that	  ‘the	  acausality	  of	  quantum	  mechanics	  forms	  a	  generalization	  of	  
the	  narrower	  causal	  framework	  which	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  special	  case	  of	  statistical	  
correspondence’	  (ibid.,	  295).	  Jung	  accepted	  this	  view	  from	  Pauli	  and	  integrated	  it	  
into	  his	  own	  theory.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  part,	  this	  particular	  
understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  acausality	  and	  causality	  had	  already	  
been	  anticipated	  by	  Peirce	  even	  before	  experiments	  revealed	  the	  odd	  mechanisms	  
of	  quantum	  physics.	  To	  remind	  ourselves,	  Peirce	  hypothesised	  that	  causality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  ‘I	  use	  the	  word	  “final”	  rather	  than	  “teleological”	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  misunderstanding	  that	  
attaches	  to	  the	  common	  conception	  of	  teleology,	  namely	  that	  it	  contains	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  
anticipated	  end	  or	  goal’	  (Jung	  in	  Nagy,	  1991,	  213).	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developed	  out	  of	  acausality	  and	  ‘that	  chance	  is	  the	  one	  essential	  agency	  upon	  which	  
the	  whole	  process	  [of	  evolution]	  depends’	  (EP	  I,	  [1883-­‐4],	  219).50	  Peirce’s	  criticism	  
was	  directed	  against	  the	  ‘natural	  belief’	  of	  determinism,	  which	  was	  followed	  by	  his	  
theory	  that	  instead	  the	  element	  of	  absolute	  chance	  must	  hold	  a	  definite	  place	  in	  the	  
world	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  all	  its	  diversity	  and	  growth.	  Pauli	  equally	  criticised	  the	  
determinists’	  rigid	  adherence	  to	  the	  universality	  of	  natural	  laws.	  	  
	  
	   Pauli	  mentions	  the	  point	  of	  view	  that	  among	  some	  physicists	  quantum	  
physics	  is	  considered	  incomplete	  because	  it	  cannot	  preserve	  the	  
determinism	  of	  classical	  physics.	  But	  quantum	  physics	  is	  only	  incomplete	  if	  
one	  presupposes	  a	  determinist	  framework!	  One	  might	  equally	  well	  say	  that	  
phenomena	  such	  as	  quanta	  and	  synchronicity	  show	  that	  the	  classical	  
worldview	  is	  incomplete.	  Scientifically	  it	  is	  more	  satisfying	  to	  position	  the	  
acausal	  correspondence	  as	  general	  principle	  (Gieser,	  2005,	  294).	  
	  
This	  suggests	  that	  both	  concepts,	  general	  acausality	  and	  tychism,	  can	  be	  
considered	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  thing.	  Jung	  himself	  only	  mentioned	  general	  acausal	  
orderedness	  briefly	  when	  he	  wrote	  that	  it	  includes	  ‘all	  “acts	  of	  creation,”	  a	  priori	  
factors	  such	  as	  the	  properties	  of	  natural	  numbers,	  the	  discontinuities	  of	  modern	  
physics,	  etc’	  (CW8,	  [1952],	  965)	  and	  ‘that	  synchronicity	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  is	  only	  a	  
particular	  instance	  of	  general	  acausal	  orderedness’	  (ibid.).	  This	  idea	  is	  crucial	  
because	  it	  explains	  that	  synchronicity	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  absolute	  chance	  per	  se,	  but	  
makes	  a	  distinct	  subspecies	  of	  it.	  Von	  Franz	  explains	  that	  while	  acausal	  orderedness	  
is	  regular	  and	  constant,	  synchronicities	  occur	  spontaneously	  and	  unpredictably	  (see	  
1998,	  240-­‐1).	  As	  such	  it	  exhibits	  specific	  features,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  
detail	  in	  the	  next	  section	  on	  synchronicity’s	  characteristics.	  The	  most	  fundamental	  of	  
these	  characteristics	  are	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  archetype,	  compensation,	  meaning	  and	  
teleology,	  or	  as	  Gieser	  writes:	  ‘general	  acausality	  is	  an	  acausality	  without	  purpose	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  The	  full	  quote	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘It	  has	  always	  seemed	  to	  me	  singular	  that	  when	  we	  put	  the	  
question	  to	  an	  evolutionist,	  Spencerian,	  Darwinian,	  or	  whatever	  school	  he	  may	  belong	  to,	  what	  
are	  the	  agencies	  which	  have	  brought	  about	  evolution,	  he	  mentions	  various	  determinate	  facts	  and	  
laws,	  but	  among	  the	  acencies	  at	  work	  he	  never	  once	  mentions	  Chance.	  Yet	  it	  appears	  to	  me	  that	  
chance	  is	  the	  one	  essential	  agency	  upon	  which	  the	  whole	  process	  depends.’	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aim	  –	  it	  is	  merely	  an	  observable	  fact	  –	  whereas	  unique	  synchronicity	  constitutes	  
phenomena	  which	  display	  an	  apparent	  purpose’	  (Gieser,	  2005,	  296).51	  	  
Before	  moving	  on	  it	  should	  briefly	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  Jung,	  like	  Peirce,	  
expressed	  the	  same	  speculative	  view	  that	  chance	  played	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  universe.	  Peirce	  for	  example	  wrote:	  ‘The	  very	  first	  and	  most	  
fundamental	  element	  that	  we	  have	  to	  assume	  is	  a	  Freedom	  or	  Chance,	  or	  
Spontaneity,	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  the	  general	  vague	  nothing-­‐in-­‐particular-­‐ness	  that	  
preceded	  the	  chaos	  took	  a	  thousand	  definite	  qualities’	  (CP,	  [1898],	  6.200).	  In	  
comparison	  Jung	  wrote	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Erich	  Neumann:	  	  
	  
	   “It	  has	  happened	  almost	  by	  accident	  and	  casually…”	  This	  sentence	  might	  well	  
characterize	  the	  whole	  process	  of	  creation.	  […]	  It	  staggers	  the	  mind	  even	  to	  
begin	  to	  imagine	  the	  accidents	  and	  hazards	  that,	  over	  millions	  of	  years,	  
transformed	  a	  lemurlike	  tree-­‐dweller	  into	  a	  man.	  In	  this	  chaos	  of	  chance,	  
synchronistic	  phenomena	  were	  probably	  at	  work,	  operating	  both	  with	  and	  
against	  the	  known	  laws	  of	  nature	  to	  produce,	  in	  archetypal	  moments,	  
syntheses	  which	  appear	  to	  us	  miraculous.	  Causality	  and	  teleology	  fail	  us	  
here,	  because	  synchronistic	  phenomena	  manifest	  themselves	  as	  pure	  
chance.	  The	  essential	  thing	  about	  these	  phenomena	  is	  that	  an	  objective	  
event	  coincides	  meaningfully	  with	  a	  psychic	  process:	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  physical	  
event	  and	  an	  endopsychic	  one	  have	  a	  common	  meaning.	  This	  presupposes	  
not	  only	  an	  all-­‐pervading,	  latent	  meaning	  which	  can	  be	  recognized	  by	  
consciousness,	  but,	  during	  that	  preconscious	  time,	  a	  psychoid	  process	  with	  
which	  a	  physical	  event	  meaningfully	  coincides	  (Letters	  2,	  [1959],	  494-­‐5).	  
	  
It	  is	  interesting	  that	  both	  Peirce	  and	  Jung	  entertained	  the	  thought	  of	  a	  fundamental	  
involvement	  of	  chance	  in	  natural	  creation.	  In	  this	  regard	  Peat	  analysed	  that	  
‘[s]ynchronicity	  has	  gradually	  been	  enfolded	  into	  an	  entirely	  new	  dimension;	  in	  place	  
of	  a	  causal	  deterministic	  world,	  in	  which	  mind	  and	  matter	  are	  two	  separate	  
substances,	  appears	  a	  universe	  of	  infinite	  subtlety	  that	  is	  much	  closer	  to	  a	  creative,	  
living	  organism	  than	  to	  a	  machine’	  (Peat,	  1987,	  185).	  
	  
	  
2.3.	  Further	  Characteristics	  of	  Synchronicity	  	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  See	  also	  Pauli	  and	  Jung’s	  diagram	  (CW8,	  [1952],	  963).	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While	  acausality	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  characteristic	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  
chance	  too,	  some	  other	  aspects	  by	  which	  synchronicity	  can	  be	  distinguished	  as	  a	  
separate	  category	  of	  chance	  shall	  be	  introduced	  here.	  Unique	  to	  synchronicity	  are	  
for	  example	  its	  archetypal	  basis,	  Jung’s	  specific	  understanding	  of	  the	  aspect	  of	  
simultaneity,	  its	  compensatory	  function	  and	  its	  meaningfulness.	  Because	  the	  
archetype	  will	  be	  focused	  on	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  time,	  compensation	  and	  meaning	  
shall	  briefly	  be	  discussed	  here.	  	  
	  
2.3.1.	  Time	  and	  Simultaneity	  
	  
The	  aspect	  of	  time	  is	  of	  crucial	  importance	  for	  Jung	  and	  is	  reflected	  in	  his	  
choice	  of	  term	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  phenomena	  he	  wanted	  to	  describe.	  ‘Synchronicity’	  
comes	  from	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  Greek	  syn	  (together)	  and	  chronos	  (time),	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  simultaneity	  of	  events	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  type	  of	  chance.	  In	  
his	  essay	  on	  synchronicity	  Jung	  for	  example	  wrote:	  	  
	  
	   I	  chose	  this	  term	  because	  the	  simultaneous	  occurrence	  of	  two	  meaningful	  
but	  not	  causally	  connected	  events	  seemed	  to	  me	  an	  essential	  criterion.	  I	  am	  
therefore	  using	  the	  general	  concept	  of	  synchronicity	  in	  the	  special	  sense	  of	  a	  
coincidence	  in	  time	  of	  two	  or	  more	  causally	  unrelated	  events	  which	  have	  the	  
same	  or	  a	  similar	  meaning,	  in	  contrast	  to	  “synchronism,”	  which	  simply	  means	  
the	  simultaneous	  occurrence	  of	  two	  events	  (CW8,	  [1952],	  849).	  	  
	  
Yet	  Jung’s	  understanding	  of	  simultaneity	  is	  not	  straightforward	  because	  it	  not	  only	  
refers	  to	  the	  immediate	  paralleling	  of	  the	  internal	  and	  external,	  but	  it	  also	  includes	  
instances	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  accordance	  that	  are	  distant	  in	  time.	  Jung	  gave	  the	  
example	  of	  a	  precognitive	  dream	  where	  the	  dreamer	  is	  in	  a	  town	  he	  has	  never	  seen	  
before.	  He	  clearly	  sees	  a	  square,	  a	  cathedral	  and	  a	  horse	  carriage	  in	  the	  street.	  A	  few	  
weeks	  later	  the	  person	  travels	  to	  a	  town	  in	  Spain	  and	  to	  his	  amazement	  he	  finds	  that	  
it	  matches	  the	  details	  of	  his	  dream.	  	  
This	  apparent	  inconsistency	  in	  regards	  to	  simultaneity,	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  
Jung’s	  supposition	  that	  in	  the	  unconscious	  time	  and	  space	  are	  relativized:	  ‘Jung	  
considered	  that	  time	  and	  space	  belong	  to	  the	  world	  of	  phenomena,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  the	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world	  which	  forms	  our	  conscious	  frame	  of	  reference.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  unconscious	  
must	  be	  relatively	  independent	  or	  autonomous	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  categories’	  
(Gieser,	  2005,	  290).	  In	  order	  to	  accommodate	  for	  this	  extended	  understanding	  of	  
simultaneity,	  Aziz	  introduces	  two	  distinct	  concepts:	  the	  ‘synchronicity	  principle’	  and	  
the	  ‘synchronicity	  event’:	  ‘Whereas	  the	  synchronicity	  principle	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  
the	  space-­‐time	  world	  of	  the	  archetype,	  the	  synchronistic	  experience	  takes	  place	  in	  
the	  space-­‐	  and	  time-­‐bound	  world	  of	  ego-­‐consciousness’	  (1990,	  71-­‐2).	  	  
In	  her	  book	  Time	  and	  Timelessness:	  Temporality	  in	  the	  Theory	  of	  Carl	  Jung	  
Yiassemides	  argues,	  similar	  to	  Aziz,	  that	  there	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  simultaneity	  in	  Jung.	  
First	  the	  immediate,	  which	  is	  between	  an	  outer	  event	  and	  consciousness,	  and	  
second	  between	  an	  outer	  event	  and	  the	  unconscious,	  which	  can	  also	  be	  ahead	  of	  
conscious	  time.	  Furthermore,	  for	  Jung	  time	  is	  not	  only	  relative	  in	  the	  unconscious	  
but	  in	  nature	  at	  large.	  	  
	  
	   Synchronicity	  indicates	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	  eternal	  order	  due	  to	  its	  
temporal	  quality.	  Since	  it	  occurs	  in	  time	  (i.e.	  it	  is	  ‘an	  act	  of	  creation	  in	  time’)	  
it	  can	  be	  conceived	  and	  observed	  by	  our	  time-­‐bound	  existence.	  Whereas	  
eternity	  eludes	  us,	  synchronistic	  occurrences	  can	  be	  captured	  within	  ‘our	  
time’.	  (…)	  Arguably,	  then,	  synchronicity	  unifies	  psychic	  and	  physical	  events,	  in	  
agreement	  with	  fixed/linear	  time	  (Yiassemides,	  2014,	  52).	  
	  
The	  aspect	  of	  simultaneity	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  some	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  section	  on	  
‘Two	  States	  of	  Mind’,	  but	  thus	  far	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  for	  Jung,	  through	  the	  
synchronicity	  principle,	  the	  relativity	  of	  time	  and	  space	  becomes	  directly	  observable	  
since	  the	  person	  experiences	  it	  first-­‐hand.	  Main	  therefore	  concludes:	  	  
	  
synchronicity	  disrupts	  our	  tendency	  to	  think	  in	  a	  manner	  oriented	  either	  
towards	  the	  past,	  in	  terms	  of	  causality,	  or	  towards	  the	  future,	  in	  terms	  of	  
teleology,	  focusing	  our	  attention	  instead	  on	  patterns	  of	  meaning	  disclosed	  in	  
the	  present.	  In	  synchronicity,	  uniformly	  unfolding	  clock	  time	  is	  interrupted	  
with	  moments	  of	  extraordinary	  timeliness,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  open	  our	  eyes	  
to	  a	  sense	  of	  present	  time	  as	  qualitative,	  filled	  with	  varying	  landscapes	  of	  
meaning	  (2004,	  182-­‐3).	  
	  




Jung	  wrote	  that	  ‘the	  manifestations	  of	  the	  collective	  unconscious	  are	  
compensatory	  to	  the	  conscious	  attitude,	  so	  that	  they	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  bringing	  a	  
one-­‐sided,	  unadapted,	  or	  dangerous	  state	  of	  consciousness	  back	  into	  equilibrium’	  
(CW	  15,	  [1930],	  152).	  In	  synchronicity	  two	  types	  of	  compensation	  can	  be	  
distinguished,	  the	  personal	  and	  the	  social.	  In	  the	  first	  type	  the	  experience	  of	  
synchronicity	  is	  compensatory	  to	  one’s	  individual	  psychic	  constellation	  that	  has	  
gotten	  out	  of	  balance.	  The	  second	  type	  describes	  Jung’s	  larger	  aim	  of	  introducing	  
the	  synchronicity	  principle	  into	  the	  scientific	  and	  cultural	  discussions	  of	  the	  day,	  in	  
order	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  one-­‐sided	  focus	  on	  rationality	  and	  mass-­‐mindedness	  
that	  he	  perceived	  as	  threatening	  to	  the	  psychological	  equilibrium	  of	  society	  at	  large.	  	  
In	  analysis	  of	  his	  prime	  example	  of	  synchronicity,	  the	  patient	  with	  the	  scarab	  
beetle,	  Jung	  explained	  that	  the	  young	  woman	  was	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  strong	  
rationality	  complex	  before	  the	  synchronistic	  encounter	  occurred.	  In	  fact,	  Jung	  
recounted	  that	  therapeutic	  treatment	  had	  reached	  a	  stalemate	  because	  her	  
‘polished	  Cartesian	  rationalism’	  and	  her	  tendency	  to	  know	  everything	  better	  made	  it	  
difficult	  to	  access	  the	  deeper	  layers	  of	  her	  unconscious.	  Only	  the	  striking	  experience	  
of	  synchronicity	  ‘punctured	  the	  desired	  hole	  in	  her	  rationalism	  and	  broke	  the	  ice	  of	  
her	  intellectual	  resistance.	  The	  treatment	  could	  now	  be	  continued	  with	  satisfactory	  
results’	  (CW	  8,	  [1951],	  982).	  Since	  the	  patient	  struggled	  with	  an	  overly	  strong	  need	  
to	  intellectualise,	  the	  communicative	  method	  of	  traditional	  psychotherapy	  was	  of	  no	  
avail.	  Yet	  the	  direct,	  personal	  experience	  of	  something	  apparently	  irrational	  opened	  
the	  patient	  up	  for	  further	  explorations	  of	  this	  side	  of	  her	  personality.	  Jung	  therefore	  
concluded	  that	  synchronicities	  balance	  out	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  forces	  in	  
order	  to	  drive	  the	  individuation	  process	  forward.	  	  
In	  his	  book	  The	  Rupture	  of	  Time	  Main	  elucidates	  the	  aspect	  of	  social	  
compensation	  in	  detail.	  He	  writes	  that	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  Jung’s	  underlying	  aim	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  balance	  out	  the	  tension	  between	  rationality	  and	  irrationality,	  
intellect	  and	  sensation	  on	  a	  broader,	  cultural	  level.	  Even	  though	  Jung	  criticised	  that	  
science	  was	  mainly	  based	  on	  materialism	  and	  reductionism,	  he	  also	  valued	  it	  greatly	  
as	  an	  ‘empirical	  approach	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge’	  and	  the	  ‘systematic	  study	  
based	  on	  careful	  observation	  of	  facts’	  (Main,	  2004,	  122).	  It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  Peirce	  
and	  Jung	  understood	  science	  in	  very	  similar	  ways,	  where	  any	  observable	  fact	  can	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form	  the	  basis	  of	  science,	  even	  metaphysics.	  Jung	  considered	  himself	  a	  scientist	  who	  
examined	  and	  explored	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  dynamics	  of	  the	  human	  psyche.	  Within	  
this	  broad,	  general	  agenda	  synchronicity	  was	  meant	  ‘to	  mount	  a	  direct	  challenge	  on	  
the	  very	  foundations	  of	  modern	  western	  science’	  and	  its	  exposition	  ‘was	  a	  bold	  
attempt	  to	  return	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  unitary	  world-­‐view	  that	  had	  prevailed	  before	  the	  
emergence	  of	  modern	  science,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  through	  broadening	  rather	  than	  
rejecting	  modern	  science’	  (ibid.,	  123).	  
Main	  shows	  that	  through	  the	  theory	  of	  synchronicity	  Jung	  not	  only	  criticised	  
certain	  aspects	  of	  science,	  religion	  and	  society	  at	  large,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  
provided	  a	  solution,	  namely	  to	  take	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  synchronicity	  seriously.	  
Jung	  saw	  the	  greatest	  shortcomings	  in	  science	  in	  its	  exclusive	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
intellect,	  its	  reductionism	  and	  reliance	  on	  averages,	  statistics	  and	  probabilities.	  In	  
regards	  to	  religion	  he	  saw	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  dependence	  on	  dogma,	  tradition	  and	  
institutionalised	  faith.	  Jung	  observed	  with	  concern	  that	  Western	  societies	  on	  the	  
whole	  turned	  towards	  a	  culture	  of	  mass-­‐mindedness.52	  He	  considered	  the	  growing	  
split	  between	  the	  intellectual	  and	  the	  spiritual,	  between	  logic	  and	  intuition,	  a	  great	  
danger	  to	  the	  foundations	  of	  culture	  and	  society.	  Yet	  he	  was	  hoping	  that	  
synchronicity	  could	  help	  to	  remedy	  this	  by	  bringing	  about	  a	  re-­‐union	  of	  mind	  and	  
matter,	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  complexity	  of	  individual	  events	  and	  by	  attributing	  
more	  significance	  to	  direct	  experience.	  Synchronicity	  demonstrates	  that	  these	  
personal,	  spiritual	  experiences	  do	  exist	  and	  need	  to	  be	  valued	  as	  such	  (see	  Main,	  
2004,	  117-­‐143).	  Main	  therefore	  concludes	  that	  	  
	  
synchronicity	  is	  socially	  significant	  in	  two	  senses:	  first,	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  
experience	  that	  reverses	  the	  historical	  process	  according	  to	  which	  ‘the	  
symbolical	  unity	  of	  spirit	  and	  matter	  fell	  apart,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  modern	  
man	  finds	  himself	  uprooted	  and	  alienated	  in	  a	  de-­‐souled	  world’;	  and	  second,	  
it	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  symbols	  
compensating	  social	  crises	  may	  emerge	  into	  both	  private	  and	  public	  
consciousness	  (ibid.,	  139).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  ‘The	  mass	  crushes	  out	  the	  insight	  and	  reflection	  that	  are	  still	  possible	  with	  the	  individual’	  and	  
‘responsibility	  is	  collectivized	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  i.e.,	  is	  shuffled	  off	  by	  the	  individual	  and	  
delegated	  to	  a	  corporate	  body’	  (Jung	  in	  Main,	  2004,	  136).	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Since	  personal	  compensation	  is	  a	  function	  of	  individuation,	  the	  aspect	  of	  
meaning	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  this	  regard.	  Aziz	  identified	  four	  different	  levels	  of	  
meaning	  that	  are	  all	  either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  present	  in	  Jung’s	  discussion	  of	  
synchronicity:	  	  
1.) The	  intrapsychic	  state	  and	  the	  objective	  event	  as	  meaningful	  parallels	  
2.) The	  numinous	  charge	  associated	  with	  the	  synchronistic	  experience	  
3.) Import	  of	  the	  subjective-­‐level	  interpretation	  
4.) The	  archetypal	  level	  of	  meaning	  (Aziz,	  1990,	  64-­‐6).	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  type	  meaning	  is	  found	  in	  the	  surprising	  experience	  of	  contents	  being	  
mirrored	  in	  different	  subjects	  and/or	  objects.	  However,	  Aziz	  also	  identified	  
synchronicities	  in	  which	  the	  states	  and	  events	  do	  not	  parallel,	  but	  compensate	  each	  
other,	  ‘in	  the	  sense	  of	  mirroring	  the	  specific	  inner	  compensatory	  content	  or	  forming	  
the	  sole	  compensator	  of	  consciousness’	  (ibid.,	  65).	  	  
The	  second	  type	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘feeling	  level’	  (ibid.).	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  
synchronicities	  are	  generally	  accompanied	  by	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  surprise	  and	  
fascination.	  Jung	  called	  it	  the	  numinous	  feeling,	  or	  numinosum,	  which	  is	  ‘a	  dynamic	  
agency	  or	  effect	  not	  caused	  by	  an	  arbitrary	  act	  of	  will.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  seizes	  and	  
controls	  the	  human	  subject’	  (CW	  11,	  [1937],	  6).	  On	  this	  level,	  significance	  and	  
meaning	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  intensity	  of	  feelings	  triggered	  by	  the	  coincidence,	  
from	  mild	  awe	  and	  astonishment	  to	  the	  feeling	  of	  unity	  and	  ‘an	  uncanny	  sense	  […]	  
that	  the	  universe	  is	  alive’	  (Colman,	  2011,	  475).	  	  
The	  third	  layer	  of	  meaning	  is	  related	  to	  ‘the	  psychological	  development	  of	  
the	  individual’	  (Aziz,	  1990,	  65)	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  current	  constellation	  of	  
consciousness	  and	  the	  unconscious	  and	  how,	  through	  the	  synchronistic	  experience,	  
one	  can	  become	  more	  conscious	  of	  one’s	  personal	  situation.	  The	  insight	  gained	  from	  
an	  analysis	  into	  what	  the	  synchronistic	  event	  means	  can	  be	  utilised	  for	  clarifying	  
one’s	  aims,	  needs	  and	  direction.	  This	  layer	  of	  meaning	  is	  therefore	  most	  relevant	  to	  
the	  process	  of	  individuation	  and	  seems	  especially	  relevant	  in	  a	  therapeutic	  context.	  	  
The	  fourth	  type	  is	  associated	  with	  archetypal	  patterns	  and	  ‘the	  presence	  of	  
this	  objective	  meaning,	  which	  exists	  independently	  of	  consciousness’	  (ibid.,	  66).	  
Main	  points	  out	  that	  ultimately	  all	  these	  types	  of	  meaning	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  an	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archetypal	  base	  (2004,	  56)	  and	  it	  can	  thus	  be	  suggested	  that	  all	  these	  layers	  of	  
meaning	  are	  interrelated	  and	  coexist	  within	  a	  synchronistic	  event.	  Overall,	  for	  Jung	  
psychic	  reality	  is	  the	  only	  reality	  that	  we	  can	  ever	  access	  and	  even	  if	  there	  were	  an	  
objective	  reality	  outside	  of	  our	  minds,	  it	  would	  always	  enter	  our	  consciousness	  in	  a	  
filtered	  way.	  ‘According	  to	  Jung,	  one	  experiences	  life	  and	  its	  events	  in	  terms	  of	  
narrative	  truth	  rather	  than	  historical	  truth’	  (Samuels	  et.	  al.,	  1987,	  116-­‐7)	  and	  
individuation	  meant	  to	  Jung	  finding	  meaning	  in	  one’s	  own	  narrative	  truth	  in	  order	  to	  
get	  closer	  to	  one’s	  unique,	  personal	  state	  of	  psychic	  equilibrium.	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  Investigating	  Links	  between	  the	  Unconscious,	  Creativity	  
and	  Synchronicity	  	  
	  
The	  previous	  sections	  provided	  two	  separate,	  rough	  overviews	  of	  Jung’s	  
elaborations	  on	  the	  creative	  aspect	  of	  the	  psyche	  and	  chance	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
meaningful	  coincidence.	  For	  Jung,	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  unconscious	  form	  the	  
basis	  of	  both,	  of	  creative	  behaviour	  as	  well	  as	  the	  synchronistic	  experience.	  This	  
chapter	  therefore	  goes	  into	  more	  depth	  to	  highlight	  some	  of	  those	  mechanisms	  that	  
are	  present	  in	  both	  creativity	  and	  synchronicity.	  Jung	  himself	  did	  not	  draw	  these	  
connections	  and	  there	  is	  still	  very	  little	  literature	  on	  possible	  links	  between	  the	  two.	  
These	  considerations	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  preliminary	  suggestions,	  but	  hopefully	  
they	  can	  lead	  to	  further,	  more	  comprehensive	  analyses	  of	  the	  subject.	  	  
The	  following	  considerations	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  preliminary	  because	  
Jung’s	  own	  writing	  is	  often	  marked	  by	  contradiction	  and	  many	  of	  his	  views,	  
especially	  on	  artistic	  creativity,	  are	  outdated	  and	  would	  need	  further	  revision	  before	  
such	  links	  can	  be	  analysed	  more	  accurately.	  Jung	  for	  example	  held	  on	  to	  the	  
Romantic	  view	  that	  creativity	  remains	  eventually	  incomprehensible:	  ‘All	  conscious	  
psychic	  processes	  may	  well	  be	  causally	  explicable;	  but	  the	  creative	  act,	  being	  rooted	  
in	  the	  immensity	  of	  the	  unconscious,	  will	  forever	  elude	  our	  attempts	  at	  
understanding.	  It	  describes	  itself	  only	  in	  its	  manifestations;	  it	  can	  be	  guessed	  at,	  but	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never	  wholly	  grasped’	  (CW	  15,	  [1930],	  135).	  While	  it	  may	  be	  true	  that	  some	  of	  the	  
unconscious	  mechanisms	  of	  creativity	  will	  remain	  hidden,	  contemporary	  research	  
has	  shown	  that	  more	  insights	  can	  nevertheless	  be	  gained	  than	  previously	  thought.	  
	  
	  	  
3.1.	  Two	  States	  of	  Mind	  
	  
The	  issue	  of	  simultaneity	  can	  be	  taken	  up	  again	  by	  highlighting	  a	  curious	  turn	  
in	  Jung’s	  thought	  regarding	  the	  involvement	  of	  fantasy,	  and	  thus	  indirectly	  
creativity,	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  synchronicity.	  For	  this,	  two	  versions	  of	  Jung’s	  
extended	  definition	  of	  synchronicity	  need	  to	  be	  juxtaposed.	  To	  remind	  ourselves,	  in	  
his	  first	  lecture	  on	  synchronicity,	  Jung	  distinguished	  between	  three	  categories:	  	  
	  
1. The	  coincidence	  of	  a	  psychic	  state	  in	  the	  observer	  with	  a	  simultaneous,	  
objective,	  external	  event	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  psychic	  state	  or	  content	  
(e.g.	  the	  scarab),	  where	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  a	  causal	  connection	  between	  
the	  psychic	  state	  and	  the	  external	  event,	  and	  where,	  considering	  the	  psychic	  
relativity	  of	  space	  and	  time,	  such	  a	  connection	  is	  not	  even	  conceivable.	  
2. The	  coincidence	  of	  a	  psychic	  state	  with	  a	  corresponding	  (more	  or	  less	  
simultaneous)	  external	  event	  taking	  place	  outside	  the	  observer’s	  field	  of	  
perception,	  i.e.,	  at	  a	  distance,	  and	  only	  verifiable	  afterward	  (e.g.	  the	  
Stockholm	  fire).	  
3. The	  coincidence	  of	  a	  psychic	  state	  with	  a	  corresponding,	  not	  yet	  existent	  
future	  event	  that	  is	  distant	  in	  time	  and	  can	  likewise	  only	  be	  verified	  
afterward.	  (CW	  8,	  [1951],	  984).	  
	  
	  It	  shows	  that	  his	  definition	  includes	  experiences	  where	  simultaneity	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  
necessary	  requirement:	  while	  type	  1	  is	  governed	  by	  simultaneity,	  type	  2	  describes	  a	  
separation	  in	  space	  and	  type	  3	  a	  separation	  in	  time.	  It	  remains	  unclear	  if	  Jung	  
abandoned	  simultaneity	  in	  types	  2	  and	  3	  or	  if	  he	  based	  type	  2	  and	  3	  on	  the	  
hypothesis	  laid	  out	  in	  1,	  namely	  that	  time	  and	  space	  can	  be	  relativized	  or	  even	  
transcended	  by	  the	  psyche.	  The	  concept	  of	  simultaneity	  could	  then	  possibly	  be	  
stretched	  in	  order	  to	  include	  2	  and	  3.	  	  
In	  his	  essay,	  Jung	  suggested	  another	  possibility	  when	  he	  wrote	  that	  
‘synchronistic	  events	  rest	  on	  the	  simultaneous	  occurrence	  of	  two	  different	  psychic	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states’	  (CW	  8,	  [1952],	  855):	  the	  ‘normal	  state’,	  which	  is	  causally	  explicable	  and	  a	  
‘phantasm’	  or	  ‘critical	  experience’,	  which	  is	  not	  causally	  derived	  from	  the	  normal	  
state.	  By	  phantasm,	  or	  critical	  experience,	  Jung	  meant	  events	  separated	  from	  the	  
person	  in	  time	  or	  space	  that	  
	  
	   are	  experienced	  as	  psychic	  images	  in	  the	  present,	  as	  though	  the	  objective	  
event	  already	  existed.	  An	  unexpected	  content	  which	  is	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  
connected	  with	  some	  objective	  external	  event	  coincides	  with	  the	  ordinary	  
psychic	  state:	  this	  is	  what	  I	  call	  synchronicity,	  and	  I	  maintain	  that	  we	  are	  
dealing	  with	  exactly	  the	  same	  category	  of	  events	  whether	  their	  objectivity	  
appears	  separated	  from	  my	  consciousness	  in	  space	  or	  in	  time	  (ibid.).	  
	  
It	  appears	  that	  through	  introducing	  a	  separate	  psychic	  state,	  in	  which	  the	  external	  
event	  is	  experienced	  through	  fantasy	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  clairvoyant	  ability	  or	  
precognition,	  Jung	  sought	  to	  keep	  the	  notion	  of	  simultaneity	  intact.	  	  
In	  a	  Resume	  written	  for	  the	  1955	  English	  translation	  Jung	  even	  reworked	  his	  
three-­‐part	  definition	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  dispel	  the	  confusion	  and	  doubts	  that	  have	  
arisen	  since	  his	  publication	  in	  1952.	  Interestingly	  Jung	  decided	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  idea	  
of	  the	  two	  different	  psychic	  states	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  more	  clarity.	  It	  suggests	  that	  
by	  then	  he	  considered	  this	  solution	  the	  most	  sensible	  one.	  His	  revised	  definition	  
therefore	  reads	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
By	  synchronicity	  I	  mean	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  meaningful	  coincidence	  in	  time.	  
It	  can	  take	  three	  forms:	  	  
a) The	  coincidence	  of	  a	  certain	  psychic	  content	  with	  a	  corresponding	  objective	  
process	  which	  is	  perceived	  to	  take	  place	  simultaneously.	  
b) The	  coincidence	  of	  a	  subjective	  psychic	  state	  with	  a	  phantasm	  (dream	  or	  
vision)	  which	  later	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  more	  or	  less	  faithful	  reflection	  of	  a	  
“synchronistic,”	  objective	  event	  that	  took	  place	  more	  or	  less	  simultaneously,	  
but	  at	  a	  distance.	  
c) The	  same,	  except	  that	  the	  event	  perceived	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  future	  and	  is	  
represented	  in	  the	  present	  only	  by	  a	  phantasm	  that	  corresponds	  to	  it.	  (Jung,	  
1985,	  144-­‐5).	  
	  
He	  distinguished	  between	  a	  ‘subjective	  psychic	  state’	  (formerly	  referred	  to	  as	  
‘normal	  state’)	  and	  a	  phantasm	  (the	  ‘unexpected	  content’),	  which	  he	  further	  
narrowed	  down	  to	  dreams	  and	  visions.	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  he	  decided	  to	  bring	  in	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the	  concept	  of	  phantasm	  in	  order	  to	  describe	  those	  extraordinary	  contents	  that	  are	  
mirrored	  either	  externally	  or	  in	  another	  person’s	  psyche.	  	  
The	  question	  arises	  if	  Jung	  was	  here	  referring	  to	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  ‘fantasm’	  
(Phantasma)	  as	  defined	  in	  his	  Collected	  Works	  6.	  There	  he	  wrote:	  ‘fantasy	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  a	  fantasm	  is	  a	  definite	  sum	  of	  libido	  that	  cannot	  appear	  in	  consciousness	  in	  
any	  other	  way	  than	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  image.	  A	  fantasm	  is	  an	  idee-­‐force’	  (CW	  6,	  722).	  
At	  first	  they	  seem	  to	  differ	  from	  each	  other	  since,	  firstly,	  they	  are	  spelt	  differently.53	  
Secondly,	  Jung	  specified	  that	  by	  phantasm	  he	  particularly,	  if	  not	  exclusively,	  refers	  to	  
dreams	  and	  visions	  instead	  of	  other	  products	  of	  the	  imagination.	  Third	  and	  most	  
importantly,	  Jung	  defined	  fantasm	  as	  ‘a	  complex	  of	  ideas	  that	  is	  distinguished	  from	  
other	  such	  complexes	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  no	  objective	  referent’	  (CW	  6,	  711),	  
whereas	  in	  contrast	  a	  phantasm	  ‘later	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  more	  or	  less	  faithful	  
reflection	  of	  a	  ‘synchronistic’,	  objective	  event’	  (Jung,	  1987,	  144-­‐5).	  However,	  instead	  
of	  referring	  to	  different	  concepts,	  it	  rather	  seems	  that	  Jung	  tweaked	  the	  meaning	  of	  
the	  term	  in	  order	  to	  fit	  the	  purpose	  in	  this	  particular	  context	  as	  well	  as	  his	  revised	  
general	  outlook	  that	  he	  developed	  at	  the	  time.	  That	  is,	  what	  was	  formerly	  described	  
as	  ‘fantasm’,	  now	  as	  phantasm,	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  represent	  parts	  of	  the	  external	  
world	  without	  the	  person’s	  consciousness	  having	  been	  in	  direct	  contact	  with	  them.	  
Underlying	  this	  change	  in	  outlook	  is	  also	  his	  introduction	  of	  the	  ‘psychoid’,	  a	  
concept	  which	  defines	  the	  deeply	  unconscious	  realm	  where	  the	  internal	  and	  
external	  are	  no	  longer	  altogether	  separate,	  an	  aspect	  which	  shall	  be	  further	  
explored	  in	  the	  next	  section	  on	  archetypes.	  In	  conclusion	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  emphasised	  
that	  the	  implicit	  suggestion	  is	  that	  through	  the	  imagination,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
phantasm,	  creativity	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  synchronicity.	  Though	  Jung	  himself	  does	  
not	  stress	  the	  point	  nor	  further	  develop	  it,	  it	  raises	  some	  interesting	  questions	  in	  
regard	  to	  how	  sudden	  images	  or	  series	  of	  images	  that	  are	  then	  mirrored	  in	  an	  
external	  event	  can	  unexpectedly	  interrupt	  the	  subjective	  psychic	  state.	  In	  order	  to	  
explore	  these	  connections	  further	  one	  needs	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  
archetype.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  It	  needs	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  might	  only	  be	  due	  to	  translation.	  The	  definitions	  have	  been	  translated	  




3.2.	  Archetypes,	  Time,	  the	  Psychoid	  and	  the	  Unus	  Mundus	  
	  
Whereas	  for	  example	  the	  factors	  of	  acausality	  and	  the	  relativisation	  of	  time	  
and	  space	  are	  characteristics	  for	  other	  forms	  of	  chance	  too,	  there	  is	  one	  factor	  that	  
is	  unique	  to	  synchronicities.	  Jung	  namely	  wrote:	  ‘Meaningful	  coincidences	  (…)	  seem	  
to	  rest	  on	  an	  archetypal	  foundation’	  (CW8,	  [1952],	  846).	  As	  we	  shall	  later	  see,	  it	  
might	  be	  through	  the	  constellation	  of	  archetypes	  that	  a	  deeper,	  more	  inherent	  link	  
between	  synchronicity	  and	  creativity	  can	  be	  suggested.	  The	  archetypal	  base	  is	  
therefore	  the	  most	  crucial,	  because	  distinct,	  characteristic	  of	  a	  synchronistic	  
experience	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  types	  of	  chance	  such	  as	  randomness,	  a	  lucky	  hit,	  
serendipity	  or	  a	  series	  of	  chance	  (see	  Fordham,	  1957,	  48).	  Jung	  (CW	  8,	  [1952],	  841)	  
and	  later	  Fordham	  (1957,	  48)	  argued	  that	  synchronicities	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  
when	  the	  threshold	  of	  consciousness	  is	  lowered.	  This	  state	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  
abaissement	  du	  niveau	  mental	  and	  for	  example	  can	  be	  brought	  on	  through	  
exhaustion,	  stress,	  during	  sleep,	  hypnosis	  or	  trance.	  Once	  ego	  consciousness	  is	  
lowered,	  more	  energy	  flows	  back	  into	  the	  unconscious,	  thus	  raising	  the	  chances	  that	  
an	  archetype	  is	  constellated	  and	  brought	  to	  the	  surface.	  	  
As	  already	  mentioned,	  the	  archetype	  is	  a	  key	  element	  in	  Jung’s	  overall	  model	  
of	  the	  psyche.	  ‘The	  archetype	  is	  an	  unobservable	  general	  structure,	  which	  only	  in	  
individual	  cases,	  when	  aroused,	  manifests	  in	  the	  inner	  perception	  of	  mythical	  
images	  and	  ideas	  or	  in	  the	  expression	  of	  ritual	  gestures,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  
accompanied	  by	  strong	  emotion’	  (von	  Franz,	  1992,	  206).	  Interestingly,	  Jung	  re-­‐
examined	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  archetypes	  around	  the	  same	  time	  he	  was	  working	  on	  his	  
theory	  on	  synchronicity.	  His	  revised	  view	  on	  archetypes	  can	  be	  found	  in	  On	  the	  
Nature	  of	  the	  Psyche,	  written	  and	  updated	  in	  1946	  and	  1954	  respectively.	  	  
About	  the	  relationship	  between	  archetype	  and	  synchronicity,	  Main	  writes:	  
‘[A]lthough	  archetypes	  do	  not	  cause	  synchronicities,	  the	  constellation	  or	  activation	  
of	  an	  archetype	  in	  a	  situation	  makes	  the	  occurrence	  of	  synchronicities	  more	  likely’	  
(2004,	  18).	  Similarly,	  Jung	  argued	  that	  at	  least	  some	  kinds	  of	  creativity,	  as	  for	  
example	  visionary	  art,	  are	  the	  result	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  archetypal	  material.	  	  Yet	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Fordham	  observed	  that	  the	  archetypal	  constellation	  might	  not	  immediately	  be	  
apparent	  and	  that	  it	  may	  take	  some	  time	  to	  discover	  its	  specific	  contents	  (1957,	  45).	  	  
Jung	  actually	  identified	  the	  archetype	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  
relativized	  time	  and	  space.	  In	  a	  letter	  he	  wrote:	  ‘We	  conclude	  …	  that	  we	  have	  to	  
expect	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  psyche	  that	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  time	  and	  space	  …	  
[and]	  this	  factor	  is	  expected	  to	  manifest	  the	  qualities	  of	  time-­‐	  and	  spacelessness,	  i.e.,	  
‘eternity’	  and	  ‘ubiquity.’	  Psychological	  experience	  knows	  of	  such	  a	  factor;	  it	  is	  what	  I	  
call	  the	  archetype’	  (Aziz,	  1990,	  57).	  Yet	  there	  is	  this	  curious	  dichotomy	  of	  the	  
momentary	  experience	  of	  relativisation	  of	  time	  embedded	  within	  the	  on-­‐going	  
perception	  of	  clock	  time.	  The	  dichotomy	  arises	  because	  the	  unconscious	  is	  timeless,	  
whereas	  ego	  consciousness	  conceptualises	  itself	  and	  the	  world	  around	  it	  within	  the	  
linearity	  of	  time.	  Jung	  therefore	  refers	  to	  the	  two	  concepts	  of	  continuous	  and	  
spontaneous	  creation.	  In	  his	  synchronicity	  essay	  he	  wrote:	  ‘Continuous	  creation	  is	  to	  
be	  thought	  of	  not	  only	  as	  a	  series	  of	  successive	  acts	  of	  creation,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  
eternal	  presence	  of	  the	  one	  creative	  act	  (…).	  Before	  the	  Creation	  there	  was	  no	  time	  
–	  time	  only	  began	  with	  created	  things’	  (CW8,	  [1952],	  967,	  n.	  17).	  And	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  
Markus	  Fierz	  he	  wrote	  in	  1950:	  	  
	  
It	  seems	  to	  me	  synchronicity	  represents	  a	  direct	  act	  of	  creation	  which	  
manifests	  itself	  as	  chance.	  The	  statistical	  proof	  of	  natural	  conformity	  to	  law	  is	  
therefore	  only	  a	  very	  limited	  way	  of	  describing	  nature,	  since	  it	  grasps	  only	  
uniform	  events.	  But	  nature	  is	  essentially	  discontinuous,	  i.e.	  subject	  to	  
chance.	  To	  describe	  it	  we	  need	  a	  principle	  of	  discontinuity	  (CW	  18,	  [1950],	  
1198).	  
	  
This	  shows	  that	  Jung,	  similar	  to	  the	  atomists’	  theory	  of	  the	  clinamen,	  believed	  that	  
within	  the	  overall,	  continuous	  stream	  of	  creation,	  there	  occur	  interruptions	  of	  
spontaneous	  creation.	  For	  Jung	  these	  spontaneous	  deviations	  are	  due	  to	  the	  action	  
of	  synchronicity.	  He	  wrote:	  	  
	  
Synchronicity	  is	  no	  more	  baffling	  or	  mysterious	  than	  the	  discontinuities	  of	  
physics.	  It	  is	  only	  the	  ingrained	  belief	  in	  the	  sovereign	  power	  of	  causality	  that	  
creates	  intellectual	  difficulties	  and	  makes	  it	  appear	  unthinkable	  that	  acausal	  
events	  exist	  or	  could	  ever	  occur.	  But	  if	  they	  do,	  then	  we	  must	  regard	  them	  as	  
creative	  acts,	  as	  the	  continuous	  creation	  of	  a	  pattern	  that	  exists	  from	  all	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eternity,	  repeats	  itself	  sporadically,	  and	  is	  not	  derivable	  from	  any	  known	  
antecedents	  (CW	  8,	  [1952],	  967).54	  	  
	  
Von	  Franz	  quotes	  G.	  J.	  Withrow	  who	  once	  said	  that	  ‘Time	  is	  the	  mediator	  
between	  the	  possible	  and	  the	  actual’	  and	  adds:	  ‘This	  is	  just	  another	  aspect	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  ‘continuous	  creation’.	  It	  needs	  a	  flow	  of	  outer	  and	  inner	  events	  to	  
actualize	  the	  latent	  meaning	  of	  archetypal	  patterns	  in	  the	  form	  of	  sporadic	  
synchronistic	  events’	  (von	  Franz,	  1992,	  274).	  With	  the	  description	  of	  synchronicity	  as	  
an	  act	  of	  creation	  in	  time,	  Jung	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  only	  direct	  connection	  that	  he	  
himself	  draws	  between	  creativity	  and	  synchronicity,	  yet	  it	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  
promising	  starting	  point.	  In	  this	  context	  Pozzi	  writes	  that	  creativity’s	  	  
	  
most	  commonly	  accepted	  meaning	  is	  “something	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  before	  it	  
is	  made	  to	  be.”	  Creativity	  is	  thus	  profoundly	  linked	  to	  our	  notion	  of	  time	  and,	  
as	  such,	  is	  a	  projection	  of	  a	  specifically	  modern	  understanding	  of	  experience,	  
one	  grounded	  in	  the	  categories	  “before”	  and	  “after”.	  Creativity	  then	  is	  not	  
absolute,	  but	  rather	  a	  possibility	  of	  historical	  nature	  (1990,	  150).	  
	  
The	  assumption	  is	  that	  creativity	  and	  synchronicity	  are	  linked	  through	  the	  archetype,	  
yet	  the	  experience	  of	  time	  and	  timelessness	  needs	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  
preliminary	  hypothesis	  that	  will	  need	  further	  analysis	  to	  determine	  if	  it	  can	  hold	  up.	  	  	  
	   One	  of	  the	  fundamental	  ways	  in	  which	  Jung	  revised	  the	  archetype	  in	  On	  the	  
Nature	  of	  the	  Psyche	  is	  his	  addition	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  psychoid.	  Jung	  introduced	  
it	  to	  refer	  to	  two	  things.	  Firstly	  it	  describes	  the	  deepest	  region	  of	  the	  unconscious,	  so	  
remote	  that	  it	  remains	  completely	  inaccessible	  to	  consciousness.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  
he	  used	  it	  to	  describe	  archetypes	  as	  psychoid,	  which	  means	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  
purely	  intrapsychic,	  but	  of	  dual	  nature,	  located	  within	  a	  psycho-­‐physical	  realm.	  	  
	  
On	  Jung’s	  map,	  the	  psyche	  is	  a	  region	  that	  is	  located	  in	  the	  space	  between	  
pure	  matter	  and	  pure	  spirit,	  between	  the	  human	  body	  and	  the	  transcendent	  
mind,	  between	  instinct	  and	  archetype.	  He	  shows	  it	  as	  stretched	  between	  two	  
ends	  of	  a	  spectrum	  that	  has	  openings	  at	  either	  end	  permitting	  an	  entrance	  of	  
information	  into	  the	  psyche	  (Stein,	  1998,	  103).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  ‘when	  people	  follow	  only	  causal	  pathways	  there	  will	  never	  be	  creativity.	  The	  contingent,	  





Due	  to	  this	  new	  concept,	  the	  archetype	  could	  now	  range	  on	  a	  spectrum	  between	  
not	  only	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  body,	  but	  also	  mind	  and	  matter	  more	  generally	  (cf.	  CW8,	  
[1947/1954],	  420).	  It	  is	  this	  addition	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  archetypes	  which	  ultimately	  
allowed	  Jung	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  meaningful,	  acausal	  mirroring	  between	  psychic	  states	  or	  
a	  psychic	  state	  and	  external	  events.	  
Closely	  connected	  to	  the	  new	  concept	  of	  the	  psychoid	  is	  Jung’s	  description	  of	  
the	  unus	  mundus,	  a	  realm	  of	  unity	  beyond	  the	  perception	  of	  fragmentation,	  a	  
‘potential	  world	  outside	  of	  time’	  (CW	  14,	  [1954],	  718),	  where	  everything	  is	  
interconnected.	  It	  is	  ‘[a]t	  this	  level	  of	  psychological	  process,	  [that]	  certain	  things	  just	  
“happen”	  to	  occur	  together,	  and	  psychological	  significance	  is	  experienced	  
synchronistically	  through	  meaningful	  coincidences’	  (Salman,	  2008,	  59).	  Jung	  argued	  
that	  through	  synchronicity	  one	  can	  for	  brief	  moments	  experience	  the	  transcendence	  
of	  time	  and	  space	  and	  thus	  gain	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  unus	  mundus.	  	  
	  
Jung	  envisaged	  nothing	  less	  than	  a	  unification	  of	  these	  two	  realms:	  the	  realm	  
outside	  time	  and	  space	  and	  the	  realm	  within	  time	  and	  space.	  And	  
concomitantly,	  their	  two	  corresponding	  modes	  of	  perception	  –	  intellectual	  
intuition	  and	  sensory	  intuition	  –	  would	  be	  united	  as	  well.	  In	  his	  later	  
psychological	  writings,	  Jung	  referred	  to	  this	  mystical	  unity	  as	  the	  unus	  
mundus	  (Bishop,	  2000,	  55).	  
	  
This	  experience	  is	  an	  extraordinary	  one	  and	  since	  it	  is	  triggered	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  
an	  archetype	  it	  is	  accompanied	  by	  strong	  emotions.	  In	  fact,	  the	  extraordinary	  impact	  
is	  the	  result	  of	  these	  emotions.	  Synchronicity	  ‘is	  as	  a	  rule	  dependent	  on	  a	  certain	  
state	  of	  affectivity’	  (CW	  8,	  [1951],	  980)	  and	  this	  affectivity	  is	  due	  to	  the	  constellation	  
of	  an	  archetype	  (see	  CW8,	  [1952],	  846).	  	  
At	  other	  times,	  often	  in	  connection	  with	  religious	  experiences,	  Jung	  
described	  this	  particular	  affectivity	  as	  ‘transcendental	  feeling’	  or	  numinosity.	  These	  
feelings	  either	  appear	  as	  divine	  or	  diabolical,	  as	  beneficial	  or	  threatening,	  depending	  
if	  one	  experiences	  this	  total	  unity	  and	  interconnection	  as	  liberating	  or	  annihilatory.	  
Jung	  also	  considered	  that	  through	  being	  in	  this	  acute	  state	  of	  experiencing	  the	  unus	  
mundus	  one	  gains	  access	  to	  ‘absolute	  knowledge’.	  Gieser	  describes	  it	  as	  ‘a	  factor	  
which	  Jung	  links	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  archetype	  to	  organize	  and	  convey	  
	  	  
144	  
information	  on	  an	  unconscious	  level’	  (2005,	  304).	  That	  is,	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  not	  
only	  through	  conscious	  means	  but	  also	  through	  glimpses	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  
collective	  unconscious	  where	  all	  this	  hidden	  information	  is	  stored.	  Main	  explains:	  ‘If	  
there	  is	  then	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  parallel	  between	  any	  of	  this	  ‘absolute	  knowledge’	  
and	  co-­‐occurring	  outer	  physical	  events,	  the	  result	  will	  be	  the	  experience	  of	  
synchronicity’	  (Main,	  2004,	  37).	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  this	  understanding	  of	  
the	  archetype	  is	  what	  greatly	  fascinated	  Pauli	  because	  in	  it	  he	  saw	  the	  seed	  for	  an	  
explanation	  of	  how	  mind	  and	  matter	  might	  correspond	  with	  each	  other.55	  	  
Jung	  also	  linked	  the	  idea	  of	  absolute	  knowledge	  to	  teleology	  when	  he	  wrote:	  
‘final	  causes,	  twist	  them	  how	  we	  will,	  postulate	  a	  foreknowledge	  of	  some	  kind.	  It	  is	  
certainly	  not	  a	  knowledge	  that	  could	  be	  connected	  with	  the	  ego,	  and	  hence	  not	  a	  
conscious	  knowledge	  as	  we	  know	  it,	  but	  rather	  a	  self-­‐subsistent	  “unconscious”	  
knowledge	  which	  I	  would	  prefer	  to	  call	  “absolute	  knowledge”’	  (CW	  8,	  [1952],	  931).	  
This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Jung	  had	  in	  mind	  a	  predetermined	  
foreknowledge,	  that	  is,	  the	  accessing	  of	  an	  unconscious	  realm	  that	  is	  fixed	  for	  all	  
time,	  or	  one	  that	  develops	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	  natural	  and	  conscious	  processes.	  
Here	  Peirce’s	  concept	  of	  developmental	  teleology	  can	  be	  useful	  since	  it	  suggests	  
that	  purposes	  change	  and	  develop	  through	  experiences	  instead	  of	  having	  been	  
predetermined.	  Even	  though	  this	  concept	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  Jung,	  it	  seems	  useful	  
to	  extend	  the	  idea	  of	  developmental	  teleology	  from	  the	  conscious	  realm	  to	  the	  
collective	  unconscious,	  since	  it	  too	  grows	  with	  conscious	  experiences.	  
Directly	  following	  the	  quote	  above,	  Jung	  moved	  on	  to	  speculate	  about	  the	  
exact	  way	  in	  which	  absolute	  knowledge	  is	  accessed.	  He	  wrote:	  	  
	  
	   It	  is	  not	  cognition	  but,	  as	  Leibniz	  so	  excellently	  calls	  it,	  a	  “perceiving”	  which	  
consists	  –	  or	  to	  be	  more	  cautious,	  seems	  to	  exist	  –	  of	  images,	  of	  subjectless	  
“simulacra.”	  These	  postulated	  images	  are	  presumably	  the	  same	  as	  my	  
archetypes,	  which	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  formal	  factors	  in	  spontaneous	  fantasy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  ‘Pauli	  believed	  that	  serious	  research	  in	  physics,	  psychology,	  biology	  and	  parapsychology	  might	  be	  
able	  to	  throw	  light	  on	  the	  question	  of	  information	  processing	  and	  transfer.	  He	  believed	  that	  Jung’s	  
archetype	  model	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  absolute	  knowledge	  could	  be	  a	  helpful	  perspective	  in	  this	  
respect.	  The	  psychic	  factor	  might	  possibly	  be	  active	  as	  a	  basic	  component	  of	  biological	  evolution	  and	  
manifest	  itself	  as	  a	  purposeful	  holistic	  regulation	  of	  life	  phenomena.	  He	  assumed	  that	  ‘this	  holistic	  
occurrence	  of	  meaningful	  coincidences	  points	  to	  a	  psychological	  factor	  in	  the	  biological	  evolution	  




products.	  Expressed	  in	  modern	  language,	  the	  microcosm	  which	  contains	  “the	  
images	  of	  all	  creation”	  would	  be	  the	  collective	  unconscious	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  this	  part,	  this	  perceiving,	  which	  could	  also	  be	  
called	  intuiting,	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  the	  activity	  of	  imagination.	  It	  is	  this	  particular	  
ability	  of	  the	  psyche	  to	  produce	  spontaneous	  fantasies,	  which	  are	  nothing	  more	  
than	  fragments	  of	  the	  unconscious	  knowledge,	  that	  Jung	  called	  absolute	  knowledge.	  
In	  this	  context	  it	  also	  becomes	  clearer	  why	  Jung	  was	  keen	  to	  stress	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
parallel	  psychic	  state,	  that	  of	  the	  phantasm,	  which	  is	  brought	  up	  from	  the	  collective	  
unconscious	  into	  one’s	  conscious	  awareness.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  only	  because	  of	  the	  
phantasm	  that	  synchronicity	  can	  be	  experienced.	  The	  normal,	  conscious	  state	  simply	  
does	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  produce	  such	  striking	  and	  surprising	  contents.	  Only	  
through	  the	  abaissement	  du	  niveau	  mental	  and	  the	  subsequent	  constellation	  of	  
unconscious	  contents	  ‘can	  space	  and	  time	  be	  relativized	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  thereby	  
reducing	  the	  chances	  of	  a	  causal	  process.	  What	  then	  happens	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  creatio	  ex	  
nihilo,	  an	  act	  of	  creation	  that	  is	  not	  causally	  explicable’	  (ibid.,	  912).	  Yet	  it	  only	  
appears	  as	  creation	  from	  nothing	  to	  consciousness,	  because	  in	  actuality	  the	  material	  




3.3.	  Images,	  Symbols	  and	  the	  Autonomous	  Creative	  Drive:	  Are	  there	  More	  
Inherent	  Links	  between	  Synchronicity	  and	  Creativity?	  
	  
For	  Jung	  the	  ‘originary	  principle	  is	  the	  world	  of	  the	  image.	  Image	  is	  the	  world	  
in	  which	  experience	  unfolds.	  Image	  constitutes	  experience.	  Image	  is	  psyche’	  (Kugler,	  
2008,	  77).56	  Jung	  himself	  defined	  the	  image	  as	  ‘a	  condensed	  expression	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Paul	  Kugler	  provides	  an	  interesting	  overview	  of	  the	  historic	  development	  of	  philosophical	  
understandings	  of	  images,	  where	  he	  elaborates	  the	  move	  from	  the	  view	  that	  images	  are	  mere	  
reproductions	  of	  ‘real’	  events	  to	  the	  understanding	  that	  images	  are	  creations	  of	  the	  individual.	  Kugler	  
elaborates	  that	  Jung	  took	  this	  idea	  one	  step	  further	  by	  locating	  the	  autonomous,	  creative	  nature	  of	  
images	  within	  the	  human	  unconscious	  and	  therefore	  out	  of	  reach	  of	  conscious	  volition.	  Kugler	  quotes	  
Paracelsus	  and	  Bruno,	  who	  already	  exclaimed:	  ‘What	  else	  is	  imagination,	  if	  not	  the	  inner	  sun?’	  
(Paracelsus)	  and	  ‘human	  imaging	  was	  the	  source	  of	  thought	  itself’	  (Bruno)	  (Kugler,	  2008,	  81).	  In	  this	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psychic	  situation	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  not	  merely,	  or	  even	  predominately,	  of	  unconscious	  
contents	  pure	  and	  simple’	  (CW	  6,	  [1921],	  745).	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  emphasised	  
that	  the	  image	  	  
	  
undoubtedly	  does	  express	  unconscious	  contents,	  but	  not	  the	  whole	  of	  them,	  
only	  those	  that	  are	  momentarily	  constellated.	  This	  constellation	  is	  the	  result	  
of	  the	  spontaneous	  activity	  of	  the	  unconscious	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  of	  the	  
momentary	  conscious	  situation	  on	  the	  other…	  The	  interpretation	  of	  its	  
meaning,	  therefore	  can	  start	  neither	  from	  the	  conscious	  alone	  nor	  from	  the	  
unconscious	  alone,	  but	  only	  from	  their	  reciprocal	  relationship	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
The	  image	  is	  generated	  through	  the	  interplay	  of	  the	  currently	  known	  and	  the	  
unknown,	  it	  brings	  together	  a	  momentary	  state	  of	  thoughts	  and	  emotions	  with	  the	  
spontaneous	  and	  unexpected	  from	  the	  depth	  within.	  It	  can	  thus	  be	  stressed	  once	  
more	  that	  the	  image	  can	  be	  a	  reproduction,	  a	  recreation	  and	  a	  unique	  admixture	  of	  
the	  reproduced	  and	  the	  generated.	  A	  fantasy,	  that	  is,	  a	  sequence	  of	  images,	  is	  the	  
foundation	  of	  psychic	  reality	  and	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  other	  mental	  processes.	  ‘With	  
this	  epistemological	  shift,	  mental	  image	  ceases	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  copy,	  or	  a	  copy	  of	  
a	  copy,	  and	  now	  assumes	  the	  role	  of	  ultimate	  origin	  and	  creator	  of	  meaning	  and	  of	  
our	  sense	  of	  existence	  and	  reality.	  The	  act	  of	  imaging	  creates	  our	  consciousness	  
which	  then	  provides	  the	  illumination	  of	  our	  world’	  (Kugler,	  2008,	  85).	  
This	  activity	  is	  separate	  from	  conscious	  volition	  and	  it	  is	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  
Jung	  argued	  for	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  creative	  drive.	  In	  On	  the	  Relation	  of	  Analytical	  
Psychology	  to	  Poetry	  he	  explained	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  autonomous	  complex	  in	  
general.	  It	  is	  ‘a	  psychic	  formation	  that	  remains	  subliminal	  until	  its	  energy-­‐charge	  is	  
sufficient	  to	  carry	  it	  over	  the	  threshold	  into	  consciousness.	  Its	  association	  with	  
consciousness	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  assimilated,	  only	  that	  it	  is	  perceived;	  but	  it	  is	  
not	  subject	  to	  conscious	  control,	  and	  can	  be	  neither	  inhibited	  nor	  voluntarily	  
reproduced’	  (CW	  15,	  [1922],	  122).	  Jung	  made	  it	  very	  clear	  that	  this	  autonomous	  
activity	  of	  the	  psyche	  is	  not	  to	  be	  considered	  pathological,	  but	  constitutes	  a	  normal	  
process	  that	  occurs	  in	  all	  healthy	  individuals.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
respect	  Jung	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  their	  direct	  descendant	  when	  he	  explained:	  ‘all	  those	  sun,	  fire,	  flame,	  
wind,	  breath	  similes	  that	  from	  time	  immemorial	  have	  been	  symbols	  of	  the	  procreative	  and	  creative	  
power	  that	  moves	  the	  world.	  […]	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  creative	  world-­‐principle	  is	  a	  projected	  perception	  of	  
the	  living	  essence	  in	  man	  himself.’	  (CW6,	  [1921],	  336-­‐7).	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The	  autonomous	  drive	  to	  generate	  images	  also	  explains	  how	  true	  novelty	  
arises.	  These	  images	  are	  perceived	  as	  novel	  by	  the	  experiencer	  themselves,	  which	  is	  
why	  they	  are	  also	  described	  as	  spontaneous	  insight	  or	  sudden	  revelation.	  They	  
appear	  seemingly	  out	  of	  nowhere,	  which	  as	  a	  side	  note	  is	  a	  possible	  explanation	  for	  
the	  early	  conception	  of	  ‘creation	  from	  nothing’.	  Ego-­‐consciousness	  is	  unable	  to	  
produce	  real	  novelty,	  it	  can	  only	  emerge	  from	  the	  chaotic	  realm	  of	  the	  unconscious.	  
It	  requires	  a	  certain	  loosening	  of	  conscious	  control	  and	  only	  when	  psychic	  energy	  
flows	  back	  into	  the	  unconscious	  can	  such	  insights	  come	  up.	  The	  intuitive	  function	  
promotes	  this	  process	  because	  it	  leads,	  by	  nature,	  to	  abaissement	  du	  niveau	  mental	  
and	  thus	  to	  the	  unrestrained	  exploration	  of	  possibilities.	  Jung	  wrote	  in	  this	  regard:	  
‘The	  creation	  of	  something	  new	  is	  not	  accomplished	  by	  the	  intellect,	  but	  by	  the	  play	  
instinct	  acting	  from	  inner	  necessity.	  The	  creative	  mind	  plays	  with	  the	  object	  it	  loves’	  
(CW	  6,	  [1921],	  197).	  
Jung	  also	  described	  symbols	  and	  their	  need	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  images.	  
The	  image	  is	  not	  only	  ‘both	  prior	  to	  and	  greater	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  symbolic	  
components’	  (Samuels	  et.	  al.,	  1986,	  72)	  but	  it	  is	  also	  ‘a	  container	  of	  opposites,	  in	  
contradistinction	  to	  the	  symbol	  which	  is	  a	  mediator	  of	  opposites,	  it	  does	  not	  adhere	  
to	  any	  one	  position	  but	  elements	  of	  it	  can	  be	  found	  in	  either’	  (ibid.).	  Jung	  
furthermore	  distinguished	  between	  signs	  and	  symbols.	  While	  a	  sign	  stands	  for	  a	  
well-­‐known	  referent,	  a	  symbol	  stands	  for	  something	  not	  clearly	  understood,	  
something	  unknown	  or	  too	  complex	  to	  be	  put	  into	  words.	  Images	  are	  not	  easily	  
recognised	  as	  either	  a	  sign	  or	  a	  symbol	  and	  what	  constitutes	  a	  sign	  for	  one	  person	  
might	  reveal	  itself	  as	  a	  symbol	  to	  someone	  else.	  Signs	  are	  more	  frequently	  
associated	  with	  the	  personal	  unconscious,	  that	  is,	  they	  are	  regressive	  and	  as	  causal	  
referents	  allude	  to	  known	  but	  possibly	  repressed	  memories.	  Symbols	  on	  the	  other	  
hand	  are	  regarded	  as	  the	  language	  of	  the	  collective	  unconscious,	  penetrating	  into	  
consciousness	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  emerging	  archetypal	  patterns.	  A	  
symbol	  therefore	  only	  circumscribes	  something	  that	  at	  its	  core	  will	  remain	  
ultimately	  unknown.	  While	  signs	  help	  to	  unearth	  and	  illuminate	  one's	  unchangeable,	  
personal	  history,	  symbols	  are	  forward-­‐looking	  and	  aim	  to	  serve	  a	  teleological	  
purpose	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  aiding	  psychological	  healing	  and	  individuation.	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The	  generation	  of	  symbols	  differs	  from	  the	  generation	  of	  images	  because	  it	  
involves	  the	  archetype:	  ‘what	  is	  unconscious	  can	  only	  be	  brought	  to	  consciousness	  
by	  means	  of	  symbolising,	  and	  the	  archetypes	  are	  the	  engines	  of	  this	  process’	  (van	  
den	  Berk,	  2012,	  51).	  Jung	  also	  called	  this	  process,	  in	  which	  the	  conflict	  of	  opposites	  
is	  bridged	  and	  reconciled,	  ‘transcendent	  function’	  and	  he	  writes	  that	  here	  
‘knowledge	  of	  the	  symbols	  is	  indispensable,	  for	  it	  is	  in	  them	  that	  the	  union	  of	  
conscious	  and	  unconscious	  contents	  is	  consummated.	  Out	  of	  this	  union	  emerge	  new	  
situations	  and	  new	  conscious	  attitudes’	  (CW	  9i,	  [1939],	  524).	  The	  symbol	  contains	  a	  
large	  amount	  of	  psychic	  energy	  which	  is	  usually	  experienced	  as	  a	  strong	  and	  startling	  
feeling,	  either	  ecstatic	  or	  terrifying.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  Jung	  called	  this	  strong	  
feeling	  ‘numinosity’,	  an	  affective	  state	  characterised	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  conscious	  
volition	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  ‘spiritual’	  experience.	  	  
The	  symbol	  is	  a	  crucial	  element	  because	  through	  it	  a	  more	  inherent	  link	  
between	  creativity	  and	  synchronicity	  can	  be	  suggested.	  Cashford	  for	  example	  wrote:	  
‘when	  we	  see	  events	  as	  synchronistic,	  we	  are	  seeing	  them	  symbolically’	  (2010,	  11).	  
Main	  similarly	  emphasised	  that	  ‘[t]he	  content	  of	  synchronicities	  typically	  is	  symbolic	  
and	  arises	  when	  there	  is	  a	  psychological	  impasse	  brought	  on	  by	  the	  confrontation	  of	  
irreconcilable	  opposites’	  (2004,	  22).	  The	  image	  that	  appears	  to	  the	  experiencer	  
contains	  the	  constellation	  of	  symbolic	  content.	  Since	  it	  is	  generated	  in	  the	  
unconscious	  through	  the	  autonomous	  creative	  drive,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  
synchronistic	  experience	  ultimately	  rests	  on	  a	  creative	  base.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  what	  extent	  symbols	  might	  in	  
turn	  actually	  be	  generated	  by	  synchronicity.	  Leopold	  Stein	  looked	  at	  the	  etymology	  
of	  the	  symbol	  and	  explains	  that	  the	  original	  Greek	  term	  ‘means	  something	  
perceptible	  that	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  activity	  which	  throws	  together	  such	  things	  as	  
have	  something	  in	  common,	  and	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  one	  thing	  somehow	  accords	  
with	  another	  not	  presented	  to	  the	  senses,	  and	  is	  synchronous	  with	  it’	  (Stein,	  1994,	  
40).57	  Based	  on	  this,	  Gordon	  describes	  the	  symbol	  as	  a	  split	  token	  (what	  she	  refers	  
to	  as	  a	  tally):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  ‘The	  Greek	  word	  is	  symbolon.	  It	  is	  usually	  translated	  as	  an	  agreed	  sign	  wherefrom	  one	  can	  
recognize	  or	  infer	  something;	  a	  pledge,	  a	  token,	  a	  distinctive	  mark;	  a	  premonitory	  sign’	  (ibid.)	  
Gordon	  adds:	  ‘When	  the	  Greeks	  first	  used	  the	  word	  they	  referred	  with	  it	  to	  ‘two	  halves	  of	  




	   the	  essential	  feature	  of	  a	  tally	  is	  that	  once	  there	  was	  a	  whole	  thing	  –	  a	  coin,	  a	  
bone	  or	  a	  ring	  –	  which	  was	  broken	  apart,	  and	  that	  then	  each	  piece	  went	  on	  its	  
own	  separate	  way,	  until	  some	  chance	  or	  deliberate	  effort	  brought	  together	  the	  
pieces	  which	  at	  first	  sight	  look	  so	  disparate.	  […]	  For	  unless	  the	  original	  self	  has	  
been	  able	  to	  break	  up,	  unless	  de-­‐integration	  […]	  has	  taken	  place	  and	  the	  
opposites	  have	  been	  constellated,	  no	  bridging,	  no	  transcendent	  function,	  is	  in	  
fact	  conceivable	  (Gordon,	  1994,	  55,	  my	  emphasis).	  
	  
It	  suggests	  that	  the	  actual	  symbol	  that	  is	  constellated	  in	  representation	  of	  some	  
hidden,	  unconscious	  content	  can,	  at	  least	  sometimes,	  emerge	  by	  chance.	  It	  has	  no	  
definite,	  predetermined	  form	  but	  it	  emerges	  spontaneously.	  	  
The	  ego,	  for	  example,	  differentiates	  itself	  out	  of	  the	  greater	  whole	  of	  the	  
self.	  They	  break	  into	  two	  parts.	  It	  is	  a	  necessary	  process	  without	  which	  we	  could	  not	  
be	  self-­‐conscious.	  From	  then	  on	  the	  two	  opposing	  forces	  of	  consciousness	  and	  
unconscious	  struggle	  with	  each	  other	  and	  create	  conflict.	  Yet	  in	  fact	  they	  do	  want	  to	  
find	  a	  new	  equilibrium	  and	  be	  reunited	  to	  form	  a	  greater	  whole.	  It	  is	  the	  function	  of	  
the	  symbol,	  to	  come	  in	  as	  a	  third	  element	  in	  order	  to	  throw	  signals	  across,	  to	  bridge	  
over	  the	  dividing	  gap	  and	  to	  compensate	  for	  one-­‐sided	  priority	  of	  one	  over	  the	  
other.	  The	  symbol-­‐making	  process	  therefore	  ‘relies	  on	  a	  relationship	  between	  three	  
distinct	  psychic	  contents:	  the	  original	  object,	  the	  symbol	  for	  the	  original	  object	  and	  
the	  ego	  which	  must	  relate	  to	  them	  both’	  (ibid.,	  54).	  This	  process	  reminds	  of	  the	  
synchronistic	  experience	  itself,	  where	  an	  outer	  object	  and	  inner	  content	  are	  
mirrored	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  is	  perceived	  as	  deeply	  
meaningful.	  For	  the	  moment	  these	  are	  speculative	  suggestions	  only	  and	  will	  have	  to	  
be	  examined	  further	  and	  their	  validity	  tested.	  Yet	  if	  chance	  should	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  
symbol-­‐making	  process,	  it	  could	  be	  suggested	  that	  on	  the	  unconscious	  level,	  chance	  
and	  creativity	  are	  inherently	  linked	  through	  reciprocal	  action.	  	  
	  
	  
3.4.	  Synchronicity	  and	  Art	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
broke	  between	  them	  in	  order	  to	  have	  proof	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  presenter	  of	  the	  other	  part.’’	  
(Gordon,	  1994,	  53).	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The	  last	  point	  of	  discussion	  focuses	  on	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  are	  also	  
links	  between	  synchronicity	  and	  art.	  Not	  much	  has	  been	  written	  on	  the	  subject,	  but	  
there	  are	  some	  sources	  that	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  connection	  points.	  
Rowland	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  first	  who	  commented	  on	  such	  connections	  when	  she	  
wrote:	  	  
	  
Synchronicity	  (…)	  is	  a	  way	  of	  reading	  reality	  non-­‐rationally	  and	  symbolically,	  
in	  ways	  traditionally	  assigned	  to	  the	  making	  of	  art.	  So	  synchronicity	  treats	  
time	  and	  spaces	  as	  aesthetic	  components	  of	  momentary	  artistic	  wholes.	  It	  is	  
possible,	  therefore,	  to	  argue	  that	  synchronicity	  is	  reality	  in	  aesthetic	  (non-­‐
rational)	  mode,	  or	  that	  it	  represents	  the	  human	  mind	  ‘reading’	  or	  ‘composing’	  
acausal	  events	  into	  art	  without	  being	  entirely	  aware	  of	  so	  doing	  (Rowland,	  
2005,	  147).	  
	  
	  Colman	  similarly	  notes	  that	  synchronicity	  and	  art	  share	  a	  reliance	  on	  meaning	  
constructed	  from	  personal	  narrative:	  ‘Whereas	  rational	  knowledge	  depends	  on	  a	  
form	  of	  meaning	  in	  which	  causal	  chains	  and	  logical	  links	  are	  paramount,	  imaginal	  
meaning	  is	  generated	  by	  forms	  of	  congruent	  correspondence	  –	  a	  feature	  that	  
synchronicity	  shares	  with	  metaphor	  and	  symbol	  –	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  narratives	  by	  
means	  of	  retroactive	  organization	  of	  its	  constituent	  elements’	  (2011,	  471).	  In	  this	  
regard	  Cashford	  remarks	  that	  ‘the	  language	  of	  the	  poets	  –	  the	  subtle	  and	  tacit	  
language	  of	  image,	  symbol,	  metaphor,	  and	  still	  subtler,	  pause,	  rhythm,	  placing,	  tone	  
–	  can	  bring	  us	  closer	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  psyche	  than	  that	  other,	  more	  direct	  way	  of	  
talking	  –	  through	  concept,	  statement	  and	  amplifying	  idea’	  (2010,	  3).	  It	  can	  be	  added	  
that	  while	  the	  artists	  can	  bring	  one	  closer	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  psyche	  on	  a	  broader,	  
cultural	  level,	  synchronicity	  does	  so	  on	  a	  unique	  personal	  level	  first.	  	  
	   Van	  den	  Berk	  has	  no	  doubts	  that	  a	  relationship	  between	  synchronicity	  and	  
art	  exists	  when	  he	  concludes	  his	  book	  Jung	  on	  Art	  on	  this	  subject.	  He	  explains	  that	  
Jung	  ‘related	  the	  creation	  of	  art	  to	  participation	  mystique.	  “This	  re-­‐immersion	  in	  the	  
state	  of	  participation	  mystique	  is	  the	  secret	  of	  artistic	  creation”’	  and	  that	  ‘[t]his	  
partial	  identity	  between	  subject	  and	  object	  is	  a	  synchronistic	  ground	  par	  excellence’	  
(2012,	  135).	  He	  therefore	  suggests	  that	  ‘[p]articipation	  mystique	  can	  just	  as	  well	  be	  
called	  participation	  synchronistique’	  because	  ‘the	  symbol	  that	  is	  elicited	  by	  the	  work	  






To	  sum	  up,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  through	  Jung’s	  postulation	  that	  the	  psyche	  is	  
inherently	  creative,	  a	  clear	  connection	  between	  creativity	  and	  chance,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
synchronicity,	  can	  be	  established.	  Through	  the	  autonomous	  activity	  of	  the	  
unconscious	  to	  produce	  images	  independently	  from	  ego	  consciousness,	  the	  
emergence	  of	  truly	  novel	  ideas	  can	  be	  explained.	  Only	  through	  a	  temporary	  letting	  
go	  of	  ego-­‐control	  can	  energy	  flow	  back	  into	  the	  unconscious,	  where	  fantasy-­‐thinking	  
will	  take	  over	  and	  the	  production	  of	  images	  and	  symbols	  will	  be	  stimulated.	  Once	  
they	  are	  brought	  to	  the	  surface,	  they	  can	  then	  be	  further	  cultivated	  by	  the	  ego.	  That	  
is,	  judged,	  processed	  and	  shaped	  by	  it	  in	  order	  to	  be	  of	  further	  use.	  The	  psyche’s	  
ability	  to	  generate	  images	  therefore	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  any	  creative	  behaviour,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  synchronicity.	  ‘Synchronicity	  provides	  a	  theoretical	  
framework	  for	  appreciating	  one	  of	  the	  most	  distinctive	  and	  important	  notions	  in	  
Jungian	  psychology:	  the	  autonomous	  psyche’	  (Main,	  2004,	  133).	  The	  generation	  and	  
constellation	  of	  symbols	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  creative	  act	  and	  since	  it	  determines	  
synchronistic	  experiences,	  it	  can	  be	  suggested	  that	  synchronicities	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  
of	  being	  creative	  too.	  For	  Jung	  the	  publication	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  synchronicity	  fulfilled	  
the	  double	  function	  of	  describing	  an	  important	  phenomenon	  of	  personal	  and	  
spiritual	  experiences	  as	  well	  as	  of	  critiquing	  contemporary	  Western	  culture’s	  one-­‐
sided	  reliance	  on	  rationality,	  tradition	  and	  institutional	  dogma,	  instead	  of	  valuing	  





























1.	  Mallarmé	  and	  Dada:	  the	  Beginnings	  of	  Chance	  in	  Modern	  
Art	  	  	  
	  
1.1.	  Mallarmé	  and	  the	  Act	  of	  Throwing	  Dice	  
	  
The	  writings	  of	  the	  French	  poet	  Stéphane	  Mallarmé	  influenced	  the	  later	  
emerging	  Dada	  and	  Surrealist	  movements.	  His	  unconventional	  poetic	  style	  is	  marked	  
by	  complexity	  and	  ambiguity	  in	  syntax,	  imagery	  and	  meaning.	  The	  presentation	  of	  
words	  on	  the	  page	  in	  his	  last	  poem	  impressed	  these	  later	  artists	  deeply	  and	  thus	  in	  
some	  ways	  preceded	  what	  was	  to	  become	  known	  as	  ‘modern’	  technique.	  The	  
question	  of	  chance	  keeps	  troubling	  Mallarmé	  and	  the	  theme	  accompanies	  him	  
throughout	  his	  writing	  career,	  cropping	  up	  again	  and	  again,	  especially	  at	  critical	  
moments	  in	  his	  life.	  Mauron	  argues	  that	  Mallarmé	  was	  going	  through	  two	  
depressive	  phases,	  the	  first	  between	  1862-­‐1869	  and	  the	  second	  during	  the	  years	  
shortly	  before	  his	  death,	  and	  that	  these	  phases	  are	  marked	  by	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  
similar	  metaphysical	  themes	  (Mauron,	  1963,	  130-­‐1).	  During	  these	  times	  Mallarmé	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wrote	  the	  poems	  Igitur	  (1867-­‐1870)58	  and	  his	  most	  well-­‐known	  work,	  A	  Throw	  of	  the	  
Dice	  will	  Never	  Abolish	  Chance	  (1897),	  which	  incidentally	  became	  his	  last	  poem	  
before	  his	  sudden	  death	  in	  1898.	  Both	  texts	  are	  similar	  in	  nature	  and	  theme,	  
containing	  the	  motives	  of	  shipwreck,	  chaos,	  chance,	  death	  and	  the	  Absolute.	  
Mallarmé’s	  writing	  reveals	  his	  very	  ambivalent	  view	  on	  chance.	  Above	  all,	  it	  
represents	  a	  menace	  to	  him	  whereby	  it	  arrives	  in	  the	  service	  of	  chaos	  threatening	  
order,	  stability	  and	  happiness.	  Both	  Igitur	  and	  A	  Throw	  of	  the	  Dice	  are	  expressions	  of	  
his	  struggle	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  these	  forces.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  Mallarmé	  finds	  in	  
writing	  one	  of	  the	  best	  possible	  antidotes	  for	  keeping	  the	  ever-­‐encroaching	  chaos	  
and	  its	  offspring	  chance	  at	  bay.	  His	  writings	  therefore	  make	  an	  appropriate	  opening	  
example	  for	  a	  study	  of	  chance’s	  place	  in	  modern	  art.	  	  
Igitur	  is	  sometimes	  described	  as	  a	  philosophical	  tale	  and	  Jung	  would	  have	  
recognised	  it	  as	  a	  story	  of	  descent	  into	  the	  unconscious.	  Igitur,	  the	  last	  heir	  to	  an	  
ancient	  race,	  takes	  on	  the	  ancestral	  task	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  Absolute	  through	  a	  fatal	  
throw	  of	  the	  dice,	  which	  halts	  time.	  ‘The	  basic	  drama	  of	  Igitur	  is	  a	  series	  of	  attempts	  
to	  overcome,	  in	  a	  Manichean	  pattern,	  the	  becoming-­‐linearity	  of	  life,	  …;	  the	  goal	  is	  a	  
perfect	  Being’	  (Cohn,	  1981,	  35).	  Before	  descending	  the	  stairs	  to	  the	  tomb	  to	  commit	  
the	  final	  act,	  Igitur	  asks	  himself:	  ‘Must	  I	  still	  fear	  chance,	  that	  antique	  enemy	  which	  
divided	  me	  into	  darkness	  and	  created	  time,	  both	  pacified	  there	  in	  the	  same	  
slumber?	  And	  is	  it	  not	  itself	  annulled	  by	  the	  end	  of	  time,	  which	  brought	  about	  that	  
of	  darkness?’	  (Mallarmé,	  1982,	  96).	  Through	  an	  attempt	  to	  eradicate	  chance,	  Igitur	  
seeks	  to	  finally	  liberate	  himself	  and	  his	  ‘race,	  full	  of	  chance’	  from	  its	  terror	  forever	  
(ibid.,	  100).	  The	  beginning	  of	  the	  fourth	  part	  of	  the	  poem	  entitled	  ‘The	  Dice	  Throw	  in	  
the	  Tomb’	  introduces	  the	  logic	  behind	  the	  attempt	  to	  cancel	  out	  chance:	  
	  
in	  an	  act	  where	  chance	  is	  in	  play,	  chance	  always	  accomplishes	  its	  own	  Idea	  in	  
affirming	  or	  negating	  itself.	  Confronting	  its	  existence,	  negation	  and	  
affirmation	  fail.	  It	  contains	  the	  Absurd	  –	  (ibid.).	  
	  
The	  abolition	  of	  chance	  shall	  be	  accomplished	  through	  chance	  being	  thrown	  back	  at	  
itself.	  Only	  a	  few	  lines	  above	  Igitur	  faced	  ‘the	  character	  of	  horror’	  in	  the	  mirror	  until	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Igitur	  was	  only	  published	  posthumously	  in	  1925	  (see	  Cohn,	  1981,	  xi).	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it	  slowly	  ‘reached	  an	  unbelievable	  purity’	  (ibid.).	  Igitur	  hopes	  that	  this	  act	  of	  
mirroring	  will	  dissolve	  chance	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  However	  the	  act	  remains	  inherently	  
absurd,	  because	  while	  it	  ‘seeks	  to	  disallow	  chance	  [yet]	  allows	  it	  still.	  But	  the	  realm	  
of	  chance,	  now	  reaffirmed,	  contains	  within	  itself	  –	  within	  its	  endless	  multitude	  of	  
potentialities	  –	  the	  idea	  of	  infinity’	  (Bowie,	  1978,	  124-­‐5);	  like	  a	  mirror	  faced	  with	  
another	  mirror.	  	  
Just	  before	  the	  final	  act	  Igitur	  is	  suddenly	  gripped	  by	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  he	  
can	  reach	  the	  Absolute.	  He	  contemplates	  that	  ‘the	  Act’,	  the	  throw	  of	  the	  dice,	  is	  
madness	  and	  absurd,	  but	  that	  ‘the	  Idea	  has	  been	  necessary.	  […]	  through	  this	  
madness,	  chance	  was	  denied,	  this	  madness	  was	  necessary’	  (ibid.,	  99-­‐100).	  Here	  the	  
rift	  between	  the	  real	  and	  the	  ideal,	  thought	  and	  action,	  is	  made	  visible	  and	  even	  
though	  in	  this	  moment	  Igitur	  admits	  its	  absurdity,	  he	  is	  still	  compelled	  to	  fulfil	  the	  
ancestral	  task	  and	  throws	  the	  dice.	  ‘He	  acts	  “in	  Absolute	  terms.”	  But	  now	  he	  finds	  
the	  act	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  dream	  –	  useless,	  for	  “there	  is	  and	  isn’t	  chance.”	  Here	  
again,	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  his	  triumph,	  is	  the	  old	  “absurdity	  of	  the	  absurd”	  turning	  his	  
absurd	  act	  into	  a	  meaningless	  one’	  (Cohn,	  1981,	  137).	  	  
While	  the	  hero	  in	  Igitur	  still	  compulsively	  needs	  to	  commit	  the	  absurd	  act,	  
leading	  to	  his	  metaphysical	  suicide,	  in	  A	  Throw	  of	  the	  Dice	  the	  feeling	  of	  quixotic	  
rebellion	  has	  subsided	  into	  resignation	  with	  a	  touch	  of	  hope.	  Another	  evolution	  in	  
Mallarmé’s	  approach	  to	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  extraordinary	  and	  playful	  
experimentation	  of	  representing	  content	  on	  the	  page.	  ‘The	  positive	  of	  poetic	  
expression	  is	  effectively	  eradicated	  by	  the	  negative	  of	  silence.	  Meaning	  serves	  only	  
to	  emphasize	  meaninglessness;	  text	  –	  contrary	  to	  normal	  view	  –	  highlights	  the	  
surrounding	  blankness’	  (Robb,	  1996,	  205).	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  poem	  is	  to	  epitomise	  in	  
miniature	  the	  human	  experience	  of	  being	  held	  in	  the	  clutches	  of	  chaos,	  drifting	  in	  
and	  out	  of	  multiple	  meanings	  as	  well	  as	  meaninglessness.	  
The	  title	  encapsulates	  the	  general	  theme	  of	  the	  poem	  and	  Bowie	  writes	  that	  
it	  ‘may	  be	  paraphrased	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways:	  no	  act	  of	  knowing	  eliminates	  the	  
unknowable;	  no	  would-­‐be	  definitive	  thought	  may	  free	  itself	  from	  contingency;	  no	  
action	  of	  whatever	  kind	  may	  perfectly	  transcend	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  execution’	  
(Bowie,	  1978,	  127).	  The	  science	  of	  probability	  might	  have	  gotten	  closer	  to	  the	  rules	  
of	  nature’s	  own	  games	  of	  chance	  and	  provided	  some	  security	  through	  prediction,	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but	  it	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  annul	  it	  completely.	  The	  last	  line	  of	  the	  poem	  reads:	  
‘Toute	  pensée	  émet	  un	  Coup	  de	  Dés’	  (every	  thought	  emits	  a	  throw	  of	  the	  dice)	  and	  
Bowie	  concludes	  that:	  	  	  	  
	  
Mallarme’s	  ‘hasard’	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  mind	  –	  the	  abidingly	  unstable	  medium	  
of	  thought	  –	  and	  a	  condition	  also	  of	  the	  physical	  universe;	  the	  vulnerable	  and	  
inventive	  self	  which	  is	  seen	  at	  work	  in	  the	  world	  –	  organizing,	  controlling,	  
game-­‐playing,	  living	  against	  the	  odds,	  failing	  and	  starting	  again	  –	  is	  the	  
human	  being	  at	  large.	  […]	  What	  matters	  in	  the	  poem	  is	  the	  necessarily	  
adverse	  conditions	  in	  which	  creative	  human	  gestures	  take	  place,	  and	  the	  
special	  capacity	  of	  mind	  and	  heart	  by	  which	  human	  beings	  are	  equipped	  for	  
this	  unequal	  contest	  (ibid.,	  142).	  
	  
So	  what	  we	  see	  in	  both	  poems	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  modern	  examples	  of	  the	  
depiction	  of	  the	  archetypal	  struggle	  between	  order	  and	  chaos.	  Mallarmé	  perceived	  
chaos	  as	  a	  threat,	  an	  overpowering	  force	  continually	  attempting	  to	  engulf	  those	  tiny	  
dots	  of	  consciousness.	  Yet	  he	  is	  well	  aware	  that	  to	  abolish	  chance	  would	  not	  actually	  
be	  desirable,	  because	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  would	  mean	  to	  eliminate	  all	  possibilities	  
and	  thus	  life	  itself.	  Both	  poems	  are	  attempts	  to	  keep	  the	  fear	  of	  chaos	  and	  the	  
struggle	  with	  chance	  under	  control	  and	  one	  could	  say	  that	  his	  art	  actually	  helped	  
him	  to	  keep	  these	  feelings	  of	  terror	  at	  bay.	  The	  ultimate	  wish	  to	  escape	  from	  the	  
contingency	  of	  existence	  remains	  the	  unattainable	  dream,	  but	  while	  in	  Igitur	  the	  
dichotomy	  between	  Idea	  and	  Act	  still	  leads	  to	  death	  as	  the	  only	  conclusion,	  by	  the	  
time	  Mallarmé	  wrote	  A	  Throw	  of	  the	  Dice	  he	  had	  found	  consolidation	  in	  numbers	  
and	  letters.	  For	  Mallarmé	  poetry	  became	  one	  way	  to	  defeat	  chance,	  because	  
through	  this	  medium	  one	  can	  affix	  the	  chaos	  of	  mental	  activity	  to	  the	  page	  and	  thus	  
order	  and	  control	  it.	  	  
In	  1896	  he	  concluded	  his	  The	  Mystery	  of	  Literature59	  with:	  “le	  hasard	  vaincu	  
mot	  par	  mot”	  (“to	  defeat	  chance	  word	  by	  word”)	  (Mallarmé,	  2007,	  239).	  His	  hopeful	  
goal	  was	  that	  poetry	  could	  counteract	  the	  absurdity	  of	  our	  accidental	  lives.	  He	  even	  
went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say:	  “Tout	  hasard	  doit	  être	  banni	  de	  l'oeuvre	  moderne,	  et	  n’y	  peut	  




pretended	  there”)	  (Sonnenfeld,	  1998,	  114).	  Considering	  the	  kind	  of	  art	  that	  was	  to	  
follow,	  Mallarmé’s	  plea	  not	  only	  remained	  unheard	  but	  on	  the	  contrary,	  chance	  
began	  to	  receive	  more	  attention	  than	  ever	  before	  and	  it	  quickly	  established	  itself	  as	  
an	  important	  and	  powerful	  tool	  of	  Modern	  art.	  In	  Dadaism	  and	  Surrealism	  the	  
preoccupation	  with	  the	  continuing	  struggle	  of	  chaos	  and	  order	  remained	  an	  
underlying	  metaphysical	  theme	  and	  Mallarmé’s	  incantations	  to	  keep	  chance	  at	  bay	  
and	  to	  control	  its	  destructive	  influence	  on	  reality	  through	  the	  fixation	  of	  mental	  
activity	  into	  poetry	  were	  generally	  replaced	  by	  the	  view	  that	  chance	  would	  actually	  
bring	  relief	  from	  this	  absurdity	  of	  life.	  	  
	  
	  
1.2.	  Zürich	  Dada	  	  
	  
The	  radically	  new	  style	  applied	  by	  Mallarmé	  in	  his	  last	  poem	  and	  his	  
preoccupation	  with	  the	  absurd,	  chaos	  and	  chance	  are	  also	  found	  in	  later	  movements	  
such	  as	  Dada,	  Cubism,	  Surrealism	  and	  Futurism.	  If	  he	  wasn’t	  always	  directly	  
influential,	  then	  he	  can	  at	  least	  in	  retrospect	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  intellectual	  
predecessors	  who	  anticipated	  the	  mood	  that	  moved	  these	  later	  generations	  of	  
artists.	  However,	  the	  metaphysical	  struggle	  explored	  by	  Mallarmé	  was	  generally	  not	  
accompanied	  by	  the	  same	  feeling	  of	  terror.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  against	  the	  outer	  agony	  
of	  war	  and	  constraining	  social	  conditions,	  chance	  was	  seen	  as	  one	  resource	  to	  
confront	  these	  threatening	  and	  chaotic	  forces.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  through	  these	  
differing	  entry	  points	  these	  artists	  come	  to	  varying	  outcomes	  too.	  In	  Dada	  then	  the	  
intentional	  use	  of	  chance	  for	  creative	  purposes	  comes	  to	  its	  first	  fruition.	  	  
It	  is	  commonly	  agreed	  that	  Dada	  was	  founded	  by	  Tristan	  Tzara,	  Hugo	  Ball,	  
Emmy	  Hennings,	  Hans	  Arp,	  Marcel	  Janco	  and	  Richard	  Huelsenbeck	  in	  Zürich	  in	  1916.	  
Dada	  had	  other	  important	  centres	  of	  activity,	  most	  notably	  in	  Berlin,	  New	  York,	  Köln	  
and	  Paris,	  but	  here	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  the	  Zürich	  artists.	  Dada	  is	  very	  much	  a	  child	  
of	  its	  time	  and	  arose	  from	  the	  artists’	  discontent	  with	  contemporary	  society	  and	  the	  
commercialisation	  of	  art,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  war.	  In	  retrospect,	  Tzara	  
and	  Arp,	  independently	  from	  each	  other,	  identified	  Dada	  as	  an	  attempted	  moral	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revolution	  which	  had	  the	  aim	  of	  calling	  conventional	  art	  and	  bourgeois	  beliefs	  into	  
question,	  by	  confronting	  mainstream	  society	  with	  unreason	  and	  what	  they	  called	  
anti-­‐art.	  Their	  artworks	  and	  performances	  were	  meant	  to	  “shock”	  audiences,	  with	  
the	  hope	  of	  moving	  them	  out	  of	  their	  comfort	  zones	  and	  their	  lethargy	  and	  into	  a	  
more	  appropriate	  state	  of	  response	  to	  the	  meaningless	  tragedy	  that	  was	  happening	  
all	  around	  them.	  In	  the	  following	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  their	  literary	  works,	  which	  are	  
generally	  far	  less	  known	  than	  their	  visual	  artwork.	  
Similar	  to	  Mallarmé,	  they	  viewed	  chaos	  as	  the	  overpowering	  principle	  of	  
existence	  in	  which	  ‘logic	  is	  always	  false.	  It	  draws	  the	  superficial	  threads	  of	  concepts	  
and	  words	  towards	  illusory	  conclusions	  and	  centres’	  (Tzara,	  1977,	  11).	  However,	  
contrary	  to	  Mallarmé,	  they	  generally	  welcomed	  the	  chaotic	  as	  a	  way	  to	  mirror	  what	  
humans	  had	  already	  done	  to	  themselves	  and	  the	  world.	  In	  1918	  Tzara	  published	  the	  
Dada	  Manifesto	  1918	  in	  which	  he	  declared:	  ‘We	  are	  like	  a	  raging	  wind	  that	  rips	  up	  
the	  clothes	  of	  clouds	  and	  prayers,	  we	  are	  preparing	  the	  great	  spectacle	  of	  disaster,	  
conflagration	  and	  decomposition’	  (Tzara,	  1977,	  8)	  and	  ‘What	  we	  need	  are	  strong,	  
straightforward,	  precise	  works	  which	  will	  be	  forever	  misunderstood.	  Logic	  is	  
complication.	  Logic	  is	  always	  false’	  (ibid.,	  10-­‐11).	  Every	  artist	  had	  his	  or	  her	  own	  take	  
on	  this	  basic	  maxim	  and	  while	  for	  some	  the	  purpose	  of	  their	  art	  was	  reached	  by	  
destruction	  and	  nihilism	  alone,	  there	  was	  another	  camp	  that	  sought	  to	  see	  
transformation	  and	  rebirth	  emerge	  from	  the	  ashes	  of	  obsolete	  and	  poisonous	  
cultural	  habits.	  Hence	  the	  way	  chance	  had	  been	  embedded	  in	  their	  agendas	  differs	  
to	  some	  degrees	  too.	  While	  by	  1918	  Tzara	  and	  Picabia	  had	  become	  more	  
disillusioned	  and	  thus	  propagated	  a	  more	  forcefully	  nihilistic	  outlook,	  other	  artists	  
such	  as	  Ball,	  Arp	  and	  Richter	  continued	  to	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  subsequent	  
renewal.	  Yet	  both	  were	  kept	  united	  in	  the	  propagation	  of	  non-­‐sense,	  the	  absurd	  and	  
the	  attempt	  to	  merge	  anarchy	  and	  art	  ‘to	  annihilate	  “the	  language	  by	  which	  the	  war	  
was	  justified”’	  (Varisco,	  2001,	  280).	  As	  the	  polar	  opposite	  to	  logic	  and	  its	  association	  
with	  lawlessness,	  chance	  was	  made	  one	  of	  their	  key	  tools	  used	  to	  undermine	  the	  




1.3.	  Tristan	  Tzara:	  Honouring	  the	  Purely	  Chaotic	  
	  
In	  his	  Manifesto	  Tzara	  also	  wrote:	  ‘How	  can	  anyone	  hope	  to	  order	  the	  chaos	  
that	  constitutes	  that	  infinite,	  formless	  variation:	  man?’	  (Tzara,	  1977,	  5).	  He	  heralded	  
the	  destructive	  force	  of	  chaos	  and	  saw	  Dada’s	  mission	  in	  accelerating	  the	  
fragmentation	  by	  introducing	  even	  more	  chaos	  into	  society,	  art,	  language	  and	  
aesthetics.	  With	  regard	  to	  language,	  Tzara	  was	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  
so	  difficult	  for	  words	  to	  be	  freed	  from	  their	  meanings	  and	  common	  associations.	  In	  
order	  to	  circumvent	  these	  he	  decided	  to	  take	  another	  step	  back	  and	  began	  to	  create	  
poems	  that	  were	  made	  up	  of	  words	  chopped	  into	  syllables,	  only	  individual	  sounds.	  
As	  another	  method	  to	  liberate	  words	  he	  decided	  to	  randomly	  assemble	  them	  into	  
non-­‐sense	  sentences.	  In	  To	  make	  a	  Dadaist	  Poem	  (1920)	  Tzara	  gave	  the	  following	  
instructions:	  	  
	  
Take	  a	  newspaper.	  
Take	  some	  scissors.	  
Choose	  from	  this	  paper	  an	  article	  the	  length	  you	  want	  to	  make	  your	  poem.	  
Cut	  out	  the	  article.	  
Next	  carefully	  cut	  out	  each	  of	  the	  words	  that	  make	  up	  this	  article	  and	  put	  them	  all	  in	  
a	  bag.	  
Shake	  gently.	  
Next	  take	  out	  each	  cutting	  one	  after	  the	  other.	  
Copy	  conscientiously	  in	  the	  order	  in	  which	  they	  left	  the	  bag.	  
The	  poem	  will	  resemble	  you.	  
And	  there	  you	  are—an	  infinitely	  original	  author	  of	  charming	  sensibility,	  even	  though	  
unappreciated	  by	  the	  vulgar	  herd.	  
	  
Thus	  the	  cut-­‐up	  technique	  was	  officially	  born.	  It	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  powerful	  
weapon	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  contemporary	  reason	  and	  causality.	  Tzara	  adhered	  to	  
this	  practice	  in	  the	  strictest	  sense	  and	  wouldn’t	  reassemble	  any	  of	  the	  lines	  as	  they	  
were	  spontaneously	  created	  by	  chance.	  It	  allowed	  the	  text	  a	  more	  independent	  
presence	  and	  his	  interference	  would	  only	  have	  disturbed	  the	  initial	  and	  ultimate	  
chaos	  that	  he	  was	  seeking	  in	  these	  pure	  chance	  poems.	  For	  Tzara	  this	  was	  the	  only	  
logical-­‐illogical	  conclusion	  that	  he	  could	  draw	  from	  his	  venture.	  Applied	  in	  this	  way	  
chance	  became	  a	  ‘technique	  for	  producing	  semiotic	  indeterminacy’	  (Sheppard,	  
2000,	  196).	  Duchamp’s	  Three	  Stoppages,	  Man	  Ray’s	  rayographs	  or	  Picabia’s	  La	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Sainte	  Vierge	  are	  other	  examples	  in	  which	  chance	  had	  been	  employed	  in	  similar	  
ways.	  
Another	  aleatory	  technique	  practiced	  together	  by	  Tzara,	  Huelsenbeck	  and	  
Janco	  was	  the	  recital	  of	  so-­‐called	  simultaneous	  poems	  where	  each	  of	  them	  recited	  a	  
different	  text	  in	  French,	  English	  and	  German.	  Each	  text	  was	  composed	  of	  snippets	  of	  
poetry,	  newspapers,	  letters,	  popular	  songs	  and	  pure	  sounds.	  The	  recital	  was	  
accompanied	  by	  the	  noise	  of	  drums,	  whistles	  and	  laughter.	  The	  thus	  created	  sound	  
wave	  of	  chaos,	  which	  forcefully	  swept	  over	  the	  audience,	  was	  meant	  to	  inspire	  the	  
listener	  to	  abandon	  oneself	  to	  unreason	  and	  to	  transcend	  conventionality.	  ‘“Chance	  
is	  a	  favourite	  weapon	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  against	  ‘the	  seduction	  to	  always	  use	  the	  
same	  kind	  of	  sentences’.”	  With	  the	  options	  of	  either	  chance	  selection	  or	  chance	  
combination	  of	  material,	  it	  is	  the	  second	  that	  the	  Dadaists	  forge	  into	  the	  spearhead	  
of	  their	  attack’	  (Watts,	  1980,	  3).	  
	  
	  
1.4.	  Hans	  Arp:	  Seeking	  Renewal	  out	  of	  Destruction	  
	  
Out	  of	  all	  the	  Dadaists	  Hans	  Arp	  has	  become	  most	  prominently	  associated	  
with	  the	  use	  of	  chance,	  which	  is	  probably	  due	  to	  his	  declaration	  to	  have	  discovered	  
‘das	  Gesetz	  des	  Zufalls’	  (the	  law	  of	  chance).	  It	  happened	  on	  a	  day	  in	  1916	  while	  
working	  on	  a	  drawing.	  He	  struggled	  to	  find	  the	  right	  expression	  and	  after	  many	  
failed	  attempts	  he	  got	  so	  frustrated	  that	  he	  ripped	  the	  paper	  into	  small	  pieces	  and	  
threw	  them	  on	  the	  floor.	  When	  he	  looked	  at	  the	  arrangement	  of	  fragments	  he	  
realised	  to	  his	  delight	  that	  the	  pieces	  had	  fallen	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  now	  formed	  
the	  expression	  he	  had	  been	  looking	  for.	  This	  was	  a	  pivotal	  experience	  for	  Arp	  and	  
from	  then	  on	  chance	  formed	  a	  crucial	  element	  within	  his	  worldview	  as	  well	  as	  
working	  practice.	  He	  started	  to	  use	  chance	  as	  a	  deliberate	  tool	  to	  create	  new,	  
unexpected	  meaning	  in	  all	  forms	  of	  his	  artwork	  such	  as	  poetry,	  sculpture,	  painting	  




We	  [him	  and	  his	  wife	  Sophie	  Taeuber]	  rejected	  everything	  that	  was	  a	  copy	  or	  
description,	  and	  allowed	  the	  Elementary	  and	  Spontaneous	  to	  react	  in	  full	  
freedom.	  Since	  the	  disposition	  of	  planes,	  and	  the	  proportions	  and	  colors	  of	  
these	  planes	  seemed	  to	  depend	  purely	  on	  chance,	  I	  declared	  that	  these	  
works,	  like	  nature,	  were	  ordered	  “according	  to	  the	  law	  of	  chance,”	  chance	  
being	  for	  me	  merely	  a	  limited	  part	  of	  an	  unfathomable	  raison	  d’être,	  of	  an	  
order	  inaccessible	  in	  its	  totality	  (Arp,	  1948,	  40).	  
	  
What	  the	  Surrealists	  should	  later	  call	  ‘automatic	  writing’	  was	  also	  already	  
practiced	  by	  the	  Dadaists.	  From	  1917	  onwards	  Arp	  wrote	  a	  series	  of	  automatic	  
poems	  that	  he	  collected	  under	  the	  title	  Wolkenpumpen	  (Cloud	  Pumps)	  in	  which	  he	  
sought	  to	  let	  reality	  and	  chance	  develop	  unrestrictedly.	  He	  also	  obscured	  his	  
handwriting	  in	  order	  to	  let	  the	  printer	  use	  his	  imagination	  in	  guessing	  what	  Arp	  had	  
written.	  He	  liked	  the	  idea	  of	  this	  unwitting	  collaborative	  effort	  and	  to	  his	  delight	  it	  
worked	  and	  the	  poems	  were	  thus	  further	  distorted	  by	  chance	  (Watts,	  1980,	  74).	  In	  
1919	  the	  poem	  Die	  Hyperbel	  vom	  Krokodilcoiffeur	  und	  dem	  Spazierstock	  (The	  
Hyperbole	  of	  the	  Crocodile’s	  Hairdresser	  and	  the	  Walking-­‐Stick)	  was	  spontaneously	  
written	  in	  collaboration	  with	  Tzara	  and	  Walter	  Serner.	  Another	  selection	  of	  poems	  
called	  Arpaden	  was	  created	  by	  either	  marking	  words	  and	  sentences	  in	  newspapers	  
and	  other	  texts	  while	  blindfolded,	  or	  cut-­‐ups	  were	  selected	  and	  arranged	  
automatically	  without	  conscious	  choice.	  It	  appealed	  to	  Arp	  that	  this	  way	  the	  artist	  
stepped	  behind	  the	  work,	  which	  in	  turn	  gained	  more	  independence	  and	  individuality	  
separate	  from	  him.	  	  
Furthermore,	  he	  felt	  that	  in	  these	  works	  ‘art	  and	  life	  were	  reunited’	  and	  ‘the	  
ephemeral	  nature	  of	  the	  news	  printed	  daily	  was	  an	  adequate	  expression	  of	  the	  
transitory	  nature	  of	  life	  itself’	  (Watts,	  1980,	  70).	  However,	  unlike	  Tzara	  who	  
preferred	  to	  leave	  the	  pure	  chance	  structures	  unaltered,	  Arp	  only	  used	  them	  as	  a	  
starting	  point	  before	  consciously	  adapting	  and	  rearranging	  the	  material	  until	  new	  
and	  unexpected	  contexts	  were	  created	  and	  the	  meaning	  was	  no	  longer	  wholly	  
arbitrary.	  Arp	  accepted	  the	  artist	  as	  part	  of	  the	  process	  as	  long	  as	  his	  contributions	  
were	  made	  in	  a	  natural,	  unobtrusive	  way.	  His	  poems	  are	  therefore	  not	  only	  a	  lot	  
easier	  to	  read	  than	  Tzara’s	  but	  also	  stimulate	  images	  and	  associations	  which	  can	  be	  
more	  readily	  strung	  into	  an	  admittedly	  weird	  but	  interesting	  storyline.	  Overall,	  his	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Dadaist	  poetry	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  wonderfully	  refreshing	  lightness	  and	  playfulness.	  They	  
are	  full	  of	  puns,	  ambiguity	  and	  innovation	  in	  imagery	  and	  style.	  	  
For	  Arp	  the	  law	  of	  chance	  was	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  his	  philosophy	  of	  wholeness	  
and	  he	  declared	  that	  it	  ‘embraces	  all	  laws	  and	  is	  unfathomable	  like	  the	  first	  cause	  
from	  which	  all	  life	  arises,	  [it]	  can	  only	  be	  experienced	  through	  complete	  devotion	  to	  
the	  unconscious.	  I	  maintained	  that	  anyone	  who	  followed	  this	  law	  was	  creating	  pure	  
life’	  (Arp,	  1948,	  77).	  His	  recognition	  of	  chance’s	  power	  and	  influence	  was	  coupled	  
with	  the	  acceptance	  that	  humans	  will	  never	  be	  fully	  in	  control.	  In	  fact	  Arp	  was	  very	  
outspoken	  against	  the	  conception	  that	  man	  formed,	  god-­‐like,	  the	  crown	  of	  creation.	  
Instead	  he	  turned	  to	  Heraclitus’	  concept	  of	  ‘universal	  flux,	  the	  eternal	  alteration	  
between	  the	  crystallization	  and	  disintegration	  of	  form’	  (Watts,	  1980,	  129).	  He	  saw	  
man’s	  task	  to	  accept	  his	  place	  as	  only	  one	  element	  within	  the	  vast	  expanse	  of	  the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  universe,	  into	  which	  he	  is	  meant	  to	  join	  in	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  
dominate	  or	  work	  against	  it.	  In	  acceptance	  of	  this	  fluidity,	  change	  and	  
transformation	  he	  also	  allowed	  his	  artworks	  to	  grow	  over	  time.	  He	  would	  sometimes	  
come	  back	  to	  his	  poems	  and	  insert	  new	  elements;	  he	  wouldn’t	  alter	  what	  already	  
existed,	  but	  extend	  parts	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  natural	  evolution	  his	  thinking	  had	  
taken	  in	  the	  meantime.	  	  
For	  Arp	  it	  was	  furthermore	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  ever	  quicker	  
‘changing	  constellations	  of	  forces’	  in	  society	  and	  politics	  ‘required	  human	  beings	  to	  
respond	  spontaneously,	  in	  defiance	  of	  convention,	  using	  the	  most	  “primitive”	  
(fundamental)	  powers	  of	  their	  personality’	  (Sheppard,	  2000,	  184).	  Thus	  Arp	  
considered	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  the	  modern	  malady	  arose	  from	  man’s	  inability	  to	  
remain	  open	  to	  this	  spontaneity.	  Instead	  he	  saw	  that	  these	  rapid	  changes	  led	  to	  
fear,	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  more	  conservatism.	  He	  lamented	  that	  through	  the	  ages	  
man’s	  rational	  ego	  had	  started	  to	  believe	  	  	  	  
	  
itself	  to	  be	  detached	  from	  the	  surrounding	  universe,	  it	  inevitably	  imposed	  
abstractly	  conceived	  schemes	  upon	  the	  flux	  of	  Nature	  that	  took	  no	  account	  
of	  the	  patterns	  immanent	  within	  that	  flux.	  Although	  such	  schemes	  appeared	  
to	  be	  to	  human	  advantage	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  they	  inevitably	  went	  wrong	  as	  




He	  viewed	  these	  developments	  with	  worry	  but	  still	  hoped,	  naively	  as	  he	  would	  later	  
reflect,	  that	  they	  could	  counteract	  these	  movements	  with	  their	  art.	  In	  Dadaland	  he	  
wrote:	  “While	  the	  guns	  rumbled	  in	  the	  distance,	  we	  sang,	  painted,	  made	  collages	  
and	  wrote	  poems	  with	  all	  our	  might.	  We	  were	  seeking	  an	  art	  based	  on	  
fundamentals,	  to	  cure	  the	  madness	  of	  the	  age	  of	  a	  new	  order	  of	  things	  that	  would	  
restore	  the	  balance	  between	  heaven	  and	  hell”	  (in	  Short,	  1980,	  76).	  
The	  artist	  will	  never	  be	  in	  full	  control	  of	  the	  materials	  that	  he	  manipulates.	  
Arp	  therefore	  liked	  to	  leave	  room	  for	  the	  contingent	  in	  order	  to	  create	  together	  with	  
the	  forces	  around	  him.	  While	  for	  other	  Dadaists	  chance	  might	  have	  been	  a	  welcome	  
addition	  to	  the	  way	  they	  worked	  without	  further	  reflecting	  on	  it,	  for	  Arp	  this	  
collaboration	  with	  chance	  as	  an	  external	  force	  of	  nature	  was	  a	  very	  deliberate	  one.	  
His	  use	  of	  chance	  can	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  form	  of	  humility	  towards	  nature’s	  ways.	  
Here	  the	  Romantic	  influence	  comes	  through	  since	  he	  so	  clearly	  subscribed	  to	  
Novalis’	  idea	  of	  nature’s	  “Wunderschrift”,	  the	  wondrous	  pattern	  language	  of	  nature	  
in	  which	  “Geist”	  (spirit)	  is	  revealed.	  Though	  man	  has	  forgotten	  to	  read	  this	  language	  
and	  the	  patterns	  thus	  remain	  largely	  without	  meaning.	  In	  his	  artwork	  Arp	  sought	  to	  
create	  such	  natural	  patterns	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  it	  might	  teach	  us	  to	  find	  this	  spirit	  
again.	  He	  wrote:	  “Wir	  wollen	  nicht	  die	  Natur	  nachahmen.	  Wir	  wollen	  nicht	  abbilden,	  
wir	  wollen	  bilden.	  Wir	  wollen	  bilden,	  wie	  die	  Pflanze	  ihre	  Frucht	  bildet,	  und	  nicht	  
abbilden.	  Wir	  wollen	  unmittelbar	  und	  nicht	  mittelbar	  bilden”	  (in	  Zuch,	  2004,	  224).60	  
Zuch	  mentions	  that	  Jung	  had	  a	  similar	  conception	  of	  nature	  and	  that	  both	  might	  
have	  been	  influenced	  by	  Schelling	  and	  Worringer	  in	  this	  respect	  (ibid.,	  226).61	  	  	  
Arp	  also	  rejected	  the	  division	  between	  art	  and	  nature.	  For	  him	  they	  were	  not	  
opposites	  but	  different	  parts	  coming	  from	  the	  same	  source.	  His	  conviction	  that	  art	  
was	  not	  artificial,	  but	  purely	  natural,	  is	  particularly	  visible	  in	  his	  sculptures	  which	  are	  
dominated	  by	  rounded	  edges,	  giving	  them	  a	  very	  fluid	  and	  self-­‐contained	  
appearance.	  In	  connection	  to	  this,	  chance	  helped	  him	  to	  observe	  and	  to	  accept	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  “We	  don’t	  want	  to	  imitate	  nature.	  We	  don’t	  want	  to	  copy,	  we	  want	  to	  create.	  We	  want	  to	  create	  like	  the	  
plant	  creates	  its	  fruit,	  and	  we	  don’t	  want	  to	  reproduce.	  We	  want	  to	  create	  directly	  and	  not	  indirectly”	  (own	  
translation).	  61	  ‘The	  products	  of	  the	  unconscious	  are	  pure	  nature.	  Naturam	  si	  sequemur	  ducem,	  nunquam	  aberrabimus	  (“If	  
we	  take	  Nature	  for	  our	  guide,	  we	  shall	  never	  go	  astray”),	  said	  the	  ancients.	  But	  nature	  is	  not,	  in	  herself,	  a	  guide,	  
for	  she	  is	  not	  there	  for	  man’s	  sake.	  It	  [the	  unconscious]	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  source	  of	  symbols,	  but	  with	  the	  
necessary	  conscious	  correction	  that	  has	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  every	  natural	  phenomenon	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  serve	  our	  
purpose’	  (CW	  10,	  par.	  34).	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unfolding	  larger	  than	  himself	  and	  to	  incorporate	  this	  dynamic	  into	  his	  own	  creative	  
process.	  Through	  Arp’s	  art	  one	  encounters	  a	  chance	  that	  is	  not	  only	  perceived	  as	  
chaotic,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ordered,	  where	  apparent	  disorder	  is	  actually	  
immanently	  structured.	  The	  worldview	  of	  a	  mechanical	  clockwork	  universe	  
structured	  by	  rigid	  regularity	  is	  rejected	  and	  for	  Arp	  there	  exist	  ridges	  and	  bumps	  
that	  will	  lead	  evolution	  into	  virginal	  and	  unanticipated	  directions.	  Art’s	  task	  is	  to	  
capture	  this	  transformation	  and	  to	  accept	  that	  chance	  contains	  a	  necessity	  which,	  at	  
first	  or	  for	  all	  times,	  exists	  on	  a	  larger	  scale	  than	  human	  consciousness	  can	  ever	  
control	  or	  comprehend.	  Chance	  became	  the	  most	  suitable	  tool	  to	  free	  the	  artist	  
from	  established	  Western	  aesthetic	  traditions	  and	  the	  technique	  of	  automatism	  
even	  enabled	  the	  artist	  to	  bypass	  these	  internalised	  cultural	  habits.	  In	  regard	  to	  
arranging	  his	  materials	  automatically	  Arp	  concluded:	  ‘The	  “law	  of	  chance,”	  which	  
embraces	  all	  laws	  and	  is	  unfathomable	  like	  the	  first	  cause	  from	  which	  all	  life	  arises,	  
can	  only	  be	  experienced	  through	  complete	  devotion	  to	  the	  unconscious.	  I	  




1.5.	  Hans	  Richter:	  The	  Secret	  Purpose	  of	  Regaining	  the	  Numinous	  
	  
While	  Hans	  Richter	  was	  a	  visual	  artist	  and	  film	  maker,	  he	  will	  still	  be	  included	  
here	  because	  he	  left	  some	  interesting	  reflections	  on	  chance	  in	  Dada,	  particularly	  in	  
his	  book	  ‘Dada:	  Art	  and	  Anti-­‐Art’	  (1964).	  Richter	  could	  be	  described	  as	  the	  most	  
mystical	  of	  the	  Dadaists	  and	  in	  him	  we	  also	  find	  the	  most	  direct	  connections	  to	  Jung.	  
For	  Richter,	  Dada	  was	  not	  nihilism,	  but	  a	  ‘meaningful,	  necessary	  and	  life-­‐giving’	  
enterprise.	  This	  meant,	  above	  all,	  to	  overcome	  conventions	  and	  their	  seductions	  by	  
being	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  realms	  of	  the	  Unknown	  within	  and	  without	  and	  to	  harvest	  
its	  fruits	  for	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  whole.	  Reflecting	  on	  Arp’s	  discovery	  of	  
the	  law	  of	  chance,	  he	  wonders:	  ‘Was	  it	  the	  artist’s	  unconscious	  mind,	  or	  a	  power	  
outside	  him,	  that	  had	  spoken?	  Was	  a	  mysterious	  ‘collaborator’	  at	  work,	  a	  power	  in	  
which	  one	  could	  place	  one’s	  trust?	  Was	  it	  a	  part	  of	  oneself,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	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factors	  quite	  beyond	  anyone’s	  control?’	  (1964,	  50).	  He	  continues	  that	  the	  Dadaists	  
concluded	  from	  this	  ‘that	  chance	  must	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  new	  stimulus	  to	  artistic	  
creation.	  This	  may	  well	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  central	  experience	  of	  Dada,	  that	  which	  
marks	  it	  off	  from	  all	  preceding	  artistic	  movements’	  (ibid.).	  	  
For	  Richter	  chance	  was	  not	  an	  external	  force	  of	  the	  outside	  world,	  but	  the	  
voice	  of	  the	  unconscious	  mind	  at	  large,	  the	  collective	  unconscious,	  so	  to	  speak.	  ‘For	  
us,	  chance	  was	  the	  ‘unconscious	  mind’	  that	  Freud	  had	  discovered	  in	  1900’	  (Richter,	  
1964,	  57).	  The	  individual	  consciousness	  is	  embedded	  within	  this	  larger	  order,	  which	  
remains	  beyond	  conscious	  comprehension.	  Like	  Cabot,	  he	  argued	  that	  to	  accept	  
chance	  and	  to	  ‘integrate	  it	  into	  everyday	  experience’	  (Richter,	  1971,	  108)	  was	  thus	  
the	  natural	  goal	  for	  him:	  	  
	  
[To	  see]	  chance	  [as]	  a	  personal	  matter.	  An	  arrangement	  without	  cause	  is,	  as	  
Jung	  calls	  it	  –	  Chance	  –	  but	  it	  is	  still	  the	  individual,	  the	  author,	  who	  accepts	  
this	  offering	  at	  the	  moment.	  So	  chance	  can	  be	  offered	  to	  you	  a	  hundred	  
times,	  and	  you	  don’t	  make	  anything	  of	  it.	  And	  then,	  another	  time,	  it	  clicks	  
(ibid.).	  
	  
The	  chance	  event	  that	  the	  artist	  encounters	  is	  thus	  a	  very	  personal	  one	  and	  one’s	  
subjective	  elaboration	  of	  it	  is	  what	  becomes	  the	  visible	  piece	  of	  art.	  These	  artworks	  
formed	  a	  particular	  union	  of	  chance	  and	  design,	  reflecting	  the	  movement	  of	  human	  
life.	  He	  wrote	  that	  on	  the	  whole	  ‘Dada	  throve	  on	  the	  resulting	  tension	  between	  
premeditation	  and	  spontaneity,	  or	  […]	  between	  art	  and	  anti-­‐art,	  volition	  and	  non-­‐
volition’	  (Richter,	  1964,	  60).	  The	  attempt	  to	  fully	  accept	  this	  dichotomy	  often	  
created	  a	  conflict	  within	  the	  artist.	  For	  Richter	  himself,	  this	  resulted	  in	  his	  black-­‐and-­‐
white	  series	  in	  which	  for	  him	  opposites	  could	  enter	  into	  a	  dynamic	  but	  harmonising	  
interplay.	  Because	  human	  consciousness	  is	  inclined	  to	  order	  things,	  chance	  can	  give	  
a	  refreshing	  variety	  to	  this	  order.	  	  
Like	  Arp,	  Richter	  lamented	  that	  contingence	  as	  ‘the	  unity	  of	  opposites’	  
seemed	  to	  have	  been	  largely	  forgotten	  in	  the	  ‘scientific	  and	  technological	  age’	  and	  
since	  he	  was	  also	  engaged	  in	  political	  activism,	  he	  considered	  the	  promotion	  of	  
chance	  as	  a	  revolutionary	  statement	  against	  the	  alleged	  reasons	  for	  war.	  
‘Contingence	  constituted	  an	  essential	  principle	  of	  life	  and	  of	  experience,	  and	  that	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reason	  with	  all	  its	  consequences	  was	  inseparable	  from	  unreason	  with	  all	  its	  
consequences’	  (Richter,	  1964,	  64).	  Thus	  again	  chance	  became	  a	  tool	  to	  advance	  a	  
return	  to	  a	  more	  humane	  world	  in	  which	  spontaneity,	  free	  play	  and	  creativity	  could	  
fully	  unfold.	  It	  was	  meant	  to	  allow	  to	  ‘transcend	  the	  barriers	  of	  causality	  and	  
conscious	  volition,	  and	  by	  which	  the	  inner	  eye	  and	  ear	  became	  more	  acute’	  (ibid.,	  
57).	  	  
As	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  chance	  was	  also	  embedded	  in	  deep	  metaphysics	  for	  
Richter.	  The	  question	  ‘What	  is	  chance?’	  wouldn’t	  disappear,	  especially	  since	  its	  
presence	  only	  became	  more	  evident	  as	  one	  dared	  to	  look.	  Like	  Arp,	  Richter	  was	  also	  
interested	  in	  Eastern	  philosophy	  and	  showed	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  I	  Ching.	  He	  was	  thus	  
aware	  that	  the	  more	  holistic	  worldview	  of	  the	  East	  was	  still	  much	  more	  connected	  
with	  the	  concept	  of	  chance’s	  place	  in	  the	  greater	  order	  of	  things.	  Reflecting	  back	  he	  
wrote:	  ‘We	  were	  concerned	  with	  chance	  as	  a	  mental	  phenomenon.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  
later	  that	  I	  discovered	  that	  psychologists,	  philosophers	  and	  scientists	  were	  facing	  the	  
same	  intractable	  problem	  at	  the	  same	  time’	  (ibid.,	  56),	  thus	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  
time	  seemed	  to	  have	  been	  ripe	  for	  the	  West	  to	  (re-­‐)value	  chance.	  In	  retrospect	  he	  
also	  recognised	  the	  close	  affinity	  with	  Jung‘s	  concept	  of	  synchronicity	  which	  he	  
described	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
This	  order	  [referring	  to	  acausal	  orderedness]	  independent	  of	  causality	  is	  not,	  
according	  to	  Jung,	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  God	  standing	  outside	  the	  world,	  but	  
as	  the	  momentary	  pattern	  formed	  by	  a	  continually-­‐changing	  order	  whose	  
shape	  at	  any	  given	  moment	  includes	  every	  human	  being,	  every	  animal,	  every	  
blade	  of	  grass,	  every	  cloud,	  every	  star.	  The	  duty	  of	  man,	  as	  distinguished	  
from	  the	  animal	  or	  the	  blade	  of	  grass,	  would	  thus	  be	  to	  be	  conscious	  of	  this	  
order,	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  this	  continuous	  act	  of	  creation,	  and	  to	  achieve,	  
through	  meditation,	  intuition	  and	  concentration,	  complete	  identity	  with	  the	  
orderedness	  which	  has	  no	  cause	  (ibid.,	  57).	  
	  
Though	  Jung	  would	  probably	  not	  have	  approved	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘complete	  identity’,	  
they	  were	  united	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  chance	  was	  significant	  for	  artistic	  and	  personal	  
growth.	  What	  is	  more,	  he	  admitted	  that	  for	  him	  chance	  also	  had	  a	  secret	  purpose:	  
‘By	  appealing	  directly	  to	  the	  unconscious,	  which	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  chance,	  we	  
sought	  to	  restore	  to	  the	  work	  of	  art	  something	  of	  the	  numinous	  quality	  of	  which	  art	  
has	  been	  the	  vehicle	  since	  time	  immemorial,	  an	  incantatory	  power	  that	  we	  seek,	  in	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this	  age	  of	  general	  unbelief,	  more	  than	  ever	  before’	  (ibid.,	  59).	  The	  similarities	  
between	  Jung	  and	  the	  Dadaists,	  and	  later	  Breton,	  are	  undeniable.	  However	  the	  
affinity	  is	  usually	  analysed	  as	  a	  possible	  influence	  of	  Jung	  on	  the	  artists,	  while	  his	  
writings	  on	  synchronicity,	  for	  example,	  were	  not	  published	  until	  much	  later.	  The	  
question	  should	  therefore	  rather	  be,	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  Jung	  influenced	  by	  the	  
Dadaists,	  whose	  notoriety	  in	  Zürich	  he	  could	  not	  wholly	  have	  escaped?	  	  
Even	  from	  this	  small	  selection	  of	  artists,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  chance	  takes	  
on	  a	  slightly	  different	  meaning	  for	  each	  of	  them.	  Yet	  Dada	  can	  broadly	  be	  divided	  
into	  two	  main	  camps	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  chance.	  The	  first	  group	  is	  
primarily	  concerned	  with	  chance	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  chaotic.	  Achieving	  
indeterminacy	  through	  chance	  processes	  already	  constitutes	  the	  goal.	  Tzara,	  
Duchamp	  and	  Picabia	  are	  probably	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  Dadaists	  that	  can	  be	  
counted	  in	  this	  category.	  In	  the	  other	  camp	  one	  finds	  for	  example	  Arp,	  Richter	  and	  
Ball,	  who	  aimed	  beyond	  the	  chaos	  towards	  a	  new	  order.62	  	  The	  Surrealist	  André	  
Breton	  is	  another	  artist,	  who	  clearly	  belonged	  to	  the	  second	  camp.	  His	  fascination	  
with	  chance	  only	  grew	  over	  time	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  his	  thoughts	  on	  the	  subject	  
can	  be	  tracked	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  his	  writings.	  In	  Breton	  one	  finds	  a	  fascinating	  
example	  of	  how	  chance	  was	  first	  used	  as	  a	  compositional	  tool	  to	  enlarge	  the	  
arbitrary	  in	  art.	  Later	  he	  also	  developed	  a	  new	  theory	  of	  chance	  and	  his	  writings	  
shall	  therefore	  be	  analysed	  in	  depth	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  part.	  	  
	  
	  
2.	  The	  Surrealism	  of	  André	  Breton	  
2.1.	  Establishing	  Basic	  Premises	  through	  Important	  Influences	  
	  
Dada	  is	  often	  considered	  the	  major	  precursor	  to	  Surrealism,	  but	  according	  to	  
Short	  (1980,	  76)	  many	  of	  Surrealism’s	  major	  principles	  had	  already	  formed	  before	  
Dada	  arrived	  in	  Paris	  and	  its	  overall	  influence	  on	  Surrealism	  was	  more	  limited	  than	  is	  
often	  thought.	  The	  Dada	  that	  finally	  reached	  André	  Breton,	  Louis	  Aragon	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  See	  also	  Watts	  (1980,	  4)	  and	  Sheppard	  (2000,	  196).	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Philippe	  Soupault	  in	  Paris	  in	  1919	  was	  mainly	  communicated	  through	  Tzara	  and	  his	  
Dada	  Manifesto.	  By	  1918	  Tzara	  and	  Picabia	  had	  become	  exceedingly	  disillusioned	  
and	  thus	  propagated	  ‘a	  deliberately	  anarchic,	  disorganised	  and	  incoherent	  Dada	  and	  
it	  was	  this	  mode	  of	  Dada	  which	  was	  to	  impose	  itself	  in	  Paris’	  (Short,	  1980,	  76).	  Short	  
(2001)	  furthermore	  argues	  that	  they	  had	  largely	  missed	  what	  had	  been	  going	  on	  in	  
Zürich	  between	  1916	  and	  1918	  and	  thus	  the	  impression	  they	  got	  from	  the	  Zürich	  
movement	  was	  a	  distorted	  and	  one-­‐sided	  one.	  Apparently	  they	  were,	  for	  example,	  
unaware	  of	  Ball’s	  poetry	  or	  Arp’s	  experimentation	  with	  chance.63	  After	  an	  initial	  
surge	  of	  enthusiasm,	  Breton	  soon	  tired	  of	  Dada	  and	  he	  began	  to	  view	  it	  as	  a	  spiral	  
closing	  in	  on	  itself,	  holding	  the	  artist	  in	  a	  straight	  jacket	  and	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  
dead	  end.	  A	  brief	  fascination	  with	  total	  negation	  and	  destruction	  thus	  gave	  way	  
once	  more	  to	  a	  more	  constructive	  and	  life-­‐affirming	  interpretation.	  	  
Yet	  what	  the	  Dadaist	  and	  Surrealist	  enterprises	  did	  share	  was	  that	  both	  
movements	  were	  always	  intended	  to	  be	  participatory.	  Change	  could	  only	  come	  
about	  as	  long	  as	  people	  joined	  in	  to	  change	  themselves.	  Surrealism	  wasn’t	  meant	  to	  
be	  treated	  as	  another	  art	  movement	  but	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  The	  artist	  standing	  in	  front	  
merely	  pointed	  in	  a	  direction,	  but	  the	  spectators	  should	  be	  inspired	  to	  turn	  into	  
actors	  themselves.	  Breton	  made	  this	  very	  clear	  when	  he	  wrote	  that	  it	  is	  ‘a	  path	  
which	  we	  can	  show	  and	  help	  people	  to	  follow’	  (Breton,	  1972,	  128)	  and	  ‘the	  entire	  
aim	  of	  Surrealism	  is	  to	  supply	  it	  with	  practical	  possibilities’	  (ibid.,	  140).	  Furthermore,	  
both	  shared	  their	  distaste	  for	  conventional	  art	  and	  the	  industry	  that	  had	  formed	  
around	  it.	  They	  were	  thus	  united	  in	  the	  ‘avant-­‐garde	  conviction	  that	  social	  and	  
political	  radicalism	  should	  be	  bound	  up	  with	  artistic	  innovation.	  [That]	  the	  artist’s	  
task	  was	  to	  move	  beyond	  aesthetic	  pleasure	  and	  to	  affect	  people’s	  lives;	  to	  make	  
them	  see	  and	  experience	  things	  differently’	  (Hopkins,	  2004,	  4).	  Therefore	  the	  notion	  
of	  chaos	  appealed	  to	  Breton	  too,	  though	  for	  him	  it	  assumed	  the	  role	  of	  holding	  
potentiality	  and	  became	  the	  deliverer	  of	  the	  marvellous.	  In	  fact,	  ‘Breton	  does	  no	  less	  
than	  equate	  disorder	  or	  chaos	  with	  the	  purest	  and	  most	  authentic	  form	  of	  thought’	  
(Lejeune,	  2012,	  94).	  By	  allowing	  chaos	  to	  unfold,	  one	  reaches	  into	  the	  deepest,	  most	  
authentic	  recesses	  not	  only	  of	  the	  mind	  but	  the	  cosmos	  at	  large.	  The	  knowledge	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Short	  writes	  that	  ‘This	  is	  a	  peculiar	  stroke	  of	  fate	  because	  Breton	  and	  his	  friends	  would	  probably	  –	  in	  the	  long	  
run	  –	  have	  had	  more	  in	  common	  with	  Arp,	  and	  perhaps	  with	  Ball,	  than	  they	  proved	  to	  have	  with	  Tzara	  and	  
Picabia’	  (2001,	  102).	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can	  be	  brought	  back	  from	  there	  has	  the	  power	  to	  transcend	  the	  old,	  ordinary	  order,	  
so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  new	  and	  higher	  one.	  Again,	  chance	  becomes	  one	  




Balakian’s	  characterisation	  of	  Guillaume	  Apollinaire	  as	  ‘a	  motivator	  of	  ideas’	  
(1970,	  96)	  describes	  his	  role	  as	  mentor	  for	  Breton	  most	  fittingly.	  For	  Breton	  
Apollinaire	  became	  an	  intellectual	  guide	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  his	  radically	  different	  
outlook	  not	  only	  provided	  a	  stimulating	  starting	  point,	  but	  his	  writing	  also	  
constituted	  a	  friction	  surface	  from	  where	  Breton’s	  ideas	  could	  bounce	  off	  into	  
completely	  different	  directions.	  Apollinaire	  was	  the	  first	  to	  use	  the	  term	  ‘surrealism’,	  
which	  he	  adapted	  in	  1917	  from	  ‘surnaturalism’,	  first	  described	  in	  1914.	  Through	  this	  
term	  he	  sought	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  artificiality	  of	  the	  new	  sciences	  should	  similarly	  
be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  artistic,	  creative	  process.	  Engineering	  achievements	  such	  as	  
the	  telephone,	  light	  bulb,	  automobile	  or	  aeroplane	  fascinated	  Apollinaire	  because	  in	  
their	  unnaturalness	  they	  demonstrated	  the	  limitlessness	  of	  the	  human	  imagination.	  
In	  his	  preface	  to	  The	  Breasts	  of	  Tirésias	  he	  wrote:	  ‘I	  felt	  impelled	  to	  return	  to	  nature	  
itself;	  though	  I	  did	  not	  imitate	  it	  as	  a	  photographer	  does.	  When	  man	  resolved	  to	  
imitate	  walking,	  he	  invented	  the	  wheel,	  which	  does	  not	  look	  like	  a	  leg.	  In	  doing	  this,	  
he	  was	  practicing	  surrealism	  without	  knowing	  it’	  (Apollinaire,	  1997,	  153-­‐4).	  
Apollinaire	  called	  for	  an	  art	  movement	  with	  this	  principle	  at	  heart	  and	  thus	  for	  one	  
that	  starkly	  deviates	  from	  the	  prevailing	  Realism.	  ‘Since	  reality,	  according	  to	  
Apollinaire’s	  understanding	  of	  it,	  was	  dependent	  not	  on	  physical	  nature	  but	  on	  the	  
mind’s	  creativeness,	  all	  the	  arts	  were	  long	  overdue	  for	  the	  same	  basic	  revolution:	  
that	  of	  creating	  rather	  than	  representing	  the	  object’	  (Balakian,	  1970,	  86).	  
This	  idea	  is	  the	  crucial	  landmark	  in	  Apollinaire’s	  philosophy	  and	  all	  other	  
concepts	  are	  more	  or	  less	  oriented	  towards	  it.	  The	  artist’s	  goal	  thus	  became	  the	  
creation	  of	  new	  realities,	  new	  truths	  and	  whole	  new	  worlds	  by	  ‘ceaselessly	  
proceeding	  toward	  the	  most	  surprising	  discoveries’	  (Apollinaire	  in	  Bohn,	  2002,	  126).	  
Bohn	  concludes	  that	  Apollinaire	  ‘was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  enshrine	  surprise	  as	  an	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aesthetic	  principle	  and	  that	  this	  concept	  underlies	  the	  Surrealist	  notion	  of	  the	  
marvelous’	  (ibid.,	  138).	  Apollinaire	  therefore	  sought	  to	  ‘infuse	  his	  work	  with	  
unexpected	  sparks:	  visions,	  concretely	  resplendent	  and	  limitless,	  meant	  to	  surprise	  
and	  mystify	  the	  reader	  (…)	  The	  old	  artistic	  aim	  was	  to	  arouse	  the	  emotions	  of	  the	  
reader	  or	  spectator;	  now	  art	  was	  to	  be	  a	  sort	  of	  jovial	  game	  to	  create	  not	  pity	  or	  
empathy,	  but	  wonder	  –	  and	  sometimes	  irritation’	  (Balakian,	  1970,	  88).	  The	  same	  aim	  
and	  approach	  to	  art	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Breton’s	  writing,	  but	  he	  sought	  to	  propel	  it	  to	  
even	  greater	  heights	  than	  Appollinaire.	  	  
Apollinaire’s	  deep-­‐reaching	  influence	  becomes	  further	  clear	  when	  
considering	  this	  passage	  from	  Breton’s	  For	  Dada	  (1920):	  	  
	  
The	  word	  “inspiration,”	  which	  for	  some	  reason	  has	  fallen	  out	  of	  use,	  was	  
formerly	  viewed	  with	  approval.	  Nearly	  every	  discovery	  of	  an	  image,	  for	  
example,	  impresses	  me	  as	  being	  a	  spontaneous	  creation.	  Guillaume	  
Apollinaire	  rightly	  believed	  that	  clichés	  like	  “lips	  of	  coral,”	  whose	  popularity	  
can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  their	  value,	  were	  the	  product	  of	  the	  
activity	  he	  called	  surrealist.	  Language	  itself	  undoubtedly	  springs	  from	  these	  
origins.	  […]	  The	  principle	  behind	  the	  human	  leg,	  which	  was	  absorbed	  in	  the	  
wheel,	  was	  only	  rediscovered	  by	  chance	  in	  the	  locomotive’s	  connecting-­‐rod	  
(in	  Bohn,	  2002,	  132)64.	  
	  
What	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  already	  in	  this	  early	  text	  Breton	  accepted	  chance	  as	  a	  
crucial	  activator	  in	  the	  Surrealist	  pursuit	  of	  creative	  invention.	  In	  the	  First	  Manifesto	  
of	  1924,	  Breton	  explained	  that	  even	  though	  their	  own	  definition	  differed	  from	  
Apollinaire’s	  conception	  in	  many	  ways,	  he	  and	  Soupault	  had	  still	  decided	  to	  call	  their	  
‘new	  mode	  of	  pure	  expression’	  “Surrealism”	  so	  as	  to	  pay	  homage	  to	  Apollinaire,	  who	  
had	  died	  in	  1918	  (1972,	  24).	  What	  they	  did	  share	  was	  their	  striving	  away	  from	  mere	  
portraiture	  of	  the	  already	  existing	  and	  towards	  a	  radically	  creative	  art,	  with	  surprise	  
as	  a	  crucial	  aesthetic	  indicator	  for	  it.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  in	  chance	  Breton	  finds	  a	  
valuable	  phenomenon	  which	  inherently	  contains	  the	  sought	  after	  surprise	  factor.	  
Breton	  furthermore	  continued	  to	  advocate	  Apollinaire’s	  stance	  that	  art	  and	  
life	  are	  not	  two	  separate	  domains,	  but	  need	  to	  be	  valued	  as	  one,	  where	  poetics	  
infuse	  daily	  life	  and	  where	  fiction	  is	  accepted	  as	  artistic	  truth.	  For	  Apollinaire	  reality,	  
truth	  and	  aesthetics	  were	  relative	  concepts	  that	  always	  changed	  with	  history.	  For	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Bohn’s	  translation	  is	  here	  preferred	  to	  Ralph	  Manheim’s	  in	  What	  is	  Surrealism?	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him	  ‘“the	  domain	  of	  the	  imagination	  is	  reality,”	  a	  concept	  that	  was	  to	  be	  accepted	  
by	  the	  surrealists	  as	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  all	  their	  efforts	  to	  intensify	  life	  and	  enrich	  
vision.	  Apollinaire’s	  formula	  becomes	  what	  Paul	  Eluard	  calls	  “donner	  á	  voir,”	  [to	  
show]	  and	  Breton	  “le	  don	  de	  faire	  voir.”	  [the	  gift	  of	  showing]’	  (Balakian,	  1970,	  94).	  
The	  influence	  of	  Apollinaire’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  superiority	  of	  inspiration	  and	  the	  
spontaneity	  of	  creation	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  the	  section	  on	  the	  
Surrealist	  image.	  
	  
2.1.2.	  Psychoanalysis	  	  
	  
Breton	  studied	  medicine	  between	  1913	  and	  1920	  and	  during	  his	  military	  
service	  he	  first	  worked	  as	  a	  medical	  orderly	  and	  then	  transferred	  to	  a	  neuro-­‐
psychiatric	  centre	  of	  the	  army.	  It	  is	  during	  these	  early	  years	  that	  Breton	  became	  
interested	  in	  psychiatry	  and	  began	  to	  read	  Charcot,	  Kraeplin,	  Magnan	  and	  Pascal.	  
Through	  the	  works	  of	  Régis	  and	  Hesnard	  he	  was	  also	  exposed	  to	  Freud’s	  theories	  for	  
the	  first	  time	  (Polizzotti,	  1997,	  50-­‐1).65	  Breton	  was	  therefore	  not	  only	  widely	  read	  in	  
the	  psychological	  and	  psychiatric	  literature	  of	  his	  day,	  but	  he	  even	  experimented	  
with	  Freud’s	  technique	  of	  free	  association	  when	  treating	  shell-­‐shocked	  soldiers.	  
Breton	  was	  often	  fascinated	  by	  the	  rich	  imagery	  that	  was	  unearthed	  and	  he	  
concluded	  that	  deep,	  hidden,	  innate	  poetic	  powers	  could	  be	  set	  free	  through	  a	  
certain	  looseness	  of	  conscious	  control.	  In	  his	  first	  Manifesto	  of	  Surrealism	  (1924)	  
Breton	  wrote:	  	  
	  
Completely	  occupied	  as	  I	  still	  was	  with	  Freud	  at	  that	  time,	  and	  familiar	  as	  I	  
was	  with	  his	  methods	  of	  examination	  […],	  I	  resolved	  to	  obtain	  from	  myself	  
what	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  obtain	  from	  them,	  namely,	  a	  monologue	  spoken	  as	  
rapidly	  as	  possible,	  without	  any	  intervention	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  critical	  
faculties,	  a	  monologue	  consequently	  unencumbered	  by	  the	  slightest	  
inhibition	  and	  which	  was,	  as	  closely	  as	  possible,	  akin	  to	  spoken	  thought	  
(Breton,	  2010,	  22-­‐3).66	  




Pierre	  Janet’s	  Psychological	  Automatism	  (1889)	  also	  provided	  inspiration	  for	  
the	  Surrealists	  and	  Soupault	  wrote	  that	  this	  book	  ‘forced	  us	  to	  question	  ourselves	  
about	  poetic	  creation	  [...]	  Was	  the	  automatic	  writing	  put	  forward	  by	  Janet	  a	  solution	  
to	  the	  problem	  of	  poetry?	  We	  put	  this	  to	  the	  test.’	  (Bacopoulos-­‐Viau,	  2012,	  260).	  
The	  result	  of	  their	  first	  experiments	  was	  the	  book	  The	  Magnetic	  Fields,	  a	  collection	  
of	  poetic	  texts	  solely	  composed	  through	  automatic	  writing.	  Freud’s	  The	  
Psychopathology	  of	  Everyday	  Life	  (1901)	  was	  also	  hugely	  influential	  in	  its	  
interpretation	  of	  what	  were	  commonly	  considered	  meaningless	  accidents,	  such	  as	  
slips	  of	  the	  tongue,	  forgetting	  words	  or	  unintentional	  actions,	  as	  being	  actually	  
guided	  by	  hidden,	  unconscious	  motives.	  ‘Breton	  took	  up	  and	  elaborated	  Freud’s	  
theory	  in	  his	  ideas	  of	  the	  chance	  encounter	  and	  the	  ‘trouvaille’	  or	  lucky	  find	  spotted	  
amidst	  the	  detritus	  of	  the	  flea	  market:	  these	  sort	  of	  occurrence,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  
apparently	  fortuitous,	  accidental	  character,	  bypass	  one’s	  consciousness	  and	  
intentionality,	  thereby	  giving	  access	  to	  an	  otherwise	  inaccessible	  reality’	  (Iversen,	  
2010,	  20).	  This	  view	  of	  the	  apparently	  contingent	  as	  unconscious	  necessity	  deeply	  
imprinted	  itself	  on	  Breton’s	  conception	  of	  chance.	  
Freud’s	  theories	  on	  dreams,	  free	  association,	  parapraxes	  and	  humour	  thus	  
received	  a	  lot	  of	  interest	  and	  his	  techniques	  were	  freely	  incorporated	  into	  the	  
Surrealists’	  store	  of	  artistic	  techniques.	  Yet	  the	  word	  ‘freely’	  should	  be	  emphasised	  
here	  because	  although	  the	  Surrealists	  were	  fascinated	  by	  these	  new	  psychological	  
discoveries,	  they	  rarely	  shared	  their	  interpretations	  or	  implementations.	  Janet’s	  
view	  that	  automatic	  writing	  was	  a	  pathological	  symptom	  was	  rejected	  and	  instead	  it	  
was	  considered	  a	  direct	  path	  to	  one’s	  hidden	  creativity	  as	  well	  as	  to	  reveal	  
something	  of	  the	  ‘marvellous’	  they	  were	  seeking.	  Freud	  was	  similarly	  criticised	  for	  
his	  pathologising	  and	  for	  focusing	  treatment	  on	  turning	  patients	  into	  functioning	  
members	  of	  a	  society	  that	  they	  considered	  neurotic	  in	  itself.	  Instead	  Breton	  saw	  
automatism	  as	  a	  tool	  which	  could	  further	  the	  freeing	  of	  the	  mind	  from	  culturally	  
imposed	  restrictions	  and	  he	  hoped	  that	  thus	  the	  urgently	  needed	  social	  and	  political	  
revolution	  could	  be	  initiated.	  Overall,	  they	  didn’t	  consider	  slips	  of	  the	  tongue	  or	  the	  
incorrect	  use	  of	  words	  as	  psychic	  disturbances	  but	  as	  the	  wonderful	  demonstration	  
of	  the	  limitless	  freedom	  and	  abundance	  of	  the	  imagination.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  where	  
Freud	  only	  considered	  psychoanalysis’	  merits	  for	  the	  mentally	  ill,	  the	  Surrealists	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would	  have	  liked	  to	  see	  it	  applied	  on	  a	  broader	  scale	  and	  advocated	  that	  soul	  




Breton	  often	  referred	  to	  Hegel	  as	  his	  guiding	  philosopher	  and	  the	  huge	  
impression	  that	  his	  dialectical	  method	  left	  on	  Breton	  can	  be	  seen	  throughout	  
Surrealism,	  especially	  from	  1930	  onwards.	  In	  this	  model	  the	  struggle	  between	  the	  
Abstract	  and	  the	  Negative,	  by	  others	  also	  described	  as	  thesis	  and	  antithesis,	  
becomes	  ultimately	  resolved	  in	  their	  synthesis,	  or	  the	  Concrete	  as	  Hegel	  termed	  it.	  
This	  concept	  of	  an	  ultimate	  unification	  of	  all	  opposites	  was	  the	  main	  factor	  of	  
attraction	  for	  Breton,	  though	  he	  gravely	  misrepresented	  Hegel	  in	  his	  own	  
interpretation.	  67	  Instead,	  dialectics	  for	  the	  Surrealists	  meant:	  ‘a	  becoming-­‐other	  of	  
the	  object	  without	  limits,	  guided	  by	  the	  imagination,	  which	  is	  itself	  propelled	  by	  the	  
unconscious.	  […]	  In	  Breton’s	  words,	  “A	  principle	  of	  perpetual	  mutation	  has	  taken	  
over	  both	  things	  and	  ideas,	  leading	  to	  their	  total	  deliverance,	  and	  man’s	  as	  well.”’	  
(Baugh,	  2003,	  56).	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  later,	  Hegel’s	  dialectics	  is	  also	  
found	  in	  Breton’s	  understanding	  of	  chance.	  
From	  Hegel,	  Breton	  also	  adopted	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Absolute,	  but	  again	  he	  
turned	  it	  into	  something	  else.	  Hegel	  determined	  that	  the	  Absolute	  ‘appears	  only	  as	  
the	  negation	  of	  all	  predicates	  and	  as	  the	  void.	  But	  since	  equally	  it	  must	  be	  
pronounced	  to	  be	  the	  position	  of	  all	  predicates,	  it	  appears	  as	  the	  most	  formal	  
contradiction’	  (Hegel,	  1998,	  530).	  For	  Breton	  the	  Absolute,	  or	  as	  he	  called	  it	  sur-­‐
reality,	  described	  a	  state	  beyond	  all	  opposition:	  ‘Everything	  tends	  to	  make	  us	  believe	  
that	  there	  exists	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  the	  mind	  at	  which	  life	  and	  death,	  the	  real	  and	  the	  
imagined,	  past	  and	  future,	  the	  communicable	  and	  the	  incommunicable,	  high	  and	  
low,	  cease	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  contradictions’	  (1972,	  123).	  For	  Breton	  this	  state	  could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  according	  to	  Baugh	  the	  Surrealists’	  representation	  of	  synthesis	  wasn’t	  congruent	  with	  
Hegel’s	  and	  since	  they	  misunderstood	  his	  theory	  in	  this	  crucial	  aspect,	  Surrealism	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  
dialectical	  in	  the	  Hegelian	  sense.	  ‘As	  Sartre	  argued,	  the	  surrealist	  refusal	  to	  place	  any	  limits	  on	  negation	  
means	  that	  surrealist	  negation	  is	  not	  regulated	  by	  a	  totality	  that	  governs	  negations	  as	  component	  
“moments”	  of	  a	  progressively	  developing	  whole.	  Consequently,	  surrealist	  negation	  is	  what	  Hegel	  calls	  a	  
“spurious	  infinite”:	  not	  the	  internal	  and	  genuine	  infinity	  of	  the	  interrelations	  of	  the	  various	  moments	  
subsumed	  under	  the	  concept,	  but	  a	  series	  of	  negations	  and	  surpassings	  that	  extends	  ad	  infinitum’	  (Baugh,	  
2003,	  55-­‐6).	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be	  reached	  through	  the	  freedom	  that	  imagination	  enjoys	  in	  the	  unconscious.	  For	  
him	  imagination	  is	  limitless	  and	  thus	  has	  the	  power	  to	  overcome	  consciousness,	  
freeing	  the	  individual	  from	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  ego.	  Ultimately,	  ‘a	  liberated	  
imagination	  is	  the	  only	  means	  of	  resolving	  the	  antinomies	  of	  human	  life’	  (Baugh,	  
2003,	  57-­‐8).	  
Breton	  wrote	  that	  ‘Unquestionably,	  it	  is	  Hegel	  ...	  who	  enabled	  me	  to	  perceive	  
this	  point,	  to	  tend	  toward	  it	  with	  all	  my	  strength,	  and	  to	  make	  of	  this	  very	  tension	  
my	  life’s	  goal.	  [...]	  Where	  the	  Hegelian	  dialectic	  does	  not	  function,	  there	  is	  for	  me	  no	  
thought,	  no	  hope	  for	  truth.’	  (Breton,	  1982,	  xx).	  Furthermore,	  Breton	  was	  always	  
keen	  to	  stress	  that	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  reconciliation	  of	  contradictory	  forces	  
had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  mysticism	  and	  Balakian	  explains	  that	  ‘the	  surrealists	  inferred	  
from	  Hegel	  that	  the	  true	  understanding	  of	  existence	  depended	  on	  the	  knowledge	  of	  
the	  interrelation	  of	  the	  subjective	  and	  the	  objective	  (…).	  The	  metaphysical	  
experience,	  then,	  could	  be	  reached	  not	  through	  transcendence	  but	  through	  a	  
successful	  tuning	  of	  mind	  with	  matter’	  (Balakian,	  1970,	  135-­‐6).	  	  
Thus	  the	  task	  of	  Surrealism	  was	  ‘to	  make	  known	  at	  all	  costs,	  the	  artificial	  
character	  of	  the	  old	  antinomies	  hypocritically	  intended	  to	  forestall	  any	  
unprecedented	  agitation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  man’	  (Breton,	  1978,	  245).	  The	  perception	  of	  
these	  opposites	  as	  antagonists	  represents	  man’s	  ‘universal	  constraint’	  (ibid.),	  it	  
causes	  his	  suffering	  and	  it	  keeps	  him	  from	  being	  truly	  free.	  Surrealism	  was	  
considered	  man’s	  attempt	  to	  overcome	  these	  contradictions	  and	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  
the	  following,	  all	  methods,	  tools	  and	  techniques	  were	  employed	  to	  gravitate	  
towards	  this	  goal:	  ‘anything	  will	  have	  been	  considered	  good	  that	  could	  reduce	  these	  
oppositions	  which	  have	  been	  presented	  as	  unsurmountable’	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
	  





The	  spontaneous,	  arbitrary	  and	  accidental	  always	  exerted	  a	  special	  
fascination	  over	  Breton.	  He	  found	  something	  refreshing	  in	  them	  that	  he	  couldn’t	  
experience	  otherwise.	  They	  took	  him	  by	  surprise	  and	  thus	  induced	  a	  moment	  of	  
heightened	  emotionality.	  They	  acted	  as	  reminders	  that	  beyond	  the	  routine	  and	  
habit	  of	  everyday	  life	  there	  lingered	  something	  unknown,	  something	  that	  could	  be	  
discovered	  if	  one	  followed	  its	  clues.	  In	  1922	  Breton	  wrote:	  ‘Pleasure	  is	  conveyed	  
through	  accident	  and	  surprise,	  whether	  discordant	  or	  otherwise’	  (Breton,	  1982,	  xx).	  
Whatever	  they	  brought,	  their	  authenticity	  was	  a	  welcome	  change	  to	  the	  dull,	  
superficial	  monotony	  of	  everyday	  life.	  For	  Breton	  society	  was	  diseased	  with	  inertia	  
on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  a	  will	  to	  control	  on	  the	  other.	  In	  his	  view	  this	  created	  the	  tragic	  
condition	  that	  little	  to	  no	  room	  was	  left	  for	  the	  playfulness	  and	  freedom	  of	  the	  
imagination	  to	  unfold.	  Like	  the	  Dadaists,	  he	  therefore	  promoted	  an	  
acknowledgement	  of	  these	  occurrences	  in	  order	  to	  revolt	  against	  a	  one-­‐sided	  status	  
quo	  and	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  restore	  society	  to	  greater	  balance.	  The	  spontaneous	  and	  
arbitrary	  were	  declared	  ‘beautiful’	  because	  they	  represented	  those	  forces	  that	  could	  
still	  reveal	  something	  new	  and	  genuine	  to	  man.	  However	  it	  should	  be	  stressed	  once	  
more	  that	  Breton	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  arbitrary	  as	  random,	  but	  comprising	  of	  a	  
latent	  content	  hidden	  in	  man	  and	  nature.	  	  
	  
	  
3.1.	  Exploring	  the	  Central	  Role	  of	  Automatism	  
	  
Automatism	  constituted	  a	  pivotal	  concept	  for	  Breton,	  most	  of	  his	  philosophy	  
revolved	  around	  it	  and	  the	  methods	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  on	  were	  based	  on	  it.	  
In	  1942	  he	  said:	  ‘surrealism	  has	  continuously	  emphasised	  automatism,	  not	  only	  as	  a	  
method	  of	  expression	  on	  the	  literary	  and	  artistic	  level,	  but	  moreover,	  as	  a	  first	  step	  
towards	  a	  general	  revision	  of	  the	  modes	  of	  knowledge’	  (1978,	  245).	  Automatism	  had	  
the	  power	  to	  circumvent	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  ego	  and	  to	  reveal	  an	  unfettered	  
creativity	  hidden	  within	  the	  layers	  of	  the	  unconscious.	  Though	  Breton	  had	  been	  
aware	  of	  automatism	  through	  the	  psychological	  literature	  he	  had	  read,	  his	  interest	  
in	  using	  automatism	  for	  creative	  purposes	  was	  only	  fully	  awakened	  when	  one	  night	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in	  this	  half-­‐and-­‐half	  state	  between	  being	  awake	  and	  asleep	  the	  phrase	  ‘a	  man	  cut	  in	  
two	  by	  the	  window’	  suddenly	  appeared	  to	  him.	  	  
The	  image	  struck	  him	  with	  such	  force	  that	  after	  that	  ‘all	  [he]	  could	  think	  of	  
was	  to	  incorporate	  it	  into	  [his]	  material	  for	  poetic	  construction’	  (Breton,	  1972,	  22).	  
He	  further	  reflected:	  ‘No	  sooner	  had	  I	  granted	  it	  this	  capacity	  than	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  
succeeded	  by	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  phrases	  […]	  and	  left	  me	  with	  the	  impression	  of	  their	  
being	  so	  gratuitous	  that	  the	  control	  I	  had	  then	  exercised	  upon	  myself	  seemed	  to	  me	  
illusory’	  (ibid.).	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  experience	  Breton,	  together	  
with	  Soupault,	  began	  to	  fervently	  use	  the	  automatic	  method,	  which	  in	  1919	  
culminated	  in	  the	  first	  Surrealist	  book,	  The	  Magnetic	  Fields	  and	  in	  1924	  Breton’s	  
second	  purely	  automatic	  text	  Soluble	  Fish	  followed.	  
Breton’s	  realisation	  that	  a	  certain	  abandonment	  of	  control	  led	  to	  more	  
striking	  imagery	  than	  he	  could	  ever	  consciously	  construct	  came	  to	  him	  as	  a	  
fundamental	  revelation	  and	  the	  seeming	  arbitrariness	  with	  which	  words	  formed	  
unconventional	  associations	  intrigued	  him.	  Chance,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  coincidence,	  
through	  which	  words	  spontaneously	  encountered	  each	  other,	  is	  therefore	  an	  
inherent	  part	  of	  the	  mechanism	  of	  automatism.	  Similar	  to	  the	  Dadaists,	  chance	  as	  
the	  opposite	  of	  logic	  was	  regarded	  as	  the	  element	  which	  could	  produce	  poetry	  that	  
is	  closer	  to	  the	  mysterious	  source	  of	  creativity.	  For	  Breton	  ‘the	  evidence	  of	  
automatic	  writing	  tended	  to	  prove	  to	  him	  that	  man	  had	  artificially	  divided	  what	  was	  
originally	  a	  single	  faculty,	  and	  [that]	  the	  distinction,	  is	  an	  artificial	  one’	  (Balakian,	  
1971,	  62).	  He	  hoped	  that	  automatism	  could	  bridge	  this	  divide	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  
experience	  of	  a	  new	  wholeness.	  
During	  the	  1920s	  the	  Surrealists	  were	  experimenting	  with	  the	  automatic	  
method	  and	  at	  the	  time	  it	  was	  constantly	  employed	  during	  their	  meetings.	  In	  
comparison	  to	  the	  more	  passive	  reception	  of	  dreams,	  they	  considered	  automatism	  
as	  an	  active	  means	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  hidden	  recesses	  of	  the	  unconscious.	  In	  1924	  
in	  his	  First	  Manifesto	  Breton	  presented	  his	  conclusions	  as	  to	  the	  value	  of	  
automatism	  that	  he	  had	  drawn	  from	  their	  experimentations.	  In	  fact	  he	  defined	  
Surrealism	  on	  the	  whole	  as:	  ‘Psychic	  automatism	  in	  its	  pure	  state,	  by	  which	  one	  
proposes	  to	  express	  –	  verbally,	  by	  means	  of	  the	  written	  word,	  or	  in	  any	  other	  
manner	  –	  the	  actual	  functioning	  of	  thought.	  Dictated	  by	  thought,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	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any	  control	  exercised	  by	  reason,	  exempt	  from	  any	  aesthetic	  or	  moral	  concern’	  
(1972,	  26).	  Breton	  kept	  stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  absence	  of	  reserve	  in	  order	  to	  
ensure	  the	  circumvention	  of	  logic	  and	  he	  encouraged	  participants	  to	  re-­‐establish	  
‘dialogue	  in	  its	  absolute	  truth,	  by	  freeing	  both	  interlocutors	  from	  any	  obligation	  of	  
politeness’	  (ibid.,	  35).	  
Automatism,	  this	  ‘true	  photography	  of	  thought’	  (Rosemont,	  1978,	  21)	  had	  
become	  their	  first	  tool	  of	  choice	  to	  manifest	  their	  aspiration,	  which	  was	  ultimately	  
aimed	  at	  nothing	  less	  than	  ‘solving	  all	  the	  principle	  problems	  of	  life’	  and	  to	  reach	  the	  
Absolute,	  that	  ‘superior	  reality	  of	  certain	  forms	  of	  previously	  neglected	  associations’	  
(ibid.,	  26).	  This	  remained	  Breton’s	  aim	  throughout	  and	  later	  in	  life	  he	  still	  stated	  that	  
they	  were	  striving	  towards	  nothing	  less	  than	  ‘to	  transform	  the	  world,	  change	  life,	  
remake	  from	  scratch	  human	  understanding’	  (in	  Balakian,	  1972,	  49).	  In	  order	  to	  reach	  
this	  idealistic	  objective,	  automatism	  was	  meant	  to	  deliver	  personal,	  social	  and	  
artistic	  transformation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  ‘ordinarily	  indistinct	  murmur	  of	  self-­‐
revelation	  is	  amplified	  and	  recorded’	  (Breton,	  1978,	  21),	  thus	  broadening	  one’s	  
understanding	  of	  those	  other	  parts	  besides	  ego	  consciousness.68	  	  
These	  texts	  were	  considered	  to	  hold	  the	  key	  ‘capable	  of	  opening	  indefinitely	  
that	  box	  of	  many	  bottoms	  called	  man’	  (Breton,	  2010,	  162-­‐3).69	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
due	  to	  this	  lack	  of	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  concern	  that	  was	  found	  in	  automatic	  
utterances,	  it	  could	  undermine	  society’s	  traditional	  values	  and	  established	  frames	  of	  
reference.	  In	  advocating	  a	  broader	  use	  of	  automatism	  Breton	  saw	  a	  potential	  to	  
bring	  more	  truthfulness	  into	  a	  society	  stifled	  by	  norms	  and	  conventions.	  The	  artistic	  
aim,	  though	  ultimately	  feeding	  into	  the	  other	  two,	  was	  to	  create	  such	  unpredictable	  
meetings	  between	  words	  and	  images	  that	  sparks	  of	  surprise	  were	  released.	  The	  
element	  of	  surprise,	  a	  temporary	  shock,	  was	  a	  crucial	  concept	  for	  Breton.	  He	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Breton:	  ‘The	  surrealism	  in	  a	  work	  is	  in	  direct	  proportion	  to	  the	  efforts	  the	  artist	  has	  made	  to	  embrace	  the	  
whole	  psychophysical	  field,	  of	  which	  consciousness	  is	  only	  a	  small	  fraction.	  In	  those	  unfathomable	  depths	  
there	  prevails,	  according	  to	  Freud,	  a	  total	  absence	  of	  contradiction,	  a	  release	  from	  the	  emotional	  fetters	  
caused	  by	  repression,	  a	  lack	  of	  temporality,	  and	  the	  substitution	  of	  external	  reality	  by	  psychic	  reality	  
obedient	  to	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  and	  no	  other.	  Automatism	  leads	  us	  straight	  to	  these	  regions.’	  (ibid.)	  69	  The	  full	  quote	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘These	  products	  of	  psychic	  activity,	  as	  far	  removed	  as	  possible	  from	  the	  desire	  
to	  make	  sense,	  as	  free	  as	  possible	  of	  any	  ideas	  of	  responsibility	  which	  are	  always	  prone	  to	  act	  as	  brakes,	  as	  
independent	  as	  possible	  of	  everything	  which	  is	  not	  “the	  passive	  life	  of	  the	  intelligence”	  –	  these	  products	  
which	  automatic	  writing	  and	  the	  description	  of	  dreams	  represent	  offer	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  time	  the	  
advantage	  of	  being	  unique	  in	  providing	  elements	  of	  appreciation	  of	  great	  style	  to	  a	  body	  of	  criticism	  which,	  
in	  the	  realm	  of	  art,	  reveals	  itself	  to	  be	  strangely	  helpless,	  of	  permitting	  a	  general	  reclassification	  of	  lyrical	  
values,	  and	  of	  proposing	  a	  key	  capable	  of	  opening	  indefinitely	  that	  box	  of	  many	  bottoms	  called	  man	  […].’	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conceived	  that	  this	  heightened	  emotionality	  not	  only	  transported	  one	  out	  of	  the	  
realm	  of	  habits,	  but	  it	  also	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  let	  the	  person	  experience,	  albeit	  only	  
for	  brief	  moments,	  this	  realm	  of	  sur-­‐reality	  that	  they	  were	  aiming	  for.	  	  
During	  these	  early	  years	  pure	  automatic	  production	  was	  generally	  deemed	  a	  
sufficiently	  creative	  outcome	  and	  many	  texts	  were	  hence	  published	  in	  their	  raw	  
form.	  However,	  later	  Breton	  recognised	  that	  only	  seizing	  these	  inner	  images,	  which	  
if	  allowed	  kept	  bubbling	  up	  continuously,	  was	  often	  not	  enough.	  The	  texts	  thus	  
produced	  were	  after	  all	  marked	  by	  too	  much	  incoherence	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  
repetition	  of	  words	  on	  the	  other.	  These	  texts	  therefore	  revealed	  above	  all	  the	  
workings	  of	  the	  subconscious	  mind:	  its	  inherent	  chaotic	  stream	  of	  images	  which	  is	  
only	  limited	  by	  the	  mind’s	  tendency	  towards	  habitual	  thinking.	  What	  Breton	  
therefore	  realised	  later	  on	  is	  that	  pure	  chaos	  does	  not	  satisfy	  man’s	  striving,	  but	  that	  
there	  needs	  to	  be	  some	  ordering	  and	  meaning-­‐making	  involved	  so	  that	  the	  text	  does	  
not	  lose	  its	  appeal.	  Breton	  once	  called	  the	  time	  between	  1919	  and	  1924	  Surrealism’s	  
‘intuitive	  stage’	  and	  in	  retrospect	  this	  phase	  in	  itself	  can	  be	  discerned	  as	  the	  chaotic	  
beginning	  during	  which	  the	  movement	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  finding	  and	  defining	  
itself.	  They	  did	  not	  quite	  know	  yet	  what	  or	  who	  they	  were	  and	  what	  they	  wanted.	  
Their	  automatic	  experiments	  reveal	  their	  groping	  in	  the	  dark	  for	  meaning.	  As	  such	  it	  
became	  a	  self-­‐revelatory	  process	  that	  helped	  them	  to	  find	  out	  what	  they	  actually	  
wanted	  to	  express,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  far	  they	  could	  go.	  	  
	  
	  
3.2.	  The	  Surrealist	  Image	  
	  
Through	  the	  automatic	  method	  the	  imagination	  could	  be	  freed	  from	  the	  
fetters	  of	  conscious	  control	  and,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  for	  Breton	  imagination	  was	  the	  
sole	  faculty	  that	  could	  liberate	  man	  from	  the	  shackles	  of	  his	  perception	  of	  
opposition.	  Its	  product,	  the	  Surrealist	  image,	  was	  therefore	  heralded	  as	  the	  supreme	  
expression	  of	  this	  achievement.	  The	  Surrealist	  image,	  as	  Apollinaire	  first	  perceived	  it,	  
is	  the	  child	  of	  imaginative	  freedom.	  It	  shows	  man	  the	  endless	  possibilities	  of	  what	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can	  be,	  rather	  than	  what	  already	  is.	  For	  Breton,	  having	  found	  a	  way	  to	  liberate	  the	  
imagination	  amounts	  to	  nothing	  less	  than	  having	  found	  the	  philosopher’s	  stone:	  
	  
the	  philosopher’s	  stone	  is	  nothing	  more	  or	  less	  than	  that	  which	  was	  to	  
enable	  man’s	  imagination	  to	  take	  a	  stunning	  revenge	  on	  all	  things,	  which	  
brings	  us	  once	  again,	  after	  centuries	  of	  the	  mind’s	  domestication	  and	  insane	  
resignation	  to	  the	  attempt	  to	  liberate	  once	  and	  for	  all	  the	  imagination	  by	  the	  
“long,	  immense,	  reasoned	  derangement	  of	  the	  senses,”	  and	  all	  the	  rest	  
(1972,	  174-­‐5).	  
	  
The	  Surrealist	  image	  is	  considered	  revolutionary	  because	  it	  no	  longer	  represents	  the	  
world,	  but	  it	  creates	  a	  new	  one.	  In	  his	  First	  Manifesto	  Breton	  explained	  the	  
mechanisms	  of	  image	  creation	  by	  first	  quoting	  Reverdy:	  ‘The	  image	  is	  a	  pure	  
creation	  of	  the	  mind.	  It	  cannot	  be	  born	  from	  a	  comparison	  but	  from	  a	  juxtaposition	  
of	  two	  more	  or	  less	  distant	  realities.	  The	  more	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  
juxtaposed	  realities	  is	  distant	  and	  true,	  the	  stronger	  the	  image	  will	  be	  –	  the	  greater	  
its	  emotional	  power	  and	  poetic	  reality’	  (Breton,	  1972,	  20).	  Although	  he	  found	  this	  
explanation	  revealing,	  the	  image	  kept	  eluding	  him	  until	  he	  discovered	  it	  by	  chance,	  
namely	  that	  of	  the	  man	  cut	  in	  half	  by	  the	  window.	  	  
It	  was	  this	  experience	  that	  ultimately	  led	  Breton	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  image	  
wasn’t	  actually	  created	  consciously.	  They	  either	  arise	  spontaneously	  and	  
independently	  of	  the	  artist’s	  will	  or	  they	  can	  be	  sought	  through	  automatism.	  Breton	  
further	  elaborated:	  	  
	  
It	  is	  true	  of	  Surrealist	  images,	  as	  it	  is	  of	  opium	  images,	  that	  man	  does	  not	  
evoke	  them;	  rather	  they	  “come	  to	  him	  spontaneously,	  despotically.	  He	  
cannot	  chase	  them	  away;	  for	  the	  will	  is	  powerless	  now	  and	  no	  longer	  
controls	  the	  faculties.”	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  images	  have	  ever	  been	  
“evoked”.	  If	  one	  accepts,	  as	  I	  do,	  Reverdy’s	  definition	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  
possible	  to	  bring	  together,	  voluntarily,	  what	  he	  calls	  “two	  distant	  realities.”	  
The	  juxtaposition	  is	  made	  or	  not	  made,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  long	  and	  the	  short	  of	  
it.	  […]	  It	  is	  from	  the	  fortuitous	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  two	  terms	  that	  a	  particular	  
light	  has	  sprung,	  the	  light	  of	  the	  image,	  to	  which	  we	  are	  infinitely	  sensitive.	  
The	  value	  of	  the	  image	  depends	  upon	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  spark	  obtained;	  it	  is,	  
consequently,	  a	  function	  of	  the	  difference	  of	  potential	  between	  the	  two	  




This	  is	  crucial	  for	  Breton,	  that	  the	  artist	  becomes	  merely	  the	  receiver	  of	  images	  
which	  flash	  into	  consciousness	  through	  the	  agency	  of	  chance.	  However,	  ‘Surrealist	  
images	  are	  fortuitous,	  not	  in	  that	  they	  are	  found	  at	  random,	  but	  in	  that	  they	  do	  not	  
rely	  on	  reason’	  (Lejeune,	  2012,	  103).	  	  
The	  marvellous	  can	  only	  be	  revealed	  through	  the	  fortuitous	  flash	  that	  creates	  
a	  new	  connection	  between	  the	  known	  and	  the	  unknown.	  Lautréamont’s	  phrase	  
‘beautiful	  as	  the	  chance	  meeting	  on	  a	  dissecting	  table	  of	  a	  sewing	  machine	  and	  an	  
umbrella,’	  illustrates	  this	  well.	  Breton	  heralded	  the	  phrase	  as	  an	  example	  of	  
Surrealist	  juxtaposition	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  chance	  meetings	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
perception	  of	  their	  beauty.	  In	  the	  Second	  Manifesto	  Breton	  wrote:	  ‘Just	  as	  in	  the	  
physical	  world,	  a	  short	  circuit	  occurs	  when	  the	  two	  ‘poles’	  of	  a	  machine	  are	  joined	  
by	  a	  conductor	  of	  little	  or	  no	  resistance.	  In	  poetry	  and	  in	  painting,	  Surrealism	  has	  
done	  everything	  it	  can	  and	  more	  to	  increase	  these	  short	  circuits…’	  (Breton,	  2010,	  
161).	  The	  conductor	  that	  they	  had	  found	  was	  nothing	  less	  than	  chance,	  which	  thus	  
became	  the	  energetic	  charge	  between	  consciousness	  and	  the	  unconscious	  on	  an	  
internal	  level,	  and	  as	  we	  shall	  later	  see,	  between	  man	  and	  nature	  on	  the	  external	  
level.	  
It	  is	  images	  like	  these	  that	  truly	  fascinated	  Breton	  and	  which	  he	  thinks	  are	  
the	  only	  ones	  worthwhile	  to	  construct	  art	  from.	  He	  sought	  the	  same	  ability	  to	  
transcend	  the	  possible	  and	  to	  depict	  the	  impossible	  in	  words	  and	  believed	  that	  they	  
are	  based	  on	  the	  same	  principles:	  ‘Almost	  all	  images	  strike	  me	  as	  spontaneous	  
creations.	  Guillaume	  Apollinaire	  rightly	  believed	  that	  clichés	  such	  as	  ‘coral	  lips’,	  
whose	  success	  may	  pass	  for	  a	  criterion	  of	  value,	  were	  the	  product	  of	  this	  activity,	  
which	  he	  qualified	  as	  surrealist.	  Words	  themselves	  have	  doubtless	  no	  other	  origin’	  
(Breton,	  1978,	  5).	  In	  fact,	  he	  wanted	  nothing	  less	  than	  to	  ‘recover	  the	  origin	  of	  
words,	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  speaking	  is	  synonymous	  with	  creating’	  (Hedges,	  1983,	  
80)	  and	  he	  believed	  that	  ‘through	  metaphor,	  man	  can	  evade	  the	  cage	  of	  language	  
that	  imprisons	  him’	  (ibid.,	  81).	  
As	  a	  result	  Breton	  developed	  a	  new	  style,	  analogical	  prose,	  which	  ‘proceeds	  
not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  narrative	  sequence	  or	  systematic	  description,	  but	  is	  free	  of	  both	  
time	  and	  place	  and	  moves	  in	  accordance	  with	  word	  and	  image	  associations	  […];	  it	  is	  
so	  totally	  and	  exclusively	  dependent	  on	  the	  unfurling	  of	  spontaneous	  association’	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(Balakian,	  1971,	  61).	  Since	  the	  usual	  coordinates	  of	  prose	  are	  lost	  and	  free	  reign	  is	  
given	  to	  the	  imagination,	  the	  narrative	  is	  composed	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  unconscious	  
connections.	  ‘Breton	  declared	  that	  words	  have	  their	  own	  emotional	  life,	  unrelated	  
to	  their	  meaning,	  which	  permits	  them	  to	  respond	  to	  each	  other	  according	  to	  secret	  
affinities’	  (Bohn,	  2002,	  147).	  Through	  the	  revelation	  of	  these	  secret	  affinities	  Breton	  
aimed	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  their	  perceived	  contradiction	  was	  a	  false	  one	  and	  that	  in	  
fact	  any	  object	  could	  be	  described	  by	  another,	  thus	  proving	  that	  the	  one	  is	  always	  
contained	  in	  the	  other	  and	  vice	  versa.	  He	  felt	  so	  strong	  about	  the	  power	  of	  analogy	  
that	  he	  wrote:	  ‘I	  have	  never	  experienced	  intellectual	  pleasure	  except	  on	  an	  
analogical	  level.	  For	  me,	  what	  is	  unmistakably	  real	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  
spontaneous,	  clairvoyant,	  insolent	  relation	  that,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  connects	  
one	  thing	  with	  another,	  and	  that	  common	  sense	  would	  be	  loath	  to	  confront’	  
(Breton,	  1982,	  xxi).	  
Since	  man	  is	  unable	  to	  consciously	  produce	  Surrealist	  images,	  one	  needs	  to	  
revert	  to	  the	  use	  of	  other	  methods	  in	  order	  to	  harness	  them.	  The	  observation	  of	  
dreams,	  automatism,	  games	  and	  later	  objective	  chance	  were	  all	  techniques	  to	  spur	  
the	  quest	  for	  new	  images.	  Breton	  once	  explained:	  ‘Imagination	  is	  neither	  right	  nor	  
wrong.	  One	  does	  not	  invent	  in	  a	  void.	  I	  have	  resorted	  to	  chance	  and	  to	  magic	  
potions.	  I	  have	  disdained	  reason	  and	  experience’	  (1978,	  300-­‐1).	  As	  we	  shall	  later	  see,	  
his	  works	  Nadja,	  Communicating	  Vessels	  and	  Mad	  Love	  are	  examples	  of	  his	  use	  of	  
analogical	  prose,	  while	  The	  Magnetic	  Fields	  and	  Soluble	  Fish	  ‘depended	  largely	  on	  
verbal	  automatism	  rising	  out	  of	  spontaneous	  memory	  to	  communicate	  the	  mind’s	  
analogical	  powers.	  The	  three	  later	  works	  are	  based	  on	  the	  automatic	  coincidences	  of	  
experiences	  whose	  relationships	  with	  the	  logical	  sequence	  of	  events	  are	  arbitrary	  
and	  can	  be	  deciphered	  only	  after	  the	  fact’	  (Balakian,	  1971,	  103-­‐4).	  
	  
	  
3.3.	  Surrealist	  Games	  and	  other	  Techniques:	  Chance	  at	  Play	  
	  
Besides	  the	  automatic	  method	  the	  Surrealists	  developed	  a	  taste	  for	  other	  
techniques,	  which	  would	  aid	  their	  striving	  for	  self-­‐discovery,	  social	  subversion	  and	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the	  stimulation	  of	  new	  artistic	  expressions.	  For	  example,	  the	  Surrealists	  
experimented	  with	  the	  cut-­‐up	  method,	  they	  played	  and	  adapted	  old	  parlour	  games	  
and	  aimlessly	  wandered	  the	  streets	  in	  search	  for	  the	  extraordinary.	  Although	  here	  
too	  coincidence	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  their	  functioning,	  some	  important	  distinctions	  
need	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  automatism	  and	  these	  other	  techniques,	  the	  games	  in	  
particular.	  While	  automatic	  activity	  reveals	  the	  unconscious	  of	  one	  individual	  alone,	  
in	  the	  games	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  heterogeneous	  images	  comes	  from	  a	  collective	  
effort.	  ‘This	  collective	  element	  perhaps	  explains	  the	  apparent	  randomness	  of	  
Surrealist	  games:	  two	  or	  more	  strictly	  distinct	  subjectivities	  are	  mixed,	  or	  blended,	  in	  
order	  to	  produce	  a	  totality.	  Each	  part	  is	  unrelated	  to	  what	  the	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  
whole	  will	  be,	  and	  this	  is	  all	  that	  matters,	  because	  the	  objective	  of	  this	  technique	  is,	  
precisely,	  to	  produce	  a	  whole	  that	  has	  no	  precedent	  or	  connection’	  (Lejeune,	  2012,	  
91).	  	  
The	  individual	  ego	  and	  even	  unconscious	  motives	  are	  bypassed,	  because	  
each	  player	  is	  only	  allowed	  to	  contribute	  one	  element	  to	  the	  whole	  and	  the	  fortuity	  
of	  the	  sentence	  or	  image	  is	  thus	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  purely	  circumstantial	  situation	  
the	  players	  find	  themselves	  in	  at	  that	  particular	  moment	  in	  time.	  The	  games	  
furthermore	  differed	  from	  automatism	  by	  being	  structured	  by	  strict,	  predetermined	  
rules,	  for	  example	  the	  grammatical	  structure	  of	  the	  sentence.	  However,	  instead	  of	  
hindering	  the	  occurrence	  of	  chance,	  these	  rules	  merely	  provided	  a	  framework	  for	  its	  
occurrence.	  Laxton	  argues	  that:	  ‘If	  ‘surreality’	  sought	  a	  utopian	  representational	  
mode	  that	  approached	  immediacy	  through	  the	  production	  of	  unpremeditated	  texts,	  
the	  game	  and	  its	  regulations	  could	  be	  designed	  to	  put	  it	  into	  effect:	  the	  regulations	  
acted	  as	  a	  guarantor	  of	  chance	  and	  chance’s	  repetition’	  (2011,	  11).	  Thus	  the	  rules	  
decide	  upon	  the	  initial	  conditions,	  but	  they	  leave	  enough	  freedom	  for	  chance	  and	  
imagination	  so	  that	  the	  exact	  outcome	  can	  never	  be	  determined.	  
Although	  there	  was	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  games	  they	  played	  (see	  Brotchie	  and	  
Gooding,	  1995)	  and	  all	  of	  them	  were	  employed	  to	  assist	  the	  Surrealists	  in	  their	  
search	  for	  meaning	  in	  the	  spontaneous	  and	  arbitrary,	  two	  of	  their	  favourites	  were	  
cadavre	  exquis	  (‘exquisite	  corpse’)	  and	  dialogue.	  For	  an	  exhibition	  catalogue	  
Breton’s	  first	  wife	  Simone	  Kahn	  recalled	  how	  they	  adapted	  the	  parlour	  game	  
‘leaflets’	  into	  exquisite	  corpse.	  The	  rules	  are	  as	  follows:	  every	  participant	  contributes	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one	  part	  of	  a	  text	  or	  image,	  while	  they	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  see	  the	  contributions	  of	  
the	  other	  players	  before	  the	  text	  or	  image	  is	  finished.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  
folding	  the	  paper	  before	  passing	  it	  on	  to	  the	  next	  person.	  To	  create	  a	  text	  a	  
particular	  grammatical	  order	  that	  has	  been	  decided	  on	  at	  the	  outset	  needs	  to	  be	  
adhered	  to.	  Kahn	  remembered	  that	  ‘André	  shouted	  with	  joy,	  immediately	  
recognizing	  in	  this	  game	  one	  of	  those	  natural	  wellsprings	  or	  waterfalls	  of	  inspiration	  
that	  he	  loved	  so	  much	  to	  discover.	  It	  was	  an	  unfettering.	  Even	  more	  so	  than	  with	  
automatic	  writing,	  we	  were	  sure	  of	  getting	  an	  astonishing	  amalgam’	  (Rosemont,	  
1998,	  19).	  
In	  dialogue,	  very	  similar	  to	  exquisite	  corpse,	  all	  participants,	  usually	  two	  
players,	  formulate	  questions	  and	  answers	  separately	  before	  combining	  them.	  The	  
games	  constituted	  an	  important	  addition	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  fortuitous	  meaning	  
was	  sought.	  Breton	  called	  them	  ‘an	  infallible	  means	  for	  sending	  judgment	  on	  holiday	  
and	  for	  completely	  liberating	  the	  metaphorical	  activity	  of	  the	  mind’	  (Laxton,	  2003,	  
9).	  The	  striking	  and	  unique	  images	  that	  were	  thus	  produced	  had	  their	  ‘prime	  value’	  
in	  ‘signposting	  the	  route	  to	  total	  imaginative	  liberation,	  unattainable	  without	  the	  
cooperation	  of	  chance’	  (Matthews,	  1977,	  149).	  The	  games	  further	  illustrated	  the	  
vital	  interconnection	  between	  chance	  and	  design.	  Chance	  provided	  an	  element	  of	  
inspiration	  that	  the	  mind	  couldn’t	  have	  created	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Kahn	  remembered	  
that	  ‘the	  suggestive	  power	  of	  those	  arbitrary	  meetings	  of	  words	  was	  so	  astounding,	  
so	  dazzling,	  and	  verified	  surrealism’s	  theses	  and	  outlook	  so	  strikingly,	  that	  the	  game	  
became	  a	  system,	  a	  method	  of	  research,	  a	  means	  of	  exaltation	  as	  well	  as	  
stimulation,	  and	  even,	  perhaps	  a	  kind	  of	  drug’	  (Rosemont,	  1998,	  19).	  
While	  exquisite	  corpse	  and	  dialogue	  harnessed	  the	  richness	  of	  several	  minds	  
coming	  together,	  errance	  sought	  more	  broadly	  to	  exploit	  the	  coincidence	  between	  
man	  and	  nature.	  Errance	  refers	  to	  the	  aimless	  wandering	  about.	  Though	  maybe	  not	  
strictly	  speaking	  a	  game,	  its	  playfulness	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  purposelessness	  and	  
freedom	  from	  conscious	  motivation	  on	  the	  other,	  set	  it	  clearly	  in	  contrast	  to	  
society’s	  serious	  moving	  about,	  driven	  by	  goal-­‐orientation	  and	  efficiency.	  Errance	  is	  




this	  solitary	  mortal	  endowed	  with	  an	  active	  imagination,	  always	  roaming	  the	  
great	  desert	  of	  men,	  has	  a	  nobler	  aim	  than	  that	  of	  the	  pure	  idler,	  a	  more	  
general	  aim,	  other	  than	  the	  fleeting	  pleasure	  of	  circumstance.	  He	  is	  looking	  
for	  that	  indefinable	  something	  we	  may	  be	  allowed	  to	  call	  ‘modernity’,	  for	  
want	  of	  a	  better	  term	  to	  express	  the	  idea	  in	  question.	  The	  aim	  for	  him	  is	  to	  
extract	  from	  fashion	  the	  poetry	  that	  resides	  in	  its	  historical	  envelope,	  to	  distil	  
the	  eternal	  from	  the	  transitory	  (Baudelaire,	  1972,	  402).	  
	  
In	  1924,	  Breton	  and	  three	  of	  his	  friends	  roamed	  haphazardly	  through	  the	  
countryside	  for	  several	  days	  after	  having	  set	  off	  from	  a	  town	  chosen	  at	  random.	  The	  
aim	  was	  to	  come	  across	  an	  external	  object	  or	  circumstance,	  which	  would	  trigger	  a	  
spontaneous	  internal	  response,	  leading	  to	  creative	  inspiration.	  The	  city	  was	  
particularly	  favoured	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  drifting	  since	  its	  bustling	  nature	  with	  all	  the	  
various	  smells,	  noises	  and	  sights	  never	  ceased	  to	  stimulate	  the	  arousal	  of	  stark	  
images	  in	  short	  succession.	  ‘Errance	  was	  an	  extension	  of	  automatist	  strategies	  into	  
physical	  space,	  a	  revaluation	  of	  perception	  and	  apprehension	  that,	  in	  its	  privileging	  
of	  the	  immediacy	  of	  experience,	  stood	  firmly	  against	  representation	  itself’	  (Laxton,	  
2003,	  6).	  	  
In	  this	  particular	  form	  of	  free	  play	  one	  finds	  a	  good	  example	  of	  a	  technique	  
to	  quicken	  the	  experience	  of	  objective	  chance.	  During	  these	  wanderings	  the	  artist	  
would	  remain	  highly	  receptive	  to	  one’s	  environment.	  The	  only	  intention	  was	  to	  
remain	  open	  to	  the	  encounter	  with	  the	  unknown	  and	  to	  find	  within	  ordinary	  reality	  
that	  spark	  of	  the	  extraordinary.	  ‘Such	  random	  encounters	  reinforce	  a	  magical	  
conception	  of	  the	  world,	  where	  play	  is	  a	  magical	  impulse	  that	  has	  far-­‐reaching	  
consequences.	  Each	  aspect	  of	  chance	  was	  employed	  by	  the	  surrealist	  to	  reveal	  the	  
power	  of	  imagination,	  elevated	  against	  bourgeois	  dependency	  on	  reason’	  





4.	  Objective	  Chance:	  Transcending	  the	  Dichotomy	  between	  
the	  Subjective	  and	  Objective	  
4.1.	  Defining	  the	  Theory	  of	  Objective	  Chance	  
	  
Automatism,	  games	  and	  objective	  chance	  all	  have	  the	  same	  principle	  at	  their	  
core,	  namely	  to	  bypass	  subjective	  control	  in	  order	  to	  uncover	  the	  arbitrary,	  which	  is	  
perceived	  to	  contain	  a	  hidden	  but	  meaningful	  message.	  Furthermore,	  they	  share	  the	  
same	  intention	  of	  letting	  distant	  realities	  fuse	  into	  a	  surprising	  whole	  larger	  than	  its	  
parts.	  Yet	  in	  other	  respects	  objective	  chance	  also	  differs	  from	  the	  other	  two.	  Firstly,	  
while	  the	  latter	  two	  represent	  methods	  that	  can	  be	  induced	  and	  performed	  at	  a	  
time	  of	  the	  artist’s	  choosing,	  for	  objective	  chance	  one	  cannot	  do	  more	  than	  to	  
remain	  receptive	  in	  order	  to	  notice	  when	  it	  suddenly	  happens.	  Secondly,	  while	  all	  
three	  unearth	  unconscious	  material,	  the	  material	  of	  objective	  chance	  is	  somehow	  
mirrored	  in	  the	  external	  world.	  	  
In	  his	  search	  for	  the	  marvellous	  Breton	  had	  sensitised	  himself	  to	  observing	  
his	  environment	  more	  closely	  and	  that	  is	  when	  he	  started	  to	  notice	  what	  he	  could	  in	  
the	  beginning	  only	  describe	  as	  strange	  and	  'sudden	  parallels'	  (Breton,	  1999,	  19)	  
between	  the	  internal	  and	  the	  external	  world.	  This	  paralleling	  puzzled	  Breton	  beyond	  
comprehension.	  He	  considered	  these	  events	  as	  ‘facts	  of	  quite	  unverifiable	  intrinsic	  
value’	  with	  an	  ‘absolutely	  unexpected,	  violently	  fortuitous	  character’	  (ibid.).	  These	  
early	  descriptions	  appeared	  in	  Nadja	  in	  1928	  and	  his	  interest	  in	  understanding	  these	  
‘facts’	  only	  grew	  over	  time.	  By	  the	  early	  1930s	  Breton	  had	  thus	  begun	  to	  turn	  his	  
attention	  away	  from	  the	  automatic	  method,	  the	  word	  games	  and	  more	  generally	  
from	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  internal,	  subjective	  world	  alone.	  The	  outcome	  of	  
experimenting	  with	  these	  techniques,	  the	  texts	  themselves,	  did	  not	  excite	  him	  in	  the	  
same	  way	  anymore.	  Instead	  he	  became	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  
man	  and	  the	  world	  and	  in	  addressing	  the	  dichotomy	  that	  was	  perceived	  to	  exist	  
between	  them.	  In	  his	  Second	  Manifesto	  (1930)	  he	  wrote:	  ‘People	  pretend	  not	  to	  pay	  
too	  much	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  logical	  mechanism	  of	  the	  sentence	  alone	  
reveals	  itself	  to	  be	  increasingly	  powerless	  to	  provoke	  the	  emotive	  shock	  in	  man	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which	  really	  makes	  life	  meaningful’	  (1972,	  152).	  To	  turn	  towards	  an	  investigation	  of	  
such	  chance	  encounters	  therefore	  only	  seemed	  the	  logical	  conclusion.	  
By	  the	  time	  he	  wrote	  Mad	  Love	  (1937)	  Breton	  had	  fully	  developed	  his	  theory	  
and	  by	  then	  defined	  objective	  chance	  as	  ‘the	  encounter	  of	  an	  external	  causality	  and	  
an	  internal	  finality’	  (1987,	  21).	  These	  events,	  where	  an	  object,	  event	  or	  person	  
triggers	  a	  strong	  emotional	  response,	  make	  themselves	  felt	  as	  if	  they	  must	  be	  of	  
great	  significance.	  For	  a	  brief	  moment	  the	  external	  world	  seems	  to	  embody	  
something	  from	  the	  inside	  that	  would	  otherwise	  possibly	  have	  remained	  hidden	  
away.	  This	  means	  that	  one’s	  personal	  desires	  find	  their	  unexpected	  fulfilment	  in	  the	  
world,	  even	  desires	  that	  one	  hasn’t	  even	  become	  aware	  of	  yet.	  For	  Breton	  this	  
represented	  the	  greatest	  contradiction	  of	  all	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  objective	  chance	  was	  
his	  attempt	  at	  explaining	  it.	  As	  we	  already	  know,	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  
antinomies	  of	  the	  world	  and	  to	  transcend	  the	  perception	  that	  held	  them	  in	  place	  
was	  Surrealism’s	  activating	  motive.	  	  
Objective	  chance	  can	  therefore	  be	  described	  as	  one	  of	  the	  two	  most	  
important	  discoveries	  in	  achieving	  the	  Surrealist	  goal,	  because	  it	  represents	  the	  
direct,	  personal	  experience	  of	  the	  transcendence	  between	  the	  outside	  and	  the	  
inside;	  a	  moment	  of	  truly	  experiencing	  the	  marvellous.	  The	  other	  discovery	  was	  that	  
of	  objective	  humour:	  ‘a	  synthesis	  in	  the	  Hegelian	  sense	  of	  the	  imitation	  of	  nature	  in	  
its	  accidental	  forms	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  of	  humour	  on	  the	  other.	  Humour,	  as	  a	  
paradoxical	  triumph	  of	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  over	  real	  conditions	  at	  a	  moment	  
when	  they	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  most	  unfavourable,	  is	  naturally	  called	  on	  as	  a	  
defence	  during	  the	  period,	  heavily	  loaded	  with	  menaces,	  in	  which	  we	  live’	  (Breton,	  
1978,	  154).	  For	  Breton	  objective	  chance	  and	  objective	  humour	  are	  two	  distinct	  
modes	  of	  perception	  providing	  at	  the	  same	  time	  relief	  from	  suffering	  and	  hope	  that	  
a	  greater,	  more	  balanced	  experience	  of	  life	  is	  possible.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  Breton	  
continued	  to	  stress	  their	  mutual	  importance	  in	  later	  years:	  ‘Objective	  humour	  and	  
objective	  chance	  may	  be	  considered	  the	  two	  poles	  between	  which	  surrealism	  will	  be	  
able	  to	  flash	  a	  current	  of	  the	  highest	  tension’	  (ibid.)	  and	  ‘that	  the	  black	  sphinx	  of	  
objective	  humour	  cannot	  fail	  to	  encounter,	  on	  the	  dusty	  road	  of	  the	  future,	  the	  
white	  sphinx	  of	  objective	  chance,	  and	  that	  all	  further	  human	  creation	  must	  be	  the	  





4.2.	  The	  Dialectics	  of	  Chance	  and	  Necessity	  
	  
Although	  in	  instances	  of	  objective	  chance	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  man	  and	  
nature	  could	  be	  experienced	  as	  transcended,	  Breton	  continued	  to	  be	  troubled	  by	  
the	  intellectual	  contradiction	  that	  it	  presented.	  In	  fact	  objective	  chance	  should	  be	  
understood	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  illustrate	  that	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  while	  the	  
contradiction	  ultimately	  persists.	  In	  Nadja	  Breton	  speculated	  that	  these	  ‘petrifying	  
coincidences	  […]	  may	  belong	  to	  the	  order	  of	  pure	  observation,	  but	  which	  on	  each	  
occasion	  present	  all	  the	  appearances	  of	  a	  signal,	  without	  our	  being	  able	  to	  say	  
precisely	  which	  signal,	  and	  of	  what’	  (1999,	  19).	  Browder	  summarises	  Breton’s	  
dilemma	  in	  a	  nutshell:	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  secret	  of	  the	  magie	  circonstancielle	  in	  life,	  whereby	  reality	  abruptly	  
satisfies	  the	  mind’s	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  desires?	  Does	  not	  some	  obscure	  
yet	  definable	  principle	  determine	  the	  miraculous	  rencontre	  (be	  it	  of	  images,	  
objects,	  or	  people)	  wherein	  human	  finality	  and	  universal	  causality	  fuse?	  How	  is	  it	  
that	  every	  sudden	  discovery,	  every	  coincidence	  appears	  paradoxically	  under	  the	  
double	  aspect	  of	  chance	  and	  fatality?	  (1967,	  106).	  
	  
Since	  the	  subjective	  and	  objective	  could	  fuse	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  Breton	  perceived	  that	  a	  
special	  relationship	  between	  chance	  and	  necessity	  must	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
phenomenon.	  In	  Mad	  Love	  where	  he	  defined	  objective	  chance	  as	  ‘the	  form	  making	  
manifest	  the	  exterior	  necessity	  which	  traces	  its	  path	  in	  the	  human	  unconscious’	  
(1987,	  23),	  he	  explained	  that	  in	  this	  definition	  he	  is	  ‘boldly	  trying	  to	  interpret	  and	  
reconcile	  Engels	  and	  Freud	  on	  this	  point’	  (ibid.)	  and	  in	  Entretiens	  he	  wrote	  that	  the	  
term	  ‘objective	  chance’	  was	  inspired	  by	  Hegel.	  Since	  Breton	  did	  not	  elaborate	  upon	  
the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  sources,	  it	  helps	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  
this	  background	  of	  objective	  chance	  in	  order	  to	  further	  elucidate	  what	  Breton	  meant	  
by	  this	  concept.	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In	  Dialectics	  of	  Nature	  Engels	  describes	  Hegel’s	  ‘unheard-­‐of70	  propositions’	  
that	  say	  ‘that	  the	  accidental	  has	  a	  cause	  because	  it	  is	  accidental,	  and	  just	  as	  much	  
also	  has	  no	  cause	  because	  it	  is	  accidental;	  that	  the	  accidental	  is	  necessary,	  that	  
necessity	  determines	  itself	  as	  chance,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  chance	  is	  rather	  
absolute	  necessity’	  (1940,	  233).	  This	  proposition	  is	  based	  on	  another	  hypothesis,	  
namely	  that	  possibility	  and	  actuality	  form	  a	  contradictory	  unity	  and	  that	  their	  
dialectics	  are	  the	  deeper	  cause	  for	  the	  accidental	  (Köhler,	  1993,	  103).	  For	  Hegel,	  
necessity	  only	  governs	  the	  realm	  of	  possibility	  and	  all	  actuality	  is	  at	  first	  determined	  
by	  necessity	  as	  infinite	  possibility.	  Only	  through	  the	  action	  of	  chance	  does	  one	  of	  
these	  possibilities	  become	  realised	  in	  actuality.	  This	  dynamic	  is	  based	  on	  Hegel’s	  
concept	  of	  reciprocal	  action	  	  
	  
as	  the	  true	  causa	  finalis	  of	  things.	  […]	  Only	  from	  this	  universal	  reciprocal	  
action	  do	  we	  arrive	  at	  the	  real	  causal	  relation.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  
separate	  phenomena,	  we	  have	  to	  tear	  them	  out	  of	  the	  general	  inter-­‐
connection	  and	  consider	  them	  in	  isolation,	  and	  there	  the	  changing	  motions	  
appear,	  one	  as	  cause	  and	  the	  other	  as	  effect	  (Engels,	  1940,	  173-­‐4).	  	  
	  
Lukács	  explains	  that	  chance	  does	  not	  cease	  to	  be	  chance	  because	  necessity	  finds	  
expression	  within	  it	  and	  in	  turn	  necessity	  does	  not	  cease	  to	  be	  necessary	  because	  it	  
has	  been	  induced	  by	  chance	  (Köhler,	  2004,	  102).	  Thus,	  Hegel’s	  ‘outrageous’	  
proposition	  says	  that	  chance	  and	  necessity	  are	  mutually	  dependent	  on	  each	  other	  
and	  as	  such	  can’t	  be	  understood	  separately	  from	  one	  another.	  
Yet	  while	  Hegel	  considered	  the	  occurrence	  of	  objective	  chance	  at	  large,	  
Breton	  was	  also	  interested	  in	  the	  question	  of	  what	  part	  human	  consciousness	  plays.	  
When	  applied	  to	  his	  ethics,	  for	  Hegel,	  chance	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  
predetermination	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  fate.	  There	  is	  no	  deeper	  meaning	  hidden	  behind	  a	  
certain	  event	  happening	  to	  someone	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  (see	  Henrich,	  1975,	  172-­‐3).	  
It	  is	  at	  this	  point	  where	  Breton	  diverges	  from	  Hegel	  and	  includes	  Freud	  into	  his	  own	  
definition	  of	  objective	  chance,	  namely	  by	  adding	  the	  role	  of	  desire.	  According	  to	  
Freud’s	  theory,	  man	  is	  constantly	  driven	  by	  unconscious	  wishes	  and	  for	  Breton	  it	  is	  




this	  desire,	  which	  induces	  a	  state	  of	  heightened	  attention	  and	  availability,	  thus	  
turning	  the	  individual	  into	  a	  medium	  for	  revelatory	  chance	  (Köhler,	  2004,	  83).	  	  
By	  meeting	  one’s	  desire	  –	  the	  ‘internal	  finality’	  –	  objective	  chance	  reveals	  
something	  real	  and	  necessary,	  which	  would	  otherwise	  have	  remained	  unconscious.	  
By	  using	  the	  term	  ‘objective’	  Breton	  stressed	  that	  the	  event	  is	  not	  only	  experienced	  
subjectively	  but	  that	  it	  includes	  a	  coincidental	  manifestation	  of	  real	  form	  in	  the	  
external	  world.	  As	  if	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  which	  as	  of	  yet	  remain	  out	  of	  sight,	  
nature	  was	  able	  to	  answer	  man’s	  desire	  in	  spontaneous,	  fortuitous	  moments.	  
Breton	  liked	  to	  use	  the	  crystal	  as	  a	  metaphor,	  accidentally	  created	  by	  nature,	  ‘it	  
appears	  suddenly,	  retrospectively	  necessary	  and	  necessarily	  perfect.’	  (Caws,	  1966,	  
68).	  
While	  this	  explains	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  theory	  that	  Breton	  settled	  on,	  the	  
question	  of	  how	  it	  could	  be	  possible	  that	  such	  an	  alliance	  exists	  between	  man	  and	  
nature	  ultimately	  remained	  a	  mystery	  to	  him.	  In	  1942	  he	  still	  wrote:	  	  
	  
Among	  those	  contradictions	  which	  are	  fatal	  to	  us,	  the	  most	  important	  to	  resolve	  
–	  and	  it	  is	  the	  one	  in	  which	  I	  have	  interested	  myself	  most	  extensively	  –	  is	  the	  one	  
that	  sets	  at	  odds	  nature	  and	  man	  within	  man’s	  conception	  of	  nature’s	  necessity	  
and	  of	  his	  own,	  these	  two	  necessities	  presenting	  themselves	  as	  being	  in	  grave	  
disaccord.	  Although	  I	  cannot	  pretend	  to	  have	  resolved	  it,	  I	  have	  at	  least	  shown	  
that	  it	  does	  not	  totally	  resist	  the	  attentive	  observation	  of	  coincidences	  and	  other	  
phenomena	  said	  to	  be	  ‘chance.’	  Chance	  remains	  the	  great	  veil	  to	  be	  lifted.	  I	  have	  
said	  that	  it	  could	  be	  the	  form	  of	  the	  manifestation	  of	  external	  necessity	  as	  it	  
makes	  a	  way	  into	  the	  human	  unconscious	  (Breton,	  1978,	  245).	  
	  
The	  crucial	  sentence	  is:	  ‘within	  man’s	  conception	  of	  nature’s	  necessity	  and	  of	  his	  
own’,	  meaning	  that	  the	  contradiction	  is	  only	  an	  intellectually	  perceived	  but	  not	  a	  
real	  one.	  With	  the	  theory	  of	  objective	  chance	  he	  hoped	  that	  he	  had	  gotten	  closer	  to	  
finding	  a	  way	  in	  which	  man	  could	  make	  peace	  with	  the	  perceived	  contradiction	  
between	  himself	  and	  the	  world.	  Like	  in	  Mallarmé	  the	  solution	  to	  understand	  chance	  
was	  again	  only	  found	  in	  recourse	  to	  the	  Absurd.	  ‘The	  existence	  of	  the	  absolute	  can	  
be	  established	  only	  through	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  absurd	  (…).	  For	  the	  difference	  
between	  the	  finite	  world	  and	  the	  infinite	  is	  that	  in	  the	  former	  we	  recognise	  the	  
juxtaposition	  of	  opposites	  as	  “absurd,”	  while	  the	  power	  of	  “chance”	  which	  nullifies	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this	  contradiction	  in	  things	  can	  be	  said,	  from	  our	  point	  of	  view,	  “to	  contain	  the	  
absurd”’	  (Balakian,	  1970,	  43-­‐4).	  	  
	  
	  
4.3.	  A	  Brief	  Comparison	  between	  Synchronicity	  and	  Objective	  Chance	  
	  
Since	  Jung’s	  and	  Breton’s	  definitions	  of	  chance	  appear	  so	  similar,	  this	  section	  
will	  briefly	  describe	  encounters	  between	  the	  two	  men	  and	  look	  at	  similarities	  and	  
differences	  between	  both	  concepts.	  Breton	  is	  generally	  associated	  with	  Freud’s	  
school	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  a	  few	  interesting	  meeting	  points	  with	  
Jung.	  First	  of	  all,	  Breton	  was	  undoubtedly	  aware	  of	  Jung	  because	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Tzara	  
from	  1919	  he	  wrote:	  ‘You	  have	  still	  not	  told	  me	  on	  what	  terms	  you	  were	  with	  Dr	  
Jung	  –	  of	  whom	  you	  sometimes	  speak.	  I	  like	  Jung’s	  cast	  of	  mind’	  (Sheppard,	  2000,	  
189).	  Unfortunately	  it	  remains	  unclear	  what	  aspects	  of	  Jung’s	  work	  Tzara	  
communicated	  to	  Breton	  and	  which	  of	  these	  Breton	  liked.	  One	  year	  after	  the	  
publication	  of	  Communicating	  Vessels	  Breton,	  together	  with	  Paul	  Eluard,	  conducted	  
an	  enquiry	  into	  perceptions	  of	  chance	  encounters	  of	  which	  Jung	  was	  one	  
respondent.	  They	  posed	  the	  following	  questions:	  ‘What	  do	  you	  consider	  the	  
essential	  encounter	  of	  your	  life?	  To	  what	  extent	  did	  this	  encounter	  seem	  to	  you,	  and	  
does	  it	  seem	  to	  you	  now,	  to	  be	  fortuitous	  or	  foreordained?’	  (Breton,	  1987,	  19).	  
The	  questions	  were	  sent	  out	  to	  about	  three	  hundred	  writers,	  artists,	  
philosophers	  and	  other	  prominent	  thinkers	  at	  the	  time,	  of	  which	  one	  hundred	  and	  
forty	  questionnaires	  were	  returned.	  The	  answers,	  together	  with	  a	  short	  introduction	  
by	  Breton	  and	  Eluard,	  where	  then	  published	  in	  the	  Surrealist	  magazine	  Minotaure.	  In	  
Mad	  Love	  Breton	  returned	  to	  discussing	  the	  survey	  and	  further	  explained	  their	  
original	  motives,	  their	  expectations	  and	  conclusions.	  By	  asking	  for	  an	  essential	  
encounter	  they	  were	  keen	  to	  not	  only	  find	  out	  about	  the	  most	  subjective	  one	  but	  
even	  more	  so	  how	  many	  of	  these	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  objective	  chance.	  While	  the	  
first	  question	  was	  meant	  to	  engage	  on	  an	  emotional	  level,	  the	  second	  ‘was	  intended	  





This	  was	  without	  a	  doubt	  my	  birth.	  The	  second	  rencontre	  will	  be	  my	  death,	  
an	  experience	  I	  haven't	  made	  yet.	  Between	  these	  two	  exist	  events	  whose	  
significance	  is	  difficult	  to	  evaluate.	  The	  third	  encounter,	  which	  seems	  
essential	  to	  me,	  is	  my	  encounter	  with	  the	  world.	  The	  world	  was	  less	  
surprised	  about	  this	  encounter	  than	  I	  was.	  I	  don't	  know	  its	  importance,	  since	  
I	  don't	  understand	  the	  world.	  I	  think	  that	  my	  existence	  was	  necessary	  
because	  it	  was,	  no	  doubt,	  inevitable.71	  
	  
Jung	  seems	  to	  have	  somewhat	  evaded	  the	  question	  but	  it	  shows	  that	  he	  must	  have	  
been	  aware,	  at	  least	  through	  this	  survey,	  that	  an	  interest	  in	  chance	  encounters	  
existed	  in	  some	  artistic	  circles.	  	  
Both	  definitions	  of	  chance,	  and	  in	  fact	  Cabot’s	  too,	  come	  very	  close	  to	  each	  
other	  because	  they	  all	  focus	  on	  the	  coincidence	  of	  parallel	  external	  and	  internal	  
contents.	  All	  three	  stress	  that	  meaning	  can	  be	  extracted	  from	  the	  event	  and	  all	  
consider	  this	  meaning	  valuable	  for	  personal	  growth.	  When	  Breton	  observed	  that	  
‘only	  a	  precise	  and	  absolutely	  careful	  reference	  to	  the	  emotional	  state	  of	  the	  person	  
to	  whom	  such	  things	  happen	  can	  furnish	  any	  basis	  for	  their	  evaluation’,	  Jung	  could	  
not	  have	  agreed	  more	  and	  the	  emotional	  component	  was	  fundamental	  to	  both.	  The	  
experience	  of	  the	  numinous,	  or	  the	  flash	  of	  a	  spark,	  were	  by	  both	  considered	  a	  sign	  
of	  transcendence,	  though	  for	  Breton	  not	  in	  a	  mystical	  or	  religious	  sense.	  	  
For	  both	  the	  phenomena	  brought	  causality	  and	  time	  into	  question.	  In	  
Communicating	  Vessels	  Breton	  wrote:	  	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  sensible	  relation	  between	  a	  certain	  letter	  that	  arrives	  for	  you	  
from	  Switzerland	  and	  a	  certain	  preoccupation	  you	  might	  have	  had	  around	  
the	  time	  this	  letter	  was	  written.	  But	  isn't	  that	  making	  the	  notion	  of	  causality	  
absolute	  in	  a	  regrettable	  way?	  Isn't	  it	  taking	  too	  lightly	  Engels's	  words:	  
‘Causality	  cannot	  be	  understood	  except	  as	  it	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  category	  of	  
objective	  chance,	  a	  form	  of	  the	  manifestation	  of	  necessity?’	  I	  will	  add	  that	  
the	  causal	  relation,	  however	  troubling	  it	  is	  here,	  is	  real,	  not	  only	  because	  of	  
its	  reliance	  on	  reciprocal	  universal	  action	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
is	  noticed	  (1997,	  91-­‐2).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





And	  later	  he	  adds:	  ‘If	  causality	  seemed	  for	  me	  that	  morning	  a	  slippery	  and	  
particularly	  suspicious	  thing,	  the	  idea	  of	  time	  hadn’t	  remained	  intact	  either’	  (ibid.,	  
93).	  	  Although	  Breton	  does	  not	  adhere	  to	  indeterminism	  in	  the	  absolute	  sense,	  he	  
dismisses	  a	  traditional	  view	  on	  causality	  and	  suggests	  instead	  that	  psychic	  reality	  
should	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  equation.	  Jung	  also	  takes	  psychic	  reality	  into	  account,	  
but	  otherwise	  he	  believed	  synchronicity	  to	  be	  due	  to	  an	  instance	  of	  pure	  acausality.	  
Breton	  does	  not	  place	  such	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  explaining	  the	  roles	  that	  time	  and	  
causality	  play	  as	  Jung	  does.	  On	  the	  whole	  Jung	  was	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  exact	  
workings	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  whereas	  for	  Breton	  it	  had	  more	  relevance	  as	  a	  means	  
to	  an	  end.	  The	  theories	  differ	  most	  significantly	  in	  that	  objective	  chance	  is	  
understood	  more	  broadly	  than	  synchronicity.	  It	  includes	  encounters	  that	  are	  not	  
directly	  mirrored	  by	  internal	  images,	  but	  that	  simply	  answer	  a	  desire.	  	  
	  
	  
4.4.	  Lived	  Chance:	  Portrayals	  in	  Nadja,	  Communicating	  Vessels	  and	  Mad	  
Love	  
	  
After	  having	  outlined	  the	  basics	  of	  objective	  chance,	  it	  is	  time	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  
look	  at	  those	  texts	  in	  which	  Breton	  described	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  personal	  experiences	  
of	  the	  phenomenon.	  From	  early	  on	  Breton	  perceived	  that	  objective	  chance	  exists	  on	  
a	  broad	  spectrum	  and	  does	  not	  always	  constitute	  the	  same	  experience.	  In	  Nadja	  he	  
wrote:	  	  
	  
Such	  facts,	  from	  the	  simplest	  to	  the	  most	  complex,	  should	  be	  assigned	  a	  
hierarchy,	  from	  the	  special,	  indefinable	  reaction	  at	  the	  sight	  of	  extremely	  
rare	  objects	  or	  upon	  our	  arrival	  in	  a	  strange	  place	  (both	  accompanied	  by	  the	  
distinct	  sensation	  that	  something	  momentous,	  something	  essential	  depends	  
upon	  them),	  to	  the	  complete	  lack	  of	  peace	  with	  ourselves	  provoked	  by	  
certain	  juxtapositions	  […].	  We	  might	  establish	  a	  number	  of	  intermediate	  
steps	  between	  such	  slope-­‐facts	  and	  such	  cliff-­‐facts	  (1972,	  20).	  
	  
The	  hierarchy	  of	  chance	  events	  would	  thus	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
spark,	  that	  is,	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  feeling	  that	  is	  released.	  The	  sense	  of	  significance	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depends	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  emotion	  and	  the	  greater	  the	  spark,	  the	  stronger	  the	  
experience	  of	  surreality.	  Breton	  never	  provides	  such	  a	  hierarchy,	  but	  a	  selection	  of	  
chance	  encounters	  from	  all	  three	  texts	  shall	  illustrate	  the	  differences	  in	  experience	  
that	  Breton	  is	  referring	  to.	  	  
All	  three	  texts	  form	  a	  triad	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  discovery	  and	  exploration	  of	  
objective	  chance.	  All	  three	  are	  strongly	  autobiographical	  and	  seem	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  
the	  two	  questions	  that	  Breton	  asks	  himself	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  Nadja:	  ‘Who	  am	  
I?’	  and	  ‘Who	  do	  I	  haunt?’	  These	  questions	  reveal	  that	  he	  does	  not	  only	  see	  his	  quest	  
as	  one	  of	  self-­‐revelation	  but	  also	  in	  the	  discovery	  of	  how	  he	  relates	  to	  ‘the	  other’	  in	  
the	  world,	  to	  objects	  and	  persons,	  and	  his	  desire	  for	  authentic	  connection.	  That	  he	  
uses	  the	  word	  ‘haunt’	  suggests	  that	  he	  perceives	  something	  uncanny	  about	  this.	  He	  
once	  wondered	  if	  ‘perhaps	  life	  needs	  to	  be	  deciphered	  like	  a	  cryptogram’	  (ibid.,	  112)	  
and	  in	  this	  quest,	  objective	  chance	  takes	  on	  more	  and	  more	  the	  role	  of	  a	  divinatory	  
tool	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  the	  mystery	  and	  find	  answers	  to	  these	  questions.	  	  
Sometimes	  Breton	  easily	  detects	  the	  answers	  but	  in	  other	  cases	  they	  are	  too	  
oracular	  and	  although	  Breton	  feels	  a	  hidden	  significance,	  he	  remains	  unable	  to	  solve	  
the	  riddle.	  In	  Nadja	  he	  lyrically	  describes	  these	  ‘petrifying	  coincidences’	  as	  
‘harmonies	  struck	  as	  though	  on	  the	  piano,	  flashes	  of	  light	  that	  would	  make	  you	  see,	  
really	  see,	  if	  only	  they	  were	  not	  so	  much	  quicker	  than	  all	  the	  rest’	  (ibid.,	  19).	  Overall	  
it	  also	  has	  become	  clear	  that	  for	  Breton	  these	  coincidences	  hold	  the	  power	  to	  
transform	  something	  mundane	  into	  something	  marvellous	  and	  beautiful,	  thus	  
infusing	  the	  experience	  of	  reality	  with	  the	  extraordinary.	  	  
Furthermore,	  all	  three	  texts	  are	  deeply	  imbued	  with	  the	  Surrealist	  aim	  of	  
attempting	  to	  eradicate	  contradiction	  and	  to	  fuse	  them	  into	  a	  larger	  unity.	  All	  three	  
are	  written	  in	  analogical	  prose,	  where	  priority	  is	  given	  to	  the	  narration	  of	  chains	  of	  
associations	  over	  the	  causal	  and	  temporal.	  Each	  book	  seems	  to	  concentrate	  on	  
another	  overall	  theme:	  in	  Nadja	  it	  is	  the	  opposition	  between	  sanity	  and	  insanity,	  in	  
The	  Communicating	  Vessels	  between	  the	  dreaming	  and	  the	  waking	  state	  and	  in	  Mad	  
Love	  between	  the	  subjective	  and	  the	  objective.	  In	  Nadja	  the	  first	  experience	  that	  
Breton	  recounts	  is	  how	  he	  became	  friends	  with	  Paul	  Eluard.	  At	  their	  first	  meeting	  
Eluard	  approached	  Breton	  at	  the	  opera	  because	  he	  mistakenly	  recognised	  him	  as	  a	  
friend	  he	  believed	  had	  been	  killed	  in	  the	  war.	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  through	  the	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introduction	  of	  a	  mutual	  friend,	  they	  begin	  to	  correspond	  by	  letter	  without	  knowing	  
who	  the	  other	  one	  is.	  It	  is	  not	  until	  they	  meet	  again	  in	  person	  that	  they	  realise	  that	  
they	  had	  met	  this	  one	  time	  before.	  What	  struck	  Breton	  as	  significant	  here	  is	  that	  a	  
stranger	  mistakes	  him	  for	  a	  friend	  when	  only	  a	  short	  while	  later	  and	  through	  other	  
circumstances	  they	  shall	  really	  become	  friends,	  as	  if	  at	  their	  first	  encounter	  they	  
were	  unknowingly	  already	  drawn	  towards	  each	  other.	  	  
While	  here	  the	  meaning	  seems	  clear	  to	  Breton,	  he	  recounts	  another	  example	  
where	  it	  is	  not.	  He	  explains	  that	  he	  was	  shown	  two	  different	  but	  similar	  optical	  
illusions	  by	  separate	  people	  only	  one	  or	  two	  hours	  apart.	  This	  paralleling	  struck	  him	  
as	  significant,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  it	  remained	  ‘quite	  impossible	  to	  establish	  a	  rational	  
correlation	  between	  them.’	  (ibid.,	  59).	  In	  Communicating	  Vessels	  (1932)	  Breton	  
described	  the	  encounter	  with	  an	  elegant	  man	  who	  looked	  like	  a	  professor,	  asking	  
him	  for	  some	  change	  for	  the	  metro.	  He	  thanks	  Breton	  with	  the	  following	  words:	  “I	  
do	  not	  know	  who	  you	  are,	  sir,	  but	  I	  hope	  that	  you	  can	  do	  what	  you	  must	  and	  what	  
you	  can	  do:	  something	  great”,	  and	  went	  off.	  The	  chapter	  including	  the	  encounter	  
with	  the	  man	  had	  already	  been	  written	  when	  some	  time	  later	  he	  finds	  in	  The	  Old	  
English	  Baron	  the	  following	  words:	  “I	  do	  not	  know,	  but	  I	  think	  I	  perceive	  in	  you	  some	  
qualities	  that	  announce	  to	  me	  you	  are	  destined	  to	  be	  something	  great”	  (Breton,	  
1997,	  89).	  Though	  again	  the	  parallel	  encounters	  struck	  him	  as	  extraordinary,	  he	  
doesn’t	  provide	  any	  further	  explanation	  as	  to	  their	  exact	  meaning.	  	  
The	  title	  of	  ‘Communicating	  Vessels’	  is	  significant	  too,	  because	  by	  choosing	  
this	  image	  Breton	  not	  only	  sought	  to	  exemplify	  the	  connection	  between	  different	  
states	  such	  as	  waking	  and	  sleeping,	  inner	  and	  outer	  experience,	  but	  also	  to	  highlight	  
the	  crucial	  act	  of	  balancing	  out	  any	  disequilibrium	  between	  them.	  Breton	  also	  called	  
it	  a	  ‘capillary	  tissue’	  which	  guarantees	  ‘the	  constant	  exchange	  in	  thought	  that	  must	  
exist	  between	  the	  exterior	  and	  interior	  worlds’	  (ibid.,	  139).	  It	  is	  this	  fluidity	  which	  is	  
perceived	  to	  give	  the	  experiencer	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  Absolute,	  the	  realm	  of	  
coincidentia	  oppositorum,	  within	  everyday	  life.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  book	  Breton	  
invokes	  the	  image	  of	  a	  future	  poet	  who	  will	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  the	  two	  contradictions	  
together:	  ‘the	  objective	  consciousness	  of	  realities	  and	  their	  interior	  development,	  
since	  this	  relationship,	  through	  individual	  feeling	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  universal	  
feeling	  on	  the	  other,	  contains	  something	  magical	  for	  the	  time	  being’	  (ibid.,	  147).	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The	  emotional	  significance	  of	  object	  trouvé,	  the	  found	  object,	  is	  for	  Breton	  
also	  a	  direct	  outcome	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  objective	  chance.	  Breton’s	  frequent	  visits	  to	  
the	  flea	  market	  were	  made	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  encountering	  one	  such	  object	  that	  will	  
trigger	  an	  immediate	  emotional	  response.	  In	  Mad	  Love	  Breton	  described	  one	  of	  
these	  strolls	  through	  the	  antique	  fair	  when	  he	  and	  Alberto	  Giacometti	  each	  
stumbled	  upon	  an	  object	  which	  urgently	  spoke	  to	  them.	  An	  iron	  half-­‐mask	  
resembling	  an	  evolved	  helmet	  for	  Giacometti	  and	  a	  large	  wooden	  spoon	  with	  a	  little	  
shoe	  attached	  to	  its	  handle	  for	  Breton	  (1987,	  28-­‐30).	  Though	  they	  weren’t	  sure	  
about	  their	  meanings	  at	  first,	  both	  discovered	  it	  after	  some	  musing.	  The	  mask	  
inspired	  Giacometti	  to	  complete	  a	  statue	  he	  had	  been	  desperate	  to	  complete	  but	  
that	  he	  had	  been	  stuck	  with	  for	  some	  time.	  Breton,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  asked	  
Giacometti	  to	  sculpt	  him	  a	  “Cinderella	  ash-­‐tray”	  a	  few	  months	  earlier.	  It	  was	  meant	  
as	  ‘a	  little	  slipper	  which	  was	  to	  be	  in	  principle	  Cinderella’s	  lost	  slipper’	  (ibid.,	  33),	  but	  
since	  Giacometti	  forgot,	  Breton	  had	  remained	  with	  the	  feeling	  of	  unmet	  desire	  until	  
he	  found	  his	  longing	  at	  last	  satisfied	  in	  the	  spoon.	  	  
	   	  
Then	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  object	  I	  had	  so	  much	  wanted	  to	  contemplate	  
before,	  had	  been	  constructed	  outside	  of	  me,	  very	  different,	  very	  far	  beyond	  
what	  I	  could	  have	  imagined,	  and	  regardless	  of	  many	  immediately	  deceptive	  
elements.	  So	  it	  was	  at	  this	  price,	  and	  only	  at	  this	  price,	  that	  the	  perfect	  
organic	  unity	  had	  been	  reached	  (ibid.,	  34).	  
	  
Yet	  in	  this	  case	  the	  chain	  of	  associations	  didn’t	  stop	  there,	  but	  some	  more	  thinking	  
finally	  led	  to	  ‘the	  objective	  equation:	  slipper=spoon=penis=perfect	  mold	  of	  this	  
penis’	  (ibid.,	  36)	  to	  ‘the	  fact	  that	  Cinderella’s	  slipper	  is	  just	  what,	  in	  our	  folklore,	  
takes	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  lost	  object,	  so	  […]	  that	  it	  symbolized	  for	  me	  a	  woman	  
unique	  and	  unknown,	  magnified	  and	  dramatized	  by	  my	  loneliness	  and	  by	  my	  
imperious	  need	  to	  abolish	  certain	  memories’	  (ibid.,	  36-­‐7).	  Here	  Freud’s	  influence	  
becomes	  visible,	  in	  that	  Breton	  considers	  every	  emotion	  and	  unconscious	  movement	  
to	  contain	  a	  hidden	  motive.	  However,	  for	  Breton	  the	  object	  itself	  is	  not	  infused	  with	  
absolute	  necessity:	  ‘Truthfully,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  of	  less	  importance	  to	  know	  if	  certain	  
answers	  given	  are	  able	  to	  be	  interchanged:	  […].	  It	  might	  be	  that	  instead	  of	  the	  spoon	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and	  the	  mask,	  other	  objects	  we	  could	  have	  discovered	  the	  same	  day	  would	  have	  
been	  capable	  of	  filling	  the	  same	  role’	  (ibid.,	  35).	  	  
For	  Breton	  individual	  chance	  encounters	  were	  often	  embedded	  within	  a	  
longer	  series	  of	  events	  and	  their	  meaning	  might	  only	  be	  revealed	  in	  connection	  with	  
each	  other.	  Thus	  the	  meaning-­‐making	  process	  can	  possibly	  stretch	  out	  over	  long	  
periods	  of	  time.	  For	  example,	  the	  found	  slipper-­‐spoon	  only	  finds	  conclusion	  in	  his	  
encounter	  with	  Jacqueline	  Lamba,	  who	  then	  becomes	  the	  Cinderella,	  the	  woman	  
and	  companion,	  Breton	  had	  been	  longing	  for.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  third	  part	  of	  Nadja,	  
written	  a	  few	  months	  after	  the	  previous	  parts	  had	  been	  written,	  Breton	  gathered	  
that	  only	  then	  he	  understood	  the	  meaning	  of	  events.	  Chénieux-­‐Gendron	  writes	  that	  
‘chance	  is,	  for	  Breton,	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  series	  (in	  a	  mathematical	  sense)	  of	  its	  
effects’	  and	  in	  her	  analysis	  she	  explains	  that	  ‘the	  series	  of	  effects	  is	  thus,	  in	  Nadja,	  
the	  series	  of	  disturbing	  meetings	  between	  Breton	  and	  the	  young	  woman,	  and	  the	  
reason	  for	  this	  series	  is	  the	  name	  “Nadja”:	  the	  beginning	  and	  only	  the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  word	  for	  hope’	  (Chénieux-­‐Gendron,	  1990,	  83-­‐4).	  After	  Breton	  found	  his	  new	  love	  
Suzanne	  and	  shortly	  afterwards	  lost	  her	  again,	  he	  suddenly	  understood	  the	  meaning	  
of	  ‘Nadja’.	  	  
Nadja	  is	  the	  mysterious,	  young	  woman	  he	  had	  met	  while	  strolling	  aimlessly	  
and	  bored	  through	  Paris.	  Through	  her,	  Breton	  encounters	  chance	  events	  of	  the	  most	  
mysterious	  kind.	  In	  some	  instances	  Nadja	  seems	  to	  have	  the	  ability	  of	  clairvoyance.	  
It	  seems	  as	  if	  her	  unconscious	  speaks	  through	  her	  and	  that	  this	  access	  to	  the	  deeper	  
realm	  within	  also	  gives	  her	  a	  deeper	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  Breton	  is	  
fascinated	  by	  her	  ability	  to	  predict	  and	  to	  speak	  of	  certain	  things	  that	  he	  is	  
concerned	  with	  at	  the	  time,	  though	  most	  of	  the	  time	  Nadja	  seems	  oblivious	  to	  her	  
own	  powers.	  An	  example	  is	  her	  prediction	  of	  the	  red	  window:	  ‘“Do	  you	  see	  that	  
window	  up	  there?	  It’s	  black,	  like	  all	  the	  rest.	  Look	  hard.	  In	  a	  minute	  it	  will	  light	  up.	  It	  
will	  be	  red.”	  The	  minute	  passes.	  The	  window	  lights	  up.	  There	  are,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  
red	  curtains’	  (1999,	  83).	  Or	  another	  time	  when	  they	  stand	  in	  front	  of	  a	  fountain	  and	  
she	  tells	  him	  how	  their	  thoughts	  rise	  and	  fall	  indefinitely	  like	  the	  fountain	  jet	  in	  front	  
of	  them.	  Breton	  is	  utterly	  taken	  aback	  by	  her	  musings	  because	  they	  remind	  him	  of	  a	  
vignette	  in	  Berkeley’s	  Dialogues	  between	  Hylas	  and	  Philonous	  that	  he	  just	  finished	  
reading.	  It	  shows	  two	  men	  conversing	  in	  front	  of	  a	  fountain	  and	  the	  caption	  reads:	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Urget	  aquas	  vis	  sursum	  eadem,	  flectit	  que	  deorsum	  (“It	  is	  the	  same	  force	  which	  
made	  the	  water	  ascend	  and	  descend”).	  When	  Breton	  later	  found	  out	  that	  Nadja	  was	  
mentally	  unstable	  and	  that	  she	  had	  been	  admitted	  to	  an	  asylum,	  it	  confirmed	  his	  
belief	  that	  those	  individuals	  with	  more	  permeable	  access	  to	  the	  unconscious	  
simultaneously	  gained	  more	  access	  to	  knowledge	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  Though	  
the	  exact	  mechanisms	  remained	  mysterious	  to	  him,	  he	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  
unconscious	  must	  represent	  the	  hidden	  gateway	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  	  
In	  Nadja	  one	  chain	  of	  associations	  also	  revolves	  around	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  
sphinx,	  probably	  the	  most	  haunting	  mythic	  creature	  to	  pose	  questions	  about	  the	  
riddles	  of	  life.	  Sometimes	  Nadja	  is	  identified	  with	  the	  sphinx	  because	  her	  mysterious	  
talk	  makes	  Breton	  question	  himself	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  existence.	  Breton	  mentions	  
the	  Sphinx-­‐Hotel	  where	  Nadja	  tells	  him	  that	  ‘the	  luminous	  sign	  with	  the	  words	  made	  
her	  decide	  to	  stay	  here	  the	  night	  she	  arrived	  in	  Paris’	  (ibid.,	  105),	  thus	  indicating	  to	  
Breton	  that	  some	  hidden	  desire	  must	  link	  her	  to	  the	  mythic	  creature.	  While	  she	  
poses	  these	  questions	  to	  Breton,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  already	  she	  seems	  to	  know	  the	  
answers	  to	  these	  existential	  questions.72	  The	  medium	  Helene	  Smith	  and	  the	  
clairvoyante	  Madame	  Sacco,	  of	  whom	  Breton	  includes	  a	  photo	  in	  the	  book	  (ibid.,	  
81),	  are	  equally	  mentioned	  as	  examples	  of	  women	  who	  have	  the	  power	  to	  give	  
guidance	  in	  times	  of	  uncertainty.	  When	  Breton	  reflects	  how	  he	  and	  Nadja	  ‘haunted’	  
each	  other,	  he	  admits	  that	  Nadja	  appeared	  to	  him	  as	  one	  of	  these	  rare	  ‘free	  
geniuses’,	  ‘this	  always	  inspired	  and	  inspiring	  creature.’	  While	  for	  her	  he	  was	  on	  the	  
one	  hand	  a	  god,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  he	  ‘appeared	  black	  and	  cold	  to	  her,	  like	  a	  man	  
struck	  by	  lightning,	  lying	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  the	  Sphinx’	  (ibid.,	  111-­‐13)	  –	  thus	  having	  failed	  
to	  solve	  the	  puzzle.	   	  
Through	  Nadja,	  Breton	  had	  hoped	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  the	  sources	  of	  mystery	  and	  
once	  she	  had	  vanished,	  he	  once	  more	  felt	  lost	  and	  left	  alone	  with	  all	  conundrums.	  
He	  thus	  finishes	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  book	  with	  more	  questions:	  ‘Who	  goes	  there?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  ‘Who	  were	  we,	  confronting	  reality,	  that	  reality	  which	  I	  know	  now	  was	  lying	  at	  Nadja’s	  feet	  like	  a	  
lapdog?	  By	  what	  latitude	  could	  we,	  abandoned	  thus	  to	  the	  fury	  of	  symbols,	  be	  occasionally	  a	  prey	  to	  
the	  demon	  of	  analogy,	  seeing	  ourselves	  the	  object	  of	  extreme	  overtures,	  of	  singular,	  special	  
attentions?	  How	  does	  it	  happen	  that	  thrown	  together,	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  so	  far	  from	  the	  earth,	  in	  those	  
brief	  intervals	  which	  our	  marvellous	  stupor	  grants	  us,	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  exchange	  a	  few	  incredibly	  
concordant	  views	  above	  the	  smoking	  debris	  of	  old	  ideas	  and	  sempiternal	  life?’	  (ibid.,	  108-­‐111).	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Is	  it	  you,	  Nadja?	  Is	  it	  true	  that	  the	  beyond,	  that	  everything	  beyond	  is	  here	  in	  this	  life?	  
I	  can’t	  hear	  you.	  Who	  goes	  there?	  Is	  it	  only	  me?	  Is	  it	  myself?’	  (ibid.,	  144).	  Only	  in	  the	  
third	  part	  and	  the	  appearance	  of	  another	  woman,	  Suzanne,	  did	  he	  find	  answers	  
again.	  Yet	  it	  comes	  as	  a	  great	  relief	  that	  she	  is	  not	  a	  Sphinx	  and	  that	  ‘it	  was	  for	  all	  
eternity	  that	  this	  succession	  of	  terrible	  or	  charming	  enigmas	  was	  to	  come	  to	  an	  end	  
at	  your	  feet.	  You	  are	  not	  an	  enigma	  for	  me.	  I	  say	  that	  you	  have	  turned	  me	  from	  
enigmas	  forever’	  (ibid.,	  158).	  It	  reveals	  Breton’s	  Romantic	  belief	  that	  women	  have	  
greater	  access	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  unconscious	  and	  points	  towards	  the	  difficult	  
position	  women	  held	  in	  Surrealism.	  	  	  
In	  1941	  Breton	  wrote	  that	  Surrealism	  continues	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  following	  
three	  things:	  	  
	  
alienation	  of	  sensation,	  in	  full	  accord	  with	  the	  precept	  of	  Rimbaud,	  to	  
become	  a	  ‘seer’	  by	  the	  careful	  derangement	  of	  all	  the	  senses;	  the	  deep	  
exploration	  of	  objective	  chance,	  centre	  of	  conciliation	  for	  natural	  and	  human	  
necessity	  –	  point	  of	  revelation,	  pivot	  of	  liberty';	  the	  prospecting	  of	  black	  
humour,	  extreme	  means	  for	  the	  'ego'	  to	  surmount	  the	  traumas	  of	  the	  
exterior	  world	  and	  above	  all	  to	  show	  that	  for	  the	  great	  illnesses	  of	  the	  'ego,	  
great	  remedies,	  in	  the	  Freudian	  sense,	  can	  come	  only	  from	  the	  'id'.	  (1978,	  
203-­‐4).	  
	  
In	  Nadja	  he	  wrote	  ‘the	  event	  from	  which	  each	  of	  us	  is	  entitled	  to	  expect	  the	  
revelation	  of	  his	  own	  life’s	  meaning	  –	  that	  event	  which	  I	  may	  not	  yet	  have	  found,	  but	  
on	  whose	  path	  I	  seek	  myself’	  (Breton,	  1999,	  60).	  All	  three	  books	  detail	  his	  aimless	  
wandering	  in	  search	  of	  this	  event.	  Yet	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  one	  single	  event,	  
but	  the	  chain	  of	  encounters,	  which	  reveal	  its	  meaning	  bit	  by	  bit,	  even	  if	  the	  message	  
of	  some	  of	  these	  encounters	  remains	  hidden	  forever.	  The	  questions	  ‘Who	  am	  I?’	  and	  
‘Whom	  do	  I	  haunt?’	  not	  only	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Surrealist	  enterprise,	  but	  the	  
attempt	  to	  answer	  them	  shows	  that	  life	  oscillates	  between	  the	  extreme	  ends	  of	  
contradictory	  experiences.	  For	  the	  time	  being	  these	  contradictions	  only	  find	  their	  
intellectual	  resolution	  in	  the	  Absurd,	  but	  the	  attempt	  was	  all	  that	  mattered:	  	  
	  
I	  hope	  it	  [Surrealism]	  will	  be	  considered	  as	  having	  tried	  nothing	  better	  than	  
to	  cast	  a	  conduction	  wire	  between	  the	  far	  too	  distant	  worlds	  of	  waking	  and	  
sleep,	  exterior	  and	  interior	  reality,	  reason	  and	  madness,	  the	  assurance	  of	  
	  	  
198	  






When	  considering	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  chance,	  therefore,	  Surrealism	  plays	  
on	  two	  different,	  and	  complementary,	  ways	  of	  understanding	  it.	  First	  is	  the	  
conception	  of	  chance	  as	  inherited	  from	  Dada:	  chance	  as	  a	  corrosive	  and	  
scandalous	  concept	  which	  always	  carries	  with	  it	  connotations	  of	  Anarchism,	  
of	  the	  destruction	  of	  tradition.	  Second	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  chance	  as	  the	  
necessary	  step	  required	  to	  sample	  the	  unconscious.	  As	  the	  definition	  of	  
Surrealism	  shows,	  both	  levels	  coexist	  inextricably	  (Lejeune,	  2012,	  101-­‐2).	  
	  
The	  Dadaists	  and	  Surrealists	  demonstrated	  most	  poignantly	  that	  chance,	  both	  the	  
spontaneous	  as	  well	  as	  the	  induced	  kind,	  can	  most	  fruitfully	  stimulate	  and	  aid	  the	  
creative	  process.	  They	  discovered	  that	  to	  employ	  chance	  has	  a	  range	  of	  different	  
benefits.	  It	  brings	  a	  new	  aspect	  of	  autonomy	  to	  the	  art	  object	  while	  the	  artist	  steps	  
more	  into	  the	  background.	  Instead	  of	  being	  the	  sole,	  independent	  creator,	  they	  
began	  to	  see	  themselves	  as	  collaborators	  in	  a	  process	  that	  is	  larger	  than	  themselves.	  
It	  was	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  nature’s	  contribution	  and	  to	  use	  chance	  means	  to	  
actively	  invite	  these	  contributions	  rather	  than	  rejecting	  them	  as	  interferences	  with	  
one’s	  own	  conscious	  plans.	  To	  employ	  chance	  also	  has	  the	  benefit	  that	  it	  surprises	  
even	  the	  artist	  and	  it	  allows	  for	  unpredictable	  and	  wonderful	  combinations	  of	  
words,	  images	  and	  objects.	  	  
	  
Accidents	  enchant	  us	  far	  more	  than	  any	  ordinary	  event	  that	  has	  arisen	  
predictably	  from	  an	  expected	  cause,	  and	  nowhere	  does	  this	  principle	  seem	  
more	  compelling	  than	  in	  modern	  poetry,	  where	  “[w]ords	  […],	  when	  we	  allow	  
them	  their	  free	  play,	  […]	  assume	  the	  order	  of	  destiny,”	  becoming	  all	  the	  
more	  oracular	  when	  their	  message	  seems	  most	  unintentionally	  profound	  
(Bök,	  2006,	  26).	  	  
	  
With	  the	  help	  of	  chance	  the	  artist	  can	  therefore	  create	  something	  entirely	  
unexpected,	  but	  nevertheless	  truly	  meaningful.	  However	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that,	  since	  it	  
is	  a	  meaning	  that	  resonates	  deeply	  with	  the	  artist,	  the	  experience	  is	  most	  profound	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for	  the	  artists	  themselves	  and	  often	  less	  so	  for	  the	  audience.	  The	  use	  of	  chance	  was	  
regarded	  as	  a	  great	  tool	  against	  boredom	  with	  the	  familiar	  and	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  games	  
it	  also	  helped	  to	  redefine	  art	  as	  a	  highly	  playful	  activity.	  	  
In	  comparison	  to	  Peirce	  and	  Jung,	  the	  Dada-­‐	  and	  Surrealists	  used	  chance	  
most	  intentionally	  for	  rebellious	  and	  subversive	  means.	  By	  taking	  chance	  seriously	  
they	  sought	  to	  oppose	  the	  emerging	  view	  of	  art	  as	  commodity,	  to	  free	  art	  by	  
producing	  what	  they	  called	  anti-­‐art	  through	  the	  application	  of	  unorthodox	  methods.	  
They	  wanted	  to	  counterbalance	  current	  mainstream	  society’s	  one-­‐sided	  
preoccupation	  with	  rationality	  and	  logic	  through	  the	  emphasis	  of	  chance	  as	  an	  
expression	  of	  indeterminacy,	  playfulness	  as	  opposed	  to	  work	  and	  seriousness,	  as	  
well	  as	  through	  the	  depiction	  of	  the	  absurd.	  ‘For	  creative	  and	  rebellious	  minds	  in	  the	  
late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries,	  minds	  convinced	  that	  Western	  aesthetics	  and	  
rationalism	  were	  either	  totally	  discredited,	  or	  insufficient	  to	  render	  experience	  in	  its	  
totality,	  chance	  was	  an	  obvious	  phenomenon	  to	  which	  to	  turn	  as	  a	  keyhole	  to	  the	  
































Part	  V.	  Synthesis	  
Introduction	  
	  
The	  time	  period	  between	  Peirce’s	  first	  manuscript	  on	  chance,	  written	  in	  1883	  
and	  Jung’s	  essay	  on	  synchronicity	  in	  1952,	  marks	  a	  critical	  era	  of	  paradigm	  shifts	  that	  
we	  are	  still	  in	  the	  process	  of	  comprehending	  even	  today.	  Major	  leaps	  and	  
disruptions	  have	  always	  taken	  place	  in	  history,	  but	  the	  many	  political,	  economic,	  
scientific,	  technological	  and	  social	  transformations	  that	  occurred	  during	  this	  era	  
changed	  the	  world	  most	  dramatically.	  Several	  authors	  describe	  one	  of	  the	  key	  roots	  
of	  the	  crisis	  as	  either	  ‘epistemological	  doubt’	  (Bertens,	  1986),	  ‘epistemic	  trauma’	  
(Vargish&Mook,	  1999)	  or	  ‘epistemic	  uncertainty’	  (Murphy,	  1999),	  referring	  to	  the	  
huge	  and	  unsettling	  shifts	  in	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  reality,	  time,	  space	  and	  
consciousness.	  	  
	  
In	  place	  of	  realism’s	  claim	  to	  present	  an	  abiding	  truth,	  modernism	  and	  the	  
historical	  avant-­‐garde	  both	  offer	  mere	  perspectives,	  conjectures	  and	  
provisional	  meanings	  which	  are	  foregrounded	  as	  ambiguous,	  unstable	  and	  
open	  to	  doubt.	  It	  is	  this	  “epistemological	  uncertainty”	  and	  anomic	  doubt	  that	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characterize	  the	  modernist	  period	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  set	  it	  off	  from	  the	  
nineteenth	  century	  (Murphy,	  1999,	  44).	  73	  	  
	  
The	  theory	  of	  evolution,	  the	  laws	  of	  thermodynamics,	  quantum	  mechanics	  
and	  relativity	  are	  among	  the	  most	  ground-­‐breaking	  discoveries	  of	  our	  age,	  raising	  
questions	  about	  the	  validity	  of	  previous	  conceptions	  such	  as	  for	  example	  the	  
universality	  and	  invariability	  of	  laws.	  In	  this	  earlier	  worldview,	  ‘being’	  was	  
considered	  a	  stable,	  static	  and	  orderly	  affair.	  While	  the	  Enlightenment	  delivered	  
man	  from	  the	  subservience	  to	  God	  and	  theological	  reasoning	  was	  replaced	  by	  
science,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  workings	  of	  nature	  were	  also	  solidified	  into	  
predictable	  movements	  which	  could	  ultimately	  be	  controlled	  by	  man.	  	  
These	  views,	  predominating	  for	  almost	  two	  centuries,	  were	  seriously	  
questioned	  during	  the	  era	  mentioned	  above.	  In	  many	  instances	  they	  had	  to	  be	  
reversed	  and	  suddenly	  attention	  was	  turned	  towards	  complexity,	  fragmentation,	  
multiplicity	  and	  self-­‐organisation.	  These	  shifts	  had	  consequences	  for	  our	  
understanding	  of	  man	  and	  nature	  alike:	  	  	  
	  
Like	  our	  inner	  world,	  the	  external	  world	  is	  now	  no	  longer	  uniform	  and	  
therefore	  dependable,	  but	  has	  become	  deformable,	  varying.	  The	  
homogeneous,	  “objective”	  empirical	  standards	  against	  which	  our	  internal	  
time	  and	  space	  can	  be	  tested	  are	  gone,	  and	  with	  their	  disappearance	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  we	  think	  about	  the	  world	  have	  altered.	  It	  is	  the	  process	  of	  this	  
alteration	  that	  produces	  the	  epistemic	  trauma	  evoked	  by	  Relativity	  theory	  
(Vargish&Mook,	  1999,	  24).	  
	  
This	  reciprocal	  effect	  of	  being	  confronted	  with	  uncertain	  conditions	  on	  the	  outside,	  
which	  potentiated	  uncertainty	  on	  the	  inside	  and	  vice	  versa,	  consequently	  led	  to	  an	  
acute	  state	  of	  cultural	  instability.	  In	  1863	  Baudelaire	  called	  this	  new	  mode	  
‘modernity’	  and	  described	  it	  as	  ‘the	  transient,	  the	  fleeting,	  the	  contingent;	  it	  is	  one	  
half	  of	  art,	  the	  other	  being	  the	  eternal	  and	  the	  immovable’	  (Baudelaire,	  1972,	  403).	  
Baudelaire’s	  statement	  shows	  his	  early	  acumen	  as	  to	  the	  changes	  that	  were	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Vargish	  and	  Mook	  similarly	  conclude:	  ‘the	  epistemic	  trauma	  that	  pervades	  Modernism	  –	  a	  kind	  of	  
primary	  or	  initial	  difficulty,	  strangeness,	  opacity;	  a	  violation	  of	  common	  sense	  of	  our	  laboriously	  
achieved	  intuitions	  of	  reality;	  an	  immediate,	  counter-­‐intuitive	  refusal	  to	  provide	  the	  reassuring	  
conclusiveness	  of	  the	  past	  –	  seems	  to	  us	  its	  keynote’	  (1999,	  14).	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time	  of	  his	  writing.	  It	  encapsulates	  the	  state	  of	  epistemic	  uncertainty,	  because	  while	  
he,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  accepted	  and	  even	  welcomed	  the	  changes	  he,	  on	  the	  other,	  
still	  yearned	  for	  stability,	  order	  and	  permanence	  within	  the	  increasingly	  fragmentary	  
world.	  He	  therefore	  saw	  the	  task	  of	  the	  modern	  artist	  ‘to	  distil	  the	  eternal	  from	  the	  
transitory’	  (ibid.,	  402).	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  task	  to	  navigate	  between	  the	  forces	  
of	  fragmentation	  and	  unity,	  between	  stability	  and	  variability,	  has	  remained	  the	  
epistemic	  struggle	  until	  today.	  	  
	  
This	  struggle	  began	  with	  the	  fundamental	  change	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  reality	  
[itself],	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  contact	  people	  saw	  themselves	  as	  having	  with	  the	  
external	  or	  natural	  world.	  We	  identify	  this	  change	  as	  a	  shift	  in	  values	  from	  
“reality”	  to	  “observation”.	  […]	  As	  a	  fundamental	  correlative	  of	  this	  process,	  
our	  relation	  to	  the	  media	  of	  space	  and	  time	  underwent	  a	  marked	  alteration	  
(Vargish&Mook,	  1999,	  77).	  
	  
It	  is	  evident	  that	  Peirce,	  Cabot,	  Jung	  and	  Breton	  all	  sensed	  that	  mainstream	  society	  
was	  too	  one-­‐sidedly	  guided	  by	  rationality	  and	  that	  this	  overemphasis	  had	  something	  
unhealthy	  about	  it.	  All	  of	  them	  turned	  to	  chance	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  
irrational,	  that	  which	  remains	  beyond	  our	  grasp,	  has	  nevertheless	  an	  important	  role	  
to	  play.	  They	  all	  argued	  that	  meaning	  and	  novelty	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  it.	  
By	  comparing	  all	  previous	  discussions,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  thinkers	  
introduced	  here	  shared	  a	  variety	  of	  underlying	  sentiments.	  From	  comparing	  these	  
similarities	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  they	  all	  regarded	  chance	  as	  a	  culturally	  subversive	  
tool	  and	  that	  their	  writings	  on	  chance	  suggest	  that	  it	  can	  meaningfully	  influence	  the	  
creative	  process.	  These	  two	  arguments	  are	  actually	  related	  and	  creativity	  has	  always	  
been	  regarded	  as	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  to	  undermine	  the	  status	  quo.	  These	  
underlying	  sentiments	  can	  be	  summarised	  under	  four	  separate	  but	  interrelated	  
areas,	  which	  in	  turn	  sustain	  the	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  above	  argument.	  These	  are,	  
firstly,	  that	  chance	  was	  considered	  an	  agency	  to	  experience	  greater	  freedom.	  
Secondly,	  taking	  chance	  seriously	  led	  to	  a	  stronger	  emphasis	  on	  the	  bond	  between	  
man	  and	  nature	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  wholeness.	  Thirdly,	  chance	  highlighted	  the	  
archetypal	  interdependency	  between	  order	  and	  chaos,	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  a	  re-­‐





1.	  Chance	  and	  the	  Experience	  of	  Greater	  Freedom	  
	  
In	  the	  West,	  we	  are	  quite	  familiar	  with	  the	  fall	  as	  dramatized	  in	  the	  myth	  of	  
Adam	  and	  Eve.	  There	  it	  seems	  a	  matter	  of	  acquiring	  false	  knowledge	  of	  
opposites	  as	  real.	  The	  duality	  of	  good	  and	  evil,	  their	  polar	  opposition,	  becomes	  
central	  focus	  and	  any	  notion	  of	  the	  unifying	  sacrality	  of	  Being-­‐Itself	  is	  lost.	  […]	  
What	  happens	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  fall	  is	  crushing:	  people	  perceive	  themselves	  as	  
only	  relative,	  dependent,	  and	  conditioned	  –	  as	  beings	  under	  the	  constant	  threat	  
of	  not-­‐being	  and	  consequent	  meaninglessness.	  They	  are	  cut	  off	  from	  any	  
recognition	  of	  themselves	  as	  participants	  in	  the	  Holy,	  which	  transcends	  the	  
created	  opposition	  of	  being	  and	  not-­‐being	  (Sproul,	  1979,	  24).	  	  
	  
The	  scientific,	  rationalistic-­‐deterministic	  worldview	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  was	  based	  
on	  the	  same	  understanding	  of	  polarity,	  on	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  by	  thinking	  in	  
opposites.	  This	  way	  of	  thinking	  excludes	  one	  side	  or	  the	  other	  from	  being	  taken	  
seriously.	  It	  leads	  towards	  a	  general	  attitude	  of	  closing	  in,	  rather	  than	  opening	  up	  
and	  broadening	  one’s	  perspective.	  When	  the	  individual	  is	  perceived	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
huge	  clockwork	  universe,	  ticking	  away	  to	  physical	  rules	  that	  have	  been	  
unchangeably	  set	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  time,	  then	  there	  is	  not	  much	  space	  left	  for	  
the	  feeling	  of	  freedom.	  Humans	  continue	  to	  feel	  relative,	  dependent	  and	  
conditioned	  by	  the	  dogma	  of	  science,	  where	  personal	  experience	  of	  the	  irrational	  
and	  the	  spiritual	  are	  the	  ‘other’	  and	  regarded	  as	  invalid.	  	  
	   As	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  this	  thesis,	  for	  some	  thinkers	  chance	  became	  a	  tool	  to	  
break	  out	  of	  this	  limiting	  mind-­‐set.	  They	  did	  not	  reject	  determinism	  or	  rationality	  per	  
se,	  but	  by	  taking	  chance	  seriously	  and	  by	  stressing	  its	  different	  but	  equal	  value,	  they	  
advocated	  to	  include	  it	  within	  a	  more	  open	  worldview.	  They	  understood	  this	  as	  one	  
way	  of	  approaching	  greater	  freedom.	  Peirce	  therefore	  once	  wondered	  ‘whether	  
absolute	  chance	  –	  pure	  tychism	  –	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  product	  of	  freedom,	  
and	  therefore	  of	  life’	  (CP,	  [1909],	  6.322).	  The	  recognition	  of	  chance	  as	  a	  liberating	  
factor	  is	  therefore	  present	  in	  all	  descriptions	  of	  chance	  discussed	  here.	  At	  the	  time	  
these	  were	  radical	  suggestions	  that	  were	  perceived	  as	  threatening	  to	  mainstream	  
culture.	  Yet	  their	  impact	  was	  not	  lost	  and	  contributed	  to	  some	  more	  open	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worldviews	  that	  we	  see	  today.	  The	  following	  sections	  describe	  a	  range	  of	  aspects	  
that	  contribute	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  greater	  freedom.	  
	  
	  
1.1.	  Characteristics	  of	  Chance	  
	  
The	  way	  they	  defined	  chance	  and	  the	  characteristics	  they	  attributed	  to	  it	  
forms	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  argument	  of	  chance	  as	  an	  agency	  of	  freedom.	  Cabot’s,	  Jung’s	  
and	  Breton’s	  definitions	  of	  chance	  are	  strikingly	  similar:	  	  
	  
Cabot:	  	   ‘Chance	  is	  the	  encounter	  of	  factors	  outside	  of	  our	  plans	  with	  our	  
special	  end’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  189).	  
Jung:	  	   ‘the	  simultaneous	  occurrence	  of	  a	  certain	  psychic	  state	  with	  one	  or	  
more	  external	  events	  which	  appear	  as	  meaningful	  parallels	  to	  the	  
momentary	  subjective	  state	  –	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  vice	  versa’	  (CW	  8,	  
[1952],	  850).	  
Breton:	  	   'the	  encounter	  of	  an	  external	  causality	  and	  an	  internal	  finality'	  
(Breton,	  1987,	  21).	  
	  
All	  three	  focus	  on	  chance	  in	  its	  effect	  on	  and	  interaction	  with	  man.	  Only	  the	  unique	  
interplay	  between	  certain	  characteristics	  of	  chance	  and	  the	  subjective	  attitude	  
renders	  freedom	  possible.	  
Firstly,	  chance	  is	  described	  as	  the	  external	  element	  which	  gives	  access	  to	  
new	  possibilities	  by	  initially	  undermining	  one’s	  original	  intention.	  This	  conscious	  
intention	  is	  a	  limiting	  factor,	  which	  is	  overthrown	  through	  the	  occurrence	  of	  chance.	  
It	  initiates	  chaos,	  but	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  chaos	  is	  also	  the	  realm	  of	  possibilities	  and	  this	  
state	  of	  chaos	  offers	  the	  experiencer	  the	  opportunity	  to	  reorient	  themselves.	  They	  
are	  given	  the	  freedom	  to	  explore	  if	  the	  unexpected	  contains	  something	  interesting,	  
valuable	  and	  meaningful	  that	  has	  been	  hiding	  in	  the	  shadows.	  Kaag	  therefore	  sees	  
chance	  as	  ‘an	  encounter	  with	  an	  unforeseen	  opportunity,	  with	  the	  field	  of	  possibility	  
that	  is	  partially	  –	  or	  more	  often,	  predominately	  –	  obscured	  from	  our	  sight.	  […]	  
Chance	  events	  may	  stand	  counter	  to	  the	  purposes	  of	  a	  given	  agent,	  but	  do	  emerge	  




	   	  In	  Peirce’s	  philosophy	  chance	  represents	  absolute	  indeterminacy.	  Natural	  
laws	  are	  reduced	  to	  transfixed	  habits	  and	  its	  existence	  acts	  as	  proof	  of	  nature’s	  
inherent	  connection	  to	  a	  realm	  of	  endless	  possibilities.	  The	  category	  of	  Firstness	  
describes	  a	  state	  of	  homogenous	  unity	  containing	  all	  possibilities.	  Chance	  is	  
described	  as	  a	  First	  and	  through	  its	  action	  one	  of	  these	  infinite	  possibilities	  becomes	  
actualised.	  He	  wrote:	  ‘The	  idea	  of	  First	  is	  predominant	  in	  the	  ideas	  of	  freshness,	  life,	  
freedom.	  The	  free	  is	  that	  which	  has	  not	  another	  behind	  it,	  determining	  its	  actions;	  
Freedom	  can	  only	  manifest	  itself	  in	  unlimited	  and	  uncontrolled	  variety	  and	  
multiplicity’	  (CP,	  [1894],	  1.302).	  
In	  regard	  to	  the	  mind,	  chance	  has	  the	  potential	  of	  breaking	  up	  thought	  cycles	  
and	  routine	  behaviours,	  thus	  freeing	  the	  individual	  from	  such	  internal	  restrictions.	  
However	  this	  can	  only	  happen	  if	  the	  person	  is	  open	  enough	  to	  revise	  their	  
intentions.	  This	  finds	  expression	  in	  Peirce’s	  concept	  of	  developmental	  teleology.	  It	  
implies	  that	  any	  given	  result	  does	  not	  represent	  the	  only	  or	  the	  best	  outcome,	  but	  
one	  of	  many	  possible	  ones	  good	  enough	  to	  fulfil	  the	  individual’s	  purpose.	  Chance	  
interjections	  will	  make	  sure	  that	  ‘our	  plans	  and	  explanations	  will	  remain	  partial	  and	  
provisional’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  75).	  The	  experiencer’s	  general	  attitude	  therefore	  needs	  to	  
be	  one	  of	  flexibility,	  openness	  to	  change	  and	  the	  willingness	  to	  loosen	  ego	  control.	  
In	  regards	  to	  synchronicity,	  Colman	  therefore	  wrote:	  ‘synchronicity	  requires	  a	  sort	  of	  
mental	  skill	  that	  creates	  an	  openness	  to	  the	  associative	  thinking	  of	  the	  primordial	  
mind.	  And,	  as	  Jung	  claimed	  in	  relation	  to	  synchronicity,	  in	  the	  primordial	  mode	  of	  
thought,	  the	  laws	  of	  time,	  space	  and	  causality	  do	  not	  apply’	  (Colman,	  2011,	  487).	  
Cabot,	  Jung	  and	  Breton	  explicitly	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  allowing	  
unconscious	  forces	  to	  come	  in	  and	  leave	  their	  mark.	  By	  giving	  credibility	  and	  value	  to	  
this	  other	  realm,	  which	  expresses	  itself	  autonomously	  to	  conscious	  volition,	  one	  
once	  more	  opens	  the	  gates	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  greater	  freedom.	  The	  Dadaists	  and	  
Surrealists	  turned	  to	  chance	  most	  deliberately	  in	  order	  to	  break	  with	  the	  limitations	  
of	  contemporary	  society.	  To	  invert	  the	  commonly	  accepted	  view	  by	  putting	  a	  
positive	  spin	  on	  chance	  was	  in	  itself	  regarded	  a	  liberating	  act.	  ‘To	  use	  chance	  was	  an	  






1.2.	  Novelty,	  Diversity	  and	  Growth	  
	  
Creativity	  is	  most	  consistently	  defined	  by	  the	  production	  of	  novelty.	  Peirce,	  
Cabot,	  Jung	  and	  Breton	  maintained	  the	  view	  that	  chance	  makes	  an	  indispensable	  
pre-­‐requisite	  for	  novelty,	  diversity	  and	  growth	  to	  emerge	  and	  all	  three	  can	  be	  
described	  as	  expressions	  of	  freedom.	  As	  part	  of	  Peirce’s	  attack	  on	  mechanical	  
determinism	  he	  argued	  that	  it	  could	  not	  explain	  the	  continuing	  emergence	  of	  
novelty	  in	  the	  universe.	  For	  him	  ‘[n]ovelty	  can	  be	  explained	  only	  by	  spontaneity,	  that	  
is,	  by	  some	  sort	  of	  chance	  variation:	  infinitesimal	  variations	  take	  place	  continuously,	  
Peirce	  holds,	  and	  great	  ones,	  infrequently.	  Time	  is	  discontinuous	  in	  the	  present	  
instant,	  and	  in	  this	  present	  instant	  action	  and	  novelty	  are	  possible’	  (Britton,	  1939,	  
446-­‐449).	  Later	  Francis	  Crick	  would	  echo	  this	  view	  when	  he	  said	  that	  ‘[c]hance	  is	  the	  
only	  source	  of	  true	  novelty’	  (Simonton,	  2004,	  161).	  	  
Cabot	  explicitly	  argued	  that	  ‘when	  we	  exclude	  all	  chance	  elements	  from	  the	  
birth	  of	  our	  purpose,	  we	  are	  decidedly	  apt	  not	  to	  get	  novelty	  at	  all’	  and	  that	  in	  fact	  
‘the	  deliberate	  watching	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  novelty	  kills	  it’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  193).	  The	  
Dadaists	  and	  Surrealists	  had	  come	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  and	  therefore	  decided	  to	  
actively	  invite	  chance	  into	  the	  creative	  process.	  For	  Breton	  true	  novelty	  could	  not	  be	  
produced	  through	  conscious	  volition,	  but	  had	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  unconscious.	  He	  
considered	  the	  first	  automatic	  image	  he	  perceived,	  the	  man	  cut	  in	  half	  by	  the	  
window,	  so	  unique	  because	  it	  was	  even	  new	  to	  him.	  	  
Jung	  was	  primarily	  interested	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  psychological	  novelty	  and	  
personal	  growth.	  This	  marks	  one	  crucial	  area	  where	  Jung	  diverged	  from	  Freud	  as	  
Tacey	  explains:	  ‘Freud	  seemed	  to	  want	  to	  link	  everything	  back	  to	  early	  childhood;	  
Jung	  sought	  to	  show	  that	  the	  psyche	  was	  urging	  us	  onward	  to	  create	  a	  new	  and	  
broader	  personality’	  (2006,	  4).	  Jung	  argued	  that	  unconscious	  material	  is	  not	  only	  
composed	  of	  one’s	  conscious	  material	  merely	  recombined	  in	  new	  ways,	  but	  that	  the	  
unconscious	  also	  possesses	  an	  inherent	  creative	  drive	  from	  which	  real	  originality	  




If	  it	  [the	  unconscious]	  were	  merely	  reactive	  to	  the	  conscious	  mind,	  we	  might	  
aptly	  call	  it	  a	  psychic	  mirror-­‐world.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  real	  source	  of	  all	  
contents	  and	  activities	  would	  lie	  in	  the	  conscious	  mind,	  and	  there	  would	  be	  
absolutely	  nothing	  in	  the	  unconscious	  except	  the	  distorted	  reflection	  of	  
conscious	  contents.	  The	  creative	  process	  would	  be	  shut	  up	  in	  the	  conscious	  
mind,	  and	  anything	  new	  would	  be	  nothing	  but	  conscious	  invention	  or	  
cleverness	  (CW7,	  [1935],	  292).	  	  
Since	  conscious	  knowledge	  and	  insight	  are	  limited,	  Jung	  advocated	  fostering	  a	  
dialogue	  with	  the	  unconscious	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  novel	  insight	  and	  advance	  the	  
individuation	  process.	  	  
Consciousness	  and	  the	  unconscious	  are	  in	  a	  continual	  relationship	  of	  tension	  
and	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  one-­‐sidedness	  and	  inertia,	  the	  balance	  between	  the	  two	  needs	  
to	  be	  negotiated	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  Psychic	  energy	  needs	  to	  flow	  back	  into	  the	  
unconscious	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  overemphasis	  of	  ego-­‐consciousness,	  which	  is	  by	  far	  
more	  common	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  This	  surge	  of	  psychic	  energy	  activates	  the	  
formation	  of	  a	  new	  image	  or	  symbol.	  A	  symbol	  is	  the	  autonomous	  element	  that	  
emerges	  as	  a	  mediating	  third,	  in	  order	  to	  bridge	  the	  conflict	  between	  consciousness	  
and	  the	  unconscious.	  It	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  synchronistic	  experience,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  
at	  least	  some	  cases	  artistic	  creativity.	  The	  symbol	  presents	  itself	  as	  novel	  psychic	  
content	  to	  the	  experiencer	  themselves,	  thus	  providing	  the	  opportunity	  to	  reflect	  on	  
one’s	  situation	  and	  to	  expand	  one’s	  consciousness	  in	  new	  directions.	  	  
	  
	  
1.3.	  Play	  and	  Imagination	  
	  
The	  discussions	  of	  all	  previous	  parts	  demonstrated	  that	  play	  and	  imagination	  
are	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  single	  most	  important	  faculty	  in	  understanding	  the	  
relationship	  between	  chance	  and	  creativity.	  For	  Cabot	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  an	  agile	  
imagination	  was	  the	  prerequisite	  for	  making	  life	  liveable.	  She	  for	  example	  wrote	  that	  
‘the	  imagination	  is	  the	  power	  to	  be	  in	  whatever	  we	  touch.	  It	  is	  through	  imagination	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that	  we	  fill	  the	  gaps	  and	  out	  of	  fragments	  make	  a	  whole’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  79).74	  Kaag	  
adds	  that	  ‘[w]hile	  the	  imagination	  may	  be	  operative	  in	  all	  cases	  of	  seeing,	  as	  Cabot	  
suggests,	  it	  is	  most	  obviously	  at	  play	  when	  we	  encounter	  and	  creatively	  integrate	  
chance	  appearances’	  and	  ‘[i]t	  is	  only	  through	  the	  imagination	  that	  chance	  becomes	  
my	  chance’	  (ibid.).	  
Peirce	  argued	  that	  the	  mind	  is	  ruled	  by	  habits	  and	  to	  large	  parts	  thinking	  can	  be	  
described	  as	  mechanical,	  inclined	  to	  follow	  the	  paths	  it	  has	  used	  before.	  Yet	  the	  
mind	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  imagine	  and	  thus	  to	  be	  original	  and	  inventive.	  Since	  Peirce	  
saw	  the	  mind’s	  capability	  to	  do	  so,	  he	  advocated	  the	  creation	  of	  inner	  and	  outer	  
environments	  that	  stimulate	  and	  nurture	  the	  occurrence	  of	  spontaneous	  thoughts	  
and	  images.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  one	  has	  to	  abandon	  or	  loosen	  one’s	  purpose	  to	  such	  a	  
degree	  that	  deviances	  can	  be	  noticed	  and	  meaningfully	  integrated.	  He	  calls	  this	  
particular	  state	  of	  mind	  either	  pure	  play,	  abduction	  and	  musement	  and	  for	  him	  it	  
constituted	  the	  only	  source	  of	  genuinely	  new	  ideas.	  ‘[I]n	  the	  act	  of	  musement	  we	  
temporarily	  set	  aside	  our	  self-­‐centred	  purposes	  or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  look	  beyond	  
their	  constraining	  scope.	  That	  is	  also	  to	  say	  that	  we	  await	  the	  emergence	  of	  chance	  
and	  are	  willing	  to	  claim	  this	  chance	  as	  our	  own’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  81).	  The	  pure	  play	  of	  
thoughts	  is	  free	  from	  pressure,	  it	  imposes	  no	  necessities	  and	  it	  thus	  makes	  the	  
experience	  of	  more	  freedom	  possible.	  In	  fact,	  Peirce	  insisted	  that	  only	  through	  the	  
purposelessness,	  receptivity	  and	  openness	  of	  pure	  play	  can	  new	  thoughts	  and	  ideas	  
emerge	  at	  all.	  	  
For	  Jung	  the	  free	  play	  of	  thoughts	  similarly	  forms	  an	  important	  part	  in	  human	  
cognition.	  He	  actually	  hypothesised	  that	  this	  form	  of	  thinking	  pre-­‐dated	  rational	  
thinking.	  He	  agreed	  with	  William	  James	  when	  quoting	  him:	  ‘Much	  of	  our	  thinking	  
consists	  of	  trains	  of	  images	  suggested	  one	  by	  another,	  of	  a	  sort	  of	  spontaneous	  
reverie	  […]	  This	  sort	  of	  thinking	  leads	  nevertheless	  to	  rational	  conclusions	  both	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  She	  furthermore	  wrote:	  ‘[t]he	  man	  of	  little	  imagination	  may	  plod	  along	  doing	  about	  what	  is	  
expected	  of	  him.	  …	  [T]housands	  of	  iridescent	  opportunities	  open	  for	  a	  moment	  like	  a	  rainbow	  before	  
him,	  but	  he	  sees	  only	  the	  dust	  in	  the	  road.’	  And	  Kaag	  comments	  that	  ‘[f]or	  this	  wanderer,	  the	  road	  of	  
life	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  odd,	  but	  all	  too	  familiar,	  mix	  of	  drudgery	  and	  anxiety.	  Things	  appear	  on	  this	  
road	  in	  one	  of	  two	  unsatisfactory	  ways:	  as	  a	  patterned	  and	  boring	  landscape	  or	  as	  disjointed	  and	  
chaotic	  terrain.	  (…)	  In	  both	  cases,	  we	  remain	  oddly	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  our	  surroundings,	  displaced	  and	  
forever	  not	  at	  home.	  Cabot	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  only	  through	  acts	  of	  the	  imagination	  that	  we	  can	  make	  a	  




practical	  and	  theoretical’and	  added	  ‘that	  this	  sort	  of	  thinking	  does	  not	  tire	  us,	  that	  it	  
leads	  away	  from	  reality	  into	  fantasies	  of	  the	  past	  or	  future.	  At	  this	  point	  thinking	  in	  
verbal	  form	  ceases,	  image	  piles	  on	  image,	  feeling	  on	  feeling,	  and	  there	  is	  an	  ever-­‐
increasing	  tendency	  to	  shuffle	  things	  about	  and	  arrange	  them	  not	  as	  they	  are	  in	  
reality	  but	  as	  one	  would	  like	  them	  to	  be’	  (CW	  5,	  [1912],	  18-­‐9).	  This	  kind	  of	  fantasy-­‐
thinking	  is	  characterised	  by	  spontaneity	  and	  by	  being	  motivated	  by	  unconscious	  
motives:	  ‘the	  play	  of	  fantasy	  uncovers	  creative	  forces	  and	  contents,	  just	  as	  dreams	  
do.	  Such	  contents	  cannot	  as	  a	  rule	  be	  realized	  except	  through	  passive,	  associative,	  
and	  fantasy-­‐thinking’	  (CW	  5,	  [1912],	  20).	  Jung	  was	  also	  influenced	  by	  Schiller’s	  
notion	  of	  the	  play-­‐drive	  when	  he	  concluded:	  ‘The	  creation	  of	  something	  new	  is	  not	  
accomplished	  by	  the	  intellect,	  but	  by	  the	  play	  instinct	  acting	  from	  inner	  necessity.	  
The	  creative	  mind	  plays	  with	  the	  object	  it	  loves’	  (CW6,	  [1921],	  197).	  
	   Synchronicities	  are	  characterised	  by	  two	  states	  of	  mind	  with	  the	  phantasm	  
mirroring	  the	  external	  event,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  normal	  state	  of	  ego	  
consciousness	  remains	  intact.	  When	  Peirce	  more	  generally	  discussed	  what	  a	  
phenomenon	  is	  he	  considered	  a	  similar	  mechanism	  to	  be	  at	  work:	  	  	  
	  
Your	  mind	  was	  filled	  [with]	  an	  imaginary	  object	  that	  was	  expected.	  At	  the	  
moment	  when	  it	  was	  expected	  the	  vividness	  of	  the	  representation	  is	  exalted,	  
and	  suddenly	  when	  it	  should	  come	  something	  quite	  different	  comes	  instead.	  
I	  ask	  you	  whether	  at	  that	  instant	  of	  surprise	  there	  is	  not	  a	  double	  
consciousness,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  of	  an	  Ego,	  which	  is	  simply	  the	  expected	  idea	  
suddenly	  broken	  off,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Ego,	  which	  is	  the	  Strange	  
Intruder,	  in	  his	  abrupt	  entrance	  (EP	  2,	  [1903],	  154).	  
	  
Both	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  novel,	  imaginative	  insight	  comes	  out	  of	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  
unconscious	  so	  that	  its	  content	  even	  surprises	  the	  experiencer.	  	  
	   Play	  is	  an	  inherent	  element	  in	  imagination	  and	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  Schiller’s	  
elaborations	  on	  play	  as	  the	  mediator	  between	  reason	  and	  feeling	  has	  influenced	  all	  
three	  thinkers.	  Schiller	  considered	  that	  only	  when	  the	  two	  drives	  are	  connected	  and	  
in	  a	  state	  of	  co-­‐operation,	  is	  man	  really	  free.	  Play	  therefore	  became	  a	  very	  crucial	  
agency	  of	  man’s	  freedom.	  Yet	  for	  Schiller	  freedom	  did	  not	  mean	  complete	  
lawlessness,	  because	  thinking	  and	  behaviour	  are	  still	  governed	  by	  past	  experiences,	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as	  well	  as	  natural	  and	  moral	  restrictions.75	  This	  reciprocity	  between	  freedom	  and	  
constraint	  is	  also	  at	  work	  in	  Surrealist	  games.	  The	  existence	  of	  some	  constraints	  
provides	  a	  suitable	  container	  for	  play	  and	  imagination	  to	  unfold	  openly	  and	  
creatively.	  ‘The	  rule	  is	  there,	  and	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  makes	  the	  freedom	  of	  chance	  
open	  up	  into	  the	  freedom	  of	  your	  own	  imagination,	  along	  with	  that	  of	  the	  other	  
imaginative	  players’	  (Caws,	  2011,	  74).	  However	  these	  constraints	  can’t	  be	  too	  
limiting	  or	  the	  creativity	  of	  play	  becomes	  stifled.	  It	  requires	  quite	  a	  delicate	  balance	  
and	  in	  some	  cases	  rules	  need	  to	  be	  broken	  in	  order	  to	  invent	  new	  games	  altogether.	  
On	  a	  cultural	  scale	  these	  types	  of	  rule-­‐breaking	  games	  can	  even	  lead	  to	  ‘productive	  
disruption	  and	  transgression	  that	  can	  have	  political	  implications	  and	  even	  
revolutionary	  effects.	  They	  are	  therefore,	  at	  least	  potentially,	  forms	  of	  ‘freeing’	  (i.e.	  
liberating)	  play’	  (Pope,	  2005,	  121).	  
	   As	  discussed	  in	  Part	  II,	  play	  and	  imagination	  enjoy	  the	  greatest	  expression	  of	  
freedom	  in	  artistic	  creativity.	  Here	  again	  imagination	  has	  significance	  on	  a	  personal,	  
artistic	  and	  cultural	  level.	  
	  
All	  the	  way	  through	  the	  modernisms	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  
twentieth	  centuries,	  this	  double	  meaning	  of	  imagination	  –	  as	  both	  ‘just	  a	  
play’,	  and	  a	  ‘just	  play’,	  an	  act	  of	  sympathy	  and	  an	  act	  of	  symbolizing	  –	  
animated	  its	  major	  artists.	  André	  Breton	  wrote	  in	  his	  Manifesto	  that	  
‘Imagination	  alone	  offers	  me	  some	  intimation	  of	  what	  can	  be.’	  His	  fellow	  
surrealist	  Luis	  Buñuel	  concurred:	  ‘Somewhere	  between	  chance	  and	  mystery	  
lies	  the	  imagination,	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  protects	  our	  freedom’	  (Kane,	  2011,	  
46).	  
	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  play	  is	  considered	  an	  activity	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  and	  was	  thus	  seen	  as	  
an	  analogy	  of	  making	  art.	  It	  can	  fragment	  but	  also	  generate	  a	  new	  whole	  and	  it	  is	  
free	  from	  control,	  purpose	  and	  rationality	  in	  the	  common	  sense.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
engaging	  in	  play	  can	  change	  one’s	  perceptions	  and	  thus	  indeed	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  
circumstances	  outside	  of	  play.	  ‘These	  attributes	  characterize	  play	  as	  eccentric	  
specifically	  in	  its	  lack	  of	  limits	  –	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  grasp	  of	  play	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  ‘Determinations	  which	  we	  have	  acquired	  from	  past	  experience	  can	  enhance	  our	  freedom	  by	  
making	  us	  capable	  of	  responding	  more	  intelligently	  and	  spontaneously	  to	  new	  experience.	  For	  
Schiller	  freedom	  is	  not	  ultimately	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  being	  free	  from	  determination	  by	  experience	  
but	  only	  as	  being	  free	  through	  such	  determination.	  […]	  that	  past	  experience	  inform	  but	  not	  restrict	  
our	  openness	  to	  the	  present’	  (Barnouw,	  1988,	  625).	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bounded	  activity.	  This	  designation	  sets	  play	  against	  the	  normative,	  the	  rational,	  and	  
the	  ideal	  as	  well	  as,	  in	  its	  apparent	  unconcern	  with	  external	  conditions,	  against	  
political	  entities’	  (Laxton,	  2003,	  5).	  For	  the	  artists	  mentioned	  here	  the	  mechanism	  of	  
indeterminacy	  was	  particularly	  appealing	  and	  they	  were	  therefore	  inspired	  to	  play	  
games	  based	  on	  chance.	  Caws	  maintains	  that	  ‘the	  Surrealists	  saw	  the	  freedom	  of	  
chance	  as	  opening	  the	  freedom	  to	  one’s	  imagination’	  (Getsy,	  2011,	  xv)	  and	  there	  it	  
could	  not	  only	  instigate	  personal	  transformation,	  but	  lead	  to	  greater	  social	  change	  
too.	  Laxton	  therefore	  explains:	  
	  
Chance	  is	  the	  definitive	  element	  in	  the	  ludic;	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  attempts	  to	  tame	  
chance	  into	  the	  calculable	  probabilities	  of	  economic	  game	  theory,	  play	  
continued	  to	  perform	  destructively	  –	  not	  only	  at	  the	  level	  of	  provocations	  
aimed	  at	  the	  propriety	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie,	  but	  at	  a	  level	  directed	  against	  the	  
broader	  political	  category	  of	  repressive	  conventions	  and	  the	  institutions	  of	  
power	  that	  keep	  them	  in	  place.	  (Laxton,	  2003,	  13).	  
	  
	  
2.	  The	  Interconnectedness	  between	  Man	  and	  Nature	  
	  
It	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  that	  during	  the	  Enlightenment	  era	  the	  belief	  
arose	  that	  nature	  operates	  like	  a	  clockwork.	  It	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  
time	  until	  all	  its	  laws	  and	  regularities	  would	  be	  discovered.	  Bernard	  le	  Bovier	  de	  
Fontenelle	  for	  example	  wrote	  in	  1686:	  ‘I	  esteem	  the	  universe	  all	  the	  more	  since	  I	  
have	  known	  that	  it	  is	  like	  a	  watch.	  It	  is	  surprising	  that	  nature,	  admirable	  as	  it	  is,	  is	  
based	  on	  such	  simple	  things.’	  This	  understanding	  raised	  expectations	  that	  one	  day	  
all	  the	  secrets	  of	  nature	  could	  be	  decoded.	  It	  implied	  that	  once	  man	  had	  gained	  
complete	  knowledge	  of	  nature’s	  processes,	  he	  would	  be	  able	  to	  control	  and	  alter	  
them	  to	  his	  liking.	  The	  assumption	  that	  nature	  operated	  according	  to	  simple	  rules,	  
which	  could	  be	  made	  visible	  through	  the	  human	  intellect,	  led	  to	  an	  emphasis	  of	  the	  
Christian	  understanding	  that	  domination	  over	  nature	  is	  man’s	  birthright.	  In	  1620	  
Francis	  Bacon	  therefore	  exclaimed:	  ‘Let	  the	  human	  race	  recover	  that	  right	  over	  
Nature	  which	  belongs	  to	  it	  by	  divine	  bequest,	  and	  let	  power	  be	  given	  it;	  the	  exercise	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thereof	  will	  be	  governed	  by	  sound	  reason	  and	  pure	  religion.’	  The	  notion	  of	  man’s	  
superiority	  over	  nature	  was	  generally	  accepted	  and	  the	  division	  between	  the	  
cultural	  and	  the	  natural	  only	  grew	  and	  led	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  they	  are	  two	  
separate	  domains	  with	  nature	  only	  existing	  to	  serve	  culture.	  	  
As	  these	  beliefs	  were	  slowly	  overturned	  and	  replaced	  with	  the	  realisation	  
that	  the	  universe	  is	  actually	  so	  much	  more	  intricate	  and	  complex	  than	  could	  ever	  
have	  been	  imagined,	  some	  people	  also	  began	  to	  question	  if	  man	  really	  is	  the	  
pinnacle	  of	  creation.	  Ideas	  of	  man	  as	  only	  one	  part	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  evolution	  
emerged	  and	  the	  thinkers	  discussed	  here	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  humans	  will	  
neither	  be	  able	  to	  solve	  all	  the	  complex	  mysteries	  of	  the	  cosmos,	  nor	  ever	  be	  in	  total	  
control	  over	  nature,	  let	  alone	  over	  themselves.	  The	  realisation	  was	  that	  man’s	  
knowledge	  will	  keep	  lagging	  behind	  because	  ‘nature	  always	  extends	  beyond	  the	  
maps	  employed	  to	  negotiate	  its	  confusing	  intersections’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  75).	  From	  their	  
descriptions	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  they	  viewed	  chance	  as	  a	  humbling	  experience,	  




2.1.	  Highlighting	  and	  Strengthening	  the	  Bond	  
	  
The	  perception	  that	  man	  is	  not	  separate	  from	  nature,	  but	  deeply	  interwoven	  
with	  it,	  was	  an	  important	  element	  of	  American	  transcendentalism	  and	  pragmatism	  
and	  this	  sentiment	  is	  deeply	  ingrained	  in	  Peirce’s	  and	  Cabot’s	  philosophies	  too.	  ‘The	  
dearest,	  most	  precious	  and,	  for	  some,	  most	  sacred	  experience,	  that	  of	  unity,	  of	  
connaturality	  between	  man	  and	  Nature,	  seems	  to	  be	  celebrated	  in	  Peirce’s	  
philosophical	  system,	  much	  beyond	  any	  epistemological	  problems’	  (Ibri,	  2009,	  300).	  
It	  especially	  finds	  expression	  in	  abduction,	  the	  intuitive	  guessing	  of	  natural	  
processes:	  ‘It	  is	  certain	  that	  the	  only	  hope	  of	  retroductive	  reasoning	  ever	  reaching	  
the	  truth	  is	  that	  there	  may	  be	  some	  natural	  tendency	  toward	  an	  agreement	  
between	  the	  ideas	  which	  suggest	  themselves	  to	  the	  human	  mind	  and	  those	  which	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are	  concerned	  in	  the	  laws	  of	  nature’	  (CP,	  [1896],	  1.81).76	  For	  Peirce	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  
only	  through	  this	  intuitive	  guessing	  new	  insights	  can	  be	  gained	  and	  until	  now	  ‘the	  
well-­‐prepared	  mind	  has	  wonderfully	  soon	  guessed	  each	  secret	  of	  nature’	  (CP,	  [1908],	  
6.476).	  Peirce	  suggested	  that	  this	  must	  be	  due	  to	  an	  inherent	  link	  between	  the	  two.	  
To	  be	  creative	  therefore	  includes	  being	  a	  good	  observer	  of	  one’s	  environment	  and	  
to	  seize	  on	  the	  unusual	  and	  unexpected.	  Cabot	  shared	  this	  opinion	  and	  suggested	  to	  
acknowledge	  this	  mutuality	  more	  strongly:	  ‘We	  take	  the	  credit	  but	  the	  impetus	  and	  
suggestion	  is	  forever	  flowing	  in	  from	  an	  endless,	  dazzling	  flight	  of	  objects	  of	  beauty	  
or	  curiosity.’	  (Kaag,	  2011,	  193).	  
Among	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  artists	  were	  many	  who	  followed	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  
the	  Romantics	  and	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  Enlightenment’s	  gross	  misconception	  of	  
man’s	  superiority	  over	  nature	  was	  leading	  to	  alienation,	  exploitation	  and	  destruction.	  
Instead	  the	  Romantics	  advocated	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  beauty	  of	  nature	  and	  
assumed	  that	  humans	  could	  experience	  genuine	  emotions	  and	  find	  their	  true	  selves	  
only	  in	  nature.	  Many	  of	  these	  notions	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  persisted	  and	  influenced	  
Modernist	  artists.	  Breton,	  Arp	  and	  Richter	  all	  came	  to	  regard	  the	  use	  of	  chance	  as	  a	  
way	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  artist	  as	  sole	  creator	  should	  be	  questioned.	  
Short	  explains	  Arp’s	  artistic	  agenda	  as	  follows:	  ‘Arp’s	  recourse	  to	  chance	  [was	  
meant]	  to	  reveal	  the	  elementary	  forms	  of	  nature,	  and	  his	  almost	  mystical	  resolve	  
[was]	  to	  simplify	  life	  and	  artistic	  expression	  –	  to	  merge	  art	  into	  nature’	  (Short,	  2001,	  
101).	  For	  Arp	  the	  law	  of	  chance	  was	  the	  most	  fundamental	  one	  of	  all	  and	  he	  
described	  it	  as	  the	  urgrund	  from	  which	  all	  life	  ultimately	  arises.	  By	  inviting	  it	  into	  
one’s	  creative	  process,	  the	  artist	  could	  connect	  with	  nature	  on	  the	  deepest	  level	  and	  
through	  the	  unification	  of	  man’s	  and	  nature’s	  creative	  forces	  bring	  something	  forth	  
that	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  individual	  alone.	  This	  interplay	  has	  found	  its	  most	  alluring	  
expression	  in	  the	  Aeolian	  harp.	  As	  one	  of	  man’s	  inventions	  it	  sprung	  from	  the	  
imagination,	  but	  can	  only	  be	  played	  through	  the	  forces	  of	  nature.	  The	  pieces	  it	  plays	  
are	  due	  to	  chance	  and	  the	  effect	  it	  has	  on	  us	  is	  drawn	  from	  the	  ‘harmony	  [of]	  the	  
outer	  motion	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  inner	  emotion	  of	  man’	  (Cashford,	  2010,	  7).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Peirce	  also	  wrote	  about	  the	  abductive	  moment:	  ‘sit	  down	  and	  listen	  to	  the	  voice	  of	  nature	  until	  you	  
catch	  the	  tune	  …	  The	  invention	  of	  the	  right	  hypothesis	  requires	  genius	  –	  an	  inward	  garden	  of	  
ideas	  that	  will	  furnish	  the	  true	  pollen	  for	  the	  flowers	  of	  observation’	  (in	  Ibri,	  2009,	  298).	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Since	  Surrealism’s	  goal	  was	  the	  fusion	  of	  opposite	  states,	  it	  also	  included	  the	  
one	  between	  man	  and	  nature	  by	  breaking	  down	  the	  barrier	  between	  subject	  and	  
object	  more	  generally.	  Objective	  chance	  became	  such	  a	  crucial	  concept	  for	  Breton	  
because	  he	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  had	  the	  power	  to	  do	  so.	  He	  hypothesised	  
that	  it	  describes	  the	  ‘manifestation	  of	  external	  necessity	  as	  it	  makes	  a	  way	  into	  the	  
human	  unconscious	  (Breton,	  1978,	  245).	  It	  describes	  the	  brief	  moment	  when	  the	  
ego	  is	  released	  from	  its	  watcher’s	  place,	  where	  the	  inner	  and	  outer	  merge	  in	  order	  
to	  partake	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  reality	  greater	  than	  oneself.	  Arp	  wrote	  more	  
directly	  about	  his	  concern	  with	  dissolving	  the	  artificial	  division	  that	  had	  been	  created	  
between	  art	  and	  nature.	  He	  argued	  that	  both	  are	  ultimately	  coming	  from	  the	  same	  
source	  and	  chance	  is	  nature’s	  expression	  of	  this	  otherwise	  inaccessible	  order.	  By	  
using	  chance	  in	  one’s	  work,	  nature	  could	  be	  incorporated	  in	  cultural	  products.	  
Richter	  similarly	  regarded	  chance	  as	  part	  of	  nature’s	  language	  and	  by	  the	  contingent	  
coming	  together	  with	  design,	  the	  particular	  union	  that	  characterises	  human	  life	  can	  
be	  mirrored	  in	  art.	  	  
It	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  that	  around	  the	  time	  Jung	  developed	  his	  ideas	  
on	  synchronicity,	  he	  also	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  psychoid.	  He	  described	  it	  as	  
the	  deepest,	  inaccessible	  region	  of	  the	  psyche,	  that	  layer	  of	  the	  unconscious	  where	  
the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  intersect	  thus	  suggesting	  that	  they	  are	  inherently	  
connected.	  Yiassemides	  explains	  its	  relationship	  to	  synchronicity:	  ‘However,	  unlike	  
the	  psychoid,	  which	  cannot	  be	  made	  fully	  conscious,	  synchronicity	  is	  observable.	  
Thus,	  it	  can	  demonstrate	  by	  analogy	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  psychoid’	  (Yiassemides,	  2014,	  
46).	  For	  Jung	  the	  collective	  unconscious	  and	  the	  archetypes	  are	  more	  part	  of	  nature	  
than	  man	  and	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  psychoid	  they	  begin	  to	  directly	  transition	  into	  the	  
physical	  realm	  of	  nature.	  Main	  explains:	  	  
	  
the	  psychoid	  factor	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  synchronicity	  is	  the	  archetype	  […].	  
Archetypes	  provide	  the	  shared	  meaning	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  two	  events	  are	  
considered	  to	  be	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  synchronicity.	  They	  cannot	  be	  
determined	  with	  precision	  and	  are	  capable	  of	  expressing	  themselves	  in	  
physical	  as	  well	  as	  psychic	  processes.	  They	  manifest	  their	  meaning	  through	  
whatever	  psychic	  and	  physical	  content	  is	  available,	  but	  might	  equally	  well	  




Since	  the	  archetype	  can	  manifest	  in	  the	  mental	  as	  well	  as	  the	  material	  realm,	  it	  lies	  
at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  synchronistic	  experience	  and	  in	  turn	  synchronicities	  make	  the	  
strong,	  direct	  and	  inherent	  bond	  between	  man	  and	  nature	  visible.	  In	  this	  way	  
chance	  is	  used	  to	  show	  that	  actually	  no	  clear	  line	  can	  be	  drawn	  between	  the	  two,	  
between	  subject	  and	  object.	  	  
	  
	  
2.2.	  Calling	  for	  a	  More	  Holistic	  Worldview	  
	  
In	  Peirce,	  Jung	  and	  Breton	  one	  finds	  concepts	  of	  wholeness	  or	  oneness,	  
which	  today	  would	  be	  described	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  order	  of	  ‘holistic	  worldviews’.	  
These	  worldviews	  conflict	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  clockwork	  universe	  governed	  by	  strict	  
cause	  and	  effect.	  The	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  chance	  as	  well	  as	  creativity	  
will	  be	  more	  clearly	  linked	  to	  holism:	  ‘In	  the	  future,	  radical	  creativity	  will	  probably	  
stem	  from	  a	  disengagement	  from	  conceptions	  of	  linear	  time,	  progress	  and	  regress,	  
and	  from	  an	  engagement	  in	  more	  circular	  models.	  One	  thing	  is	  clear:	  our	  concern	  for	  
creativity	  encompasses	  the	  culture	  as	  a	  whole’	  (Pozzi,	  1990,	  151).	  It	  can	  be	  shown	  
that	  their	  descriptions	  of	  wholeness	  are	  all	  linked	  to	  their	  theories	  of	  chance.	  The	  
idea	  of	  a	  greater	  reality	  existing	  within	  or	  beyond	  the	  visible	  world	  is	  an	  ancient	  one	  
and	  has	  persisted	  over	  time	  and	  in	  different	  traditions.	  This	  idea	  is	  therefore	  known	  
under	  many	  names	  such	  as	  the	  Absolute,	  the	  Source,	  the	  One,	  Monad,	  Logos,	  
Nirvana,	  Tao,	  Brahman	  or	  Teotl.	  They	  all	  describe	  a	  unified	  reality	  beyond	  the	  
fragmentation	  of	  everyday	  experience	  and	  where	  everything	  is	  interconnected.	  
Mind	  and	  matter,	  subject	  and	  object,	  time	  and	  space	  are	  no	  longer	  perceived	  as	  
separate	  and	  opposite,	  but	  as	  parts	  of	  a	  larger	  whole.	  	  	  
In	  Reply	  to	  the	  Necessitarians	  Peirce	  stated	  the	  following:	  ‘I	  carefully	  
recorded	  my	  opposition	  to	  all	  philosophies	  which	  deny	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  Absolute,	  
and	  asserted	  that	  the	  one	  intelligible	  theory	  of	  the	  universe	  is	  that	  of	  objective	  
idealism,	  that	  matter	  is	  effete	  mind’	  (CP,	  [1891],	  6.605).	  He	  loosely	  borrowed	  the	  
term	  ‘objective	  idealism’	  from	  Schelling	  and	  defined	  it	  in	  the	  Century	  Dictionary	  as	  
‘the	  opinion	  that	  nature	  and	  the	  mind	  have	  such	  a	  community	  as	  to	  import	  to	  our	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guesses	  a	  tendency	  toward	  the	  truth,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  they	  require	  the	  
confirmation	  of	  empirical	  evidence’	  (Brent,	  1998,	  205).77	  It	  was	  after	  Peirce	  had	  a	  
mystical	  experience	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1892	  that	  he	  began	  to	  describe	  himself	  as	  an	  
objective	  idealist.	  From	  then	  on	  he	  advocated	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  both	  the	  material	  
realm	  and	  the	  realm	  of	  ideas	  are	  equally	  real.	  Britton	  elaborates	  on	  this	  point	  as	  
follows:	  	  
	  
And	  his	  pragmatism	  could	  make	  nothing	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  
phenomenal	  and	  the	  noumenal	  worlds;	  for	  him,	  the	  world	  which	  is	  open	  to	  
observation,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  is	  the	  real	  and	  only	  world.	  Peirce	  had	  
therefore	  to	  seek	  another	  explanation	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  duty	  and	  freedom,	  
and	  this	  he	  found	  in	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  chance.	  It	  is	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  same	  
hypothesis	  that	  he	  explains	  the	  tendency	  of	  nature	  to	  produce	  order,	  and,	  
especially,	  mind;	  all	  nature	  shows	  the	  beginnings	  of	  mind,	  and	  the	  real	  world	  
is	  a	  “mental	  continuum.”	  Peirce's	  tychism	  (the	  doctrine	  of	  chance)	  is	  thus	  the	  
solution	  to	  a	  problem	  in	  idealist	  philosophy	  for	  one	  who	  could	  not	  accept	  the	  
“hypothesis	  of	  freedom”	  in	  a	  noumenal	  world;	  it	  is	  Peirce's	  substitute	  for	  
Schelling's	  “transcendental	  self”	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  action	  
(Britton,	  1938,	  445).	  
	  
For	  Peirce	  the	  Absolute	  is	  inherent	  in	  reality	  and	  certain	  events,	  chance	  encounters	  
among	  them,	  can	  make	  it	  experienceable.	  	  
Breton	  similarly	  believed	  that	  the	  Absolute	  can	  be	  experienced	  and	  
Surrealism	  was	  intended	  to	  do	  nothing	  less	  than	  to	  facilitate	  that.	  Based	  on	  Hegel’s	  
concept	  of	  the	  Absolute,	  Breton	  devised	  the	  term	  ‘surreality’	  in	  order	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  
state	  of	  wholeness	  where	  opposites	  have	  merged.	  In	  his	  First	  Manifesto	  Breton	  
described	  Surrealism	  as	  ‘based	  on	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  superior	  reality	  of	  certain	  forms	  
of	  previously	  neglected	  associations’	  (Breton,	  1972,	  26).	  Through	  surrealist	  activities	  
the	  Absolute	  should	  be	  made	  accessible	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  with	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  
making	  this	  heightened	  state	  of	  awareness	  the	  new	  normal	  condition	  of	  
consciousness.	  Rosemont	  explains	  that	  the	  very	  term	  was	  intended	  to	  describe	  this:	  
‘an	  extension	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  reality	  –	  more	  precisely,	  an	  expanded	  awareness	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  ‘This	  idealism,	  when	  misunderstood	  as	  subjective	  idealism,	  leads	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  incompatibility	  with	  
realism,	  for	  how	  could	  reality,	  grounded	  on	  subjectivity,	  as	  proclaimed	  by	  Berkeley	  and	  Fichte,	  for	  
example,	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  independent	  of	  thought	  and	  language?	  Nevertheless,	  here,	  Peirce’s	  
realism	  and	  idealism	  are	  doctrines	  that	  interlock	  and	  complement	  each	  other’	  (Ibri,	  2009,	  293).	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reality.	  It	  demonstrates	  not	  only	  the	  continuity	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  reality	  
but	  their	  essential	  unity’	  (Rosemont,	  1978,	  24).	  For	  Breton,	  like	  for	  Peirce	  and	  Jung,	  
the	  experience	  of	  chance	  posits	  the	  possibility	  of	  experiencing	  a	  ‘fusion	  of	  necessity	  
and	  freedom,	  of	  reality	  and	  desire’	  and	  like	  no	  other	  phenomenon	  it	  constitutes	  ‘a	  
reconciliation	  of	  opposites	  in	  the	  surreel’	  (Browder,	  1967,	  107).	  In	  an	  interview	  in	  
1941	  Breton	  therefore	  continued	  to	  encourage	  the	  exploration	  of	  objective	  chance,	  
this	  ‘centre	  of	  conciliation	  for	  natural	  and	  human	  necessity	  –	  point	  of	  revelation,	  
pivot	  of	  liberty'	  (Breton,	  1987,	  203-­‐4).	  
In	  Jung’s	  writing	  wholeness	  finds	  expression	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  unus	  
mundus,	  which	  translates	  as	  ‘one	  world.’	  While	  for	  Peirce	  and	  Breton	  the	  Absolute	  is	  
contained	  within	  this	  reality,	  for	  Jung	  it	  ultimately	  remains	  beyond	  it.	  Yet	  although	  it	  
is	  ultimately	  unfathomable,	  in	  rare	  circumstances	  of	  transcendence	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  
oneness	  can	  be	  glimpsed.	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Jung,	  wholeness	  is	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  health.	  […]	  While	  
wholeness	  cannot	  be	  actively	  sought	  or	  pursued	  per	  se,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  
how	  often	  life’s	  experience	  has	  that	  end	  as	  its	  secret	  goal.	  The	  connection	  
with	  creativity	  underlines	  that	  wholeness	  (and	  health)	  are	  relative	  terms,	  
distinguishable	  from	  normality	  or	  conformism	  (Samuels,	  et.	  al.,	  1986,	  160).	  	  
	  
In	  the	  unus	  mundus	  the	  distinction	  between	  opposites	  no	  longer	  exists	  and	  even	  
though,	  on	  the	  level	  of	  actuality,	  this	  state	  cannot	  be	  maintained,	  it	  remains	  the	  
ideal	  the	  Self	  is	  striving	  for.	  On	  the	  whole	  the	  process	  of	  individuation,	  or	  self-­‐
creation,	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  wish	  to	  re-­‐enter	  a	  state	  of	  oneness.	  Synchronicity,	  as	  well	  
as	  alchemy,	  brought	  Jung	  to	  think	  about	  the	  unus	  mundus	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  He	  for	  
example	  wrote:	  ‘This	  [synchronistic]	  principle	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  an	  inter-­‐
connection	  or	  unity	  of	  causally	  unrelated	  events,	  and	  thus	  postulates	  a	  unitary	  
aspect	  of	  being	  which	  can	  very	  well	  be	  described	  as	  the	  unus	  mundus’	  (CW14,	  [1955-­‐
6],	  662).	  It	  led	  him	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  not	  only	  an	  intrapsychic	  union	  between	  
consciousness	  and	  the	  unconscious,	  but	  also	  a	  bond	  between	  body	  and	  mind	  and	  on	  
an	  even	  larger	  scale,	  between	  man	  and	  nature.	  	  
For	  Jung,	  synchronicity	  is	  not	  only	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  unus	  
mundus,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  represents	  a	  way	  through	  which	  oneness	  can	  briefly	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be	  experienced.	  Synchronicity	  emphasises	  the	  underlying	  relationship	  between	  all	  
expressions	  of	  creation,	  with	  man	  only	  constituting	  one	  part	  within	  this	  wider	  
network.	  All	  our	  actions,	  therefore,	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  this	  web	  and	  it	  remains	  our	  
responsibility	  to	  value	  and	  respect	  all	  of	  the	  other	  elements	  of	  creation,	  because	  we	  
ultimately	  depend	  on	  the	  health	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  When	  Jung	  referred	  to	  
the	  Chinese	  concept	  of	  Tao,	  he	  explained	  that	  ‘[t]he	  realisation	  of	  Tao’	  means	  ‘being	  
in	  a	  sort	  of	  synchronistic	  relation	  with	  everything	  else;	  …	  and	  that	  is	  the	  general	  
mystical	  experience,	  the	  coincidence	  of	  the	  individual	  condition	  with	  the	  universe,	  
so	  that	  the	  two	  become	  undistinguishable’	  (Jung,	  1998,	  608).	  Since	  synchronistic	  
experiences	  remind	  the	  experiencer	  of	  this	  unity,	  they	  also	  contain	  the	  potential	  to	  




3.	  The	  Archetypal	  Struggle	  between	  Chaos	  and	  Order	  
	  
All	  previous	  parts	  have	  shown	  that	  a	  discussion	  of	  chance	  and	  creativity	  
almost	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  the	  broader	  theme	  of	  how	  chaos	  relates	  to	  order.	  In	  Part	  I	  
on	  creation	  myths,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  since	  ancient	  times	  there	  are	  two	  basic	  
approaches	  to	  chaos.	  The	  first	  regards	  it	  as	  randomness	  and	  the	  exact	  opposite	  to	  
order.	  As	  such	  it	  is	  considered	  an	  undesirable	  state,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  overcome	  
and	  supplanted	  by	  regularity.	  The	  other	  recognises	  chaos	  as	  the	  realm	  of	  infinite	  
possibilities,	  containing	  the	  potential	  for	  something	  new	  and	  meaningful	  to	  emerge.	  
While	  in	  the	  former	  order	  and	  chaos	  are	  perceived	  as	  a	  pair	  of	  opposites,	  in	  the	  
latter	  the	  two	  are	  connected	  through	  a	  dynamic	  relationship.	  In	  the	  West,	  chaos	  has	  
been	  more	  often	  regarded	  in	  the	  former	  sense	  with	  all	  its	  negative	  connotations.	  At	  
least	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  philosophy,	  the	  sciences	  and	  art	  
predominantly	  accentuated	  structures	  of	  order	  and	  harmony	  in	  nature,	  as	  well	  as	  
culture.	  Yet,	  together	  with	  the	  reconceptualisation	  of	  chance,	  chaos	  also	  
experienced	  a	  re-­‐evaluation	  and	  has	  since	  then	  more	  widely	  been	  understood	  to	  





3.1.	  The	  Vitality	  of	  Chaos	  
	  
Peirce	  was	  among	  the	  first	  modern	  thinkers	  to	  declare	  that	  the	  predominant	  
scientific	  view	  needs	  to	  be	  revised.	  He	  argued	  that	  order	  cannot	  generate	  more	  
order	  but	  that	  it	  must	  grow	  out	  of	  disorder.	  Even	  though	  his	  writings	  received	  little	  
notice	  during	  his	  lifetime,	  in	  retrospect	  his	  foresight	  should	  be	  fully	  appreciated.	  For	  
Peirce	  chance	  played	  the	  decisive	  factor	  in	  bringing	  this	  movement	  about	  when	  he	  
hypothesised:	  ‘in	  that	  original	  chaos	  there	  happened,	  by	  chance,	  to	  be	  a	  tendency	  
toward	  uniformity,	  a	  tendency	  of	  things	  to	  take	  habits.	  And	  this	  habit-­‐taking	  
tendency	  grew	  ever	  stronger	  until	  we	  get	  the	  emergence	  of	  law	  as	  we	  know	  it’	  (CP,	  
[1898],	  6.200).	  Based	  on	  this	  hypothesis,	  he	  boldly	  declared	  that	  ‘the	  idea	  that	  
chance	  begets	  order,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  corner-­‐stones	  of	  modern	  physics’	  (CP,	  [1893],	  
6.297).	  At	  the	  time	  this	  was	  still	  a	  radical	  view	  and	  was	  not	  shared	  by	  many	  other	  
thinkers.	  	  
While	  Peirce	  was	  interested	  in	  explaining	  the	  emergence	  of	  natural	  laws,	  
around	  the	  same	  time	  Henri	  Poincaré	  discovered	  that:	  ‘It	  may	  happen	  that	  small	  
differences	  in	  the	  initial	  condition	  produce	  very	  great	  ones	  in	  the	  final	  phenomena.	  
A	  small	  error	  in	  the	  former	  will	  produce	  an	  enormous	  error	  in	  the	  latter.	  Prediction	  
becomes	  impossible,	  and	  we	  have	  the	  fortuitous	  phenomenon’	  (Best&Kellner,	  1997,	  
128).	  Although	  these	  early	  intuitions	  existed,	  they	  only	  came	  to	  fruition	  around	  sixty	  
years	  later	  when	  Edward	  Lorenz	  discovered	  the	  chaotic	  in	  complex	  systems	  through	  
his	  work	  on	  weather	  prediction.	  Today	  these	  dynamics	  are	  studied	  in	  chaos	  theory	  
and	  ‘like	  quantum	  mechanics,	  chaos	  theory	  is	  a	  dynamic	  view	  of	  reality,	  one	  that	  
understands	  the	  behaviour	  of	  matter	  to	  be	  often	  complex	  and	  unpredictable’	  (ibid.,	  
219).	  Today	  scientists	  distinguish	  between	  chaos	  and	  ‘noise’,	  whereby	  the	  former	  is	  
considered	  to	  be	  structured	  by	  underlying	  patterns:	  	  	  
	  
Examining	  indeterminacies,	  seeming	  randomness,	  chance,	  and	  disorder	  
reveals	  new	  forms	  of	  order,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  disorder	  and	  order	  could	  coexist.	  
Thus,	  precisely	  the	  focus	  on	  chaos	  and	  complexity	  enabled	  scientists	  to	  see	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hitherto	  unknown	  patterns,	  new	  structures,	  new	  forms	  of	  order,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  ways	  that	  disorder	  contained	  implicit	  order	  (ibid.,	  220).	  
	  
The	  idea	  that	  order,	  chaos,	  chance	  and	  creation	  are	  interconnected	  in	  a	  complex	  and	  
dynamic	  system	  has	  thus	  achieved	  scientific	  acceptance	  and	  has	  become	  of	  great	  
significance	  in	  how	  we	  interpret	  the	  world	  today.	  The	  physicist	  Joseph	  Ford	  once	  
described	  the	  major	  scientific	  shifts	  of	  our	  time	  as	  follows:	  ‘Relativity	  eliminated	  the	  
Newtonian	  illusion	  of	  absolute	  time	  and	  space;	  quantum	  theory	  eliminated	  the	  
Newtonian	  dream	  of	  a	  controllable	  measurement	  process;	  and	  chaos	  eliminates	  the	  
Laplacian	  fantasy	  of	  deterministic	  probability’	  (Gleick,	  1996,	  6).	  
It	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  that	  both	  Peirce	  and	  Jung	  identified	  chance	  as	  
the	  agent	  through	  which	  order	  sprang	  from	  the	  state	  of	  primordial	  chaos.	  Jung	  
described	  it	  as	  a	  creative	  act	  and	  a	  deep	  connection	  between	  chance,	  creativity,	  
order	  and	  chaos	  can	  therefore	  be	  established.	  In	  fact,	  chance	  and	  creativity	  are	  both	  
agencies	  mediating	  between	  chaos	  and	  order,	  between	  potentiality	  and	  actuality.	  
Potentialities	  are	  infinite	  and	  if	  anything,	  more	  potentialities	  arise	  with	  every	  new	  
moment	  of	  growth.	  Creativity	  can	  be	  an	  unconscious	  or	  conscious	  activity	  and	  
similarly	  chaos	  is	  not	  only	  experienced	  on	  an	  external	  level,	  but	  on	  an	  internal	  one	  as	  
well.	  The	  unstructured,	  disorienting	  and	  overwhelming	  nature	  of	  the	  chaotic	  state	  of	  
mind	  is	  usually	  described	  as	  uncomfortable	  and	  hard	  to	  bear	  for	  very	  long.	  Chaos	  
thus	  seems	  to	  be	  almost	  too	  much	  for	  human	  comprehension,	  which	  is	  why	  it	  might	  
be	  often	  feared.	  The	  instinctual	  response	  is	  to	  overcome	  it	  by	  turning	  it	  into	  
manageable	  chunks	  through	  ordering,	  categorising	  and	  labelling	  parts	  of	  the	  
homogenous	  mass.	  	  
The	  unconscious	  itself	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  the	  internal	  chaotic	  realm	  and	  the	  
ego	  takes	  on	  the	  role	  of	  an	  organising	  principle,	  in	  order	  to	  not	  be	  overwhelmed	  by	  
too	  many	  thoughts	  or	  impressions	  at	  once.	  Through	  the	  lowering	  of	  consciousness	  
as	  it	  happens	  in	  dreams,	  hallucinations,	  automatism,	  hypnosis	  or	  meditation,	  this	  
primordial	  realm	  can	  be	  accessed	  and	  new	  and	  unfamiliar	  contents	  retrieved.	  Jung	  
considered	  it	  valuable	  that	  consciousness	  and	  the	  unconscious	  are	  in	  
communication	  with	  each	  other	  and	  advocated	  that:	  ‘the	  chaotic	  life	  of	  the	  
unconscious	  should	  be	  given	  the	  chance	  of	  having	  its	  way	  too	  –	  as	  much	  as	  we	  can	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stand.	  This	  means	  open	  conflict	  and	  open	  collaboration	  at	  once’	  (CW	  9i,	  [1939],	  
522).	  Since	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  creative	  process	  are	  influenced	  by	  elements	  of	  the	  
unconscious,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  chaos	  plays	  an	  important	  part	  in	  it	  too.	  Runco	  therefore	  
draws	  connections	  between	  chaos	  theory	  and	  creativity:	  	  
	  
As	  Gleick	  (1987)	  put	  it,	  “to	  some	  physicists	  chaos	  is	  a	  science	  of	  process	  
rather	  than	  a	  state,	  a	  becoming	  rather	  than	  being.”	  That	  applies	  well	  to	  
creativity.	  Indeed,	  the	  creative	  process	  frequently	  appears	  to	  be	  chaotic,	  but	  
there	  may	  be	  order	  in	  the	  disorder.	  Gleick	  noted	  that	  structure	  and	  order	  
and	  meaning	  may	  be	  “masquerading	  as	  randomness”.	  Creative	  ideas	  that	  
come	  out	  of	  nowhere	  that	  reflect	  intuition	  or	  a	  huge	  leap,	  may	  in	  fact	  merely	  
reflect	  chaos	  at	  work	  within	  our	  thinking	  (2006,	  393).	  
	  
Some	  of	  Mallarmé’s	  poems	  reveal	  that	  he	  struggled	  with	  his	  fear	  of	  being	  
overwhelmed	  by	  chaos.	  He	  knew	  that	  irregularity	  can	  never	  entirely	  be	  eradicated	  
and	  that	  chaos	  will	  remain	  a	  fact	  of	  life,	  but	  he	  kept	  pondering	  how	  it	  could	  best	  be	  
kept	  at	  bay.	  For	  him	  writing	  poetry	  constituted	  one	  way	  of	  finding	  relief,	  because	  it	  
constituted	  a	  powerful	  ordering	  technique	  through	  which	  the	  unstructured	  could	  be	  
confined	  within	  the	  clear	  cut	  boundaries	  of	  the	  page.	  Hans	  Richter	  similarly	  wrestled	  
with	  the	  unsettling	  experience	  of	  the	  chaotic	  and	  the	  contingent	  that	  springs	  from	  it.	  
In	  his	  poem	  Chaos	  he	  described	  his	  ambivalence	  towards	  it:	  	  
	  
Gottfried	  Benn,	  the	  German	  poet,	  declared	  	  
That	  the	  whole	  cosmos	  is	  the	  total	  Chaos	  per	  se	  –	  	  
no	  law	  and	  order	  there,	  but	  chance.	  	  
Where	  do	  we	  stand?	  
If	  Chaos	  is	  the	  mother	  of	  chance	  it	  is	  also	  	  
the	  father	  of	  infinite	  order.	  	  
Man	  is	  the	  expression	  of	  universal,	  organic,	  social	  
and	  personal	  formative	  tendencies	  in	  a	  world	  of	  accidents.	  
Chaos	  attracts	  the	  desperate	  and	  the	  weak,	  	  
the	  ones	  giving	  up	  hope	  –	  or	  the	  ones	  gaining	  hope	  from	  	  
destruction.	  	  
It	  is	  the	  abyss	  to	  jump	  into,	  	  
The	  ladder	  without	  rungs,	  	  
The	  dream	  of	  final	  dissolution	  
Or	  is	  it	  a	  fact	  …	  as	  inconceivable	  as	  eternity?	  
	  
But	  whatever	  it	  might	  be	  we	  have	  to	  face	  it	  
and	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  it.	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There	  must	  be	  a	  place	  for	  it	  in	  our	  lives	  
and	  deeds	  	  
and	  words	  
and	  behaviour	  
Even	  if	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  it	  we	  have	  to	  play	  the	  game.	  
We	  have	  to	  study	  its	  rhythm	  
make	  use	  of	  its	  hints	  
Swing	  with	  it	  –	  incorporate	  it	  –	  be	  it!	  	  
And	  still	  go	  on	  purposefully	  with	  our	  life	  in	  a	  precarious	  balance	  
There	  is	  no	  Chaos	  if	  we	  are	  part	  of	  it.	  (Watts,	  1980,	  133).	  
	  
Even	  though	  chaos	  would	  never	  be	  fully	  comprehensible	  and	  to	  feel	  unsettled	  by	  it	  
remains	  a	  part	  of	  human	  experience,	  Richter	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  lose	  its	  edge	  if	  
one	  played	  according	  to	  its	  rules.	  His	  realisation	  was	  that	  one	  needs	  to	  ‘face	  it,	  come	  
to	  terms	  with	  it,	  to	  play	  the	  game,	  be	  it’,	  to	  go	  with	  its	  flow	  instead	  of	  fighting	  
against	  it	  and	  it	  will	  stop	  posing	  a	  threat.	  Tzara	  simply	  sought	  to	  portray	  moments	  of	  
chaos	  and	  to	  direct	  attention	  to	  this	  state	  in	  all	  its	  confusion	  and	  destruction.	  
Through	  the	  artistic	  representation	  of	  chaos	  he	  also	  wanted	  to	  mirror	  the	  state	  of	  
chaos	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  war.	  He	  wanted	  people	  to	  see	  and	  recognise	  its	  
devastation	  and	  the	  meaninglessness	  and	  despair	  it	  left	  behind.	  Breton,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  did	  not	  want	  to	  dwell	  on	  this	  aspect	  of	  chaos,	  but	  rather	  focus	  on	  its	  potential	  
for	  renewal	  and	  creativity.	  Breton	  especially	  focused	  on	  the	  potentiality	  of	  internal	  
chaos	  and	  he	  in	  fact	  did	  ‘no	  less	  than	  equate	  disorder	  or	  chaos	  with	  the	  purest	  and	  
most	  authentic	  form	  of	  thought’	  (Lejeune,	  2012,	  94).	  Since	  the	  task	  of	  consciousness	  
is	  to	  eradicate	  chaos,	  it	  had	  to	  be	  circumvented	  in	  order	  to	  access	  the	  hidden	  
meaning	  of	  unconscious	  chaos.	  	  
Dada	  and	  Surrealism	  exemplify	  how	  the	  fundamental	  struggle	  between	  
chaos	  and	  order	  finds	  expression	  in	  all	  acts	  of	  creation	  in	  two	  interrelated	  ways:	  ‘to	  
be	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  time	  ‘destructively	  creative’	  (i.e.	  to	  form	  the	  temporal	  world	  
of	  individuation	  and	  becoming,	  a	  process	  destructive	  of	  unity)	  and	  ‘creatively	  
destructive’	  (i.e.	  to	  devour	  the	  illusory	  universe	  of	  individuation,	  a	  process	  involving	  
the	  recreation	  of	  unity)’	  (Bradbury&McFarlane,	  1991,	  445).	  Harvey	  adds	  that	  ‘[t]he	  
image	  of	  ‘creative	  destruction’	  is	  very	  important	  to	  understanding	  modernity	  
precisely	  because	  it	  derived	  from	  the	  practical	  dilemmas	  that	  faced	  the	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implementation	  of	  the	  modernist	  project.	  How	  could	  a	  new	  world	  be	  created,	  after	  
all,	  without	  destroying	  much	  that	  had	  gone	  before?’	  (Harvey,	  1989,	  16).	  
	  
	  
3.2.	  Creating	  New	  Order:	  Logos,	  Mythos	  and	  the	  Importance	  of	  Personal	  
Truth	  
	  
Until	  now	  the	  main	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  chance	  influences	  
the	  creative	  process.	  Yet	  vice	  versa	  it	  also	  requires	  creativity	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  
of	  chance	  encounters.	  In	  fact,	  the	  creative	  meaning-­‐making	  process	  is	  crucial	  in	  how	  
we	  integrate	  chance	  encounters	  into	  our	  lives.	  To	  find	  meaning	  is	  nothing	  less	  than	  
to	  bring	  order	  into	  the	  confusing	  array	  of	  information	  we	  are	  given.	  Jung	  argued	  that	  
there	  are	  two	  ways	  to	  do	  so:	  fantasy	  thinking	  and	  rational	  thinking.	  Fantasy	  thinking	  
is	  primarily	  based	  on	  images	  and	  rational	  thinking	  on	  words.	  While	  the	  former	  is	  
non-­‐linear	  and	  feeling-­‐based,	  where	  images	  ‘float,	  sink	  or	  rise	  according	  to	  their	  
specific	  gravity’	  (CW	  [1912],	  18),	  the	  latter	  is	  ‘adapted	  to	  reality,	  by	  means	  of	  which	  
we	  imitate	  the	  successiveness	  of	  objectively	  real	  things,	  so	  that	  the	  images	  inside	  
our	  minds	  follow	  one	  another	  in	  the	  same	  strictly	  causal	  sequence	  as	  the	  events	  
taking	  place	  outside	  it’	  (ibid.,	  11).	  Myths,	  our	  first	  cultural	  expressions,	  are	  a	  product	  
of	  fantasy	  thinking.	  Philosophy	  and	  science	  only	  emerged	  once	  the	  ability	  of	  directed	  
thinking	  was	  acquired.	  
At	  least	  in	  the	  West,	  logos	  is	  primarily	  based	  on	  linearity	  and	  causality	  and	  
the	  conceptualisation	  of	  information	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  separation	  through	  
dichotomies:	  light	  is	  separated	  from	  darkness,	  heaven	  from	  earth,	  masculine	  from	  
feminine,	  culture	  from	  nature,	  matter	  from	  spirit,	  life	  from	  death,	  being	  from	  not-­‐
being	  and	  so	  forth.	  This	  kind	  of	  ordering	  is	  of	  crucial	  significance	  and	  it	  helps	  us	  
greatly	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  our	  place	  in	  it.	  After	  all,	  
only	  by	  understanding	  that	  there	  is	  a	  separation	  between	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘other’	  do	  we	  
become	  self-­‐conscious.	  Yet	  since	  the	  Enlightenment	  logos	  has	  been	  considered	  as	  
the	  only	  true	  path	  to	  knowledge	  and	  mythos,	  as	  the	  more	  primitive	  way	  of	  making	  
sense	  of	  the	  world,	  was	  to	  be	  supplanted	  by	  it.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  problems	  with	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this	  partial	  focus.	  Firstly,	  we	  have	  become	  too	  preoccupied	  with	  oppositions	  and	  the	  
discovery	  of	  ever	  larger	  and	  smaller	  differentiations.	  While	  it	  helps	  to	  comprehend	  
and	  structure	  reality,	  relying	  on	  it	  too	  one-­‐sidedly	  leads	  us	  into	  perceiving	  the	  world	  
as	  increasingly	  fragmented.	  Since	  the	  psyche’s	  inherent	  drive	  is	  ultimately	  directed	  
towards	  reintegration	  and	  wholeness,	  the	  perception	  of	  fragmentation	  is	  deeply	  
unsettling	  and	  often	  entails	  psychological	  imbalances	  such	  as	  anxiety	  and	  
depression.	  The	  other	  problem	  is	  that	  many	  of	  these	  pairs	  of	  opposites	  have	  been	  
moralised,	  with	  one	  element	  being	  associated	  with	  ‘goodness’	  and	  the	  other	  
consequently	  with	  ‘badness’.	  Light,	  matter,	  the	  masculine	  and	  life,	  for	  example,	  are	  
the	  ones	  holding	  ‘good’	  qualities,	  while	  their	  counterparts	  are	  considered	  negative,	  
frightening	  or	  of	  less	  value.	  Harvey	  therefore	  points	  out:	  ‘The	  difficulty	  under	  
capitalism,	  given	  its	  penchant	  for	  fragmentation	  and	  ephemerality	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  
the	  universals	  of	  monetization,	  market	  exchange,	  and	  the	  circulation	  of	  capital,	  is	  to	  
find	  a	  stable	  mythology	  expressive	  of	  its	  inherent	  values	  and	  meanings’	  (Harvey,	  
1989,	  217).	  
Jung	  already	  argued	  that	  both	  kinds	  of	  thinking	  are	  of	  equal	  importance.	  
They	  are	  two	  different	  ways	  through	  which	  we	  comprehend	  the	  world	  and	  both	  
should	  be	  valued	  for	  what	  they	  are	  in	  themselves,	  instead	  of	  in	  comparison	  to	  each	  
other.	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  best	  way	  to	  understand	  myths	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  human	  role	  in	  
life	  itself.	  It	  might	  well	  be	  said	  that	  what	  defines	  us	  as	  humans	  is	  our	  need	  to	  
imitate	  reality,	  to	  tell	  stories.	  […]	  By	  responding	  to	  the	  mysteries	  of	  the	  world	  
around	  us	  in	  story	  we	  become	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  that	  world.	  We	  fulfil	  our	  
role	  in	  creation	  that	  our	  consciousness	  and	  sense	  of	  plot	  demand	  that	  we	  
fulfil;	  we	  make	  creation	  conscious	  of	  itself	  (Leeming,	  2010,	  xviii-­‐xix).	  
	  
In	  trying	  to	  understand	  unexpected	  and	  seemingly	  illogical	  chance	  encounters,	  
fantasy	  thinking	  can	  prove	  to	  be	  of	  more	  value	  than	  directed	  thinking.	  This	  is	  
because	  it	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  fluidity,	  intuition,	  connection	  and	  personal	  narrative.	  
The	  Surrealists,	  for	  example,	  took	  this	  approach	  and	  sought	  to	  find	  artistic	  creativity	  
and	  deeper	  truths	  in	  the	  chaos	  of	  the	  unconscious	  through	  automatism.	  ‘Reason	  is	  
indeed	  synonymous	  with	  logic	  and	  order,	  and	  in	  negating	  it,	  Breton	  seems	  to	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suggest	  that	  Surrealism	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  with	  illogic	  and	  disorder,	  two	  terms	  
frequently	  associated	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  chance’	  (Lejeune,	  2012,	  94).	  
Furthermore,	  Peirce	  argued	  that	  the	  unique	  guessing	  ability	  of	  abduction,	  
which	  is	  based	  on	  fantasy	  thinking,	  constitutes	  the	  only	  source	  of	  novel	  insight.	  
‘Peirce	  focuses	  on	  the	  ways	  that	  life	  experience	  and	  even	  letting	  the	  mind	  wander	  
can	  be	  part	  of	  argument,	  and	  he	  makes	  a	  case	  for	  an	  early	  stage	  of	  argument	  as	  the	  
only	  time	  when	  new	  knowledge	  is	  created’	  (Newcomb,	  2009,	  58).	  While	  these	  
intuitive	  insights	  are	  highly	  fallible	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  not	  every	  mythos	  will	  flower	  
into	  a	  meaningful	  narrative,	  this	  playful	  and	  unconstrained	  approach	  opens	  one	  up	  
to	  the	  realm	  of	  possibilities.	  Rational	  thinking	  should	  therefore	  not	  be	  the	  only	  
medium	  through	  which	  we	  create	  legitimate	  stories	  around	  personal	  chance	  
encounters,	  because	  ‘[s]ymbolic	  orderings	  of	  space	  and	  time	  provide	  a	  framework	  
for	  experience	  through	  which	  we	  learn	  who	  or	  what	  we	  are	  in	  society’	  (Harvey,	  
1989,	  214).	  This	  symbolic	  ordering	  takes	  the	  shape	  of	  images	  and	  metaphors	  woven	  
into	  personal,	  narrative	  truths.	  Colman	  suggests	  ‘that	  synchronicity	  works	  by	  the	  
same	  process	  by	  which	  metaphor	  operates	  –	  the	  use	  of	  congruence	  between	  two	  or	  
more	  factors	  to	  produce	  a	  meta-­‐meaning	  that	  might	  be	  described	  as	  “emergent”	  or	  
even	  “transcendent”’	  (Colman,	  2011,	  486).	  It	  can	  therefore	  be	  argued	  that	  both	  
share	  the	  same	  process	  of	  meaning-­‐making,	  namely	  by	  playfully	  drawing	  
connections	  that	  are	  non-­‐linear	  and	  based	  on	  association,	  rather	  than	  cause	  and	  
effect.	  The	  fact	  that	  synchronicity	  rests	  on	  how	  creatively	  we	  interpret	  its	  images	  
and	  metaphors	  is	  part	  of	  its	  liberating	  function.	  Metaphorical	  language	  needs	  to	  be	  
‘considered	  not	  as	  the	  figuration,	  but	  as	  the	  transfiguration,	  of	  the	  real.	  Poetry	  and	  
language	  aspire	  to	  transcend	  the	  world	  of	  the	  sense,	  to	  attain	  a	  superreality	  which	  is	  
at	  once	  a	  sublimation	  and	  a	  negation	  of	  human	  and	  terrestrial	  reality’	  (Poggioli,	  
1981,	  197).	  Yet	  the	  negation	  is	  less	  targeted	  at	  the	  perception	  of	  reality	  on	  the	  
whole,	  but	  rather	  the	  one-­‐sided	  view	  gained	  through	  rational	  thinking.	  ‘To	  the	  
surrealist,	  inviting	  the	  intervention	  of	  chance	  through	  verbal	  and	  graphic	  
automatism	  does	  not	  mean	  leaving	  himself	  open	  to	  the	  discordant	  influence	  of	  the	  
haphazard.	  Surrealists	  look	  upon	  the	  participation	  of	  chance	  as	  a	  valid	  means	  to	  
defeat	  the	  purposes	  of	  reason’	  (Matthews,	  1977,	  129).	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Yet	  in	  fact,	  in	  our	  own	  personal	  and	  cultural	  narratives,	  mythos	  and	  logos	  are	  
always	  intricately	  woven	  together,	  because	  if	  we	  want	  it	  or	  not,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  
coherent	  story,	  the	  gaps	  are	  always	  filled	  in	  with	  guesses	  we	  find	  meaningful	  at	  the	  
time.	  What	  is	  therefore	  actually	  required	  is	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  we	  need	  both.	  ‘We	  
now	  understand	  that	  meaning	  and	  change	  are	  both	  created	  and	  discovered,	  both	  
subjectively	  and	  objectively	  determined,	  and	  that	  all	  psychological	  experience	  exists	  
in	  and	  emerges	  from	  a	  bi-­‐directional	  field	  of	  inner-­‐outer,	  self-­‐other’	  (Salman,	  2008,	  
74).	  Ultimately,	  chance	  in	  itself	  is	  neutral	  and	  it	  is	  only	  our	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
event	  that	  decides	  if	  it	  was	  a	  ‘good’	  or	  a	  ‘bad’	  thing	  that	  happened.	  Cabot,	  Jung	  and	  
Breton	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  finding	  significance	  that	  is	  useful	  to	  the	  individual	  
and	  that	  the	  darkest	  moments	  usually	  contain	  the	  largest	  amounts	  of	  hidden	  gold.	  
Metaphysics	  belongs	  to	  the	  order	  of	  fantasy	  thinking.	  It	  remains	  difficult	  to	  
scientifically	  prove	  metaphysical	  theories,	  but	  these	  beliefs	  are	  nevertheless	  the	  
fundamental	  structures	  on	  which	  our	  understanding	  of	  reality	  is	  built.	  It	  has	  been	  
shown	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  chance	  ranges	  from	  causal	  to	  acausal	  
explanations	  and	  that	  these	  underlying	  beliefs	  certainly	  influence	  how	  chance	  
experiences	  are	  conceptualised.	  Yet	  Cabot	  pointed	  out	  that	  its	  metaphysics	  should	  
be	  of	  secondary	  order	  and	  the	  focus	  should	  instead	  be	  on	  the	  practical	  insight	  
chance	  can	  give	  us	  in	  regard	  to	  making	  discoveries,	  creating	  works	  of	  art	  and	  in	  how	  
life	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  more	  meaningful	  generally.	  ‘[C]oincidences	  may	  or	  may	  not	  
be	  connected	  in	  “fact”,	  they	  become	  connected	  by	  being	  organized	  into	  a	  
retrospective	  narrative	  that	  creates	  the	  meaning	  as	  an	  emergent	  phenomenon,	  the	  
whole	  process	  being	  stimulated	  by	  the	  need	  to	  “make	  sense”	  of	  what	  has	  happened’	  




	   	  
‘These	  concepts	  (creativity,	  novelty,	  innovation)	  (or	  at	  least	  these	  words)	  are	  
so	  familiar	  today	  –	  familiar,	  perhaps,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  nausea	  –	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
grasp	  how	  radical	  a	  rupture	  they	  mark	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  thought’	  (Shaviro,	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2009,	  70).	  ‘Chance’	  has	  similarly	  become	  a	  buzzword	  in	  recent	  popular	  and	  academic	  
literature,	  but	  during	  the	  beginnings	  of	  its	  reconceptualisation	  it	  has	  also	  shattered	  
previous	  paradigms.	  This	  study	  has	  sought	  to	  portray	  some	  of	  this	  radicalness,	  by	  
focusing	  on	  the	  period	  in	  history	  when	  age-­‐old	  mainstream	  dogmas	  began	  to	  break	  
up	  and	  when	  the	  world	  experienced	  another	  critical	  shift	  in	  how	  we	  understand	  
such	  fundamental	  concepts	  like	  time,	  space	  and	  consciousness.	  Separate	  from	  each	  
other,	  chance	  and	  creativity	  were	  major	  aspects	  in	  shaping	  this	  shift.	  This	  study	  
focused	  on	  thinkers	  that	  began	  to	  take	  the	  previously	  marginalised	  element	  of	  
chance	  seriously.	  They	  lifted	  it	  out	  of	  the	  shadow	  of	  order	  and	  rationality	  and	  
reinterpreted	  it	  as	  meaningful	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  They	  all	  argued	  that	  chance	  plays	  an	  
important	  part	  in	  the	  human	  experience	  and	  they	  intended	  to	  shine	  a	  light	  on	  this	  
previously	  neglected	  aspect.	  In	  their	  own	  times,	  these	  thinkers’	  views	  on	  chance	  
remained	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  intellectual	  debate,	  with	  most	  of	  their	  
contemporaries	  receiving	  their	  ideas	  with	  suspicion	  and	  caution.	  While	  in	  the	  three	  
main	  analyses	  introduced	  here,	  chance	  and	  creativity	  remain	  discussed	  separately,	  
all	  accounts	  show	  that	  there	  are	  many	  connection	  points.	  Part	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  
thesis	  therefore	  was	  to	  bring	  these	  connection	  points	  to	  the	  surface	  and	  to	  
illuminate	  that	  a	  strong,	  and	  possibly	  inherent,	  relationship	  exists	  between	  the	  two.	  	  
It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  since	  the	  re-­‐integration	  of	  chance	  into	  intellectual	  
debates	  many	  changes	  have	  taken	  place.	  There	  is,	  for	  example,	  a	  recent	  turn	  
towards	  more	  qualitative	  than	  quantitative	  research.	  The	  limits	  of	  rationality	  have	  
been	  recognised.	  Some	  scientists	  advocate	  less	  rigour	  in	  publications,	  so	  that	  room	  
for	  narratives	  of	  serendipity	  can	  form.	  These	  are	  all	  important	  steps,	  but	  again	  they	  
are	  still	  only	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  margins	  and	  even	  though	  these	  issues	  have	  been	  
made	  conscious,	  many	  mental	  habits	  remain	  alive	  in	  us	  today.	  We	  might	  have	  
realised	  where	  we	  need	  to	  be	  more	  open,	  yet	  to	  put	  these	  realisations	  into	  practice	  
is	  a	  slower	  process.	  Conceptualisation	  through	  moral	  dichotomy	  and	  overemphasis	  
on	  rationality	  are	  more	  difficult	  to	  eradicate	  than	  we	  might	  wish	  for.	  	  
Besides,	  the	  mainstream	  drive	  continues	  on	  towards	  the	  unrealistic	  ideal	  of	  
perfection	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ever	  greater	  efficiency,	  unlimited	  economic	  growth	  and	  
boundless	  self-­‐optimisation.	  The	  fallacy	  behind	  this	  drive	  is	  the	  persisting	  belief	  that	  
we	  are	  able	  to	  change	  our	  environment	  as	  well	  as	  ourselves	  according	  to	  conscious	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will.	  With	  increasing	  force	  we	  start	  to	  experience	  the	  backlash	  of	  this	  fallacy	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  climate	  change,	  growing	  mental	  health	  problems,	  economic	  and	  social	  crises	  
and	  religious	  unrest.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  growing	  interest	  in	  chance,	  Watts	  wrote:	  ‘For	  
creative	  and	  rebellious	  minds	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries,	  minds	  
convinced	  that	  Western	  aesthetics	  and	  rationalism	  were	  either	  totally	  discredited,	  
or	  insufficient	  to	  render	  experience	  in	  its	  totality,	  chance	  was	  an	  obvious	  
phenomenon	  to	  which	  to	  turn	  as	  a	  keyhole	  to	  the	  unknown,	  where	  other	  
possibilities	  might	  well	  exist’	  (Watts,	  1980,	  155).	  This	  ambition	  could	  –	  and	  should	  –	  
well	  be	  renewed	  at	  this	  moment	  in	  time.	  Einstein	  once	  said	  that	  problems	  cannot	  be	  
solved	  by	  using	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  thinking	  that	  created	  them.	  We	  can	  therefore	  ask	  
ourselves:	  what	  if	  we	  would	  pause	  and	  take	  a	  moment	  to	  be	  receptive	  to	  what	  is	  
around	  and	  within	  us?	  Would	  we	  notice	  some	  chance	  encounters	  that	  can	  free	  us	  
from	  old	  habits	  and	  inspire	  us	  to	  develop	  unexpected	  and	  novel	  solutions?	  It	  sounds	  
irrational,	  yet	  chance	  is	  irrational	  and	  this	  study	  has	  tried	  to	  show	  that	  it	  quite	  often	  
contains	  some	  hidden	  gold,	  if	  we	  are	  open	  to	  play	  with	  the	  initially	  chaotic	  in	  order	  
to	  turn	  it	  into	  something	  meaningful.	  We	  should	  therefore	  reclaim	  some	  of	  the	  
radicalness	  by	  strengthening	  our	  trust	  in	  the	  significance	  of	  personal	  chance	  
encounters.	  
In	  this	  interdisciplinary	  work	  the	  focus	  lay	  on	  drawing	  attention	  to	  certain	  
patterns	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  chance	  and	  creativity.	  By	  focusing	  on	  
connection	  points	  and	  similarities	  between	  these	  two	  subject	  areas,	  many	  details,	  
intricacies,	  but	  also	  contradictions	  and	  controversies	  have	  been	  left	  out.	  The	  result	  is	  
a	  broad,	  introductory	  overview	  on	  the	  topic	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  behind	  each	  individual	  
discussion	  awaits	  a	  wealth	  of	  further	  interesting	  information.	  Yet	  a	  much	  larger	  work	  
would	  have	  to	  be	  written	  in	  order	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  this	  fascinating	  but	  complex	  topic.	  
Besides	  going	  into	  more	  depth,	  the	  discussion	  could	  also	  be	  broadened	  to	  include	  
the	  voices	  of	  other	  scientists,	  artists	  and	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Emerson,	  
Schopenhauer,	  Pauli,	  Bohm,	  Cage,	  Dick,	  Auster	  and	  Burroughs,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.	  
Furthermore,	  it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  that	  Analytical	  Psychology	  offers	  some	  
fascinating	  starting	  points	  for	  a	  theory	  on	  an	  inherent	  connection	  between	  chance	  
and	  creativity,	  yet	  further	  research	  needs	  to	  be	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  test	  its	  
validity.	  Lastly,	  this	  study	  is	  firmly	  rooted	  within	  a	  Western	  approach	  and	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comparisons	  with	  alternative	  conceptions	  of	  chance	  and	  creativity	  would	  surely	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